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Agreement" or "MSA").l)ecision on Objections to Jurisdiction ~ 12 (July 20, 2006). These measures 
were not adopted at the federalleve1 of the United States government and never received any 
endorsement or approval from Congress. 
One type of measme - enacted by 46 states - purports to directly impose a financial obligation 
upon the deemed "manufacturer" oftobacco products, which could be the actual manufacturer or an 
importer. Relevant state enforcement officials deem such products to have been intended for sale in the 
United States. Id. This so-called "escrow measure" requires deemed "manufacturers" to deposit large 
sums, measured in the millions of dollars, into escrow accounts annually, to be held for 25 years. The 
amount of such escrow deposits purports to be based upon tobacco products allegedly sold within a 
state, ignoring whether or not the location in which the sales were made constituted Indian country. Id. 
Under this escrow measure, a state court may be petitioned to impose an injunction against sales or 
distribution of tobacco product brands manufactured or imported by a defined "manufacturer," as well 
as monetary penalties in addition to payment of escrow payments demanded. Id. at ~~ ]3-] 4. 
These 46 identical state-adopted escrow measures were each amended between 2004 and 2006, 
removing the regional exemption mechanism upon which the Claimants had relied when they 
established their Seneca brand outside of Indian Country by commencing off-reserve sales in 2002. Id. 
at ~~ 15-16. See generally Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and 
Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 8-1] (Nov. 6, 2006). 
Several of the escrow measures have been expressly applied to on-reservation sales, Statement 
of Claimants' Claims Arisiin~ Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share 
Amendments ~~ 81-85; 95-96 (Nov. 6, 2006); while other escrow measures have been explicitly 
applied to off-reserve sales, id. ~~ 78-80; 89-94. See generally id. ~~ 42-43. 
The other measure at issue in this proceeding operates to prohibit distribution of products made 
by a "manufacturer" within any given state, by not listing all brands allegedly produced by a non­
compliant "manufacturer" on that certification list of approved brands and manufacturers ("the 
contraband measure"). A brand can be removed from this certification list (and thereby effectively 
banned) when a State Attorney General (without any requirement of court hearing or review) 
determines that its "manufacturer" has not made allegedly required escrow payments or penalties 
demanded by that state under its escrow measure. See Statement of Claimants' Claims Arisin~ Directly 
Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 45-47 (Nov. 6, 2006). 
Each escrow measure adopted by the affected states permits any deemed "manufacturer" of 
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tobacco products that is the subject of an escrow demand to elect to "join" the MSA. Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction.~ 10 (July 20, 2006). The MSA constitutes a 1997 litigation settlement 
agreement executed betw~:en 46 states and the large tobacco manufacturers they sued in the early 
1990s. Id. ~ 8. This agreement was not approved by and had no sanction from the Congress of the 
United States government. The MSA requires payments to be made by its members into a fund that is 
distributed to the participating states. Id. If a "manufacturer" petitions to join the MSA, it must agree to 
make back-payments alleged as owing under the MSA. Statement ofClaimants' Claims Arising 
Directly Out ofthe Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ~ 10 (Nov. 6, 
2006). 
All of the Claimants' "on-reserve" or "tribal sales" sales were manufactured by GRE on the Six 
Nations of the Grand River Reservation and distributed through NWS, under the Claimants' Seneca 
brand. This Expert understands that Seneca branded products intended for "off-reserve" sales were 
manufactured on the Six Nations of the Grand River Reservation by GRE and that permission for their 
importation by the distributor was granted by NWS, the trademark holder. 
All products manufactured by GRE were shipped 'FOB' Ohsweken, located on the Six Nations 
of the Grand River Reservation, meaning that title and responsibility for these products was deemed by 
the vendor and purchaser to have passed to the purchaser on the Six Nations of the Grand River 
Reservation. See Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and 
Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 33 (Nov. 6,2006). 
Finally, this Expert understands that with respect to the distribution of their own Seneca brand, 
GRE contracted with an independent trucking firm, Walker Transport, to ship all of their production to 
Free Trade Zones located in the United States. This Expert is also informed that GRE shipped all 
Seneca branded products it manufactured using Walker Transport. After picking up the shipment in 
Oshweken, the trucker would take the products to a Free Trade Zone storage facility within the United 
States designated by the purchaser. At all times, GRE was responsible for, and paid, Walker 
Transportation for its services. Accordingly, while title and risk did pass in respect of Seneca branded 
products at the moment they departed GRE's facilities in Oshweken, it was GRE's responsibility to 
arrange and pay for their being delivered to a US FTZ warehouse designated by the purchaser.3 GRE 
did not provide the same shipping arrangements for private label customers, who were responsible for 
This Expert is also infonned that on the occasions when GRE shipped unusually high quantities of Seneca cigarettes to 
its off-reserve distributor, Tobaccoville, GRE arranged for them to be held in a separate, bonded warehouse, to be 
released, as necessary, only upon payment by Tobaccoville. 
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making their own shipping arrangements. 
Questions Addressed 
Professor Clinton has been asked to address the following issues: 
1. At the time of the negotiation and ratification of the 1794 Jay Treaty, would it be fair to say 
that United States ofAmerica understood that it could not, and would not, attempt to assert its 
regulatory jurisdiction over the commercial activities of Haudenosaunee individuals and 
enterprises, which took place in the territory of the United States ofAmerica, as demarcated by 
the terms of the 1794 Jay Treaty and 1814 Treaty of Ghent? If yes, to the best of your 
knowledge, would Haudenosaunee tobacco trading be of a kind of commercial activity 
contemplated by the parties to these treaties the description above? 
2. During the first !half of the 19th century, would it be fair to say that United States ofAmerica 
would have understood that, in good faith observance of the terms of the 1794 Jay Treaty and 
1814 Treaty of Ghent and under its own laws dealing with Indian tribes, that the states 
comprising its Union did not have authority to regulate the commercial activities of 
Haudenosaunee individuals and enterprises in the territory of the United States ofAmerica, as 
demarcated by the terms of those treaties, on the grounds that they were domiciled or otherwise 
resided outside of that territory? 
3. Given both the historical treaty context, and the state of United States federal Indian law 
between 1994 and 2006, please explain whether and how the Claimants, as Haudenosaunee 
tobacco manufacturers and traders, could have reasonably expected that their business would 
not be subjected to the two types of regulatory measure at issue in this dispute (i.e. the state­
government-enacted escrow measures and the effective banning of non-certified brands in each 
state)? 
a. In answering; this question, please indicate whether the Claimants' entitlement to hold 
Page 8 
000684
,.-­
such expe(;tation would differ as between the three categories of their tobacco sales: 
(i)	 Distributed under the Claimants' Seneca brand, on-reservation in the territory of 
the United States; 
(ii)	 Distributed under the Claimants' Seneca brand, off-reservation in the territory of 
the United States; and 
(iii) Third party brands, made under contract, on-reservation in Canada, sold directly 
to unrelated third parties who would import and market such products under their 
own brand labels. 
After setting forth in an initial section the background explaining the historical setting for an the 
negotiation posture of the Haudenosaunee in early treaty negotiations, this Report will proceed to 
address each of these questions sequentially. 
Discussion 
A.	 Background on Indian Treaty Negotiations and the Haudenosaunee 
As one of the earli(~r aboriginal groups in North America contracted by first Dutch and, later, 
British colonial settlement, the Haudenosaunee (People of the Longhouse) played a pivotal role in 
colonial and early American diplomacy. The Haudenosaunee constitute a confederation originally 
composed of five separate aboriginal nations - the Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida, and the 
Seneca nations.4 After being displaced from their southern home, a sixth Iroquoian speaking tribe, the 
Tuscarora, joined their brothers and sisters in the early seventeenth century, albeit not as a full-fledged 
member of the Confederation. Thus, the Haudenosaunee are variously referred in historical sources 
and the literature to as the Iroquois Confederation, the Five Nations or the Six Nations. 
4	 Each of these aboriginal nations employs its own Iroquoian language to name its people. With the single exception of 
the confederation name of Haudenosaunee, this Expert Opinion Report will employ the names traditionally used by the 
English and American colonists for these nations, rather that the nation's own name in its own language. In adopting this 
convention the author intends no disrespect for the native language and the tribal names employed thereby. Rather, the 
names of these nations commonly used by the Anglo-American settlers are used here simply because those names, 
unfortunately, are the names most commonly employed in the historical sources and secondary literature. Thus, to avoid 
confusion regarding the tribal named referenced, the author has employed the names commonly used in such sources. 
Nevertheless, he recognizes that the tribal nation's own name for itself in its own language constitutes the preferable 
reference and would use it here if he did not anticipate that it could cause considerable confusion. 
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Sometime before the advent of major European contact, a leader known as Dekanawida (The 
Great Peacemaker) and his spokesman Hiawatha helped unite the then warring members of the 
Haudenosaunee by creating an oral constitution for the Confederation known as Gayanashagowa (the 
Great Law of Peace). 5 Cell1tral to the Great Law of Peace was an agreement to end all warfare and 
hostilities between the Haudenosaunee.6 The emergence of the Haudenosaunee Confederation created 
a very powerful and united Confederation that controlled most of what is now trans-Allegheny western 
New York to Lake Erie and large portions of western Pennsylvania and Northern Ohio.? Given their 
geo-political position, Haudenosaunee control of trans-Allegheny upstate New York was pivotal to the 
European colonial powers since this powerful Huadenosaunee alliance sat athwart most of the colonial 
trade routes between western tribes and the English and, earlier, Dutch settlers on the east coast of the 
North America and also placed them in a pivotal position during the seventeenth and most of the 
eighteenth century between French settlements in Quebec and the English settlement on the east coast 
of North America. Based on both their military might and their control of pivotal trade routes, all 
European colonial powers who settled in northeastern North America diplomatically courted and 
sought alliances with the Haudenosaunee. This history ofHaudenosaunee diplomacy produced perhaps 
the richest history of Indian treaty understandings in North America between and among the European 
settlers and aboriginal nations.. 
Not surprisingly, these diplomatic exchanges initially were couched in the lingua franca of 
Haudenosaunee understandIngs of political relationships, which, like many Indian tribes, were on­
going, organic, and modeled on metaphoric extensions of the extended kinship and clam relationships 
5	 An English translation of Gayanashagowa (or the Great Law of Peace) is available at 
http://www.humanistictexts.org/dekanawidah.htm 
6	 Id. at ~ ~ I & 2; see generally, S. J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 79 (2000); C, Colden, Cadwallader. 
The History ofthe Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province ofNew-York in America. ( Orignal 1727ed. Repinted 
1958); B. E. Johansen, The Encyclopedia ofNative American Legal Tradition 81-82 (I 998); 
7	 See generally, F. Jennings, Thl: Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation ofIndian Tribes with 
English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (1984). 
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on which most oftheir int,ernal political relationships were organized.8 Thus, to the Haudenosaunee, a 
treaty agreement was not a momentary set of agreements memorialized in a written document, it was, 
rather, an organic and on-going allegiance that bound the parties to continuing reciprocal obligations 
that were periodically rent:wed and refreshed by observance and by periodic diplomatic meetings that 
might be seen as a type of renewal that occurs at a family reunion. While there might be an English 
memorialization of either discussions at such meeting, or, later, of agreements achieved during such 
diplomatic discussions, th(: Haudenosaunee, whose Iroquoian language was oral, rather than written, 
relied upon both their oral tradition of the meetings and wampum belts (ornately decorated belts made 
of wampum shells) to memorialize the relationship. 
Thus, for example,. throughout most of the first half ofthe eighteenth century the Indian 
Commissioners at Albany, New York would periodically meet with representatives of the 
Haudenosaunee to renew and refresh the Covenant Chain that bound the Huadenosaunee to an alliance 
with the British Crown. These meetings were occasions not only renew alliances, but also to hear and, 
sometimes, attempt to redness any source of grievance or harm that might tarnish the Covenant Chain 
that since at least since] 692 metaphorically bound the Haudenosaunee in an alliance with the British 
colonies. The largest fear of the Anglo-American settlers during most of the meetings in the first half 
of the eighteenth century was concern that the Haudenosaunee might be seduced into trade and 
alliances with the French, then in Quebec. 
The basic Haudenosaunee diplomatic position and understanding regarding such alliances was 
reflected in what may be their first, or one oftheir first, major diplomatic alliances with a European 
settler power - the 1613 treaty with the Dutch - the Guswhenta (Two Row Wampum Treaty).9 This 
8	 For an extended discussion of original aboriginal notions of diplomatic relationships. see R. Clinton. C. Goldberg. and 
R. Tosise, American Indian Law: Native Nations and the Federal System 1-13 (5th edit 2006). 
9	 Some sources. perhaps errone:ously, attribute the Two Row Wampum Belt to the 1692 Covenant Chain council with the 
British. For purposes of this Expert Opinion this discrepancy need not be resolved since the basic noninterference 
principle symbolized in the Two Row Wampum Belt Treaty was central Haudenosaunee diplomacy continued 
throughout negotiations with the Dutch. British. and. later, Americans and Canadians. 
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treaty was memorialized by the Two Row Wampum Belt, a replica ofwhich is depicted below: 
The Two Row Wampum Belt is intended to depict the two nations, Haudensaunee and Dutch, 
each traveling in a canoe down their river, shown in purple, in parallel and allied ways, albeit each 
without intersection or interference from the other. 10 G. Peter Jemison, a Faithkeeper at the Cattaraugus 
Reservation of the Seneca Nation, has been quoted in describing the oral tradition surrounding the Two 
Row Wampum Belt as folIows: 
The purple lines represent the Haudenosaunee traveling in their canoe. Parallel to 
them, but not touching, is the path of the boat of the Europeans that came here. 
In our canoe is our way of life, our language, our law and our customs and 
traditions. And in the boat, likewise, are the European language, customs, traditions, and 
law. We have said, "Please don't get out of your boat and try to steer our canoe. And we 
won't get out of our canoe and try to steer your boat." We're going to accept each other 
as sovereign - we'n: going to travel down the river of life together, side by side. II 
These principles of parallel development, mutual support and alliance, but, most importantly, mutual 
non-interference, so graphically captured by the Two Row Wampum Belt, lie at the core of both 
Haudenosaunee diplomacy and their understandings of alliances and diplomatic agreements thereafter 
negotiated. The subsequent diplomatic history supports their understanding. 
British colonial diplomatic discourse with the Haudenosauneee continued this tradition. 12 
Beginning with a treaty council in 1692, the Haudenosaunee described their relationship as being 
bound together in a Covenant Chain that linked them in an alliance for mutual defense and 
10 See Robert A. Williams, Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions ofLaw and Peace, 1600-18004-5,9, 
12,51(1999). 
11 Quoted at http://www.pbs.org/warrior/content/timeline/hero/wampum.html 
12 For excellent surveys of the Haudenosaunee diplomatic relationship with the British, see, F. Jennings, The Ambiguolls 
Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation ofIndian Tribes with English Colonies, from Its Beginnings to the 
Lancaster Treaty of1744 (1984); The History and Culture ofIroquois Diplomacy (F. Jennings, ed. 1985); Beyond the 
Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (D. K .. Richter, and J. H. 
Merrell, eds. , 1981); F. Jenniings, in 115 American Philosophical Society Proceedings 88-96 (Apr 1911). 
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development, albeit independent of one and other at each end of the Covenant Chain. This alliance was 
continually renewed and refreshed by periodic meetings between the Indian Commissioners at Albany, 
New York and the Haudenosaunee. After disgruntled Mohawks declared the Covenant Chain broken in 
1753 on the eve of a decade of conflict commonly known as the French-Indian Wars, the British 
recognized the necessity of safeguarding their critical alliance with the Haudenosaunee. Thereafter the 
British gradually removed responsibility for diplomatic relations with the Haudenosaunee from the 
colonial authorities and vested it in agents of the Crown. This gradual centralization resulted in a 
renewal of the Covenant Chain, the establishment of the British Indian Department in 1755, the 
Proclamation of 1763, and ultimately a trade plan that removed control of the regulation of non-Indians 
who traded with Indians from local colonial authorities and vested in agents of the Crown. 13 
The English victory, in alliance with the Huadenosaunee, during the he French-Indian Wars of 
the second half of the eighteenth century ultimately removed the French from colonial North America. 
This fact temporarily diminished the pivotal geo-political position held by the Haudenosaunee who, 
nevertheless, still controlled major western trade routes important to the northeastern American 
colonies. 
The American Revolution between 1775 and 1783 again renewed the geopolitical importance of 
Haudenosaunee as the ersn.vhile American colonists were pitted against British forces in Canada and 
Great Lakes. Not only did the Haudenosaunee control the western trade routes, they also controlled the 
lands that provided access to each of the belligerent parties between the British forces in Canada and 
the Great Lakes and the Americ:an revolutionary forces in the northeastern American colonies. This 
renewed geo-political importance of the Haudenosaunee would continue until the War of 1812 finally 
ended any possibility of Briitish alliance with the Haudenosaunee against the United States. The results 
of the American Revolution were not entirely happy ones for the Haudenosaunee but provide the 
13	 R. Clinton, The Proclamation of1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries ofFederal-State Conflict Over the 
Management ofIndian Affairs, 69 Boston University Law Review 329-85 (1989) (set forth as Appendix D). 
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background for the important treaty guarantees at issue in this matter. 
The Haudenosaun{:e were bound by the Covenant Chain of friendship to the British colonists 
and therefore the British Crown .. Thus, when the British Crown found itself at war with its own 
colonists, the Haudenosaunee, by virtue of their geographic position, found themselves diplomatically 
courted by both sides. Th~~ir problem, of course, turned on whether their Covenant Chain of friendship 
was with the British colonists or with the British Crown. No self-evident answer to this question 
emerged, resulting in different portions of the Haudenosaunee supporting and even fighting for 
opposite sides in the Revollution. The Oneida, for example, helped provision and assisted General 
Washington including supplying his sick and starving army with com during its difficult winter at 
Valley Forge in 1777-78. 14 By contrast, other portions of the Haudenosaunee, including some of the 
Mohawk and Seneca, sided with and fought along side the British troops.1S Thus, the American 
Revolution not only divided English colonial society in North America, it also split the Huadenosaunee, 
causing them, probably for the first time since its founding, to violate their Great Law of Peace by 
going to war against one another. American success during the Revolution, caused British loyalist 
factions of the Haudenosaunee to flee into present day Canada, a fact that contributed to an artificial 
international boundary ben~een the United States and Canada dividing the erstwhile unified 
Haudenosaunee. The intemational boundary established by the Treaty of Paris of 1783, therefore, 
constituted a dividing line (~stablished by non-Indian communities that, for the most part, the 
Haudenosaunee did not recognize as reflecting any division of their Confederation. 
When the American Revolution was brought to an end through the Treaty of Paris of 1783, 
Great Britain respected the diplomatic autonomy of its Indian allies, leaving each of the Indian nations 
to make separate peace treaties with the newly independent United States government. 16 A number of 
]4 B.A. Mann, George Washington's War on Native America 34 (2005).
 
15 See generally, B.A. Mann, George Washington's War on Native America 34 (2005).
 
]6 F. P. Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians 42 (1984)
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separate such treaties were negotiated and adopted between 1783 and the adoption of the Jay Treaty. 17 
In fact, the United States even directly negotiated a separate peace with some portions of the 
Haudenosauee who had fled into Canada, by which they relinquished their remaining claims to 
ownership of their former lands in New York. IS For present purposes the most important of these 
treaties was the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794 between the United States government and most of the 
Haudenosaunee.19 This treaty recognized Haudenosaunee ownership and control over approximately 6 
million acres (roughly 24,000 km2) of land, primarily in the State ofNew York. In addition to 
reestablishing peace and friendship between the United States and the Haudenosaunee and establishing 
clear political lines demarcating Haudenosaunee territory, Article IV of the treaty expressly provided 
that the: 
United States having thus described and acknowledged what lands belong to the 
Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas and Senekas, and engaged never to claim the same, nor 
to disturb them, or any ofthe Six Nations, or their Indianfriends residing thereon and 
united with them, in the free use and enjoyment thereof 
(Emphasis supplied). The Treaty ofCanandaigua therefore continued the tradition of Haudenosaunee 
diplomacy upon which the Confederation insisted. It involved the reestablishment of friendly and 
peaceable relations in exchange for treaty guarantees of parallel but separate development and political 
noninterference from Euro··American governments. 
The British ultimatdy questioned their policy of leaving their allied Indian nations to separately 
negotiate with the United States because the United States negotiating position involved efforts, not 
always successful, to dictate treaty terms to aboriginal nations, on the ground that having won the 
Revolutionary War, the United States was the victor and the Indian nations, both friend and foe alike, 
17 E.g. Treaty between the United States and the Seneca, Mohawk, Onondaga and Cayuga Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 
15; Treaty between the United States and the Oneida, Tuscorora and Stockbridge Nations, Jan. 21, 1795,7 Stat. 47: 
Treaty between the United States and Cherokee Nations, Nov. 28, 1785 , 7 Stat. 18; Treaty between the United States 
and Cherokee Nations, Feb. 7, 1792,7 Stat. 39; Treaty between the United States and Cherokee Nations, June 26, 1794, 
7 Stat. 43; Treaty between the United States and Choctaw Nation, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21. 
18 Treaty between the United States and the Mohawk Nation of Upper Canada, Mar. 29, 1797, 7 Stat. 61. 
19 Treaty between the United States and the Six Nations, Nov. II, 1794, 7 Stat. 44 
Page 15 
000691
-

constituted "conquered nations.,,2o This policy was widely unpopular with the fanner Indian allies of 
the British and caused so much Indian unrest and discontent that even the United States decided to 
fonnally abandon it in their later diplomacy in the 1790s. Nevertheless, as a direct result of the hostile 
relationships that the policy helped develop between Indian nations and the United States government, 
the British government abandoned the approach it previously took in the Treaty of Paris of 1783 in 
20 For a discussion ofpost-Re:volutionary American diplomacy with Indian tribes, see F. P. Prucha, The Great FatherL The 
United States Government and the American Indians 17-22 (1986); F. P. Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The history 
ofa Political Anomaly 41-1102 (1994). Illustrative of aboriginal resistance to this conquered nation theory of diplomacy 
was the speech of a Cherokee leader at the negotiations of the Treaty of Hopewell with that nation. Corn Tassel 
responded the claims of United States treaty commissioners that his tribe was a conquered nation as follows: 
Suppose, in considering the nature of your claim (and in justice to my nation I shall and will do it freely), 
I were to ask one of you, my brother warriors, under what kind of authority, by what law, or on what 
pretense he makes this exorbitant demand of nearly all the lands we hold between your settlements and 
our towns, as the cement and consideration of our peace. 
Would he tell me that it is by right of conquest? No! Ifhe did, I should retort on him that we had last 
marched over his territory; even up to this very place which he has fortified so far within his former 
limits; nay, that some of our young warriors (whom we have not yet had an opportunity to recall or give 
notice to, of the general treaty) are still in the woods, and continue to keep his people in fear, and that it 
was but till lately that these identical walls were your strongholds, out of which you durst scarcely 
advance. 
If, therefore, a bare march, or reconnoitering a country is sufficient reason to ground a claim to it, we shall 
insist upon transposing the demand, and your relinquishing your settlements on the western waters and 
removing one hundred! miles back towards the east, whither some of our warriors advanced against you in 
the course of last year's campaign. 
Let us examine the facts of your present eruption into our country, and we shall discover your pretensions 
on that ground. What did you do? You marched into our territories with a superior force; our vigilance 
gave us no timely noti,;e ofyour maneuvers; your numbers far exceeded us, and we fled to the stronghold 
of our extensive woods, there to secure our women and children. 
Thus you marched into our towns; they were left to your mercy; you killed a few scattered and 
defenseless individual!., spread fire and desolation wherever you pleased, and returned again to your own 
habitations. If you meant this, indeed, as a conquest you omitted the most essential point; you should have 
fortified the junction of the Holstein and Tennessee rivers, and have thereby conquered all the waters 
above you. But, as all are fair advantages during the existence of a state of war, it is now too late for us to 
suffer for your mishap ofgeneralship! 
Again, were we to inquire by what law or authority you set up a claim, Janswer, none! Your laws extend 
not into our country, nor ever did. You talk of the law of nature and the law of nations, and they are both 
against you. 
Indeed, much has been advanced on the want of what you term civilization among the Indians; and many 
proposals have been made to us to adopt your laws, your religion, your manners and your customs. But, 
we confess that we do not yet see the propriety or practicability of such a reformation, and should be 
better pleased with beholding the good effect of these doctrines in your own practices that with hearing 
you talk about them, or reading your papers to us upon such subjects. 
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leaving each aboriginal nation to separately negotiate its terms with the United States government. 
Therefore, in its later negotiations of the Jay Treaty of 179421 and in the Treaty of Ghent of 181422 
ending the War of 1812, Great Britain expressly negotiated for and received treaty guarantees from the 
government of the United States assuring non-interference with trade and travel in both directions by 
its Indian allies across th{: international border between its Canadian territory and the United States. 
SpecificalIy, Article 3 ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 expressly provided in relevant part: 
It is agreed that it shall at all Times be free to His Majesty's Subjects, and to the Citizens 
of the United Stat4~s, and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said Boundary 
Line freely to pass and repass by Land, or Inland Navigation, into the respective 
Territories and Countries of the Two Parties on the Continent ofAmerica (the Country 
within the Limits of the Hudson's Bay Company only excepted) and to navigate all the 
Lakes, Rivers, and waters thereof, and freely to carryon trade and commerce with each 
other.... 
No Duty of Entry shall ever be levied by either Party on Peltries brought by Land, or 
Inland Navigation into the said Territories respectively, nor shall the Indians passing or 
repassing with their own proper Goods and Effects of whatever nature, pay for the same 
any Impost or Duty whatever. But Goods in Bales, or other large Packages unusual 
among Indians shall not be considered as Goods belonging bona fide to Indians. No 
higher or other Tolls or Rates of Ferriage than what are, or shall be payable by Natives, 
shall be demanded on either side; ... 
These provisions were fully implemented immediately and one historian notes that, as a consequence, 
British trade with the area of the United States known as the Northwest Territory expanded by 50% in 
the period between 1796 and 1798 by virtue of the treaty alone.23 
While the onset of hostilities during the War of 1812 might have been thought to end the legal 
obligations under the Jay Treaty of 1794, particularly since many aboriginal nations allied themselves 
Set forth in Native American Testimony 122-23 (P. Nabokov, ed. 1991). For a history of the central government's brief and 
unsuccessful invocation of the "conquered nation" theory to impose treaty tenns on Indian tribes, see F. P. Prucha, The 
Great Father: The United Stares Government and the American Indians 43-50 (1984) 
21	 The full text of the Jay Treaty of 1794 is set forth at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/jay.htm. 
22 The full text ofthe Treaty ofGhent is set forth at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/ghent.htm 
23	 B. Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805,184 (1955). Since the first United 
States statute implementing the Indian free trade provisions of the 1794 Jay Treaty was not passed until 1799, this 
increase in trade reflects the fact that both the United States and British Canadian authorities then regarded these Indian 
free trade and passage provisions as self-executing, a position that would be called in question without referencing the 
historical experience by United States courts almost 130 years later. 
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with the English during the hostilities, Great Britain was careful to negotiate an express textual 
refutation of such claims in the Treaty of Ghent of 1814. Specifically, Article 9 expressly provides: 
The United States ofAmerica engage to put an end immediately after the Ratification of 
the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with whom they 
may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or 
Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have 
enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such 
hostilities. Provide:d always that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist from all 
hostilities against the United States ofAmerica, their Citizens, and Subjects upon the 
Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so 
desist accordingly. And His Britannic Majesty engages on his part to put an end 
immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes 
or Nations of Indians with whom He may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and 
forthwith to restort~ to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and 
privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight 
hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such Tribes or 
Nations shall agree: to desist from all hostilities against His Britannic Majesty and His 
Subjects upon the Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or 
Nations, and shall so desist accordingly. 
,Therefore, the aboriginal nations at peace with the United States after the end of the War of 1812, 
including the Haudenosaunee, retained any and all rights that they had prior to the onset of hostilities, 
including their rights of free and undisturbed travel and trade across the international boundary under 
Article 3 of the Jay Treaty. See, McCandless v. United States ex rei Diabo, 25 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1928) 
(Indian guarantees of free passage and trade contained in the Jay Treaty survived the War of 1812 and 
remained in full force and l~ffect). 
Notwithstanding what appears to be the clear and explicit language ofArticle 9 of the Treaty of 
Ghent of 1814, American courts are split on the question ofwhether as a matter of domestic law the 
rights for which the British negotiated on behalf of their Indian allies among the Haudonasuanee 
survived the War of 1812. The McClandless court clearly indicated that they did. Nevertheless, in 
United States v. Garrow, 410, 88 F.2d 318 (C.C.P.A. 1937), the United States Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals somehow incorrectly concluded that the War of 1812 had ended any and all rights the 
Huadenosaunee has under Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794. The Court claimed that Article 9 of 
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Treaty of Ghent of 1814 was not self-executing and that no domestic legislation ever had been enacted 
to implement it. Since Congress had in fact enacted legislation in 1799 that remained on the books 
after 1814 implementing the free trade provisions, Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 105, 1 Stat. 627, 
702, and provisions enforcing the free passage provision of the Jay Treaty of 1794 remain in force in 
the United States Code to this day in 8 U.S.C. § 1359, the conclusion reached by the Garrow court was 
surely improperly analyzed and is highly questionable. See also, Guiles v. United States, 100 F.2d 47 
(9th Cir. 1938) (simply following Garrow without any analysis); United States v. Booth, 80 F.3d 580 (I st 
Cir. 1996); Atkins v. United States, 551 F.2d 1222 (C.C.P.A. 1977); United States v. Miller, 26 
F.Supp.2d 415 (N.D. N.V. 1998) (following Garrow). The Garrow result is rendered even more 
questionable by the fact that almost a decade previously in McCandless v. United States ex rei Diabo, 
25 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1928), the Court ofAppeals had expressly held that Haudenosaunee rights under 
Article III of the Jay Treaty of 1794 had not been extinguished by the War of 1812 and that therefore 
highly skilled Haudenosaunee high steel workers from Canada could freely cross the international 
border and enter the United States without interference. The world renown skill and the importance of 
Haudoneosaunee high steel workers in the building of the City ofNew York is legendary and it is safe 
to say that the skyline of New York might look very different had the view offered in Garrow prevailed 
over the McCandless decisiion.24 
The continued existence and enforcement statutes like 8 U.S.c. § 1359 and the Act of March 2, 
1799, ch. 22, § 105, I Stat. 627, 702, implementing the Indian free trade and passage provisions of the 
Jay Treaty of 1794 long aftt~r the War of 1812 concluded clearly demonstrates that contrary to the 
conclusion reached by the Garrow court, the United States government did not regard those guarantees 
to have been abrogated by the War of 1812 since Congress and the Executive behaved consistently 
24 See, E. Darton, Divided We Stand: A Biography ofNew York City's World Trade Center 106 (l999) (documenting the 
important role ofMohawk high steel workers in the construction ofmany ofNew York's skyscrapers since the 1930s, 
including the lamented World Trade Center buildings). 
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thereafter as if the provisions remained in fuJI force and effect. Nevertheless, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled in Karnuth v. United States ex rei. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929) that the free 
passage provisions of Jay Treaty had in fact been abrogated, as a matter ofAmerican domestic law, by 
the War of 1812 and not revived by Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent 1814. Oddly, that ruling came 
when the predecessor of 8 U.S.C. § 1359 enforcing that very free passage passage provisions remained 
in the United States Code. In fact, in In the Matter ofB-----, 3 I. & N. Dec. 191 (1948), the 
Immigration and Naturalization branch of the United States government, while acknowledging the 
decision in Karnuth, nevertheless enforced the free passage provisions on the strength of the continued 
Jay Treaty rights enforced by 8 U.S.c. § 1359. 
Thus, it appears that the various branches of the federal government, like the federal courts, are 
split on the issue of whether the Indian rights of free trade and passage set forth in Article 3 of the Jay 
Treaty of 1794 remain in force and effect. While this opinion assumes that they do, its conclusions are 
not completely dependent on that position. Two reasons, nevertheless, suggest to this Expert that the 
War of 1812 did not abrogate the Indian rights of free trade and passage protected by the Jay Treaty. 
First, the very purpose ofArticle 9 of the Treaty ofGhent was the preserve, not abrogate, those 
rights and, accordingly, those courts that have come to a contrary conclusion have totally ignored both 
the intent and the precise language of the treaty resolving the War of 1812. Since some of the Indian 
Claimants/Investors are aboriginal members of First Nations and were born in and reside in Canada, it 
remains unclear to this Expert how unilateral actions taken by American courts, and not by either the 
Congress or President of the United States, can abrogate treaty right to which such Canadian Indian 
Claimants/Investors are entitled as a matter of international, rather than domestic law. In fact, as one 
commentator has pointed out, Canadian common law continues to honor the Indian free trade and 
passage provisions of the Jay Treaty of 1794 on the assumption that they remained in full force and 
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effect.25 
Second, since international affairs, including the negotiation or abrogation of international 
treaties constitute the constitutional responsibility of the political branches of the United States 
government, the Congress and President,26 this Expert fails to see how the federal judiciary legally can 
unilaterally declare an end to Indian rights secured by the Jay Treaty, particularly when neither 
Congress nor the President has done so. Furthermore, this is not a case where the political branches of 
the United States government have been silent on the issue. The continuation of the provisions of 8 
U.S.c. § 1359 in force in the United States Code reflect a Congressional determination to continue to 
honor and treat the Indian free trade and passage provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 as 
being in full force and effi~ct. Thus, given a conflict between the Congress and the federal judiciary on 
this question, since Congress has the preeminent constitutional authority over foreign affairs, this 
Expert understands that its view on the issue prevails. Thus, notwithstanding contrary federal judicial 
decisions, this Expert is ofthe view that the Indian free trade and passage provisions of the Jay Treaty 
of 1794 remain in full force and effect both as a matter of international law and as a matter of United 
States domestic law. That appears to be the view of the Congress of the United States reflected in its 
continuation of the provisions of 8 U.S.c. § 1359 and its view should be controlling as a matter of 
American constitutional law. It is also view of the leading scholarly commentators on the issue.27 The 
remainder of this Expert Opinion therefore will proceed on that assumption. 
B. Effect of and Continuation of Rights Under the Jay Treaty of 1794 
The guarantees of Jree travel and trade by Indians across the border between Canada and the 
25 B. Nickels, Native American Free Passage Rights Under the 1794 Jay Treaty: Survival Under United States Statl/tory 
Lmv and Canadian Common Law, 24 B.C. Int'\ & Compo L. Rev. 313 (2001). 
26 See U.S. Const., Art. I. sec. 8 (Congress regulates foreign commerce and declares war) and Art. II, sec. 2 (The President 
negotiates treaties with the advise and consent of the United States Senate and receives foreign ambassadors and 
ministers). 
27 S. O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies, and Families, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 
315,315-21 (1984). 
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United States contained in the Jay Treaty of 1794 are consistent with both the long-standing 
Haudenosaunee understandings of their political relationships with the Euro-American settlers and with 
the renewed British effort to protect their Haudenosaunee allies by assuring that the newly created 
international boundary to which Great Britain and the United States agreed upon in the Treaty of Paris 
of 1783 did not interfere with the on-going political, family, social and economic relationships between 
those portions of the Iroquois Confederation who had fled to or resided in Canada and those who 
remained in the United States. Thus, insofar as the Haudenosaunee were concerned, the purpose of the 
guarantees contained in Article 3 ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 were to assure that neither Great Britain nor 
the United States, the two signatories to the Treaty, nor any political subdivisions thereof, including the 
states and provinces, would interfere with, regulate, tax or otherwise impede the free movement of 
Indians, including in particular the Haudenosaunee, across the international border between Canada and 
United States or the free trade28 by Indians, both among themselves and with non-Indian traders, across 
that boundary. Based on the Treaty guarantees set forth in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, the 
Claimants had every right Ito expect, when they founded their business and when NAFTA was adopted, 
that their sale of tobacco products, both with respect to the on-reserve and off-reserve sales, would be 
completely free of interfen:nce, taxation, or regulation by the states of the United States in the fashion 
undertaken here. This conelusion is based on a number of considerations. 
First, the express language ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, which, according to 
McCandless v. United States ex rei Diabo, 25 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1928) remained in full force and effect, 
compels that result. 29 The express Treaty language guarantees free passage across the international 
28 While the term "free trade" may have many different meanings in varied legal contexts, it is employed in this Expert 
Opinion to denote the precisf: trade related guarantees for Indians contained in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 - the 
treaty guarantee ofnoninterff:rence with the free passage oflndians across the international border in either direction 
between British Canada and the United States and the treaty guarantee that the Indian trade across that boundary in their 
goods (as opposed to goods that were not deemed to be Indian owned) would not be subject to any tariffs, duties, 
excises, or other forms of taxation. 
29 See generally, S. O'Brien. The Medicine Line.' A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies, and Families. 53 
Fordham L. Rev. 315, 331 (1984) (the seminal scholarly article discussing the legal effects and history of the Indian free 
trade and passage guarantees.ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794); B. Nickels, Native American Free Passage Rights Under the 
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border between the United States and British Canada and expressly indicates that such free passage 
includes commercial tradt:, by guaranteeing the right of "Indians dwelling on either side of the said 
Boundary Line freely to pass and repass by Land, or Inland Navigation, into the respective Territories 
and Countries of the Two Parties on the Continent ofAmerica ... and to navigate all the Lakes, 
Rivers, and waters thereof; andfreely to carry on trade and commerce with each other...." (Emphasis 
supplied). The third paragraph of the same Article reemphasizes that the Indian trade across the 
international border shall not be impeded by the impositions of tariffs, taxes or other excises. It 
expressly provides "nor shall the Indians passing or repassing with their own proper Goods and Effects 
of whatever nature, pay for the same any Impost or Duty whatever." Since the first paragraph of 
Article 3 expressly indicated that such passage was in part for trade and commerce and first part of 
paragraph 3 expressly exempts peltries, which were then the single most important part of the Indian 
trade, from taxation or other excises, the express treaty exemption of Indian "Good and Effects" from 
"any Impost or Duty what(:ver," clearly included any and all trade goods any Indian chose to take 
across the international border so long as the trade goods were of a type that could be identified as 
belonging to an Indian. 3D While goods that were "unusual among Indians," were not included in the 
treaty guarantee of Indian (:xemption from tariffs, excises, or other taxation, that limitation has no 
application to this case because, as discussed more fully below, tobacco constituted a normal staple of 
the Indian trade, including trade involving the Haudenosaunee, and because there is absolutely no 
dispute that the tobacco products at issue in this claim were manufactured and distributed by the Indian 
Claimants/Investors. 
Second, insofar as Indians were concerned, the history surrounding the negotiation and adoption 
1794 Jay Treaty: Sun-ivaI Under United States Statutory Law and Canadian Common Law, 24 B.C. Int'l & Compo L. 
Rev. 3 I3 (2001) .. 
30 The third paragraph ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 did contain a provision designed to prevent Indians from 
relying on their exemption from duties, excises, and other taxes on their imported goods to smuggle goods not belonging 
to them across the international boundary between British Canada and the United States. Thus, that paragraph provided 
that "Goods in Bales, or other large Packages unusual among Indians shall not be considered as Goods belonging bona 
fide to Indians." (Emphasis supplied). 
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of the Jay Treaty of 1794, clearly indicates that the British sought to include the guarantees set forth in 
Article 3 into the Jay Treaty to protect their Indian allies, whose ancestors included the Canadian 
Claimants/Investors in this case, from the type of unilateral treaty negotiations that the United States 
had undertaken in dealing with aboriginal nations located within its boundaries after the Treaty of Paris 
of 1783. As noted above, in the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Great Britain left its Indian allies to separately 
negotiate peace treaties with the United States government. Diplomatic relations between the United 
States government and thle Indian tribes who negotiated such treaties deteriorated greatly between the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 and the negotiation of the Jay Treaty of 1794. The primary 
reason for this deterioration was the United States negotiating positions, under which the United States 
government sought to dictate treaty terms on the theory that the Indian nations, both friend and foe 
alike, constituted conquered nations as a result of the United States victory in the American Revolution. 
The United States still regarded Indian nations as separate states with whom treaties constituted the 
normal means of affecting change in the relationships between the Indian tribes and the United States. 
The United States government theretofore assumed at the time ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 that the 
consent of the Indian nation was required as a necessary legal precondition to its imposition for any 
measure affecting them or their members.31 While the United States government formally abandoned 
their "conquered nation" theory as a basis for negotiating treaties with Indian nations approximately 
three years prior to the Jay Treaty of 1794,32 the extraordinary hostility this policy produced among the 
Indian nations33 prompted Great Britain to alter its negotiating approach while negotiating both the Jay 
31 The term "member" is commonly employed in the United States as a legal term of art designating one who is a citizen 
ofan Indian nation. For purpose of this opinion the term citizen and member therefore are employed interchangeably to 
designate a person who is a Ilegally recognized citizen in the Indian nation. The law governing that citizenship in the 
United States generally is tribal law. This Expert is advised that the Claimantsiinvestors are all citizens (members) of 
their respective Indian nations in Canada and the United States. 
32 See, F. P. Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians 43-50 (1984) 
33	 The importance of good rellations between the United States government and the Indian nations was emphasized in 
President George Washington's Seventh Annual Message (1795) to the United States Congress, which is set forth in full 
at http://www.yaJe.edu/law\\.ebl avalon/presiden/sou/washs07.him#jay.This message is the same message in which the 
President formally announced thf: successful negotiation of the Jay Treaty. Specifically, President Washington, focusing 
on the recent warfare in the Ohio valley and the unsettled nature of the frontier, noted that "the adjustment of the terms 
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Treaty of 1794 and the later Treaty of Ghent of 1814. Great Britain therefore sought to protect the 
Indian nations from the dictatorial negotiating position previously undertaken by the United States 
government by successfully insisting on adequate protections for Indian nations in both the Jay Treaty 
of 1794 and the later Treaty 0 f Ghent of 1814.34 In particular, Great Britain sought and secured the 
guarantees set forth in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 of free passage and unimpeded and untaxed 
trade for Indian nations, including especially their allies among the Haudenosaunee who had been 
separated by the American Revolution from their relatives among the Confederation remaining in the 
United States. These guarantees merely reaffirmed and renewed the traditional diplomatic relationship 
between the Haudenosaunee and the Euro-American settlers that dated back to the Two Wampum Belt 
Treaty with the Dutch, a relationship of parallel economic development and economic noninterference 
that constituted the central hallmark of Haudenosaunee diplomacy, now ratified and guaranteed through 
British diplomatic efforts with the Americans. 
Third, while renewed warfare between Great Britain and the United States during the War of 
1812 might have imperiled the guarantees set forth in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794,35 Great 
Britain again took great pains during the negotiation of the peace treaty that resolved that conflict, the 
Treaty of Ghent of 1814, to again protect her Indian allies and renew the prior treaty guarantees of free 
the satisfaction of the Indians was deemed worthy no less of the policy than of the liberality of the United States as the 
necessary basis of durable tranquillity. the object, it is believed, has been fully attained." This message indicated that 
President Washington recognized that the simultaneous resolution of disputes with Great Britain and with the Indian 
tribes were related and essential to the national economic development of the United States. After summarizing "our 
affairs with regard to the foreign powers between whom and the United States controversies have subsisted, and with 
regard also to those of our Indian neighbors with whom we have been in a state of enmity or misunderstanding," he 
noted that the recent accord "opens a wide field for consoling and gratirying reflections." 
34 For a succinct summary of the history surrounding the adoption of the Indian-related provisions of the Jay Treaty of 
1794 and the Treaty ofGhent of 1814, see S. O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty. 
Economies, and Families, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 315, 315-21 (1984). For a detailed history of the treaty and the general 
structure of relationships between Great Britain and the United States during the period of the Jay Treaty (including a 
detailing analysis of the displiltes over its ratification, see B. Perhins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United 
States, 1795-1805 (1955). 
35 The United States Supreme Court ruled that the rights of non-Indians under Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 were in 
fact abrogated by the War of 1812. Karnuth v. United States ex reI. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929). As discussed above, 
however, the express language ofArticle 9 of the Treaty ofGhent of 1814 clearly prevents application of the Karnuth 
analysis to the Indian rights since those rights were expressly preserved by the Treaty ending that conflict. 
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trade and free passage belween British Canada and the United States. Thus, in Article 9 of the Treaty 
of Ghent of 1814, Great Britain and the United States mutually agreed" to restore to such Tribes or 
Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been 
entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities," so long as the 
affected tribes remained at peace with each nation, as the Haudenosaunee had done since the end of 
that war. During the negotiation of this Treaty provision, the British negotiators had sought an even 
more expansive set of guarantees for their Indian allies, including guarantee oftheir continued rights to 
occupy and govern their lands.36 The United States negotiators responded that such expansive 
guarantees were unnecessary since: 
[u]nder [the United States constitutional] system, the Indians residing within the United 
States are so far independent that they live under their own customs, and not under the 
laws ofthe United States; that their rights upon the lands where they inhabit or hunt 
are secured to them by boundaries defined in amicable treaties between the United 
States and themselves; and that, whenever those boundaries are varied, it is also by 
amicable and voluntary treaties, by which they receive from the United States ample 
compensation for every right they have to the lands ceded by them. 37 
Clearly, the express renewal of pre-existing Indian rights, including the rights of free passage and free 
trade contained in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, contained in Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent of 
1814 reflected the fact that those rights remained in force. Furthermore, the United States claimed 
during the negotiations of the Treaty ofGhent that it had no power to unilaterally alter such guarantees 
and directly regulate the Indians. 
Fourth, as reflected in the immediate preceding quotation, the American constitutional position 
since the time of its formation had been that only those who consented to governance by the United 
States were subject to its lawful regulatory authority. This notion, commonly known as popular 
36 This diplomatic exchange is discussed by the Expert at R. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribe. 34 Az. St. L. J. 114, 136-37 (2002) (set forth as Appendix B to this Expert Opinion). 
37 Quoted in VI Gale & Seaton's: Register of Debates in Congress, 21st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 1059 (May 19, 1830) 
(emphasis added) (diplomatic correspondence during the Treaty of Ghent negotiations quoted in later Congressional 
debates).. 
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sovereignty, lay at the core of both early American constitutional theory and the early relationships the 
United States had with Indian nations. Perhaps the most graphic example of this legal position relative 
to the Indian nations can be found in the first ratified treaty the United States entered into with an 
Indian nation, the Treaty of Fort Pitt of 1778 signed with the Delaware (Lenni Lenape) Nation,38 allies 
of the Huadenosaunee to the South. In Article 6 of that Treaty, the United States set forth the 
framework by which the independent and self-governing Delaware Nation might become part of the 
United States and subject to its governance and regulation - an offer of formal statehood. Thus, the 
Treaty provided: 
should it for the future be found conducive for the mutual interest of both parties to 
invite any other tribes who have been friends to the interest of the United States, to join 
the present confederation, and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the 
head, and to have n:presentation in Congress. 
Statehood would both mah~ the Indians subject to American law and would give them formal 
representation in Congress where those law were made. Without such consent through statehood, 
however, the Delaware Nation, like all Indian nations, were not considered at the time of the 
negotiation of the Jay Treaty of 1794 to be subject to governance by the United States or any of its 
political subdivisions, including the states. As this Expert's scholarship has shown, at the time of the 
negotiation of the Jay Trea~y of 1794, the United States government claimed no unilateral right to 
regulate, tax or otherwise govern Indian nations or their members who resided on tribal lands. 39 Such 
claims of unilateral national authority to govern Indian nations and their members without their formal 
consent by treaty did not emerge until the last two decades of the nineteenth century - almost a century 
after the Jay Treaty of 1794 was negotiated and ratified. 
Therefore, when the United States agreed to the right of free passage and free trade for Indians 
contained in Article 3 ofthe Jay Treaty, American negotiators would not have seen themselves as 
38 Treaty with the Delawares, S~:pt. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13 [hereinafter Treaty offort Pitt). 
39 For the legal theories and historical support for this claim, see generally, R. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy 
Clause for Indian Tribe, 34 Az. St. L. J. 114, 136-37 (2002) (set forth as Appendix B to this Expert Opinion) 
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relinquishing a sovereign power the United States otherwise possessed, but, rather, simply as 
reaffirming the fact that notwithstanding the creation of an international border between British Canada 
and the United States, the Indians, including the Haudensonaueee, could freely cross that border in 
either direction without interference from either American or British authorities and could freely 
engage in trade (both with Indians and with non-Indians) across that border under their own tribal laws 
and customs without any interference from or regulation and taxation by British or American 
governmental officials. These treaty guarantees would not then have been seen as creating any new 
special exemption from border crossing and tariff rules that would otherwise apply, but, rather, as a 
reaffirmation that the newly created international boundary would make no change in the political 
relationships previously existing between the Indian nations, Great Britain, and the United States under 
which the Indians formerly were free to pass between the lands then comprising British Canada and 
the United States by land or water without any interference and were free to engage in trade without 
any interference, levies, tariffs, duties, excises, or other forms of taxation. 
Thus, at the time the Jay Treaty of 1794 was negotiated and ratified, the United States would 
not have seen the Indian rights of free passage and free trade set forth in Article 3 as creating unusual 
special rights, but, rather, merely reaffirming the preexisting legal and political relationship between the 
Indian nations and the Euro-American settler states notwithstanding the newly created international 
border between British Canada and United States. The United States at the time of the Jay Treaty of 
1794 simply did not claim any sovereign power over Indian tribes or their members when engaged in 
activities on their lands or in the Indian trade. As this Expert has pointed out, all of the early Trade and 
Intercourse Acts enacted by the United States Congress between 1790 and 1834, i.e. relatively 
contemporaneously with the Jay Treaty, applied only to non-Indian citizens ofthe United States 
engaged in the Indian trade" not to the Indians themselves.40 American governmental power was 
40 Discussed at R. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribe, 34 Az. St. L. J. 114, 133-35 (2002) 
(set forth as Appendix B to this Expert Opinion) 
Page 28 
000704
thought to be limited to those non-Indians who engaged in the Indian trade, not the to Indian traders 
themselves. The guarant{:es offree trade and passage for Indians set forth in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty 
of 1794 therefore merely constituted a formal treaty guarantee of this preexisting relationship. 
Fifth, by its behavior, the United States clearly treated the guarantees of free passage and free 
trade contained in Article 3 ofthe Jay Treaty of ]794 as surviving the War of ]8] 2 and as remaining in 
force throughout its subsequent dealing with the question. Specifically, those parts of the Jay Treaty 
dealing with free passage of Indians became codified into United States statutory law as Section 289 of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1359.41 In United States ex reI. 
Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. 660, 661 (W.O.N.V. ]947), a United States district court found free 
passage provision of the Jay Treaty of 1794 and its statutory implementation precluded deportation for 
lack of visa of a full-blood Canadian Indian woman born on the Six Nations Reserve who was a 
member of the Upper Cayuga Tribe of the Six Nations Indians in Canada. Likewise, the tariff 
provision was implemented by the United States Congress through the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 
105, 1 Stat. 627, 702, whieh provided: 
[N]o duty shall be levied or collected on the importation of peltries brought into the 
territories of the United States, nor on the proper goods and effects of whatever nature, 
of Indians passing, or repassing the boundary lines aforesaid, unless the same be goods 
in bales or other large packages unusual among Indians, which shall not be considered 
as goods belonging bona fide to Indians, nor be entitled to the exemption from duty 
aforesaid. 
This statute remained in force until 1897 when it was omitted without explanation from the Tariff 
Revision Act of that year and never subsequently revived.42 Since the abrogation of preexisting Indian 
41	 The half-blood requirement was more recently added. An earlier version adopted in 1928 was set forth in the original 
language of 8 U.S.c. § 226a (1928) read: "This chapter shall not be construed to apply to the right ofAmerican Indians 
born in Canada to pass the bIJrders of the United States; Provided. That this right shall not extend to persons whose 
membership in Indian tribes or families is created by adoption". Quoted in United States ex reI. Goodwin v. Karnuth. 74 
F. Supp. 660. 661 (W.D.N.Y. 1947). At the time, as the Go(Avin court noted, no definition of Indian existed in the 
immigration statute. The half-blood requirement may have been adopted in response to that concern, although it does 
not fully comply with the numdates of the Jay Treaty of 1794. which only employs the tenn Indian, without definition or 
restriction. 
42	 TariffAct Revision of 1897, ch. 11,30 Stat. 151. See generally, S. O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing 
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rights generally requires a clear statement of Congress and will not be implied from silence,43 this 
Expert concludes that the unexplained omission of this statutory implementation of the free trade 
provisions of the Jay Treaty of 1794 from the 1897 general tariff revision legislation and subsequent 
legislation was not intend'ed to abrogate or otherwise diminish the rights of the Claimants/Investors and 
other Indians under Artide 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794. 
While visiting the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation ofNew York within the past two decades as 
an invited speaker for the Tribe, this Expert personally witnessed the continued effect of the Indian free 
trade and free passage provisions Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, as he accompanied enrolled 
members of the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation ofNew York back and forth across the international 
border, only to be waived through the United States border checkpoint upon a showing by the driver of 
the vehicle of his tribal me:mbership card. There is therefore no question that the United States has 
treated the provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 guaranteeing free passage and trade for 
Indians to remain in full force and legal effect throughout its history, including the time frame when the 
Claimants/Investors commenced their business and the time frame when NAFTA was adopted. 
Finally, this Expert clearly believes that tobacco and tobacco products of the type at issue in this 
dispute were clearly within the free trade and free passage provisions ofArticle III of the Jay Treaty of 
1794. While Article 3 expressly excluded from its protections of the Indian trade goods "large 
Packages unusual among Indians," (emphasis supplied) which "shall not be considered as Goods 
belonging bona fide to Indi:ans," this exclusionary provision clearly does not apply to the cigarettes 
and other tobacco products produced and imported by the Claimants/Investors. The obvious purpose of 
Tribal Sovereignty, Economies. and Families, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 315,331 (1984). 
43	 E.g. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986). As the United States Supreme Court said in United States v. 
Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353 (1941), Congress' intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and 
plain. "Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty 
rights ...." Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979); See 
generally, Felix Cohen's Handbook ofFederal Indian Law 223 (R. Strickland. ed. 1982 edition); Wilkinson & Volkman, 
Judicial Review ofindian Tre'aty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a 
Time is That?, 63 Calif.L.Rev. 601 (1975) 
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the provision is to prevent the smuggling by Indians of large quantities of goods they do not own. The 
primary test, of course, set forth in Article 3 of whether the goods could be considered owned is 
whether they involved bales or packages of goods "unusual among Indians." If the goods did not 
constitute a nonnal part of the Indian trade, i.e. were "unusual among Indians," the treaty provision 
established a presumption (presumably rebuttable) that the goods did not actually belong to the Indians 
who were carrying them across the international border between British Canada and the United States. 
For two reasons, this exclusionary provision does not apply to the tobacco products manufactured and 
distributed by the Claimants/Investors. First, other than perhaps the fur trade, which is expressly 
referenced through the term "peltries" in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, no other product was more 
quintessentially Indian in origin and involved in the Indian trade than tobacco and tobacco products. 
One need think no further than the unfortunately racist wooden caricatures of Indians that commonly 
adorned American tobacco stores in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the so-called 'cigar 
store Indians," to demonstrate the essential Indian character and origin of tobacco and tobacco 
products. Tobacco and tobacco products were not "unusual among Indians," they were quintessentially 
associated with Indians, and for good reason. Tobacco was unknown to Europeans prior to contact 
with North American natives who grew, traded, and used tobacco and tobacco products, both 
ceremonially and as a means of exchange.44 In fact, the leading non-Indian historian of the 
Haudenosaunee, the late Francis Jennings, specifically notes that the Iroquois traded tobacco and 
tobacco products long before the Jay Treaty of 1794.45 Thus, the tobacco and tobacco products 
manufactured and distribut,ed by the Claimants/Investors clearly were not within the treaty phrase 
"unusual among Indians" and therefore unquestionably would have been thought to be covered by the 
44	 F, Jennings, The Founders ofAmerica: How Indians Discovered the Land, Pioneered in It, and Created Great Classical 
Civilizations, How They Were Plunged into a Dark Age by Invasion and Conquest, and How They Are Reviving 40 
(1993). 
45	 F. Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English 
Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744,42,254,356 (1984); see also S. Adams, The Long House 
of the Iroquois 158, 160 (1944) (documenting Haudenosaunee tobacco cultivation and ceremonial use). 
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guarantees of free trade and free passage contained in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1793. In fact, both 
express language of the Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 105, 
1 Stat. 627, 702, implementing the free trade provisions of the Jay Treaty expressly applied to "proper 
goods and effects ofwhatever nature" (emphasis supplied) so long as the goods were not "unusual 
among Indians." Second. since there is no dispute whatsoever in this claim that the tobacco and 
tobacco products at issue here were manufactured, owned and distributed by Indian 
Claimants/Investors, the express language ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty and its implementing 
legislation clearly would have been thought to cover such products. 
C. State Authorit), Over the Indian Trade in the Late Eighteenth and First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century 
Between the time ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 and the first half of the nineteenth century, neither 
United States treaty obligations nor United States constitutional and statutory law would have 
permitted the state governments (states) that are part of the United States ofAmerica to engage in any 
regulation of trade by Indians with others either within Indian reservations (on-reserve sales) or outside 
o flndian reservations (off-reserve) sales when, as here, such trade originated with Indians from British 
Canada or when it involved Indians indigenous to the United States. The reasons for this conclusion 
involve both United States treaty obligations and their relationship to the states and United States 
domestic constitutional, statutory and common law dealing with Indians at the time. 
First, and perhaps most important, the clear language ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1793 (as 
further preserved by Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent of 1814) exempted Indian trade commenced in 
Canada by Indians domiciled within the external territorial borders of British Canada (as well as the 
reverse trade by Indians domiciled within the territorial borders of the United States) from any 
interference, taxation, tariffs:, duties, or excises. That treaty obligation assumed by the United States of 
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America imposed a duty of non-interference with such trade on both the national government of the 
United States and any political constituent part thereof, such as the States of the Union comprising the 
United States ofAmerica. Under American constitutional law, treaties made under the authority of the 
United States constitute the supreme law of the land and every state is automatically bound to adhere to 
such obligations under the: Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.46 As the Supreme Court 
of the United States recently pointed out: 
[I]t is well established that a self-executing treaty binds the States pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause, and that the States therefore must recognize the force of the treaty in 
the course of adjudicating the rights of litigants. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 
U.S. 483 (1880). And where a treaty provides for a particular judicial remedy, there is no 
issue of intruding on the constitutional prerogatives of the States or the other federal 
branches. Courts must apply the remedy as a requirement of federal law. Cf. 18 U.S.c. § 
2515; United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-525 (1974).47 
This principle of state governmental subservience to treaties made under the authority of the United 
States, while explicit in thf~ Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, was further buttressed 
by the actual Congressional debates over the ratification of the Jay Treaty, where the principle was 
unsuccessfully attacked by certain opponents of both the Treaty and President Washington's position on 
its ratification.48 Thus, both the self-executing treaty language ofthe Jay Treaty of 1794 and the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Treaty 
guarantees set forth in Article 3, discussed at length in the previous section, divested alI States ofthe 
Union of the United States ofAmerica during the first half of the nineteenth century of any legal claim 
to any authority to regulate" tax or otherwise interfere with Indian trade originating in Canada either by 
Indians domiciled within the territorial limits of British Canada or by Indians from the United States. 
Second, in addition to the Treaty obligations assumed by the United States ofAmerica under 
Article 3 of the Jay Treaty 1794, the States of the American Union were also divested of any claim they 
46 United States Const. Art. 6, '1 2.
 
47 Sanche=-L1amas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331,126 S.Ct. 2669,2681 (2006)
 
48 See generally, B. Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805, 30-44 (1955)
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otherwise might have had to authority over Indian trade during the first half of the nineteenth century 
by American domestic law in two different respects. First, the two statutes cited in the preceding 
section that implemented the Indian rights of free trade and unimpeded passage set forth in Article 3 of 
the Jay Treaty 1794, specifically the statute now found as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1359 and the Act of 
March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 105, 1 Stat. 627, 702, were in force throughout the first half of the nineteen 
century. Under the express provisions of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, these 
statutes preempt any state laws that would purport to interfere with such free passage and free trade 
provisions, irrespective of the domicile of the Indians originating the trade across the international 
boundary between the United States and Canada were domiciled or resided within British Canada or 
the United States. In fact, the free passage provision now found in amended form at 8 U.S.C. § 1359 
expressly applies to Indians of Canadian origin, indicating the intent to apply these twin statutory 
provision implementing thl~ Jay Treaty rights both to Indians of United States domicile as well as 
aboriginal persons whose primary residence or domicile was in British Canada. Under the American 
constitutional system, any attempt by a state to interfere with the rights granted by these twin United 
States statutes was automatically invalidated by the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution.49 Thus, during most of the nineteenth century these two statutes implementing the Indian 
guarantees of free trade and free passage found in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 remained in force 
and effectively precluded any state effort under the United States constitutional system to regulate, tax 
or otherwise impede the free trade by Indians, whether domiciled or residing within British Canada or 
the United States, across the international boundary between those two nations. 
Second, aside from the fact that the twin federal statutes implementing the Indian free trade and 
49 Illustrative early nineteenth ccmtury decisions of the United States Supreme Court invalidating state laws due to conflict 
with federal statutes include /tVorcester v. Georgia. 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (Georgia law conflicting with the federal Indian 
Trade and Intercourse Acts invalid); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (Maryland's efforts 0 tax a federally­
charted bank invalidated by the conflict with the federal statute creating the bank); Gibbons l~ Ogden, 22 U.S. I (1824) 
(state effort to regulate coasta:! trade invalid since it conflicted with the Federal Coastal Licensing Act); Prigg v. Com. of 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539(1842) (notwithstanding inconsistent Pennsylvania law, a fugitive slave must be returned to 
his master to due federal consltitutionallaw); 
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free passage provisions of the Jay Treaty remained in force throughout most of the nineteenth century 
and preempted any state rc~gulation in the field, the basic constitutional, statutory and common law 
structure ofAmerican Indiian law during the nineteenth century also precluded any of the states 
comprising the Union of the Untied States ofAmerica from regulating, taxing, interfering with or 
impeding the free trade by Indians across the international border between British Canada and the 
United States. This conclusion is based on extensive research conducted by this Expert into United 
States constitutional, statutory" and common law surrounding Indian law. Most of that research is set 
forth in two published articles - There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribe~o and the 
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause,51 which are attached to this Opinion as Appendices Band C 
respectively. Since those two articles set forth the research in greater depth, this Opinion will simply 
outline the basic conclusions drawn from that research. The basic outline of the analysis is that during 
the first half of the nineteenth century, three analytically separate legal doctrines prevailed in American 
Indian law, each of which was sufficient to preempt the states of the American Union from exercising 
any regulatory, taxing, or other sovereign powers over Indian trade. First, the adoption of the Indian 
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution according to its major proponent, James Madison, 
was clearly intended to eliminate any claims to any state authority over Indian commerce, such as the 
trade in tobacco reflected in this case. Second, federal treaty, statutory or other recognition of lands as 
Indian country, i.e. as an aboriginal homeland for native peoples, constituted a geographic preemption 
of any state regulation oflndian activities, including Indian trade with non-Indians within that territory. 
Finally, where Congress has exercised its powers under the Indian Commerce Clause or ratified treaties 
by adopting treaties or enacting federal laws dealing with Indians, it generally has occupied that field to 
the exclusion of any state regulation, taxation, or other impediments or interference. Each of these 
50 34 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL 113-260 (2002) (set forth in Appendix B) 
51 27 Connecticut L. Rev. 1055-1249 (1995) (set forth in Appendix C) 
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legal doctrines by itself constitutes a sufficient justification for a preemption of state authority over 
Indian trade. Nevertheless, they each has a different force and will be briefly examined below. The 
first and the third apply to any state regulation, taxation or other interference with Indian trade and 
affairs, irrespective of location, and therefore would have applied both to what are called in this 
Arbitration on-reserve and off·reserve sales. By contrast, the second, legal theory is geographically 
bounded in its reach and applied only to activities occurring in Indian country, i.e. on-reserve sales. 
First, after an unhappy experience under Article IX of the Articles of Confederation with 
bifurcated claims of governmental responsibility for regulating Indian trade52 and affairs between the 
national government and the states, the first written constitution of the United States in force from 1781 
through 1789, the drafters of the United States Constitution deliberately omitted from the Indian 
Commerce Clause any claim of residual authority by the states over Indian trade and affairs. In The 
Federalist No. 42, an essay written to support ratification of the Constitution ofthe United States, 
James Madison, generally regarded as the primary figure in the formation of that document, wrote: 
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered 
from two limitations in the articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure 
and contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the 
States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own 
limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet 
settled, and has bee:n a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal 
councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing 
within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so 
far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is 
not the only case in which the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored 
to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with 
complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a 
part, and letting the whole remain. 53 
52 In using the term trade in this Expert Opinion Report, the Expert employs the term (unless the context otherwise so 
indicates) in the broad sense of commerce, which, of course, is not limited to trade in goods but also includes all sorts of 
exchanges, including commercial investment. Thus, as used in this Expert Opinion Report trade is synonymous with the 
term employed in the United States Constitution - commerce. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I (1824), the United States 
Supreme Court defined commerce, as employed in the Commerce Clause ofArticle I, section 8, clause 3 of the United 
States Constitution, as intercourse. Both trade in goods and cross-border commercial investment are subsumed with this 
broad definition of intercourse. 
53 The complete essay is set forth at htlp://www.constitution.org/fed/federa42.htm. 
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(Emphasis supplied). In perhaps the most important cornerstone Indian law case decided by the 
Supreme Court - Worcester v. Georgia" -- the Court relied on this theory and ruled unconstitutional the 
efforts by the State of Georgia to regulate affairs with the Cherokee Nation within that state. After 
discussing the history of the Indian Commerce Clause, most of which is set forth in Appendix B, it 
ruled that laws of the Statc~ of Georgia purporting to regulate Indian commerce and affairs "interfere[d] 
forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, the 
regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our Constitution, are committed exclusively 
to the government ofthe Union."ss (Emphasis supplied) To emphasize that it was the Congress, not the 
state governments, that controlled Indian trade under the Constitution, the Court added. "The whole 
intercourse between the United States and this [Indian] Nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested 
in the Government of the United States."S6 (Emphasis supplied). 
Thus, during the first half ofthe nineteenth century, the express legal doctrine adopted by the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Indian Commerce Clause as granting complete and exclusive authority 
to regulate trade with the Indians to the national government, to the exclusion of any regulation, 
taxation, other other interf{:rence by the states of the Union. Another later illustration of this principle 
occurred in Fellows v. Blacksmith,s7 where the Supreme Court ruled that despite the negotiation and 
ratification of a federal trea.ty contemplating the eventual removal of the Tonawanda Band of Seneca, 
courts of the State of New York had absolutely no jurisdiction or authority to hear a case seeking to 
eject the Tonawanda Indians from parcels they had agreed to cede since "a forcible removal must be 
made, ifmade at all, under the direction ofthe United States." Therefore at the time of the negotiation 
and ratification of the Jay Treaty of 1794 and for the first half of the nineteenth century (through a 
considerable period of the twentieth century), it was well understood as a matter ofAmerican 
54 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)
 
55 Id. at 561.
 
56 Id. at 562.
 
57 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856).
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constitutional law that the exclusive right to regulate, tax, or otherwise control Indian trade and affairs 
was vested by the United States Constitution in the national government. The States of the Union 
therefore had no authority to regulate, tax, or otherwise interfere with the Indian trade, whether 
occurring on or off an Indian reservation. In addition, as this Expert has explained at great length in the 
published article appearing at Appendix B, the power vested by the Indian Commerce Clause in the 
Congress of the United States of regulating "commerce ... with Indian Tribes" originally was 
intended, understood and limited (until the last 15 years of the nineteenth century) to regulating or 
taxing non-Indians who traded with Indians. As originally understood, the Indian Commerce Clause 
afforded Congress no power to directly regulate, tax or otherwise interfere with the Indians themselves 
during the course of Indian trade since the Indians were, throughout this period, understood to be 
citizens of their own Indian nations and, for most purposes other than crimes occurring outside their 
territory, not subject to the sovereign authority of the United States ofAmerica. 
Second, as explaim:d more thoroughly in The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause set forth in 
Appendix C, throughout most of the history of the United States, including the first half of the 
nineteenth century, American legal doctrine prevented the states from regulating, taxing or otherwise 
interfering with Indians and non-Indians who traded or otherwise dealt with Indians within the 
aboriginal territories the United States government had set aside and recognized as Indian country, by 
treaty, statute, executive orders or otherwise. The very fact of federal governmental recognition of the 
land as Indian country gem:rally meant during the first half of the nineteenth century that the land was 
set aside for the exclusive use, occupation and governance of the Indian tribe for which it was 
desgnated. Thus, in the famous case of Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held in 1832 that 
Georgia laws regulating non-Indian missionaries who were located in the territorial limits of the 
Cherokee Nation located within the boundaries of that State could have no force and effect there since 
"treaties, repeated in a succl~ssion of years, which mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee 
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country from Georgia, guaranty to them all the land within their boundary, solemnly pledge the faith of 
the United States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it, and recognize the preexisting power of 
the [CherokeeJ nation to govern itself. ·,58 (Emphasis supplied). 
That doctrine continued through the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. For 
example, in Williams v. Lee,59 the Supreme Court held that the State ofArizona had no right to 
adjudicate contracts claims involving Indian trade, specifically an effort by a licensed non-Indian trader 
to enforce a consumer credit contract for the sale of goods entered into on the Navajo Reservation with 
Navajo purchasers. The Court indicated that "Congress has also acted consistently upon the 
assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation." Noting 
the 1868 treaty creating the Navajo Reservation, the Court indicated that such federal recognition of 
Indian country constitutes an "understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained 
exclusively within the jurisdiction 0.(whatever tribal government existed." (Emphasis supplied). Thus, 
for the on-reserve sales at issue in this Arbitration, American domestic law during the first half of the 
nineteenth century (or today) would afford no adequate legal justification for a State of Union imposing 
any of the regulations or excises at issue in this Arbitration on the Indian Claimants/Investors. 
Third, from the incl~ption of national governance under its 1787 Constitution, the Congress of 
the United States enacted a series of so-called Trade and Intercourse Acts licensing, regulating and 
controlling various aspects of United States trade and affairs with Indian tribes. 60 This legislation, as 
sequentially amended and altered, remained in force throughout the first hal f of the twentieth century, 
and some portions of the legislation remain in force today.6! In Worcester v. Georgia, the United States 
58 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561-62.
 
59 358U.S.217(l959).
 
60 Act of July 22, 1790,ch. 33, I Stat. 137; Act of Mar. l,I793,ch. 19,1 Stat. 329; Act of May 19,1796. ch. 30,1 Stat.
 
469; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729. See generally F. Prucha, 
American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, /790-1834 (1962) (discussing 
the Trade and Intercourse Acts and their impact). 
61	 E.g. Oneida Indian Nation o/N. Y v. County a/Oneida. 414 U. S. 661 (1974) (Oneida I); County o/Oneida v. Oneida 
Indian Nation 0/N. Y, 470 U. S. 226 (Oneida ll) (1985) (recent Indian land litigation based on the restraint against 
alienation oflndian land contained in the Trade and Intercourse Acts). 
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Supreme Court also ruled that the existence of this extensive national statutory structure regulating 
trade and affairs with the Indian tribes had so occupied the field of Indian affairs that it preempted any 
exercise of state regulatory or other like powers over Indian trade and affairs. Thus, the Court noted, 
that the Trade and Intercourse Acts give to the "chief magistrate" (the President) full control over entry 
by non-Indians into Indian country for trade or commerce and therefore the laws of the State of 
Georgia purporting exercise a similar authority were invalid because they were in "equal hostility with 
the acts of congress for regulating this intercourse, and giving effect to the treaties."62 As described 
more fully above, American constitutional law invalidates through the Supremacy Clause any state 
legislation or other acts that would interfere with or regulate a field fully occupied by federal 
legislation. United States courts have consistently followed this approach to the present day.63 Since 
the Trade and Intercourse Acts were in full force and effect throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century, American legal doctrines of federal supremacy and preemption would have prevented any state 
of the Union for taxing, regulating or otherwise interfering with Indian trade both on and off of any 
Indian reservation. 
Finally, before 1900 American law appeared to draw absolutely no distinctions between Indians 
born, domiciled or residing within the United State and Indians born, domiciled or residing within 
British Canada for purposes of any of these legal distinctions. A careful search ofAmerican legal 
databases disclosed only one case in which any federal court in the United States confronted the 
question of the legal status of a Canadian Indian before 1900. That case dealt with naturalization and 
treated a Canadian Indian as an American Indian would have been treaty in a like situation by holding 
that the Canadian Indian should be treated as a person of the Indian race and therefore not a "white 
62 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562. 
63 E.g Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Central Machinery Co. v. Ari=ona Tax 
Conn'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (recent examples of the use of modem statutory remnants of the Trade and Intercourse Acts 
to invalidate state efforts to tax Indian trade). 
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person" then required to be eligible for naturalization.64 During most of the nineteenth century, the 
relevant legal distinctions were Indian and non-Indian. The locale of birth, domicile or residence of the 
Indian in question was considered largely relatively irrelevant to resolving border issues, trade, or the 
like since both Canadian and American Indians were then simply considered "Indians" and neither was 
treated as a citizen of the United States. Until the United States generally granted Indian in the United 
States citizenship in the United States ofAmerica in 1924, the United States courts drew absolutely no 
distinctions between India.ns of Canadian domicile and residence and those domiciled and resident in 
the United States for any purpose related to trade, border crossing or the like. 
Perhaps the best non-judicial evidence of this fact involves the flights of two great Indian 
leaders toward British Canada after armed conflict with the United State military on the western 
frontier. In 1877, Chief Joseph led his beleaguered Wallowa band of Nez Perce Indians on a protracted 
and ultimately unsuccessful flight to Canada to avoid American military authorities who sought to 
remove these Indians from their aboriginal homelands to a distant reservation not of their choosing. 
His band was stopped just 40 mile (60 km) short of the Canadian frontier and relocated to a 
reservation.65 In contrast, after the Battle of Greasy Grass (or, as most non-Indians know it, the Battle 
of the Little Big Horn) in 1876, Sitting Bull, the great Lakota (Sioux) war leader, relocated his 
followers into Canada where he and some of them remained for almost a half decade, apparently 
initially intending to remain permanently resident there. Thus, Sitting Bull and his band of Lakota 
followers acquired a new domicile and residence by their flight to Canada. Nevertheless, when Sitting 
Bull returned to the United States in 1881, he was treated identically to Chief Joseph and relocated 
ultimately to the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation. 66 The identity ofAmerican treatment ofChief 
64 See, In re Camile, 6 F. 256 (C.C.D.Or., 1880) (petitioner with white Canadian father and Indian mother from British 
Columbia ineligible for naturalization as an Indian and therefore not a "white person" as then required for American 
naturalization). 
65 See generally, K. Nerburn, ChiefJoseph & the Flight of the Ne= Perce: The Untold Story ofan American Tragedy 
(2005), 
66 See generally, B. Yenne, Sitting Bull(2008); 1. Manzione, 1 Am Looking to the Northfor My Life--Sitting Bull. 
1876-1881(1994); R. Utley, The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times ofSitting Bull (1993); S. Vestal, Sitting Bull: 
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Joseph, who had unsuccessfully sought to lead his band to a new life in British Canada, and Sitting 
BuH, who had in fact changed his domicile and residence to British Canada with the permission of the 
Canadian authorities and who had remained there for five years following the Battle of Greasy Grass, 
reflects the fact that before 1900 American law formally drew no distinctions whatsoever between 
Indians who were born, domiciled or resided in British Canada and those whose origins, domicile and 
residence was in the United States. With limited exceptions, neither were citizens of the United 
States,67 and both were simply lumped together for the purposes discussed in this section as "Indians" 
of their tribal nation of origin.68 Consequently, what little evidence exists suggests that federal Indian 
law in the United States ofAmerica before 1900 drew absolutely no distinctions between Indians born, 
domiciled or residing in Canada and those born, domiciled or residing in the United States for any 
purpose relevant to this Arbitration, including regulations involving Indian trade and commerce. 
D. Reasonable E][pectations of the ClaimantslInvestors Between 1994 and 2006
 
Based on the historical context, the relevant treaties involving or affecting the Haudenosaunee,
 
including the Jay Treaty of 1794, and the basic structure of federal Indian law during the period, this 
Expert is of the opinion that the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors could have no reasonable 
expectation that most of the business they conducted as tobacco manufacturers and traders could 
lawfully be subjected to the two types of regulatory measures at issue in this Arbitration (i.e. the state­
government-enacted escrow measures and lists of brands banned from distribution in each state). This 
opinion is based on the structure history and context of the Indian free trade and free passage 
provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, the modern interpretation of the Indian Commerce 
Champion o/the Sioux, a Biography (1932); B. Ladow, Sanctuary: Native Border Crossings and the North American 
West, 2001 American Review o/Canadian Studies 25 
67 See. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) 
68 See also, New York Indians ~~ United States, 40 Ct. CI. 448 (1905) (Relying on the example of Sitting Bull and the flight 
of the Kickapoo Indians to Mexico to demonstrate that the intended domicile ofIndians was not determinative of United 
States Indian law or policy); see also, Sully l\ United States, 195 F. 113 (D. S.D. 1912) (finding offact No, 24 references 
the birth of Sioux child named Reanor Waugh in Canada while her mother was there during a "temporary absence" from 
the Great Sioux Reservation, probably with Sitting Bull's followers, yet she is treated identically to her American born 
Sioux siblings). 
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Clause ofArticle I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, and the structure and content 
of modem domestic Indian law in the United States. For reasons stated below, all three sources point in 
the same direction, i.e that States of the Union in the United States have no power whatsoever to 
regulate Indian commerce" particularly Indian commerce protected by treaty provisions like those 
found in Article 3 of the Jay Treaty of] 794. That conclusion is certainly strongest with respect to (l) 
the activities of the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors involving on-reserve sales and (2) products 
manufactured under contract on-reserve in Canada, but sold FOB the Six Nations Reserve in Canada 
directly to unrelated third parties who themselves import into the United States and market such 
products under their own brand labels. While the States of Union may have a slightly stronger claim 
under the law prevailing b~:tween ] 994 and 2006 for authority to exercise some powers over off-reserve 
sales by the Haudenosaunee ClaimantslInvestors within each respective states in which directly market 
their products, this Expert, for reasons set forth below, nevertheless concludes that such sales remained 
exempt from state regulation and taxation, unapproved by the Congress of the United States, due to the 
Indian free trade and free passage provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of] 794, the Indian 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and the continued effects of cases like Central 
Machinery. 
As the extensive research contained in this Expert's published article entitled The Dormant 
Indian Commerce Clause, set forth as Appendix C, indicates, for most of the history of the United 
States, American domestic legal doctrine prevented any state regulation, taxation, or other exercises of 
sovereign authority over Indians either within Indian country (i.e. on-reserve) or involving Indian trade 
and commerce. The basic explanation for that conclusion was set forth in the discussions and 
references above to the cornerstone case of Worcester v. Georgia, discussed above. Until the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, a combination of the dormant effects of the Indian commerce clause, 
the geographic preemption created by federal protection of tribal sovereignty over set aside aboriginal 
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lands, and the effects off(~deral constitutional, statutory, and regulatory occupation of the field of 
Indian trade and affairs precluded any state regulation, excises or other taxes, or other interferences 
with Indian trade or commerce that had not been expressly approved by Congress. 
~DUring the last quarter of the twentieth century and first part nfthis century, the federal courts 
unilaterally began to weaken the absolute preclusion of any regulation or taxation of Indian commerce 
or control over activities occurring in Indian country. Those cases, however, are quite limited. In 
general, the decisions grant states broader authority than exercised previously over taxing non-Indians 
for purchases made in Indian country (i.e. on-reserve), while retaining an absolute bar to any the 
application of any state regulatory and tax laws to Indians in Indian country in the absence of 
Congressional legislation to the contrary. Most of the cases reflecting these changes are set forth in 
Appendix C and will not b,e further discussed in detail here. The best, and perhaps most applicable, 
,illustration of these principles involves a series of so-called "Indian smokeshop" cases heard by the 
United States Supreme COlJrt between 1976 and 1994 which permitted states to impose cigarette 
excises taxes on Indian sal(~s of cigarettes to non-Indians within an Indian reservation, while 
simultaneously holding that Indian tribal purchasers were completely exempt from the same taxes. 69 
Central to the analysis of the Supreme Court in these cases was the fact that the legal incidence of the 
tax in question fell on the non-Indian purchaser of the cigarettes. In such cases, as the Moe and 
Collville cases indicate, Indian sellers could be required to precollect the tax through cigarette excise 
stamps and to keep reasonable tax records reflecting the volume of their sale to non-Indians. States, 
nevertheless, had difficulty enforcing these requirements since any effort to directly sue the Indian 
tribal sellers was thwarted, as the Court held in Citizen Band ofPotowatomi, by the immunity of the 
69 Moe v. COIifederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Washington v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 447 
U.S. 134 (1980); California Bd. OJEquali=ation v. Chemehuevi Tribe. 474 Us. 9 (/985); N. Y Dept oj Taxation v. 
Milhem Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Cifi=en Band ojPotawatomi Tribe oj 
Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (despite validity of state cigarette excise tax on on-reservation sales by Indians to non­
Indians state could not sue to Ithe Tribe to collect the tax due to the sovereignty of the Tribe and its immunity from suit). 
This Expert should disclose that worked as a paid consultant for the attorneys representing the Confederated Colville 
Tribes on its Brief in the Unite:d States Supreme Court in the Colville litigation. 
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Indian tribes from such direct state initiated litigation. Where, however, the state attempted to directly 
tax Indian tribal members for tobacco sales, as the various states have attempted to do with respect to 
the Haudenosaunee ClaimantslInvestors in this dispute, the United States Supreme Court has 
consistently held, as it did in both the Moe and ColvWe cases, that the states lacked any taxing power to 
directly tax or regulate tribal Indians with respect to on-reservation tobacco sales. More recently, the 
Court has reaffirmed the complete and total immunity of tribal Indians from direct state regulation, 
taxation and excises for on-reservation activities in a series of non-tobacco related tax cases.70 A recent 
illustration of this principle closer the events that provoked this arbitration occurred in Thompson v, 
Country ofFranklin, 987 F. Supp. 111 (N.D.N.V. 1997) where the federal district court ruled that a 
New York country had no right to tax the lands of a Mohawk Indian (the Mohawks constituting a 
constituent tribe ofthe Hauclenosaunee) even though such lands lay outside of the diminished 
boundaries ofthe St. Regis Mohawk Reservation ofNew York because Congress had never approved 
such taxation or reduction ofthe reservation boundaries. Thus, without express authorization from 
Congress, states have no power to regulate or tax Indians directly for their commerce or their lands and 
the Indian Claimants/Investors had no reason to expect otherwise in the period between 1994 and 2006. 
It should also be emphasized that while the United States Supreme Court has modified prior 
doctrine to pennit limited state taxation of tobacco sales to non-Indians in Indian country, the Court has 
never permitted the direct regulation of tribal Indian activities in Indian country by a state. The prior 
law completely preempting and precluding any such direct regulation remains unaffected by the limited 
exceptions the Court has made for the collection of taxation of non-Indian for purchases in Indian 
country. The state schemes involved in this Arbitration clearly involve significant direct regulation of 
Indian manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products with the threat to totally ban sale of the products 
of the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors if they do not fully comply with the state escrow 
70 See e.g.. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw 
Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
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requirements. Since both the state-enacted listing ban and the state escrow requirements involved state 
regulatory structures that the states in question seek to directly apply to and enforce against the Indian 
Claimants/Investors in this I~ase for on-reservation activities, the only conceivable conclusion anyone 
familiar with domestic American Indian law could draw during the period between 1994 and 2006 is 
that such state laws could not lawfully be applied to the on-reserve business activities of the 
Haudenosaunsee ClaimantsJ1nvestors. Thus, the Indian Claimants/Investors had no reasonable 
expectation between 1994 and 2006 that the state escrow requirements or the listing ban on their 
products could be applied to their on-reserve activities. 
One other possible change in American law since the nineteenth century is that since Indians 
born in the United States were unilaterally, and often involuntarily, granted United States citizenship in 
1924 (a act that some of the Haudenosaunee reject as unlawful to this day),?! American Indian law has 
increasingly begun to draw a distinction between Indians from tribes outside the United States who 
were born and domiciled elsewhere and Indians from tribes indigenous to the United States. 
Increasingly, the some courts and federal agencies in the United States have begun to treat the former 
as if they were non-Indian, notwithstanding their Indian ancestry.72 Nevertheless, this alteration, 
71 Compare. Albany v. United States, 152 F.2d 266 (6th CiT. 1945) (Canadian Mohawk Indian resident of the United States 
appealing selective service conviction on the grounds that American draft laws did not apply to him); United States v. 
Cook, 383 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. N.Y. 1974)(same).ln noting that United States law in 1924 involuntarily conferred United 
States citizenship on American Indians from tribes of United States origin or residence, this Expert Opinion Report takes 
no position on whether the invc:stors are "nationals of Canada" under the NAFTA, because that is a question of Canadian 
law over which this Expert professes no special expertise. 
72 E.g. State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (Canadian Indian not treated as an Indian for jurisdictional 
purposes since unable to show sufficient connection with a United States Indian tribe); Cayuga Indian Nation ofNew 
York, v. Coumo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1305 nA (W. D. N.Y. 1983)(briefly noting a distinction between American and 
Canadian Cayugas); but see, Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975) (Supreme Court notes that the Canadian Indian 
wife of a United States Indian was and should be treated identically to her husband for purposes of the appeal based on 
claims of off-reservation hunting rights of their off-reservation hunting conviction). The leading scholarly commentator 
on the enforcement of the Indian free trade and passage guarantees of the 1794 Jay Treaty reports that" 
Canadian-born Indians frequently find that officials of the INS and other federal agencies are grossly underinformed 
about Indian rights." S. O'Bri(~n. The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies, and Families. 
53 Fordham L. Rev. 315, 330-331 (1984). Congress, nevertheless, sometimes has decided to expressly treat American 
Indians, i.e. Indians from tribes located in the United States, but who were born in Canada as otherwise identical to 
United States Indians for purposes of certain benefits, such as SSI and food stamps. 8 U.S.C. § I6I2(a)(2)(G). 
Likewise, at one time, the federal regulations permitted the United States Indian Health Service to serve any "Indian of 
Canadian or Mexican origin rec:ognized by any Indian tribe or group as a member of an Indian community served by the 
Indian Health program." Indian Health Service Manual, Part 2, Ch. I, s 2-1.2, quoted in Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. 
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adopted by some courts, in the approach to deciding who is an Indian governed by United States Indian 
law should have no application to those Claimants/Investors who are are members ofCanadian, rather 
than United States, Indian tribes. Since the primary point of the Indian free trade and free passage 
rights of the ] 794 Jay Treaty was to help reunify the Haudenosaunee who, contrary to their Great Law 
of Peace, had become disunified and divided by a then newly-created international boundary between 
British Canada and the United States, treating Canadian Indians from the Haudenosaunee as non-
Indians for purpose of federal Indian law doctrine would completely subvert the point ofthe treaty 
guarantees. Thus, at least one court has recognized that for most federal Indian law purposes, the 
Haudenosaunee must be treated as one people despite the international border that involuntarily 
separated them after the American Revolution. In re Linda J W, l79 Misc. 2d 96 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998) 
(ruling that for purposes of (:hild adoption by a Canadian Indian under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 
]978 "[t]he border which separates Canada from the United States ... has been subsequently adopted 
and ratified by the United States and Canada. The existence of this border has no effect on the 
community of the Six Nations .... This continuity of the Six Nations community is recognized by the 
United States and Canada in the right of free and uninhibited passage of people and goods across the 
United States/Canada border which is granted to the Six Nations under the Jay Treaty."). It is therefore 
the conclusion of this Expert that as to on-reserve sales, the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors (both 
those who are members ofCanadian First Nations and those who are members of Indian tribes in the 
United States) had absolutely no reasonable expectation in the period of 1994 through 2006 that their 
manufacture, importation, and distribution could be subject to any form of state-enacted regulation or 
Supp. 652 (D. N.M. 1976). In United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269 (D. Alask. Terr. 1958), the court noted that the 
Metlakatla Indian community in Alaska was not aboriginal to Alaska but were Indians who immigrated to Alaska in the 
nineteenth century from British Columbia, precisely the reverse of the situation involving the Canadian Indians in this 
Artibtration. Nevertheless, the Court held that they were entitled to be treated like any other Indian under American 
Indian law. At least one Soliciltor General's Opinion for the United States Department ofthe Interior advances the view 
that a Canadian Indian who is l:nrolled member of a United States Indian tribe should be treated as an Indian fully 
subject to that tribe's jurisdiction in the same way as any American Member, Op. Sol., Oct. IS, 1936, 1938 WL 6858 
(SoI.Gen.). 
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taxation, including the specifically the state-government-enacted escrow measures and lists of brands 
banned from distribution in each state, without express approval by Congress (which to date has not 
occurred). 
As to the actions of the Haudeonosaunee Claimants/Investors in manufacturing and selling 
cigarettes and other tobacco products (sold FOB the Six Nations Reserve in Canada) on-reserve in 
Canada to third parties parties who then import them into the United States and sell them under their 
own label, the law could not be clearer that no state had authority to project its regulatory or tax laws 
outside its borders (and outside the borders of the United States) to reach manufacturing and sales 
activities occurring completely within the nation of Canada and outside of the jurisdiction of both the 
United States and any state thereof. It is has long been understood that even Congress could not project 
its laws into another country and affect the activities of Indians, even Indians domiciled within the 
United States borders, within that country. See, Coralitos Stock Company v. United States, 33 Ct. CI. 
342 (1898) (rejecting the application of federal Indian claims statutes to the actions of Germonimo's 
band of Chiricahua Apache lndians for depredations done in Mexico because the United States had no 
power to regulate such actions in a foreign country). The conclusion of the court in Coralitos Stock 
Company seems compelled by the very nature of the limits of sovereignty of any nation created by an 
international boundary. Any government possesses sovereignty and full governing powers within its 
boundaries, not outside ofit. Ifthe federal government had no such constitutional power to regulate 
Indian activities outside of the nation's borders, certainly no State of the Union would have any such 
power since foreign affairs are exclusively a federal matter under the United States Constitution. Thus, 
this Expert is of the opinion that no reasonable business person would have had any reasonable 
expectation during the relevant period that activities involving manufacture and sale of tobacco 
products (or any other product occurring) completely within the country of Canada could or would 
subject them to any regulation or taxation by any state within the United States, including the two types 
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of regulations at issue in this Arbitration. 
Finally, with respect to the off-reserve sales undertaken directly by the Haudenosaunee 
Claimants/Investors, this Expert is clearly of the opinion that no reasonable Indian business person 
could have conceivably expected any state regulation listing and banning their products would have 
been legally possible during the relevant period of 1994 through 2006. By contrast, while reasonable 
Indian business person might have considered the possibility of state taxation, but not regulation, of 
their off-reserve sales (notwithstanding the existence of substantial legal arguments, described below 
suggesting the invalidity of such taxation), no reasonable aboriginal investor would have thought 
during the relevant period that any state would have authority to regulate Indian trade, not through 
taxation, but by demanding the type of escrow payments demanded here by the state-enacted 
legislation essentially as reparations or anticipated damages for the tobacco products being sold by 
Indian off-reserve. The entire basis for this Conclusion involves this Expert's understanding of the 
Indian Commerce Clause ofthe United States Constitution,73 its history and interpretation. The history 
of that constitutional clause is the central theme of his published articles set forth in Appendices Band 
C. As the article entitled The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, demonstrates, there has been some 
erosion in the force of the preemption of state regulatory and taxing authority from the earliest 
interpretation of by the United States Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 32 U.S. (6 Pet). 515 
(1832). In that case, as noted above, the United States Supreme Court held, among other things, that 
the Indian Commerce Clause granted the exclusive right of regulating Indian commerce and trade to 
Congress. Consequently, any state regulations or taxation of such Indian trade and commerce was 
unconstitutional since it usurped an exclusive function of the Congress. 
The exclusivity of national regulation of commerce and trade continued, as The Dormant 
Indian Commerce article demonstrates, until the late quarter of the twentieth century. As the Supreme 
73 U.S. Const., Art. I sec. 8 cl. 3. 
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Court recently ruled, the Indian Commerce Clause makes "Indian relations ... the exclusive province of 
federal law." County ofOneida v. Oneida Indian Nation ofN. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 234 (1985). For 
example, in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the Supreme Court ruled that state courts had no 
authority to adjudicate a consumer credit contract dispute between a licensed Indian trader and his 
Navajo customers since such matters had been left by Congress to the exclusive adjudication of the 
tribes. While the Supreme Court subsequently backed away from treating the Indian Commerce Clause 
as an automatic absolute barrier to any and all state and taxation ofIndian commerce, in Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980), a case involving the 
sale of cigarettes and tobacc:o products, the Court nevertheless ruled: 
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, of its own 
force, automatically bars all state taxation of matters significantly touching the political 
and economic interests of the Tribes. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, 425 
U.S., at 481, n. 17,96 S.Ct., at 1645. That Clause may have a more limited role to play 
in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on, Indian commerce. 
(Emphasis supplied), More recently, in Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida, 517 US 44, 62 (1996), the 
Court again discussed the ejfect of the Indian Commerce Clause on state power to regulate Indian trade 
and ruled that under that Clause "the States ... have been divested ofvirtually all authority over Indian 
commerce and Indian tribes."74 
While most Indian commerce within the United States takes place within reservations (Le. on-
reserve), the effects of the Indian Commerce Clause and Indian law doctrines generally have never 
been held limited to reservation boundaries. For example, in Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), the Supreme Court applied the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, a 
statute Congress passed under the authority of the Indian Commerce Clause, to the adoption ofIndian 
74 This Expert recognizes that is a virtually unanalyzed section of the opinion in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 
490 U. S. 163, 192 (1989), the: Supreme Court had previously taken a permissive view toward the effects of the Indian 
Commerce Clause on state taxation of Indian commerce. Nevertheless, the later treatment of the effects of the Indian 
Commerce Clause on state power to regulate and tax Indian trade and commerce in Seminole Tribe seems to reject that 
single aberrant ruling by the Court. 
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children that occurred hundreds of miles from their reservation. 
Likewise, in Kiowa Tribe ofOklahma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 
(1998), the Supreme Court ruled that conventional doctrines of United States Indian law, such as the 
sovereign immunity ofIndian tribes, apply irrespetive of where the Indian commerce occurs, noting 
that "[t]o date, our cases have sustained tribal immunity from suit without drawing a distinction based 
on where the tribal activities occurred." While the Court did note that "a State may have authority to 
tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the State but outside Indian country. See Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148-149 (1973); see also Organized Village ofKake v. Egan, 369 
U. S. 60, 75 (1962)," it, nevertheless, noted that the limited authority it recognized for such taxation 
necessarily means that the state had authority to enforce its laws against an Indian tribe off-reservation, 
noting "[t]here is a differen<:e between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means 
available to enforce them." It specifically noted that in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of 
Potawatomi Tribe ofOkla., 498 U. S. 505 (1991), it had expressly recognized the tribal Indian 
immunity from suit by a state over taxation of cigarette sales. 
In perhaps the c1eare:st example that Indian commerce includes dealings between Indians and 
non-Indians off-reservation, the Supreme Court ruled in Central Machinery v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm 'n, 448 US 160 (1980), that the federal Licensed Indian Trader Statute and regulations 
thereunder, which were the :first statutes passed under the Indian Commerce Clause and constitute 
surviving remnants in the United States Code of the original final Trade and Intercourse Acts, 
(discussed above), preempte:d any state sales taxation of the sale of farm machinery by an off­
reservation fann implement dealer to Indians even though the sale occurred outside the reservation. 
The Court found such state taxation constituted an interference with Indian commerce and trade 
regulated under the federal Licensed Indian Trader Statute. 
Clearly, as the Supreme Court ruled in the Colville and Citizen Band ofPotawatomi cases, that 
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portion of the integrated activities by the Haudensaunee Claimants/Investors involving manufacture, 
importation, and sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products attributable to and occurring within the 
borders of the United States constitutes Indian commerce within the meaning of the Indian Commerce 
Clause. It involves Indian trade and commerce. That portion of the state-enacted regulations that lists 
of brands cigarettes and other tobacco products which are banned from distribution in each state 
constitutes an total and complete embargo on such Indian commerce. No more serious impediment or 
interference with Indian commerce can be imagined. Thus, given the Colville decision expressly 
indicated that the Indian Commerce Clause operates to prevent states from imposing "undue ... 
burdens, on Indian commerce," this Expert is firmly of the opinion that any reasonable Indian investor 
would have believed during the relevant period that no state could have imposed a regulatory measure 
on Indian commerce that lists certain brands of cigarettes or tobacco products that are prohibited from 
sale and distribution within the state. Any reasonable Indian investor would have believed during the 
relevant period, for the reasons indicated above, that any such state regulation, when not approved by 
Congress, would be per se invalid for totally banning Indian commerce, a subject area left under 
prevailing American law to primary federal, not state, regulation. 
The issue of state-enacted mandatory escrow payments for off-reserve sales is somewhat more 
difficult. As noted above, during the relevant period, American courts have not regarded the mere state 
taxation of off-reservation Indian activities as imposing undue burdens and restraints on Indian 
commerce or interfering with nation powers, so long as it did not conflict with federal laws regulating 
such Indian trade or commerce. Compare, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148-149 
(1973) (state taxation ofIndian income from off-reserve ski facility upheld but not state property taxes 
on off-reserve equipment otherwise protected by federal statutes) with Central Machinery v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, 448 US 160 (1980) (state taxation of off-reservation machinery sale to Indians 
invalid as inconsistent with the federal Licensed Indian Trader statute). While cases like Mescalero 
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Apache may provide the states with some arguments for authority to collect extract taxes or like excise 
payments from Indians engaged in Indian commerce, several considerations suggest to this Expert that 
in this case the state-enacted escrow payment requirements would have been thought by any reasonable 
aboriginal investor to be legally invalid at all times relevant to this Arbitration. First, unlike the 
taxation of activities involved in Mescalero Apache, the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors were 
involved in Indian trade and commerce that by the express provisions ofArticle 3 of the Jay Treaty of 
1794 were to be exempt from all tariffs, duties, excises, and other interferences. Consequently, as in 
Central Machinery, the state-enacted escrow payment scheme at issue in this Arbitration, conflicts with 
a federally-approved policy of furthering Indian trade and commerce and, therefore, could not 
reasonably have been expected to lawfully apply to the activities of the Indian Claimants/Investors 
between 1994 and 2006. Some federal courts have ruled (erroneously in the judgment of this Expert), 
as noted above, that the unexplained lack of continuation in the 1897 Tariff Revision Act of the express 
of the statutory exemption for Indian commerce and trade from federal tariffs first enacted in 1799 in 
the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 105, 1 Stat. 627, 702 to implement the Indian free trade provisions 
of the 1794 Jay Treaty abrogated those rights with reference to the federal government. Nevertheless, 
the 1897 Tariff Revision Act is completely silent on and does not in any fashion address the question of 
state taxation of Indian trade and commerce crossing the international border under the authority of 
Article 3 of the 1794 Jay Tr,eaty. Thus, even if the 1897 Tariff Revision Act can property be seen as an 
abrogation of the Indian frec~ trade guarantees ofthe 1794 Jay Treaty (which this Expert doubts), it 
certainly not constitute the type of express Congressional approval which would be required for 
imposition of any state taxes on such treaty-protected Indian trade and commerce. No case of which 
this Expert is aware has held that the free trade and free passage rights ofthe Haudenosaunee 
Claimants/Investors under the 1794 Jay Treaty have been abrogated by federal law as against state 
taxation and regulation. Thus, even if, for purposes of argument, the federal government ofthe United 
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States may now have a claim to interfere with those rights based on the dubious cases discussed above, 
no such claim can be made for state interference with such rights. Congress has simply never approved 
the state-enacted tobacco measures at issue in this Arbitration and has never expressly authorized the 
states to interfere in any fashion with Indian trade and commerce or with the rights of the 
Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors under Article 3 of the 1794 Jay Treaty. Consequently, during the 
relevant period no aboriginal investor would have any reasonable expectation that cross-border Indian 
commerce or other business activities of the type at issue in this Arbitration could be made subject 
without Congressional approval to the state-enacted escrow payments demands involved in this 
Arbitration. Second, while the courts have permitted some limited state taxation of off-reservation 
Indian commerce and trade, this Expert is aware of no case that authorizes direct state regulation, as 
opposed to taxation, of Indian commerce and trade. The state-enacted escrow payment system does not 
constitute part of an isolated, self-standing system of taxation. Rather, it is part of an integrated 
regulatory scheme enacted by the states as part of a negotiated settlement with portions of the tobacco 
industry, not including the Haudenonsaunee Claimants/Investors, to resolve a series of law suits 
regarding damages from adverse health effects of tobacco products. While the states have considerable 
power without any approval by Congress to apply such regulations to non-Indian commerce in 
cigarettes and tobacco products manufactured, sold or distributed in each of the states, each of the 
states lacks the ability without express Congressional approval to regulate Indian trade and commerce 
of the type undertaken by the Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors in this case. The Seminole Tribe 
case clearly stated the states have been completely divested of any authority to directly regulate Indian 
trade and commerce. Thus, when the escrow payment demand requirement of the state-enacted 
tobacco legislation is seen in its full context as part of a state regulatory, as opposed to taxing, measure, 
it is clear that the very limited right of states of tax off-reservation Indian activities when not in conflict 
with federal law and policy recognized in cases like Mescalero Apache, would not justify the extensive 
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state-enacted escrow payme:nt requirement. That requirement is part of a larger, complex regulatory 
scheme for the manufacture, distribution, and sale of tobacco products that, when applied to Indian 
trade and commerce, would be thought by any reasonable aboriginal investor during the relevant period 
to be beyond the authority of any state to enact without express statutory approval by Congress 
specifically directed toward its application to Indian commerce. 
Finally, this Opinion, has to this point drawn no distinction between the Canadian 
Claimants/Investors (the manufacturers), the one Claimant/Investor who is a member of a United States 
Indian tribe who serves as the exclusive American distributor for on-reserve sales, and Tobaccoville, 
the exclusive distributor of the Claimantsiinvestor tobacco products off-reservation. Rather, most of 
the Opinion has assumed that the business activities ofthe all Claimants/Investors in this Arbitration 
constitute an integrated business plan, notwithstanding the separate business entities and owners 
involved in the operation. The Seneca brand is based upon United States registered trademarks 
controlled by Arthur Montour, who is the Claimant/Investor who is a domiciled and enrolled member 
of the Townawanda Seneca Band. NWS licenses GRE as the exclusive manufacturer of the Seneca 
brand and GRE designates ]\'WS as its exclusive distributor on-reserve (previously everywhere, until 
they went off reserve in '02). Additionally, Opal branded cigarettes are sold on-reserve, albeit 
constituting a smaller portion ofthe on-reserve sales. The Opal brand is based upon United States 
registered trademarks contro:lled by the two Canadian-domiciled Claimants/Investors, the use ofwhich 
is licensed to NWS. The reason for this integrated treatment is that in the opinion of this Expert for 
almost all purposes, as explained above, it makes virtually no legal difference whether the 
manufacturers (GRE) and Indian (as opposed to non-Indian) distributor (NWS) of the tobacco products 
in question are regarded as one integrated commercial enterprise or two separate enterprises. In either 
event, they are still engaged in Indian trade and commerce in cigarettes and tobacco products and the 
all Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors are entitled to avail themselves ofthe Indian free trade and 
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passage rights under the 1794 Jay Treaty. 
Since GRE sells the: cigarettes and other tobacco products it manufactures under contract with 
third parties FOB the Six Nations Reserve in Canada, neither GRE nor NWS are not involved at all in 
the importation, distribution, and sale of such "private brand" cigarette and other tobacco products. 
The importation, distribution and sale of such "private brand" products is undertaken by the third 
parties and the characterization of the business of the Claimant/Investors manufacture and distribution 
scheme as separate or integrated therefore is irrelevant to the "private brand" sales. 
Because the importation and all distribution in the United States for on-reserve sales of the 
tobacco products in question are controlled by an Indian firm owned by a member of an American 
Indian Nation (NWS) and even the right of the Canadian Indian manufacturers (GRE) to import its 
product into the United Stat,es free of state monetary excises or other interferences is guaranteed by 
the 1794 Jay Treaty, it should make no difference to any legal analysis of on-reserve sales whether 
GRE and NWS are regarded as one integrated economic enterprise or two separate enterprises. 
There is, however, one important context involving off-reservation sales where the difference in 
characterization of the enterprise might affect the legal analysis in question. For off-reserve sales of its 
Seneca and Opal cigarettes, GRE sells the cigarettes to Tobaccoville and arranges transport of the 
products to a Free Trade Zone within the United States (USFTZ). Since the cigarettes and other 
tobacco products legally have not entered the United States while in the USFTZ, GRE, while arranging 
for transport to the USFTZ, has technically performed no act within the State of New York (or any 
other state, for that matter) which would render it subject to the jurisdiction and regulatory authority of 
the state, as explained more fully above. While recognized by Canada, the Six Nations Reserve might 
not be seen as constituting Indian country under United Sates domestic law, see Grand River 
Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2005), and, as Canadian Indians, GRE 
might not, be considered (without the benefit of the guarantees of the 1794 Jay Treaty), as Indians 
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protected by American Indian law during the period of 1994 through 2006. Nevertheless, even if GRE 
is considered to constitute a separate enterprise (not integrated with NWS or Tobaccoville in a larger 
business enterprise), there is no reasonable legal argument for imposing any of the state-enacted 
regulatory obligations at issue in this case on GRE. As this expert understands the matter, GRE directly 
transports the Claimant/lnvl:stors' own branded products into the territory of the United States by 
delivering them to various USFTZs. These products remain outside the regulatory jurisdiction of a 
state, as discussed extensively above, unless and until they were removed from the USFTZ by 
Tobaccoville or any other non-Indian party. GRE is the only the manufacturer of those products and 
all of its manufacturing activities occur on the Six Nations Reserve in Canada. American courts have 
long recognized that neither national nor state Indian laws can apply to or reach the activities of 
Indians, even natives from Indians Nations aboriginal to the United Sates, when they occur within a 
foreign nation. See, Coralitos Stock Company v. United States, 33 C1. CI. 342 (] 898). Thus, if GRE, 
the manufacturer, is viewed as a separate non-integrated enterprise, its manufacturing activities, which 
occurred solely in Canada, could not reasonably have been thought at any time relevant to this 
arbitration to have subjected it the state-enacted tobacco regulations at issue in this Arbitration. 
Thus, while the analysis of off-reserve sales might change slightly if one views GRE, NWS, 
and Tobaccoville as separate" rather than integrated, enterprises, the ultimate legal result is not altered 
with respect to GRE by difference in conceptualization. NWS distributes exclusively on-reserve. As 
explained above, its activities are separately fully protected from state regulation or taxation by the 
1794 Jay Treaty, the Indian Commerce Clause and the general domestic doctrines of the United States 
Indian law. By contrast, however, Tobaccoville itselfwould not have the same protections if treated 
separately with regard to off-reserve sales. It constitutes the exclusive off-reserve distributor of Seneca 
and Opal branded products manufactured in Canada by GRE. This Expert understands that 
Tobaccoville is a non-Indian owned and controlled firm. Since it takes possession of the cigarette and 
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tobacco products at warehouses located within a USFTZ, Tobaccoville's activities, when considered 
separately and not as part of an integrated enterprise with GRE and NWS, are not governed by the 1794 
Jay Treaty provisions. Likewise, as a non-Indian owned and controlled business, its activities, when 
considered in isolation, in distributing Seneca branded cigarettes off-reserve within any state would 
neither constitute Indian commerce within the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause nor be subject 
to any doctrines of federal Indian law excluding state regulation or taxation for its distribution and sales 
to other non-Indians off-reserve. Thus, the states would have a perfectly valid justification for 
imposing the escrow payment regulation on Tobaccoville for its off-reserve sales of Seneca products 
This is not to say that the ml~asures at issue may not otherwise violate international law or a particular 
provision ofthe NAFTA, which are questions beyond the scope of this opinion. 
Moreover, the fact that the states could impose the escrow payment regulation on Tobaccoville, 
does not, however, justify the direct or indirect imposition of such regulations on GRE, as the 
manufacturer and brand licensee, or NWS, as the trademark holder, of the Seneca cigarettes since the 
normal doctrines of federal Indian law discussed above do apply to their involvement in these activities 
with Tobaccoville. Likewis{:, state-enacted regulations that ban specific brands cannot be applied to 
brands that are owned by Indians and employed both on and off reservation, such as Seneca and Opal. 
Tobaccoville is not the owner of the Seneca and Opal brands; it is merely the distributor. Applying this 
kind of regulation to the Seneca and Opal brands based on Tobaccoville's off-reserve distribution 
would interfere with Indian commerce by the Claimants/Investors on-reserve and illegally and 
improperly project state regulatory authority into Indian country beyond the reach recognized by 
current American domestic law. 
Conclusion 
Ever since the Haudenosaunee Confederation negotiated the Two Wampum Belt Treaty with the 
Dutch they have maintained a legal conceptualization of their relationship with their non-Indian 
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neighbors suggesting that the two communities were each traveling in parallel down the river of life in 
in their separate canoes, each taking their separate but parallel course down the river and neither 
community interfering with the economic, social or internal affairs of the other. While the American 
Revolution and the War of 1812 tore asunder both Gayanashagowa (the Great Law of Peace) that 
bound the Haudenosaunee Confederation together and the Two Wampum Belt principles of 
relationships with outsiders,. following each of these two wars Great Britain and the Haudenosaunee 
acted rapidly in both Article 3 of the 1794 Jay Treaty and Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent to heal those 
rifts, reunite the Haudenosauanee politically, if not geographically, and to assure both the parties to the 
Treaty and the Huadensosaunee that the international boundary between British Canada and the United 
States would not interfere with Haudensosaunee effort to travel down their path of life on this earth as a 
united people. By unilateralily seeking to apply to the Indian commerce undertaken by these 
Haudenosaunee Claimants/Investors the two state-enacted tobacco regulations involved in this 
Arbitration, the states have abruptly steered their canoe in an completely unexpected, unprincipled, 
and, probably unlawful, manner. These erratic and aberrant state errors in navigating the stream of 
Indian commerce have created the single largest collision of the two parallel canoes since the War of 
1812. As set forth more fully in this Expert Opinion Report and the attached published articles, no 
Haudenosaunee business investor reasonably could have foreseen or legally anticipated such gross 
deviations from the course of economic relations between the Haudenosaunee and the Americans 
prescribed by the 1794 Jay Treaty, the 1814 Treaty ofGhent, the Indian Commerce Clause of the 
United States and domestic federal Indian law. This Expert also has serious and grave doubts about 
the legality of such unilateral state-enacted deviations from the parallel course, particularly when they 
so grossly violate the rules for the navigation of the field ofIndian commerce prescribed by both the 
United States Constitution, Congress, and federally-approved treaties. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
~ ~. c.e~~~ 
Robert N. Clinton 
Indian Legal Program 
Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law 
1100 S. McAllister St. 
Box 877906 
Tempe AZ 85287-7906 
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In re: Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. 
Jerry Montour, Kenneth Hill and Arthur Montour, Jr., 
Claimants I Investors, 
- against-
United States of Amt~rica, 
Respondent I Party 
Opinion of Matthew L.M. Fletcher 
Expertise 
This expert opinion has been prepared, and is being offered for, the Tribunal's 
consideration in the above-referenced arbitration. It is based upon my professional and 
academic training, my personal investigations, and materials provided by the Claimants, 
as specified herein. I offer this opinion as an independent expert to the Tribunal, albeit 
retained by the Claimants. 
I am Associatc~ Professor at the Michigan State University College of Law and 
Director of the Indigenous Law and Policy Center. I am a co-author of the Sixth edition 
of Cases and Materials in Federal Indian Law, forthcoming from Thomson West. I 
recently published a book titled American Indian Education: Counternarratives in 
Racism, Struggle, and the Law, and I have other books forthcoming from various presses 
on the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
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Indians. I have published over 30 law review articles since 2003. I also am an enrolled 
member of the Orand Traverse Band. 
I graduated from the University of Michigan Law School and I am licensed to 
practice law in the State of Michigan and hold inactive licenses from the State Bars of 
Arizona and Washington. I have worked as in-house counsel for four different Indian 
tribes from 1998 to 2004 - the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, the Hoopa Valley Tribe in 
California, the Suquamish Tribe in Washington, and the Orand Traverse Band in 
Michigan. I began teaching law in 2004 at the University of North Dakota. In 2006, I 
moved to the Michigan State University College of Law. I teach Federal Law and Indian 
Tribes, other Indian law-related courses, and Constitutional Law. 
Personal Observations 
On March 4, 2008, I visited the Six Nations of the Orand River Reserve. I spent 
several hours touring the administrative offices and the manufacturing facilities of Orand 
River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (ORE). During my visit I spoke to several ORE 
employees that have knowledge about the enterprise's sales and markets. I spoke with 
Jerry Montour (CEO ofGRE); Steve Williams (the President of ORE); Don Richards (the 
Vice President of Finance); Don Ferrigan (Purchasing Department); and Pat Johnson 
(Accounts Receivabh::). On the same day, from the offices of ORE, I also spoke on the 
phone with Bryan Porter, the former Controller of Native Wholesale Supply ("NWS"). 
I inspected records of the enterprises, including those indicating the customers in 
the United States to whom NWS sells the Seneca® brand of cigarettes, and samples of 
sales records relating to these vendors, and spoke with various ORE employees about 
them. The list includes: (1) wholesaler companies wholly owned by federally recognized 
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Indian tribes, such as 4 Bears Casino & Resort, owned by the Mandan, Hidatsa, and 
Arikara Nation (fornlerly the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation); 
(2) federally recognized Indian tribes such as the Big Sandy Rancheria; and (3) 
wholesaler companies owned by American Indian people on Indian reservation land, such 
as the Seneka Smoke Shop in Salamanca, New York on the Allegheny Reservation of the 
Seneca Indian Nation. All three ofthe aforementioned type of customer would constitute 
a person or entity entitled to protection under Federal Indian Law. 
It is clear to me from reviewing these records that the Tribunal was accurate in 
finding that "[aJ significant portion of the Claimants' business ... involves cigarettes 
ultimately sold at retail to consumers on Indian reservations in the United States ...." 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ~ 6 (July 20, 2006). 
I also spoke on the telephone with Arthur Montour, the CEO of Native Wholesale 
Supply, on June 19, 2008, concerning role as exclusive distributor of the Seneca® brand 
in Indian Country in the United States. In conjunction with that conversation, I have 
reviewed several legal pleadings and demand letters from courts and state agencies 
respecting the Grand River Enterprises and Native Wholesale Supply. 
As a result of these personal observations and investigations, and based upon my 
professional expertise and experience described above, I am prepared to offer my opinion 
about the likely immunity GRE possesses from state regulation and taxation for its on­
reservation sales under principles of Federal Indian Law. 
Facts 
All of the individual Claimants are Haudenosaunee nation members, and all were 
born in Canada. See I)articularized Statement of Claim ~ 3 (June 30, 2005). Two of the 
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Claimants, Kenneth Hill and Jerry Montour, are recognized members of an aboriginal 
First Nation in Canada. ld. The other individual Claimant, Arthur Montour, is a 
recognized member of a United States Indian Nation, the Seneca Nation of Indians, and 
resides on the Cattaraugus Reservation of the Seneca Nation. ld. The Claimants 
manufacture and distribute their own tobacco products under their own brands. ld. at'i[6. 
All of the tobacco products that the Claimants intend for sale in the United States, as well 
as on sovereign tribal lands controlled by the United States, bear either the Seneca® or 
Opal® brand.ld. at~' 24. 
Kenneth Hill and Jerry Montour are co-owners of, and control, GRE. Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction 'i[2 (July 20, 2006). GRE's manufacturing facilities are located 
on sovereign Haudenosaunee territory controlled by Canada. ld. GRE is the exclusive 
manufacturer of the Seneca® and Opal® brands. See Particularized Statement of Claim ~ 
23 (June 30, 2005); and Witness Statement of Jerry Montour (July 10, 2008), to be 
attached to Claimants' Memorial on the Merits (July 11, 2008). Arthur Montour owns 
and controls NWS, which operates and is located on sovereign Seneca territory located in 
the United States, the Cattaraugus Reservation. Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ~ 2 
(July 20, 2006). NWS holds all of the trademark rights registered in the United States 
upon which the Seneca brand is based. Particularized Statement of Claim ~ 24 (June 30, 
2005). NWS beneficially holds the trademark rights registered in the United States upon 
which the Seneca® brand is based for the individual Claimants and NWS is the exclusive 
distributor of the Seneca® brand, for sales on Indian reservation I lands located within the 
I In Canada reserved tribal aboriginal lands tend to be called reserves. American legal authorities tend to 
employ 'reservation lands' or 'Indian country', a defined legal term of art, the definition of which is set 
forth in 18 U.S.c. § 1151. This opinion will employ the terms reservation, reserve, and Indian country 
interchangeably to refer to recognized aboriginal lands held either directly by or in trust for aboriginal 
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United States. Id. at ~ 23; and Witness Statement of Arthur Montour (July 10,2008), to 
be attached to Claimants' Memorial on the Merits (July 11,2008). 
Cigarettes manufactured by GRE are produced and sold in one of three ways: (1) 
sales of their proprietary brands, through NWS, to Indians and Indian enterprises on 
sovereign tribal lands located within the territorial limits of the United States ("on reserve 
sales" or "tribal sales"), Particularized Statement of Claim ~~ 22, 26 (June 30, 2005); and 
Witness Statement of Jerrv Montour (July 10, 2008), to be attached to Claimants' 
Memorial on the M(~rits (July 11, 2008); (2) sales of their proprietary brands in selected 
markets within the United States not located on tribal lands ("off reserves sales" or "off 
reservation sales"), id.; and (3) the production of tobacco products bearing third party 
brands under contract to third parties located off-reserve within the United States 
("private label production"), Witness Statement of Jerry Montour (July 10, 2008), to be 
attached to Claimants' Memorial on the Merits (July 11, 2008). I understand that such 
third party distributors do not purchase or sell Seneca® branded tobacco products, or 
engage in any sales on Indian reservation lands located within the United States. 
NWS served as the importer of record for all of its sales. Interviews with GRE 
business staff and a review of a sampling of records demonstrate to my satisfaction that 
all off-reserve and private label products manufactured by GRE were sold FOB from its 
location on Haudenosaunee territory controlled by Canada. See Statement of Claimants' 
Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share 
Amendments ~~ 33 (Nov.. 6, 2006). The only substantial difference between the way in 
Indian tribes or First Nations. Insofar as the United States on reserve distribution of the tobacco products 
involved in this dispute is concerned, all distribution took place within Indian country, as defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 1151. 
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which off-reserve sales of Seneca® branded products and private label sales were made 
is that in the case of the former, ORE remained responsible for arranging for the actual 
shipment of inventory into a Free Trade Zone located in the United States, for subsequent 
removal from Tobaccoville, under its federally issued Tobacco license. It did so by 
hiring a private trucking company to make the shipments. See Witness Statement of Jerry 
Montour (July 10, 2(08), to be attached to Claimants' Memorial on the Merits (July 11, 
2008). 
The two measures at the core of the present dispute were adopted by a majority of 
states and territories in the United States, including 46 states. Neither of these two 
measures, by their explicit terms, appear to apply directly to the consumers of the tobacco 
products made and distributed by the Claimants.2 Neither the governments imposing 
these measures or th{~ Respondent appears to consider them to be a tax. These measures 
were imposed following the conclusion of settlement negotiations arising out of tobacco 
litigation commenced! in the United States by 46 state attorneys general against a group of 
the largest tobacco companies in the United States. These states each subsequently 
adopted the measures pursuant to their settlement agreement with these large tobacco 
companies (the "Master Settlement Agreement" or "MSA"). Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction ~ 12 (July 20, 2006). These measures were not adopted by the United States 
government and did not receive any endorsement or approval from Congress or the 
Executive branch. 
One type of measure - enacted by 46 states - purports to directly impose a 
financial obligation upon a deemed "manufacturer" of tobacco products, which could be 
2 However, I understand that under the MSA itself, participating states did purport to bind themselves to 
consider "Indian Country or Indian Trust Land" as part of their geographic territory for purposes of 
performance of the terms of the Agreement. See Transcript of Jurisdictional Hearing at pages 0604-0606. 
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the actual manufacturer or an importer. Relevant state enforcement officials deem such 
products to have been intended for sale in the United States. Id. This so-called "escrow 
measure" requires deemed "manufacturers" to deposit large sums, measured in the 
millions of dollars, into escrow accounts annually, to be held for 25 years. The amount 
of such escrow deposits purports to be based upon tobacco products allegedly sold within 
a state, apparently ignoring whether or not the location in which the sales were made 
constituted Indian country. Id. Under this escrow measure, a state court may be 
petitioned to impose an injunction against sales or distribution of tobacco product brands 
manufactured or imported by a defined "manufacturer," as well as monetary penalties in 
addition to payment of escrow payments demanded. Id. at ~~ 13-14. 
The escrow measures were amended by all but one of the 46 states, Missouri, 
between 2004 and 2006. The amendments removed a mechanism contained within each 
original escrow measure that permitted enterprises, such as the one established by the 
Claimants, to receive a release (i.e. refund) of the portion of escrow payments made by 
such enterprise, for states in which its products were not being sold. See Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction ~ 13 (July 20, 2006). The Claimants relied on the existence of 
these release mechanisms to expand sales of the Seneca® brand off-reserve. See Witness 
Statement of Jerry Montour (July 10, 2008), to be attached to Claimants' Memorial on 
the Merits (July 11, 2008). 
Some escrow measures, including those of Oklahoma, Arizona and Colorado, 
have been explicitly applied to sales to consumers on-reservation, Statement of 
Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the 
Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 81-85; 95-96 (Nov. 6, 2006); while other escrow 
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measures have been explicitly applied to off-reserve sales, id. ~~ 78-80; 89-94. See 
generally id. ~~ 42-43. 
The other measure at issue in this proceeding operates to prohibit distribution of 
products made by a deemed "manufacturer" within any given state, by requiring all 
manufacturers to cl~rtify their compliance with that state's escrow measure and 
maintaining a public registry for purposes of identifying brands manufactured or 
distributed in that state deemed not to be in compliance ("the contraband measure"). A 
brand can be removed from this certification list (and thereby effectively banned from all 
commerce in the statl~) when a State Attorney General (without any requirement of court 
hearing or review) determines that its "manufacturer" has not made allegedly required 
escrow payments or penalties demanded by that state under its escrow measure. See 
Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and 
Implementation ofthe Allocable Share Amendments ~~ 45-47 (Nov. 6,2006). 
Claimants have provided me with copies of letters from various American 
jurisdictions demanding that Native Wholesale Supply and Grand River Enterprises cease 
selling cigarettes in those jurisdictions, as well as legal pleadings initiating enforcement 
actions against the Claimants. E.g., Letter from Dennis Eckhart, Sf. Assistant Attorney 
General, State of California, to Arthur Montour, Native Wholesale Supply (March 7, 
2008); Judgment by Court after Default, People of the State ofCalifornia v. Grand River 
Enterprises/6 nations. Ltd., No. 05ASOl688 (Cal. Superior Ct., Oct 29, 2007); Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to Native Wholesale Supply (Oklahoma Tax Commission, February 29, 
2008). 
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Finally, I note that some American Indian tribes actually sought to join in the 
lawsuits brought against the major tobacco companies which eventually led to conclusion 
of the Master Settlement Agreement between those companies and the states and 
territories that sued them. However, with the agreement of federal courts, the state 
attorneys general refused to allow these sovereigns to participate. See Table Bluff 
Reservation (Wiyot Tribe) v. Philip Morris, Inc., 256 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2001). It is ironic 
that many of these states are now attempting to enforce the measures they designed to 
implement MSA against American Indians and their businesses, after excluding tribal 
governments from participating in the legal processes that led to its negotiation. 
Questions Presented for Opinion: 
1.	 Whether, or to what extent, the Claimants' tobacco wholesale distribution 
enterprise, operated through NWS on the Cattaraugus territory of the sovereign 
Seneca Nation, appears to qualify as an activity that is deserving of protection 
from the application of state government regulation under United States Federal 
Indian Law? 
2.	 Assuming the on··reserve sales of the Claimants' Seneca® branded products are 
being affected by application of the Escrow Statutes or Contraband Laws, what 
would be the significance of such a state of affairs under United States Federal 
Indian Law? 
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Introduction 
United States Federal Indian Law, the law that I am asked to interpret and apply 
in the context of these facts, is an amalgamation of centuries of history, law, and policy, 
much of which is conflicting and very confusing. It has developed over the course of time 
and many, many tribal histories to stand for three simple propositions. First, Indian tribes 
retain inherent powers of sovereignty unless expressly abrogated by the United States 
Congress or through tribal consent in a properly ratified treaty or agreement. See FELIX S. 
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942). Second, the United States 
federal government retains the exclusive right and power to deal in Indian Affairs. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 23 U.S. 543 (1832). And third, state law has no force in Indian 
Country, absent the express consent of Congress. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515 (1831). 
Arising out of these key foundational principles of federal Indian law is the 
maxim that ambiguous terms and provisions in American Indian treaties must be 
interpreted to the benefit of Indian tribes and Indians and, more importantly, Indian treaty 
language is to be interpreted as the Indians would have understood it. E.g., Oneida 
County v. Oneida Indian Nation ofNew York, 470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985). 
The reason for this general rule is that American Indian law and policy is replete 
with bad faith and broken promises. Consider the example of Seneca Indians of the 
Allegheny Reservation in southwestern New York State. These Indians had signed the 
Treaty of Canadaigua, in which the United States promised to leave these people 
undisturbed forever. See In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 766-67 (1866). But in the 
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late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States broke that promise by constructing the 
Kinzua Dam, flooding one-third of the Reservation and forcing the evacuation of over 
500 Senecas - all without the consent of the Seneca people. See generally JOY ANN 
BILHARZ, THE ALLEGHENY SENECAS AND THE KINZUA DAM: FORCED RELOCATION 
THROUGH Two GENERATIONS (1998). 
This kind of bad faith was not an isolated incident, as virtually every American 
Indian treaty has be{:ll modified or abrogated by Congress without tribal consent. Federal 
Indian Law allows f,or Congress to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties, as it did with the 
Allegheny Senecas, and the Michigan Anishinaabek (the elimination of permanent 
reservations), the Fort Berthold Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations (the flooding of 
their reservation), the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota Nations (the taking of the Black Hills), 
the California Indians (failure to ratify eighteen treaties negotiated by the tribes in good 
faith), and many other examples. However, Federal Indian Law also provides principles 
for the defense of tribal rights, the compensation of property takings, and a defense from 
the abrogation of tribal rights by individuals and state governments. 
In this way, the New York Haudenoshaunee, as signatories to, and beneficiaries 
of, several treaties including the Treaty ofCanadaigua, have been remarkably successful 
in preserving their tribal governmental powers, individual rights, and communal and 
individual property rights through encroachments of the state and local governments. 
New York Indian tribes were among the first tribes to bring land claims suits as a means 
of restoring the tribal land base. E.g., Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Oneida 
County, 414 U.S. 66]l (1974). New York Indian tribes were among the first to commence 
on-reservation gaming enterprises for the purpose of raising government revenue. See 
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Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. 1. LEGIS. 39,45 
(2007). And, very relevant to this dispute, New York Indians and tribes were among the 
first to establish that state and local taxation and regulation does not apply in their 
homelands. See In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866). 
Federal Indian Law assigns an important status to treaty signatories. Arising out 
of the status of the New York Haudenoshaunee as treaty signatories are two fundamental 
rules that are not subject to abrogation by state or local governments, and that are relevant 
here. First, Indian tribes and Indian people - and their businesses - operating and residing 
within Indian Country are not subject to state laws or taxation. Second, federal Indian 
policy articulated by Congress protects and encourages Indian tribes and Indian people to 
engage in economic development for the purpose of generating self-sufficiency and 
moving away from dependence on the federal government. The kind of business 
operation in which the Claimants engage is exactly the type of activity that Congress 
encourages. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal 
Indian Policy, 85 NEB. 1" REv. 121, 144-47 (2006) (describing Congressional policy on 
tax immunities and tribal economic development); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of 
Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. 
REV. 759, 774-84 (2004) (describing several kinds of tribal businesses). 
There are many reasons for the development of this policy of protecting and 
encouraging Indian businesses. First, Indian people generally are the poorest people in 
the United States. Second, Federal Indian Law limits the authority of Indian tribes to tax 
nonmembers, even within Indian Country, meaning that tribal governments often have 
little capacity to provide governmental services to tribal citizens. Third, state and local 
12
 
000749
governments have long been reticent to provide services to Indian people. On occasion, 
this reticence it based in racial prejudice, but more often it is based on several often 
incorrect presumptions. State and local governments often assume that Indian people are 
ineligible for state and local services because of their tribal status, or that Indian people 
are ineligible for services because many of them do not pay state or local taxes. Finally, 
non-Indian businesses, paying the substantial taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco 
products imposed by state and local governments, treat tobacco-related businesses as 
economic competition. 
In short, Federal Indian Law has historically served as a double-edged sword for 
Indian tribes and Indian people, but the key actors in Federal Indian Law have always 
been tribal and federal. States and local governments are excluded from these relations 
absent an Act of Congress. Federal Indian Law is intended to prevent state and local 
governments from undermining the structure of federal Indian law and policy established 
by the federal government and Indian tribes. As the remainder of my analysis shows, the 
MSA established by 46 states does exactly that, and should not be enforced against 
American Indians and their businesses. 
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Point 1. Under United States Federal Indian Law, state governments do not 
maintain the authority to regulate the on-reservation activities of Indian tribes and 
Indian people either through the escrow measure and the listing measure. 
The authority of state governments to regulate the on-reservation activities of 
Indian tribes and Indian people is very limited. Ever since it rendered its Williams v. Lee 
decision in 1959, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that state 
authority to regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal Indians is all but nil: 
The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the power of regulating their 
internal and social relations," United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 
381-382 (1886), cited in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 
(1978). A tribe's power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members has 
never been doubted, and our cases establish that, "absent governing Acts 
of Congress, 'a State may not act in a manner that infringe[s] on the right 
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. ,,, 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171-172 
(1973), quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-220 (1959). New 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,332-33 (1983). 
In short, the governing standard is that states are categorically prohibited from 
regulating the on-reservation activities of Indians and Indian tribes, absent a governing 
Act of Congress. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 
6.03[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds. 2005) ("A state ordinarily may not regulate the 
property or conduct of tribes or tribal-member Indians in Indian country."). This 
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categorical bar has been applied by state and federal courts numerous times to foreclose 
state regulatory jurisdiction and authority in this and other contexts. E.g., Winer v. Penny 
Enters., Inc., 674 N. W.2d 9 (N.D. 2004) (state court subject matter jurisdiction). 
Each of the two measures that state governments have threatened to impose on the 
operations of the Claimants' run up against this categorical bar. Any attempt to impose 
the escrow measure or the complimentary listing measure on tribal sales is an attempt to 
regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal Indians. NWS is an on-reservation 
wholesaler whose blllsiness is directly affected by the measures. NWS's tribal sales are 
sales to Indian Country retailers and wholesalers; or in other words, on-reservation 
activities of tribal Indians. 
For example" from its location on the Cattaraugus territory, NWS sells tobacco 
products to other tobacco wholesalers wholly owned by members of federally recognized 
Indian tribes doing business in Indian Country. One typical transaction is instructive.3 
NWS sells the Seneca brand to Fat John's, a business located on the Allegheny 
Reservation of the Seneca Nation ofIndians and wholly owned by a member or members 
of the Seneca Nation of Indians. The transaction takes place in Indian Country (either in 
the Cattaraugus or Allegheny territories) between Indians (the owners of NWS and fat 
John's). Though it is not critically important here, it is worth noting that the value 
generated by this business transaction originates and concludes inside Indian Country. Cf 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 220 (1987). States are 
categorically barred from regulating this activity. 
3 Other customers that are similarly situated include without limitation: First American Tobacco (Irving, 
NY); HCI Distribution (Winnebago, NE); Island Casino Resort (Harris, MI); Lac du Flambeau Asema 
Wigamig (Lac du Flambeau, WI); MCN Tobacco Wholesale (Okmulgee, OK); Peace Pipe Smoke Shop 
(Salamanca, NY); Penalty Box (Irving, NY); Sac & Fox Casino (Powhattan, KS); and Thunderbird 
International (Hoopa, CA). 
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Point 2. Even assuming that states had some authority to regulate this kind of 
on-reservation activity, the MSA states in this case have engaged in a pattern and 
practice of discrimination against the Claimants' business activities, an independent 
reason for finding that the states' measures could not be enforced against the 
Claimants. 
As stated by the United States Supreme COUlt, "Absent express federal law to the 
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject 
to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State." 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,148-49 (1973) (emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently examined a state regulatory scheme 
under this test in Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 476 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 
2007).4 In Wagnon, the State of Kansas sought to apply its rules relating to motor vehicle 
registration, licensing, and titling to members of the Prairie Band who lived on-
reservation. See id. at 820. The State argued that its laws preempted similar regulations 
promulgated by the Prairie Band. See id. at 820-21. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting 
that, while Kansas refused to recognize Prairie Band license plates and registration, it had 
recognized the license plates of every American jurisdiction, including those of 
Oklahoma Indian tribes. See id. at 825-26 (citing State v. Wakole, 959 P.2d 982, 983 
(Kan. 1998». 
The measures complained of here smack of the same kind of impermissible 
discrimination. Consider the following allegation made by the Claimants: 
4 This case is distinguished from a parallel case between the same parties involving the application of state 
motor fuels taxes and decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
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The MSA States began to assert (and to this day still assert) that Grand 
River must make escrow payments under the Escrow Statutes, even if it 
was unrelated third parties had apparently purchased products from the 
Claimants on sovereign aboriginal territory and subsequently resold them 
to wholesalers or consumers in the territory of MSA states or on other 
tribal lands. Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the 
Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ,-r 42 
(Nov. 6,2006). 
Such conduct constitutes a direct form of discrimination against sovereign Indian 
Nations because it purports to trump the regulatory authority of these Nations to regulate 
the affairs of Native Americans lawfully conducting business within their territorial 
jurisdiction. 
As a result of these actions by state governments, the Claimants' businesses have 
suffered significant and tangible losses. Claimant Arthur Montour has confirmed that on­
reservation retailers located at the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community in Michigan and at 
the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in Idaho have informed NWS that they will no longer be 
able to do business with NWS as a result of pressure from MSA states. Moreover, the 
ongoing enforcement actions by states against GRE and NWS, such as those in California 
and Oklahoma, demonstrate the impact of the measures on the Claimants' businesses. 
Because these measures involve discriminatory actions against tribal businesses, the 
measures are invalid under Federal Indian Law. 
17
 
000754
Point 3. Principles of Federal Indian Taxation Law suggest that the MSA's 
measures are unenforceable against Indian businesses. 
While these measures are not taxes in that they are not specifically labeled "taxes" 
in the various state laws, it may also be useful to consider their application under Federal 
Indian Law's Indian taxation doctrine. The United States Supreme Court recently held 
that a similar categorical bar precludes states from taxing Indian lands and Indian people 
who are engaged in on-reservation activities. See Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 457-59 (1995); County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,258 (1992). In Chickasaw 
Nation, the State of Oklahoma sought to impose its motor fuel taxes on a tribal motor 
fuels retailer operating within Indian Country, as that is defined under Federal Indian 
Law. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 452-53. The Supreme Court noted that in the 
context of state taxation, it has "held unenforceable a number of state taxes whose legal 
incidence rested on a tribe or on tribal members inside Indian Country." See id. at 458 
(citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (state personal property tax); 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (state income tax)). 
Of interest, the Oklahoma Tax Commission argued that the Court should engage 
its interest-balancing test more nonnally applied to state regulation of the on-reservation 
conduct of nonmembers, largely because the vehicles that tribal members drove would 
likely leave the reservation at some point and use state roads, implicating a state interest. 
See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 457. This the Court refused to do, noting factors such 
as the "lead role" that Congress plays in federal Indian policy; the need for bright-line 
18
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rules to generate "predictability" in business and tax policy; and the problems for the 
Court in conducting complex interest-balancing of "economic realities." Id. at 459-60. 
These factors, relevant to some extent to the present dispute, convinced the Court to 
reject a balancing tf~St approach when the legal incidence of the tax approach was much 
easier for the Court to administer. 
The prototypical example of the import of this categorical bar is the case of Moe 
v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). In Moe, the State of 
Montana sought to collect cigarette and personal property taxes to reservation Indians 
who purchases cigarettes from an on-reservation "smoke shop," owned and operated by 
tribal members. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 467-68. The Court noted that the question of 
whether state authoriity to tax the on-reservation activities of reservation Indians had been 
"la[id] to rest any doubt" in the negative by the Court's decision in McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)." Moe, 425 U.S. at 476 (quoting 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973». 
The intent and operation of the escrow and listing measures demonstrates that the 
burden of the regulation (and the legal incidence, if the measures were taxes) is on the 
Claimants' business operations. The amendments made to the escrow measures have 
resulted in substantial impairment of their off-reserve markets in the MSA States. See 
Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and 
Implementation of the Allocable Share Amendments ,-r 26 (Nov. 6, 2006); see also id. ,-r,r 
23-25. The intent of the MSA States in enacting, and later amending, the escrow 
measures, relevant to determining the legal incidence or burden of the regulation, was to 
burden Claimants' business operations and businesses that are similarly situated. See 
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Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 461 (noting that the express intent of the state's 
legislature as to the legal incidence test is "dispositive"). In the words of the Tribunal, 
the MSA States intended the escrow provisions to operate as "[t]he MSA's primary 
means to limit [Claimants' and other similarly situated businesses'] ability to wrest 
market share from [participating manufacturers] ...." Id ~ 12. There can be no doubt that 
the MSA States intended both the original escrow measures and their subsequent 
amendments to them to burden Claimants. As such, the legal incidence of these 
regulations is placed directly on Claimants, rendering the measures invalid under Federal 
Indian Law. 
In short, there is no authority for state governments to regulate or tax the on­
reservation activity of Indian people. 
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Point 4. Wimrlms v. Lee categorically bars the imposition of the MSA measures 
against the Claimaults. 
Under the categorical bar described III Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), 
Indian Country actiivities of reservation Indians are Immune and exempt from state 
regulation. However, these cases and their progeny (also discussed above) all analyze fact 
patterns in which reservation Indians engage in activities on the same reservation. There 
is some question as to whether the categorical bar would apply in this situation, in which 
a tribal seller located on one reservation engages in activities with a tribal purchaser on a 
different reservation. However, in the context of state taxation, there is one important 
precedent for the proposition that the categorical bar would apply. 
In Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Morrison, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Kan. 
2007), a federal district court concluded that the State of Kansas could not tax the 
importation of motor fuels by an Indian tribal corporation located in the State of 
Nebraska for sale on various Indian reservations located within the State of Kansas. See 
id. at 1185-86 (citing Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 
459 (1995), the origin of the categorical bar to state taxation). The district court had 
certified questions of state law relating to the legal incidence of the state motor fuels tax 
to the Kansas Supreme Court.5 See Winnebago Tribe ofNebraska v. Kline, No. 02-4070, 
2005 WL 1683970 (D. Kan., June 30, 2005). The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted the 
Kansas motor fuel tax as placing the legal burden of the tax on the "distributor of first 
5 In many American jurisdictions, federal courts may "certify" questions of state law to a state supreme 
court. What this means is that, in cases where an important state law question of first impression arises, a 
federal court might choose to seek the opinion of the relevant state supreme court on this question. E.g., 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3201 (2007). 
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receipt," that is, the tribal corporation located in Nebraska. See Winnebago Tribe of 
Nebraska v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892, 900-02 (Kan. 2007) (discussing Chickasaw Nation, 515 
U.S. at 458, and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3408(b), as well as other authorities).6 Under this 
precedent, the Fedl~ral Indian Law categorical bars would apply to the activities of 
reservation Indians benveen reservations. 
In this context, we would apply the Williams v. Lee categorical bar, which states 
that state regulation is invalid under Federal Indian Law where the state regulation 
purportedly applies to the on-reservation activities of Indian tribes or reservation Indians. 
See Williams, 358 U.S. at 219-21. It is clear from the facts and representations made by 
the states that the lc~gal burden of the two measures is on ORE, the wholesaler. ORE, 
doing business in Indian Country, and selling to tribal purchasers in Indian Country, 
would be immune and exempt from these twin measures that the states seek to impose in 
the context of tribal sales. 
6 The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately held that the Kansas tax did not apply under state law because the 
state statute did not include "importers" in its definition of "distributors of first receipt." See Winnebago 
Tribe a/Nebraska, 150 P.3d at 903-05. 
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Conclusion 
Given the foregoing, in my expert opinion, the answers to the two questions posed 
above are as follows: 
1. The Claimants' tobacco wholesale distribution enterprise, operated through NWS 
on the Cattaraugus Reservation of the Seneca Nation of Indians, qualifies as an aciivity 
that is deserving of protection from the application of state government regulation under 
United States Federal Indian Law. 
2. Since on-reservation sales of the Claimants' Seneca® branded products are being 
affected by application of the Escrow Statutes and/or Contraband Lands, those laws 
should be preempted by operation of United States Federal Indian Law. 
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PRO C E E DIN G S 
PRESIDENT NARIMAN: what are we doing 
today, Mr. Luddy? 
MR. LUDDY: We're starting with 
Professor Gruber, who's witness for Respondent. 
Then I believe we take Arthur Montour out of turn 
because we're joined here today with his counsel 
in the seattle matter who will appear in the 
matter, and Mr. Calfo has to be back in Seattle 
for a court appearance tomorrow so we want to get 
him on his flight. 
Then after that, Mr. Delange, who is 
New Mexico's Assistant AG, will be cross-examined. 
And then I don't really know where that will leave 
us at the end of the day. 
PRESIDENT NARIMAN: So can we begin?
 
Mr. Feldman, can we begin?
 
MR. FELDMAN: Yes.
 
MR. LUDDY: Housekeeping. I've already
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everything and we tell them what we think they're 
doing wrong. You know, they have their own 
selfish interests obviously. we have laws to 
enforce and MSA agreement to uphold. so, you know 
we hear from all sides. we hear from SPMs, we 
1407 
hear from NPMs, we hear from OPMS. All --and we 
hear from tobacco distributors, we hear from 
consumers all expressing their views we listen to 
therna-Il. sometimes you can learn some about 
things from any of them, and we just try to figure 
out what we ought to be doing under our laws, what 
the legislature intended for us to do and go 
forth. 
Q. well I are you -- didn't you commence an 
action against philip Morris and the other major 
tobacco companies addressing, among other things, 
the very issue of whether or not Idaho's refusal 
to collect excise tax with respect to the very 
sales -- the very type of sales that are subject 
of your NWS complaint, constituted failure of due 
diligence under the -- or diligent enforcement 
under your Escrow Statute? 
A. I wouldn't characterize it that way. 
We did file an action in 2006 because R.J. 
Reynolds and Lorillard withheld a portion of their 
MSA payment. They had a claimant, their claim is 
the NPM adjustment, which is a very complicated 
1408 
adjustment, but in essence this adjustment applied 
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and they	 didn't have to pay the states. And our 
action is the declaration that we're entitled to 
that money.	 we're out right now several millions 
of dollars as a result of their withholding it 
from the	 state of Idaho. 
So, we did file an action. I actually 
think this brief, this is probably -- yeah, this 
is the brief we filed in connection with that 
motion for court to declare our rights and declare 
that we're entitled to that money. 
And so, we're in some deep litigation 
arbitration actually as it turns out, with 50 
tobacco companies -- or maybe it's 45 tobacco 
companies -- about this matter right now. 
Q. sO, that suit was essentially bounced 
to arbitration; correct? 
A. Yes. The district court ruled under 
the Master settlement Agreement, the arbitration 
clause in there should govern our entitlement to 
those payments and their argument that their 
entitled to an NPM adjustment. So, we're now 
moving toward that arbitration. 
Q. And one of the things that tobacco 
companies were claiming in that suit and now 
presumably in the arbitration, is that Idaho's 
failure or refusal as the case may be to collect 
excise tax on on-Reservation sales constituted a 
failure to diligently enforce Idaho's Escrow 
Statute; right? 
A.	 NO, they haven't been that specific 
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yet. I mean, they've argued the states -- their 
argument to date has been much broader -- you 
didn't diligently enforce your statute; you 
haven't done enough and so we're entitled to the 
NPM adjustment. I think, you know, their 
arguments over time -- everything we've done has 
been wrong, and we disagree with that, of course, 
and we think we've done exactly what we're 
supposed to do. 
Q. But you fully anticipate that they're 
going to make that argument in the arbitration 
proceeding, don't you? 
A. probably. They're going to make every 
single last argument out there, I suppose. 
ARBITRATOR CROOK: Mr. Luddy can I ask 
the witness a question? 
MR. LUDDY: Absolutely. 
ARBITRATOR CROOK: Mr. Delange, can you 
clarify the procedural situation in this 
arb-j trati on. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
ARBITRATOR CROOK: IS it a single 
arbitration with all of the states and all of the 
concerned tobacco companies or are there lots of 
different arbitrations or similar paths? How does 
it work procedurally? 
THE WITNESS: It's going to be one 
arbitration, you're going to have 52 states 
settling states because the territories are part 
of it. You're going to have 50 tobacco companies 
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This Court has asked for supplemental briefing concerning the holdings of the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Maybee, No. 35200, 2010 WL 143459 (Id. S. Ct., Jan. 15,2010), as 
they relate to the present case. The Court in Maybee decided a number of issues, several of 
which are applicable to this case. Specifically, the Maybee Court held that: 
(I) Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act) "regulates cigarettes, as defined 
by the [Idaho Master Settlement Agreement Act], not merely 'units sold.'" Maybee, at 
*5. This holding contradicts that which Native Wholesale Supply Company (NWS) has 
argued here. See Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, p. 8. 
(2) Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act "is intended to 
govern interstate as well as intrastate sales of cigarettes to consumers in the state of 
Idaho," Maybee, at *5, and because it is triggered by the sale of noncompliant cigarettes 
to consumers in Idaho, it does not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution. Maybel~, at *9-11. This holding contradicts that which NWS has argued 
here. See Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, p. 10. 
(3) The purpose of the Complementary Act is "to prevent the cigarettes of 
Noncompliant Manufilcturers from being sold to Idaho consumers," Maybee, at *9, and 
where title to the cigarettes at issue passes is irrelevant to that determination. Jd. This 
holding contradicts that which NWS has argued here. See Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Personal Jurisdiction 
Grounds, pp. 4-5, 8-1 n. 
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(4) The Complementary Act does not regulate the on-reservation activity of 
the tribal member Internet cigarette seller in that case, but rather his "introduction of 
Noncompliant Cigarettes into Idaho," Maybee, at *9 (emphasis added), and because this 
constitutes conduct going off his reservation, pursuant to applicable federal Indian law 
precedent, the tribal member Internet cigarette seller is properly subject to the 
Complementary Acfs provisions. Id at *13-14, citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). This holding contradicts that which NWS has 
argued here. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Personal Jurisdiction, p. 8. 
In short, the Maybee case stands for the proposition that selling cigarettes which are 
destined for Idaho but are non-compliant under the Complementary Act is an act that gives Idaho 
Courts jurisdiction to enforce the requirements of that Act. Maybee's membership in the Seneca 
Tribe did not protect him from application of Idaho's laws to activity that involved selling 
cigarettes to Idaho consumers. Likewise, the Native American status ofNWS's owner does not 
somehow protect NWS h~:re. Likewise, the nature of the customer is of no moment because as a 
non-member of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, NWS has no special status on the Coeur d'Alene 
Reservation. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 US 
134, 161 (1980) ("[nlon-member [Indians] are not constituents of the governing Tribe. . . 
.[T]hose Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on the reservation.") For this 
reason, NWS's position is no different from Maybee's and the holdings in the Maybee case are 
dispositive of the issues in this case. 
NWS gives short shrift to Maybee in its memo, opting instead to cite at length to two 
professors in an unrelated arbitration proceeding and misrepresenting the holdings of two other 
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cases. This is perhaps not surprising given Maybee's relevance and applicability to this case and 
the support it provides the State and the Tax Commission. In Maybee, as noted, the defendant is 
a member of the Seneca Nation of Indians, located on the Seneca Reservation in New York, who 
sold cigarettes to purchasers in Idaho. NWS is a corporation owned by a member of the Seneca 
Nation of Indians and is also located on the same Seneca Reservation in New York. Both 
Maybee's and NWS's cigarette sales are to Idaho purchasers located in Idaho, and the cigarettes 
that Maybee and NWS have sold are not listed on the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco 
Product Manufacturers and Brand Families. As a result both have violated Idaho Code Section 
39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act. Maybee made many of the same arguments NWS makes 
here and, as set forth above, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected them all. 
NWS 's response is to attempt to distinguish Maybee on one ground, and it is that the 
Idaho purchaser of NWS' s cigarettes is located in Indian country, whereas the purchasers of 
Maybee's products resid<:: throughout Idaho. Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Law 
(Defs Supp. Memo), p. 6.' This is a distinction without a difference. The fact is that the 
recipient of NWS's cigan~ttes-Warpath,Inc.-is not a member of an Indian tribe but is instead 
a corporation created pursuant to Idaho law. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 
474-75 (2003) (corporations have identities separate from that of their owners); Baraga Prods., 
Inc. v. Comm'r, 971 F. Supp. 294, 296 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (incorporated business entity not an 
enrolled member of an Indian tribe simply because its sole shareholder is); id. at 298 ("a 
corporation is not an 'Indian' for purposes of immunity" from the application of state law). As 
an Idaho corporation, Warpath, Inc. is an Idaho resident, standing in the same shoes as the Idaho 
I "Indian Country" is specifically defined by federal statute essentially to be "all land within the limits of 
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government." 18 U.S.c. § 1151. While 
the terms of Section 1151 literally only apply to crimes, federal courts have used this section in civil 
matters. See. e.g. Alaska v. Native ViII. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). 
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purchasers of Maybee's cigarettes. Caremark Therapeutic Servs. v. Leavitt, 405 F. Supp.2d 454, 
458 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (corporation a resident of the State of its incorporation). Thus, the fact that 
Warpath, Inc. is located within Indian country does not change the Maybee Court's analysis that 
an out-of-state tribal seller's introduction of noncompliant cigarettes into Idaho subjects that 
seller to the Complementary Act. 
Even if Warpath, Inc. were somehow deemed a member of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, there is 
nothing in the Indian law that decrees the result thereof to be dismissal here. Rather, the analysis 
of the matter simply changes to that of a balancing of federal, state, and tribal interests as set 
forth in White Mountain.APache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).2 Applying that test 
here, enforcement of the Complementary Act and Idaho's cigarette tax laws would be upheld. 
Concerning the federal interest "the federal government has been generally supportive of 
state regulation of cigarette sales." Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188,204 (W.D.N.Y. 
2003). NWS certainly identifies no contrary congressional directive with respect to Idaho's 
Complementary Act and administration of its cigarette tax laws. Indeed, federal law supports 
state cigarette tax efforts. The fact is that federal common law, see, infra pp. 5-6 & nn. 3 and 4, 
2 Bracker involved the qUl~stion whether Arizona could impose motor carrier license and use fuel taxes 
on a nontribal firm with respect to on-reservation timber hauling undertaken pursuant to a contract with 
the resident tribe and sets forth the following test for when a State may regulate commercial transactions 
between tribes and nonmembers that occur on reservation: 
In such cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms 
of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed 
from historical traditions of tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or 
absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into 
the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine 
whether, in the specific <:ontext, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law. 
448 U.S. at 144-45. 
As the ~aybee Court noted, Bracker's balancing test applies only where regulated conduct falls on a 
'''nontribal entity engaged in a transaction with tribes or tribal members, on the reservation. '" Maybee, at 
*14, quoting Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 110 (2005). Because that is not 
what Maybee was doing, the Court ruled that Bracker did not apply. Maybee, at *14. 
PLAINTIFFS' THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 4 
000776
recognizes the legitimacy of state taxes imposed on reservation cigarette sales to individuals not 
members of the resident tribe and federal statutory law facilitates enforcement of State tax 
provisions and other tobacco related regulation. For example, a provision of federal law known 
as the "Jenkins Act," codified at 15 U.S.c. § 376, mandates that out-of-state cigarette retailers 
report monthly to a State:'s tax or revenue commission all sales made to residents of the tax 
commission's state. 
Concerning the State's interest, Idaho's interest in regulating tobacco is self evident. As 
noted previously, the Legislature has found that smoking presents serious public health concerns 
to Idaho and its citizens. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(a) of the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement Act (MSA Act). This strong interest was expressly recognized by the Maybee Court. 
Maybee, at *7, *10. The Legislature further determined that the financial burdens imposed on 
the State by smoking should be borne by tobacco companies, rather than by the State, to the 
extent that such companies either determine to enter into settlement agreements with the State or 
are found culpable by the courts. See Idaho Code § 39-7801 (d) of the MSA Act. The State's 
interest in regulating the sale of this dangerous product cannot be gainsaid. Idaho also has an 
interest in the effective and efficient administration of its cigarette tax laws. It cannot administer 
these laws if wholesalers, with impunity, can ignore the requirement that they obtain a permit 
from the Tax Commission. In short, the State's interests implicated presently are significant and 
NWS says nothing to und(~rcut them. 
The final consideration-the relevant tribal interest-is not helpful to NWS. The burden 
upon the Seneca Nation's tribal interests in NWS (a business incorporated under a different 
tribe's corporate code) complying with Idaho law with respect to its cigarette sales to Idaho 
businesses is not apparent. It is far less intrusive on NWS's time and resources than the record-
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keeping and tax collection duties approved in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 
425 U.S. 463 (1976),3 and Colville.4 In short, even if the Bracker balancing test were employed 
because of Warpath, Inc. 's status as a Native American-owned Idaho corporation located on the 
Coeur d'Alene Reservation, application of the test would support the State and Tax Commission 
here and would not be grounds for dismissing this matter. 
NWS spends significant time quoting the opinions of two professors involved in an 
arbitration brought under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Putting aside 
the lack of relevance that proceeding has on this case, even a cursory review of the opinions 
quoted shows fundamental Haws of understanding both factually and legally. For example, 
Professor Fletcher states that federal law prohibits state regulation that applies to the on-
reservation activities of Indian tribes or reservation Indians. Defs Supp. Memo, p. 3. He then 
applies that principle to Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (GRE), calling it a 
"wholesaler" that is "doing business in Indian Country." Id. These statements are flat out wrong. 
GRE is a tobacco product manufacturer located in Canada. And as the Second Circuit has held 
in a case the Professor does not cite "Grand River itself operates only on land that is outside the 
United States. Thus the activities of Grand River in Canada are [to be considered] off-
reservation activities ...." !3rand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 174 
3 Moe involved a challenge to Montana's method for assessment and collection of personal property 
taxes as applied to reservation Indians. Moe contains four holdings, one of which is of relevance here and 
which is that Montana could require tribal retailers to collect and remit cigarette taxes imposed on non­
Indians with respect to reservation sales. 425 U.S. at 480-81,483. As to this holding, the Supreme Court 
stated that requiring an Indian tribal seller to collect a tax validly imposed on a non-member of the Tribe 
is a minimal burden that do(:s not frustrate tribal self-government and is not prohibited by congressional 
enactment. ld. at 483. 
4 In Colville, the Supreme Court, in addition to upholding Washington's sales and cigarettes taxes on 
on-reservation purchases by nonmembers of the Tribe, also upheld Washington's authority to impose 
robust regulatory obligations on tribal retailers with respect to nonmember cigarette sales-i.e., 
maintaining "detailed records of exempt and nonexempt sales in addition to simply precollecting the tax." 
447 U.S. at 151. It reasoned that "[t]he simple collection burden imposed by Washington's cigarette tax 
on tribal smokeshops is legally indistinguishable from the collection burden upheld in Moe." ld. 
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(2nd Cir. 2005). In short, the Professor's opinion, not tethered to fact, does not undercut or refute 
the Maybee Court's conclusion, supported by the Maine Supreme Court's decision involving the 
same retailer, that when a tribal member or tribal member-owned entity goes off reservation and 
introduces its cigarettes into Idaho it is subject to the Complementary Act. Maybee, at *14; 
accord Department of Health and Human Service v. Maybee, 965 A.2d 55, 56-57 (Me. 2009). 
Professor Fletcher is equally wrong on the facts. He describes the state laws discussed in 
the NAFTA arbitration as the "direct regulation of Indian manufacturers," Def's Supp. Memo, p. 
4, a claim, of course, in error on its face: GRE is not a Native American. Rather, as noted 
above, it is a Canadian corporation that manufactures cigarettes in Canada, not in Indian country. 
Thus when he opines that "state law has no force in Indian Country," Defs Supp. Memo, p. 4, 
the Professor has merely constructed a straw man because that is not what either GRE or NWS 
are doing as a result of manufacturing the cigarettes in Canada and introducing those cigarettes 
into Idaho. Thus, this Professor's opinion here also does not refute the Maybee Court's 
conclusion that when a tribal member or tribal member-owned entity goes off reservation and 
introduces its cigarettes into Idaho it is subject to the Complementary Act. Maybee, at *14. 
NWS cites to two Kansas cases-Winnebago Tribes v. Morrison, 512 F.Supp.2d 1182 
(DKan. 2007) and Winnebago Tribes v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892 (Kan. 2007)-for the proposition 
that there is a "categorical bar" to "activities of reservation Indians between reservations." Def s 
Supp. Memo, p. 7 (emphasis in original). The cases stand for no such thing. 
The Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska owns a gasoline distributor. It sold gasoline to tribes 
in Kansas for on-reservation retail sale. The Kansas Department of Revenue asserted that the 
Winnebago's gasoline distributor owed Kansas fuel taxes and because such taxes were not paid, 
it seized various property of the distributor. The Winnebago Tribe sued Kansas alleging that 
PLAINTIFFS' THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 7 
000779
Kansas was attempting to tax a transaction occurring in Indian country. Winnebago Tribes v. 
Morrison, 512 F.Supp.2d at 1184-85. The federal district court certified to the Kansas Supreme 
Court questions related to the application of Kansas's fuel tax laws and in Winnebago Tribes v. 
Kline, 150 P.3d at 904-05, the Kansas Supreme Court, applying Kansas tax law, concluded that 
the Winnebago Tribe bore no tax liability since, under relevant state statutes, such liability 
attaches only to the "distributor of first receipt" and not importers to whom "no transfer of 
possession" of the fuel in Kansas occurs. The cases did not declare or announce some sort of 
federal law preemption for inter-reservational activity and NWS is in error to so intimate. 
Finally, NWS citl;:s anew to State v. Flammond, 621 P.2d 471 (Mont. 1980), and 
Martinez v. Superior Court, 731 P.2d 1244 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), to argue that Idaho does not 
have "minimum contacts" with NWS. Deft's Supp. Memo, p. 9. Neither case is apposite here. 
As previously discussed, in flammond the court ruled that it had neither subject matter nor 
personal jurisdiction over a child support action against a father who is an enrolled member of 
the Blackfoot Tribe and who was residing on the Blackfoot Reservation. The father married the 
mother in California and the couple separated in California. Later the father moved back to the 
Blackfoot Reservation. Id. at 472. Two points about this case bear mentioning. First, finding 
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the court's ruling on personal jurisdiction is dicta. 
Second, the facts surrounding this case are not close to that before this Court. Here, as discussed 
in the prior briefing, NWS does not reside on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation; it is not a member 
of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe; and it has significant, sizable, and purposeful contacts with Idaho by 
virtue of its selling, shipping and causing to be imported to an Idaho corporation millions of 
noncompliant cigarettes. In short, the facts of this case do not fit into Flammond's child support 
framework involving an action against a member of a tribe residing on his Tribe's reservation. 
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Martinez v. Superior Court, 731 P.2d 1244 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), closely parallels 
Flammond. A non-Indian wife filed for divorce in Arizona state court. The Indian husband 
objected. The court note'd that the parties lived on the reservation of the tribe to which the 
husband belonged, that the marriage occurred and fell apart on the reservation, that the children 
to the marriage were conceived on the reservation, and that the tribe had its own divorce code 
and tribal court to handle family-law matters. Id at 1246. The court thus ruled that under such 
circumstance it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the Indian father. It is plain that 
Martinez's personal jurisdiction holding was predicated on Indian-law preemption principles, not 
Due Process Clause-based "minimum contacts" jurisprudence; it is no less plain that Martinez's 
facts are too far afield of this case to be instructive. The State and the Tax Commission are not 
suing Warpath. Inc. for selling non-compliant cigarettes on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. 
Rather, they are suing NWS for selling, shipping, and causing to be imported into Idaho non­
compliant cigarettes. 
In the end, NWS's multiple and repeated violations of Idaho law are not immunized by 
federal law. That which the State and the Tax Commission argued to the Court when they filed 
the present motion for a preliminary injunction, as well as their opposition to NWS's motion to 
dismiss, is still correct with one development, which is that with respect to a number of issues 
raised to this Court, the Idaho Supreme Court has now entered rulings and in each instance in a 
manner upholding the State and the Tax Commission here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the State and the Tax Commission respectfully request 
that this Court deny NWS's motion to dismiss on personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
grounds and grant the Statl~ and Tax Commission's motion for a preliminary injunction. 
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COMMISSION, 
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and submits its 
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintifls' 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. 
In State ofIdaho v. Maybee the Idaho Supreme Court applied the Master Settlement Agreement 
and the Complimentary Act to the sales of cigarettes by an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation 10 
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Idaho citizens who are not enrolled members ofany tribe and who are not residing on Indian Country. In 
deciding whether or not application of the statute was in conflict with the Indian Commerce Clause, the 
Court noted among other things, "it is critical to determine as a preliminary inquiry: (I) whether the 
regulated conduct occurs on or off reservation ...." The Idaho Supreme Court then held in Maybee that 
the Complimentary Act and the Master Settlement Agreement Act could be applied to Maybee's sales 
because he was involved in "selling and offering for sale non-compliant cigarettes in Idaho" which were 
"off reservation activities." The site of the transaction was critical to the Court's analysis. Similarly, the 
United States Supreme Court "has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical 
component to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption 
inquiry; though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh 
in determining whether state authority has exceeded permissible limits." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 
151. 
The State does not directly address the fact that the present case involves no sales to 
Idaho residents who are not located on Indian Country. The State engages in misdirection and 
claims that because Warpath is a corporation Idaho may regulate NWS' sales to it. This is not 
true. The State ignores Idaho Administrative Rule 35.01.10.014.01 which specifically provides 
that cigarette wholesalers may deliver cigarettes without Idaho stamps to Indian Country when: 
a.	 The purchaser is an enrolled member of an Idaho Indian tribe; 
b.	 The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and 
operated by an enrolled member or members of an Idaho Indian 
tribe; and 
c.	 The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and 
operated by an Idaho Indian tribe. 
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW - 2 
57032-1/00190772.000.DOC 
000784
IDAPA 35.01.10.014.01. For the purpose of cigarette sales, Idaho treats Native Americans and 
entities owned exclusivelly by members of an enrolled tribe the same. As has previously been 
established, Warpath is exclusively owned by enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 
Further, Tribal sovereignty claims are not limited to cases in which an Indian tribe is a party. 
Instead, there is substantial case law that tribally-chartered corporations have the same 
supremacy clause-protected status as tribes. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family 
Land and Cattle Co., No. CIV. 05-3002, 2006 WL 2055880 (D.S.D. July. 17,2006). 
The authority cited by the State, Products, Inc. v. Commissioner, 971 F.Supp. 294 (W.D.Mich. 
1997), has also been subject to rejection and criticism. See Flat Center Farms, Inc. v. Montana, 310 
Mont. 209,49 PJd 578 (!vlont. 2002). In Flat Center Farms, the Montana Supreme Court held that a 
corporate license tax could not be imposed on an Indian owned corporation that did business entirely 
within the reservation. The court rejected Baraga Products, stating: "in fact we have in the past given 
greater weight to the situs of the taxable income than the status of the income earner." Id at 581. See 
also Courier v. South Dakota Department ofRevenue, 658 N.W.2d 395 (S.Dak. 2003): 
Tbe Department claims that Muddy Creek cannot meet the threshold 
requirement ofbeing either the Tribe or an enrolled member ofthe Tribe 
because as a corporation, it cannot have the racial identity necessary to 
fall within the Chickasaw rule. In support of this argument, the 
Department relies on Baraga Products, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 971 F.Supp. 294, 296-297 (W.D.Mich. 1997). Baraga held 
that a corporation formed under state law and owned by an enrolled 
member such as Muddy Creek was not an enrolled member of the tribe 
as required by Chickasaw. We disagree and hold that a corporation 
owned by the tribe or an enrolled tribal member residing on the Indian 
reservation and doing business on the reservation for the benefit of 
reservation Indians is an enrolled member for the purpose of protecting 
tax immunity. 
Id. at 403 - 04. 
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly prohibited civil regulation of transactions between 
Indians on Indian Country. "Indian nations ... long have been distinct political communities, 
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive." Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n 
v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993). The "presumption against state taxing 
authority applies to all Indian Country ...." Id. at 126. The court must "analyze the relevant 
treaties and federal statutes against the backdrop of Indian sovereignty" in considering the 
activity to be regulated. Id. 
"In light of the unique sovereign status of Indian tribes located in [Idaho]," it is clear that 
the state "cannot tax cigarettes sold on an Indian reservation to tribal members for their own use, 
unless authorized to do so by Congress." Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Rising, 477 F.3d 
881, 883 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, 546 U.S. 95 
(2005). "The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations 
with Indian tribes ..., and in recognition of sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after 
formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals are generally exempt from state 
taxation within their own territory." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 
455 (1995) (quoting Montana v. Blaclifeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,764 (1985». Where, as here, the 
tax scheme has some effect on an Indian tribe, "[t]he initial and frequently dispositive question .. 
. is who bears the legal incidence of[the] tax." Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99 ("States are categorically 
barred from placing the legal incidence of an excise tax on a tribe or on tribal members for sales 
made inside Indian country") (citations omitted). 
In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), an off-
reservation enterprise owned by a non-member sold farm equipment to a tribe, and the sales were 
solicited on the reservation, contracted on the reservation, and payment and delivery of the 
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equipment took place on the reservation. !d. at 161. The State sought to tax these transactions 
by imposing a "privilege of doing business in the state" tax on the non-member seller. !d. The 
state pointed out that the seller was located off the reservation and was not a licensed Indian 
trader, and therefore these distinguishing factors permitted the state to impose its tax. ld. The 
Supreme Court rejected these arguments, expressly finding that that it was "irrelevant that the 
sale was made to a tribal enterprise rather than to the Tribe itself." Id. 
The State also argues that a Bracker balancing test should apply. Bracker does not apply. 
Bracker only applies to transactions involving non-tribal entities occurring on reservation. Here, that is 
not the case. Even if a Bracker balancing test were applied, clearly the statutes are not applicable to 
NWS' sales to Warpath. 
The State may have an interest in regulating sales and transactions between Warpath and Idaho 
citizens who are not enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe or residing on the Coeur d' Alene 
Reservation. However, the State has chosen instead to focus upon NWS' sales to Warpath. This tribal-
to-tribal transaction occurring only on Indian Country may not be regulated by the State. 
As the Supreme Court observed in Maybee, regulation of tribal conduct "may unlawfully 
infringe 'on the right of resf:rvation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. '" Maybee at p. 
16. 
When on-n~servation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, State 
law is generally inapplicable, because the State's regulatory interest is 
likely to minimal and the federal interest of encouraging self­
government is at its strongest. 
ld., citing Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. 
On the other hand, the strong federal interest in promoting tribal self-government, economic 
development and self-sufficiency weighs overwhelmingly against application of the statutes to NWS' 
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sales to Warpath. See, e.g.. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. laPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14, 107 S.Ct. 971,94 L.Ed.2d 
10 (1987) (stating that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly recognized the Federal Government's 
longstanding policy of em;ouraging tribal self-government"). These federal interests are reflected in 
various Acts of Congress, Executive Branch policies, and judicial opinions. See generally Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.c. § § 2701-2721 (2000); Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,25 U.S.c. 
§ § 461-479 (2000); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,25 U.S.c. 450 
(2000); see also Presidential Proclamation 7500, 66 Fed.Reg.57641 (Nov. 12,2001) ("We will protect 
and honor tribal sovereignty and help to stimulate economic development in reservation communities."); 
Exec. Order 13175, 65 Feel.Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000) ("[We] recognize [] the right of Indian tribes to 
self-government and support[] tribal sovereignty and self-determination."); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143, 100 
S.Ct. 2578 (there is "a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic 
development"); Washington v. Confederated Tribes ofColville, 447 U.S. 134, 155, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 
L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (noting that federal statutes evidence "varying degrees [of] congressional concem 
with fostering tribal self-government and economic development"). "Here, the tribal interests are ,ill 
outgrowth of the federal policy toward self-determination, self-sufficiency and self-government." Queets 
Band. 765 F.2d at 1407 n.6. 
Further, as Professor Fletcher observed in his expert opinion previously submitted to this Court: 
Federal Indian policy articulated by Congress protects and encourages 
Indian tribes and Indian people to engage in economic development for 
the purpose of generating self-sufficiency and moving away from 
dependence on the federal government. The kind of business operation 
in which the Claimants engage is exactly the type of activity that 
Congress encourages. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The 
Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb.L.Rev. 121, 144-47 
(2006) (describing Congressional policy on tax immunities and tribal 
economic development); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal 
economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 
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N.D.L.Rev. 759, 774-84 (2004) (describing several kinds of tribal 
businesses). 
There are many reasons for the development ofthis policy ofprotecting 
and encouraging Indian businesses. First, Indian people generally are the 
poorest people in the United States. Second, Federal Indian Law limits 
the authority ofIndian tribes to tax nonmembers, even within Indian 
Country, meaning that tribal governments often have little capacity to 
provide governmental services to tribal citizens. Third, state and local 
governments have long been reticent to provide services to Indian 
people. On occasion, this reticence it based in racial prejudice, but more 
often it is based on several often incorrect presumptions. State and local 
governments onen assume that Indian people are ineligible for state and 
local services because oftheir tribal status, or that Indian people are 
ineligible for services because many ofthem do not pay state or local 
taxes. Finally, non-Indian businesses, paying the substantial taxes on 
cigarettes and other tobacco products imposed by state and local 
governments, treat tobacco-related businesses as economic competition. 
In short, Federal Indian Law has historically served as a double-edged 
sword for Indian tribes and Indian people, but the key actors in Federal 
Indian Law have always been tribal and federal. States and local 
governments are excluded from these relations absent an Act of 
Congress. Federal Indian Law is intended to prevent state and local 
governments from undermining the structure offederal Indian law and 
policy established by the federal government and Indian tribes. As the 
remainder ofmy analysis shows, the MSA established by 46 states does 
exactly that, and should not be enforced against American Indians and 
their businesses. 
See Opinion ofMatthew Fletcher at pp. 12-13, Exhibit "B" to Affidavit ofSamuel A. Diddle dated 
March 4, 2010. 
The State has failed to show why the Maybee decision would in any way be controlling and 
support application ofthe MSA or Complimentary Act to NWS' sales to Warpath. In addition to the fact 
that the substantive holding in Maybee supports NWS' position, the procedural differences in the cases 
also mandate a different result. The State has not established and cannot establish any minimum contacts 
with the State ofIdaho by NWS. The only contacts by NWS that may exist are contacts with a tribal 
entity on Indian Country. TIlose contacts will not constitute contacts with the forum state, Idaho. 
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For the reasons stated herein, NWS reiterates its request that the Court deny the State's motion 
for preliminary injilllction and grant its motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. 
DATED this _LL day of March, 2010. 
, KADING, TURNBOW 
N, CHARTERED 
a u A. Diddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
:lrY5 ~~. _ 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through MAY 20 2010 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX J. ~\Il,U:HlIA~ 
Ely_--Ll~~~4=:::"'-_COMMISSION, 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 Plaintiffs, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
 
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
 
MOTION TO DISMISS
 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
This is a case involving the wholesale sale and distribution of cigarettes allegedly in violatio 
of the Idaho Complementary Act, I.C. 39-8401, et seq., and the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.C. 
48-601, et seq. On August 14,2008, Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax Commissio 
filed their Verified Complaint seeking injunctive and other relief as to Defendant Native Wholesal 
Supply Company, also hereinafter Native Wholesale. Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho State Ta 
Commission's Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed on April 9, 2009. On May 6, 2009 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction and 
related allegation of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The extensiv 
procedural history of this case was addressed by the Court in its September 15,2009, Order and wil 
not be repeated here. However, the Court does incorporate that order into this order by reference. 
Hearing was held on these motions on July 2, 2009. Supplemental authority was submitted to th 
Court for review on August 26, 2009, and the Court requested further briefing from the parties in th 
aforementioned Order of September 15, 2009. Further hearing on these motions was held Decembe 
17,2009. In February 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on a matter directly related to the issue 
before the Court in Idaho v. Maybee (Docket No. 35200 Opinion No.2 November 2009 tem1 File 
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January 15,2010). The Court requested further briefing from the parties based upon this additiona 
supplemental authority. On February 22, 2010, Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Law i 
Support of Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction wa 
filed. On that same date, Defendant filed its Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle in Support 0 
Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiff 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On March 4, 2010, Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho Stat 
Tax Commission's Third Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion t 
Dismiss was filed. On March 11,2010, Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support 0 
its Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed. 
Thereafter, on March 18, 2010, Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax Commission' 
Notice of Supplemental Authority was filed citing the Court to the case of Muscogee Nation v. Henry, 
CIV 10-019-JHP, recently decided in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 0 
Oklahoma. No response has been filed by the Defendants to this final supplemental authority. Th 
Court now considers the matter fully submitted for decision. 
On or about January I, 2004, Defendant began importing two cigarette brands, Seneca an 
Opal, for sale and distribution in Idaho. Both brands of cigarettes are not listed on the Idah 
Directory. See Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Persona 
Jurisdiction filed on May 6, 2009, hereinafter Montour Affidavit, p.2 ~3. Defendant purchases an 
imports the cigarettes and holds them in the Southern Nevada Foreign Trade Zone in Las Vegas 
Nevada. Montour Affidavit p. 2 ~4. Native Wholesale has a contract to sell Seneca and Opal brand 
of cigarettes to Warpath, ][nc., hereinafter Warpath, an Idaho corporation located in Plummer, Idaho 
on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. See Affidavit of Beth A. Kittlemann filed on April 9, 2009 
hereinafter Kittlemann Affidavit, Exhibits E-H. Warpath in tum sells the cigarettes to the public 
including persons who arl;: not Native American. See Affidavit of Mark Ausman filed on June 23 
2009, hereinafter Ausman Affidavit, pp.1-2, ~~2-5 
Seneca and Opal cigarettes are manufactured by Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., 
hereinafter Grand River. K-ittelmann Affidavit p.2 ~3. On September 5, 2002, an injunction issue 
against Grand River prohibiting Grand River from selling cigarettes in Idaho either directly 0 
through an intermediary. Kittelmann Affidavit p.3 ~6. The injunction was issued due to Gran 
River's noncompliance with I.C. §39-8403(3) which regulates what type of cigarettes can be sold i 
Idaho, and remains in effect at this time. Kittelmann Affidavit p.3 ~7. In February 2008, the Idah 
Attorney General learned that Grand River cigarettes were still being brought into Idaho throug 
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Defendant. Kittelmann Affidavit p. 3 ~8. On June 13, 2008, 1,460,000 Seneca and Opal bran 
cigarettes were imported into Idaho and on July 21, 2008, 1,634,000 Seneca and Opal bran 
cigarettes were brought into Idaho. Kittelmann Affidavit p.3 ~9. Native Wholesale has also neve 
applied for a cigarette permit required by I.C. §63-2503. See Kittlemann Affidavit p.2 ~4. 
Pursuant to Plaintiffs State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax Commission's Motion 
Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Native Wholesale Supply Company "and itsl 
employees, agents, successors, assigns, affiliates, distributors and all other persons acting in concert: 
with Native Wholesale" firom directly or indirectly "transporting, importing or causing to be importe~ 
cigarettes that are not included on Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product ManufacturerJ 
and Brand Families (the 'Idaho Directory')" pursuant to the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreemeni 
I
 
Complementary Act ("Complementary Act"), I.C. §39-8403(3), and the Idaho Consumer Protectiod 
Act, I.C. §48-601, et seq. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin Defendant "from selling cigarettes a~ 
wholesale without first applying for and possessing a cigarette permit as required by Idaho Code 
Section 63-2503(1 )." 
The Court will first address the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matte 
and Personal Jurisdiction and then, if appropriate, tum its attention to the Plaintiffs' preliminar 
injunction motion. As has previously been noted, Defendant, seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' complain 
I
 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), for lack of personal jurisdiction 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant 
i
 
to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). These various grounds for dismissal are all related to Defendant's status as ~ 
Native American business. 
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when the action at
 
issue falls within Idaho's longarm statute if the constitutional standards of due process are met.
 
Blimka v. MyWeb Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 726, 152 P.3d 594, 597 (2007); Smalley v.
 
Kaiser, 130 Idaho 909, 950 P.2d 1248, 1251 (1997). Minimum contacts with the forum state ar
 
required in order to comply with traditional notions of fair play. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 32
 
U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed 95 (1945). A corporation must "purposefully ... [avail] itself 0 .
 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits an
 
protections of its laws." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184
 
85 L.Ed.2d 528, 543 (1985); Western States Equipment Co. v. American Annex, Inc. 125 Idaho 155,
 
158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994). The defendant must "reasonably anticipate being haled into court i
 
the forum state." Western States Equipment Co. 125 Idaho at 158 citing World-Wide Volkswago
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Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287, 100 S. Ct. 559, 562, 62 L.Ed 490 (1980). Furthermore if th
 
corporation receives a dir,ect benefit from the interstate activities located in the forum jurisdiction th
 
defendant can expect to be haled into court. Schneider v. Scerdsten Logging Co., 104 Idaho 210, 213
 
657 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1983); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 11
 
(1987).
 
Native Wholesale has sold over 92 million Seneca and Opal cigarettes to Warpath, Inc., i
 
Idaho. See Verified Complaint pp.5-7 ~28-30. Native Wholesale's gross income from Idaho sale
 
totals more than $4.4 miIlion. See Second Affidavit of Beth A. Kittelmann filed on June 23, 2009,
 
hereinafter Second Kittelmann Affidavit, p.6 ~17. Defendant directly contracts for the sale 0
 
cigarettes with Warpath, Inc., an Idaho corporation. Id. The amount of business conducted between
 
Defendant and Warpath, Inc., indicates Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
 
engaging in business in Idaho and has, therefore, subjected itself to Idaho law and the personal
 
jurisdiction of this Court satisfying due process standards and traditional notions of fair play.
 
Nonetheless, Defendant argues that the Complementary Act and, specifically, I.e. §63
 
2503(1), do not apply to its activities because the transactions between Warpath and Nativ
 
Wholesale are strictly tribal to tribal events and the Court, therefore, lacks both personal and subjec
 
matter jurisdiction. An incorporated business cannot argue that it should be considered an enrolle
 
member of a tribe because its sole shareholder is a member. See Baraga Prds., Inc. v. Comm'r, 971
 
F.Supp. 294, 296 (W.D. Michigan 1977); see also Ariz. Dept. ofRevenue v. Blaze Cosntr. Co., 52
 
U.S. 32, 34 (1999)). "[A] corporation is not an 'Indian' for purposes of immunity" from th
 
application of state law. Baraga Prds., Inc., 971 F.Supp. at 298. Tribes do not have "super sovereig
 
authority to interfere with another jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax." Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v.
 
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 466, (1995). Native American immunity from state taxation extend
 
to commerce within a tribe, not among tribes. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720 (1983). In fact,
 
state can require a tribal retailer to obtain a state license for any sales to "all non-Indians and all
 
Indians who are not members of the particular tribe." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of th
 
Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-161 (1980) (upholding the State's power to make offIndia
 
country seizures of unstamped contraband product). See also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686-8
 
(1990) (immunity "does not apply to taxation of inter-tribal commerce"). "Activity of tribal member
 
that takes place within the reservation but has an impact outside the reservation may be regulated b
 
the states. . . [when] state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States may regulate th
 
activities even of tribe members on tribal land." Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.353, 362-66 (2001).
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"Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been subject to non-discriminatory stat 
laws otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 
145, 148-49 (1973). Where a non-Indian is engaging in activities on a reservation; the court employ 
a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and tribal interests at stake, an inquir 
designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violat 
federal law." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980). 
Defendant contends the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereign Immunity applies to the case at ba 
because the president and owner of Native Wholesale is a Native American and a member of th 
Seneca Nation. Native Wholesale is a cigarette wholesaler incorporated by the Sac and Fox tribe i 
Oklahoma with its principal place of business on the Seneca Nation reservation in upstate New York. 
However the Complementary Act and I.C. §63-2503(1) are not attempting to regulate activities takin 
place on that reservation, but rather off-reservation activities of 1) selling and offering for sale. 
noncompliant cigarettes and 2) selling, and offering for sale, tobacco products without first havin 
obtained a tobacco permit. As recently determined by the Supreme Court of Idaho, whether Nativ 
Wholesale 
delivers noncompliant cigarettes to Idaho consumers personally, or through a 
common carrier, this conduct is ultimately traceable to ... [Native Wholesale]. Idaho 
Code §39-8403(3) is concerned with the introduction of noncompliant cigarettes into 
Idaho, and I.C. §39-5704(1) is concerned with the introduction of any tobacco 
products into Idaho by anyone not first obtaining a tobacco permit. There is no 
conflicting federal law that would prevent the State of Idaho from regulating how 
tobacco may be sold or offered for sale in Idaho. . . Here, the regulated conduct 
occurred off-reservation, and so the Bracker balancing test does not apply. 
State v. Maybee (Docket No. 35200 Opinion No.2 November 2009 term Filed January 
15,201O)pp.17-18. 
Furthermore the cigarettes in question are ultimately sold in the state of Idaho for purposes 0 
the Complementary Act. The contracts between Native Wholesale and Warpath list F.O.B. as Senec 
Nation. See Second Kittelmann Affidavit p.7 ~20, Exhibit 1. However, the sale of the cigarette 
occurs in Idaho regardless of the term FOB Seneca Nation on the contract. Title cannot pass prior t 
identification of the goods in the contract. I.C. §28-2-401(1). Goods are identified in contracts fo 
future sale at the time the goods are shipped or otherwise designated. I.C. §28-2-501(b). If th 
contract requires delivery of the goods then title passes at the place of delivery. I.C. §28-2-401(2)(b). 
If the contract does not require delivery but requires "or authorizes the seller to send the goods to th 
buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time an 
place of shipment." I.C. §28-2-401(2)(a). Native Wholesale sells cigarettes to Warpath and has th 
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Foreign Trade Zone in N(~vada to locate and prepare the cigarettes purchased from Native Wholesal
 
for shipment. See Second Kittelmann Affidavit p.7 ,-[20, Exhibit 1. The invoices show Warpath i
 
billed for the shipment of the cigarettes from the Southern Nevada Foreign Trade Zone. Secon
 
Kittelmann Affidavit p.7 '20. Defendant argues that, as a result, Warpath is responsible for th
 
importation of these ciga[l~ttes into Idaho and not Native Wholesale. However these cigarettes may b
 
transported into Idaho, ultimately that conduct is traceable to Defendant. See State v. Maybee, supra.
 
Idaho tax laws are implicated at the time the cigarettes are introduced into the state through selling,
 
importing or causing importation of cigarettes into Idaho. Therefore, the provisions of th
 
Complementary Act apply to Defendant. See again State v. Maybee, supra.
 
The Court finds the statutes involved are non-discriminatory and regulate off-reservatio 
conduct of a Native American owned corporation. The Complementary Act also contains an expres 
legislative direction that sales, such as Native Wholesale'S, to Idaho retailers, such as Warpath 
comply with its certification requirement. Therefore, the Court is satisfied it has jurisdiction over th 
subject matter of this caSI~ and Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter as well a 
personal jurisdiction is therefore denied. 
Defendant also asserts Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
 
Although the Court feels this argument is merely an extension of Defendant's motion to dismiss fo
 
lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, it will briefly address it nonetheless. Because th
 
Court has not excluded the various affidavits and other documents submitted on this issue, it ha
 
treated Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted a
 
one for summary judgment. See LR.C.P. 12(b). Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith i
 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that ther
 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 0
 
law." LR.C.P. 56(c). "'Motions for summary judgment should be granted with caution.' Bailey v.
 
Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497,. 707 P.2d 900, 902 (1982); Steele v. Nagel, 89 Idaho 522, 528, 406 P.2
 
805,808 (1965)." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876 (1991). There do not appea
 
to be any significant issues of material fact related to Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure t
 
state a claim. In fact, as has been previously noted, Defendant's dismissal motion is primarily base
 
upon the argument that Idaho law does not apply to the actions of Native Wholesale and, therefore,
 
the Court lacks the authority to proceed. However, the Court has already held that the actions 0
 
Native Wholesale in the case at bar are not protected by the Indian Commerce Clause and are subjec
 
to the Complementary Act of Idaho and LC. §63-2503(1). Plaintiffs have properly asserted a clai
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for relief for Defendant's violation of the statutes and, therefore, Defendant's dismissal motion 0 
that basis is also denied. 
Having determined it has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and th 
case at bar, the Court will now consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In pertinen 
part, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e) specifies the following grounds for issuing a preliminar 
injunction: 
1)	 When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and suc 
relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act 
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. 
2)	 When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of some ac 
during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 
3)	 When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about t 
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiffs rights, 
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 
Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is a matter for the discretion of the trial court.
 
Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 517, 681 P. 2d 988, 992 (1984). A preliminary injunction "i
 
granted only in extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury wil
 
flow from its refusal." Id. At 518, 681 P.2d at 993 (citing Evans v. District Court ofthe Fifth Judicia
 
Dist., 47 Idaho 276, 270, 275 P. 99, 100 (1929)). However, "it is not necessary that a case should b
 
made out that would entitle complainant to relief at all events on the final hearing. If complainant ha
 
made out a prima facie case or if from the pleadings and the conflicting affidavits it appears to th
 
court that a case is presented proper for its investigation on a final hearing, a preliminary injunctio
 
may issue to maintain the status quo." Rowland v Kellog Power & Water Co., 40 Idaho 216, 225, 233
 
P.869 (1925). The Idaho Supreme Court has held "that a preliminary injunction to preserve th
 
property in status quo pending final judgment is proper. .. since the owner is entitled to the protectio
 
of his property in specie. ld. (citing Gilpin v. Sierra Nevada Con. Min. Co., 2 Idaho 696, 23 P. 547
 
1014 (1890); Staples v. Rossi, 7 Idaho 618, 65 P.67 (1901).
 
The Complaint properly asserts that Native Wholesale is in violation of the Complementar
 
Act and I.C. §63-2503(l) by causing unlawful cigarettes to be sold, offered for sale, or imported int
 
Idaho and doing so without first obtaining a tobacco permit. I.C. §63-2502(a) authorizes the ldah
 
State Tax Commission to seek injunctive relief against anyone engaged in the tobacco business as
 
wholesaler acting without a permit. The invoices attached as exhibits to the first and second affidavit
 
of Beth Kittelmann indicate the cigarette brands being sold, the importation of which was enjoined i
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another case, are not listed on the Idaho Directory and have generated a substantial amount 0 
revenue for Native Wholesale from Idaho consumers. See Kittlemann Affidavit, Exhibits I an 
Exhibits E-H. Plaintiffs have cited I.C. §39-7801 (a)-(b) whereby the state of Idaho is obligated t 
provide medical assistance to eligible persons for heath conditions related to smoking. See also I.e. 
§39-7801(c). The financial burden imposed on the State from smoking-related illness was the impetu 
for the state of Idaho to place restrictions on the tobacco industry. State v. Philip Morris et al. Cas 
No. CV-OC-9703239D, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County (December 3, 1998) (Eismann, DJ. 
This prompted the adoption of the Complementary Act which also implicates the Idaho Consume 
Protection Act because any violation of the Complementary Act is considered deceptive or an unfai 
trade practice. I.C. §39-8406(5); see I.e. §48-601. The invoices and contracts for the sale of th 
cigarettes sold by Native Wholesale have not ceased and are ongoing from the year 2004. Therefore, 
the Court finds the unlawful actions of Native Wholesale are likely to continue and a preliminar 
injunction shall issue as a result. 
This Court has considered the various cases cited by Plaintiffs and Defendant in support 0 .
 
their respective positions .. In particular, it has followed guidance of the Supreme Court of Idaho i
 
State v. Maybee, supra. In reliance on that opinion and the foregoing analysis, Defendant's Motion t
 
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction is hereby denied. Plaintiffs State 0 .
 
Idaho and the Idaho State Tax Commission's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby granted.
 
Plaintiffs are directed to prepare an appropriate order and preliminary injunction consistent with thi
 
decision for the Court's signature.
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~ day of May, 2010. 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 8
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, on this JC~day of May, 2010, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant to 
Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
954 W. JEFFERSON ST., SECOND FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-0010 
THEODORE V. SPANGLER, JR., 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
800 PARK BOULEVARD 
P.O. BOX 36 
BOISE, IDAHO 83722-0J 50 
SAMUEL A. DIDDLE 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & 
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED 
1111 WEST JEFFERSON ST., SUITE 530 
P.O. BOX 1368 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 9 000800
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 ~UK = 
sajJBJi~Mii~67 JUN 0; 2010 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk 
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED By PATRICIAAOWONel'1 
OI!PLm'1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
P. O. Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344··8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344··8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
PRELIMINARY INJUNTION 
ORDER 
Defendants .. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company (''NWS''), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and hereby lodges this 
objection to the proposed Preliminary Injunction Order submitted by the Plaintiffs in this matter. 
The Plaintiffs' proposed injunction sets forth two requested preliminary injunctions. The 
requested injunctions are distinct from the relief requested in the complaint. While similar, the added 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER - 1 
57032-1/00193940.000 
000801
........
 
language is objectionable and not contained within the pleadings and should not be included in the 
Order. Language consistent with Plaintiffs' Complaint would state the following: 
1.	 Defendant is preliminarily enjoined from any future violation of 
Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(c) ofthe Complementary Act 
pursuant to Code § 48-606(1)(b) ofthe Consumer Protection 
Act. 
2.	 Defendant is preliminarily enjoined from any future violation 
of Idaho Code § 63-25(3)(1), pursuant to Idaho Code § 63­
2519. 
The above-stated language tracks the relief requested in the Complaint. Any expansion 
upon the relief requested in a Complaint is improper. 
NWS objects to the Order to the extent it establishes sanctions for potential future 
violations. This relief is 110t requested in the Complaint, it is not addressed in any briefing, and it 
is not appropriately included in the proposed Order. Sanctions for any potential violation of an 
Order should be addressed in a hearing after proper notice. The language set forth in the 
proposed Order is premature and inappropriate. 
NWS also objects to the entry of any order because on June 3, 2010, NWS filed a Motion 
for a Stay of the Court's May 20, 2010 Memorandum, Decision and Order pending NWS's 
appeal. 
DATED this 4th day ofJune, 2010. 
EBERLE,BERL , KADING, TURNBOW 
& MCKLV ,CHARTERED 
BY-~<........>o,;+-"-':.J£l.,.4--.I.".£...--==O~-'L..:.~"L.--+-_
 
S el. Diddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER - 2 
57032-1100193940.000 
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...... 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney this 4th day of June, 2010, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Brettt T. DeLange 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
Len B. Jordan Building 
650 W. State Street, Lower Level 
PO Box 83702 
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010 
William Von Tagen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Tax Commission 
POBOX 36 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410 
LKl U.S. Mail 
1'] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax (208)334-4151 
[ ] Electronic Court Transmission 
[XI U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 334-7844 
[ ] Electronic Court Transmission 
Sa 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER - 3 
57032-1/00193940.000 
000803
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
 NO. 
A.MATTORNEY GENERAl.. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
--;;;~~.:::+~ --r---[FIL~~tg2~ =
 
JUN 2 ~ 2Gl0
 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney G4meral 
954 W. Jefferson, St., Se4:ond Floor 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Tax Commission 
800 Park Boulevard 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150 
Telephone: (208) 334-7530 
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844 
Attorneys for the Idaho 'Tax Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General, and the IDAHO TAX 
)
)
 
) Case No. CV OC 0815228 
COMMISSION,
 
Plaintiffs, 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendant. 
------)
 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
ORIGINAL 000804
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs the State of Idaho, 
by and through Attorney General Lawrence G. Wasden, and the Idaho Tax Commission, move 
the court for summary judgment against Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company because 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
This motion is based upon all of the pleadings, motions, and other documents filed in the 
above-captioned matter, including the Court's May 20, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order 
Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the First and Second Affidavits of Beth Kittelmann. 
the Affidavit of Don AndeTson, and the Affidavit of Mark Ausman, all of which were previously 
filed in this matter. The motion is also based on the Third Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann and the 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, both filed 
contemporaneously with this motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of June, 2010.
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
STATE OF IDAHO
 
By~~h 
BRETT T. DELANGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
IDAHO TAX COMMISSION 
By: -:::t""'~:::::=:"..::J::::::.~~===-..,~-----
lAM VON TAGE 
Attorney General 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of June, 2010, I caused to be served, by the method 
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following: 
Samuel A. Diddle Ii(! U.S. Mail 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & o Hand Delivery 
McKlveen, Chartered D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 D Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1368 D Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
Deputy Attorney General 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
 
000806
1 LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney Genend 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 West Jefferson, 2nd Ifloor 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Tax Commission 
800 Park Boulevard 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150 
Telephone: (208) 334-7530 
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844 
Attorneys for the Idaho Tax Commission 
NO·-----:::F1:"':=LED::--;a7.'=71j'.-::•.-.:::;'-­
P.M. L?-- jAM
.---­
JUN 2 ~ 20m 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through )
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney )
 
General, and the IDAHO TAX )
 
COMMISSION, )
 
)
 
Plaintiffs, )
 
)
 
vs. )
 
)
 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY )
 
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1 )
 
through 20, )
 
)
 
Defendant. 
._----) 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF BETH A. 
KITTELMANN 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF BETH A. KITTELMANN -1 ORIGINAL 
()JJ\

I 
000807
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Beth A. Kittelmann, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a Paralegal for the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Idaho 
Attorney General. One of my duties is to oversee and maintain records received and compiled 
by the Office of the Attorney General that relate to the matters set forth in this Affidavit. I have 
personal knowledge and information of the facts set forth herein, as well as their accuracy. I also 
have personal knowledge of the records referred to in this Affidavit. 
2. The Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes are manufactured by Grand River 
Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (GRE), a foreign cigarette manufacturer located in Ohseweken, 
Ontario, Canada. 
3. The Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes and their manufacturer, GRE, have never 
been listed on Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brands 
(Directory) and thus have never been approved for sale in Idaho. 
4. Attached as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of the webpages from 
www.smartsmoker.com showing, on June 18, 2010, that their retail prices for the Opal and 
Seneca cigarette brands an~, respectively $28.99 and $26.99. 
5. Attached as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of the webpages from 
www.intemetsmokes.com showing, on June 18, 2010, that their retail prices for the Opal and 
Seneca cigarette brands are, respectively $23.10 and $21.80. 
6. Attached as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the webpages from 
www.smokes-spirits.com showing, on June 18, 2010, that their retail prices for the Opal and 
Seneca cigarette brands are, respectively $24.49 and $24.99. 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF BETH A. KITTELMANN - 2
 
000808
7. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a June 23, 2010 e-mail that 
Steve Kenyon, clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court, sent to deputy attorney general Brett DeLange, 
stating that the median time for an appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court for the past 12 months 
is 536 days. 
12 rd 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~day of June, 2010. 
....................
 
..IENNIFER L. BITHELL J
 
NOTARY PUBLIC
 
STATE OF IIDAHO
 
+....."""..,.·..,,"'''',,1.',.·'·,.'''"'1»+ 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OIr BETH A. KITTELMANN - 3 
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--
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I hereby certify that on the ~'4ay of June, 2010, I caused to be served, by the method 
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following: 
Samuel A. Diddle ~ U.S. Mail 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & o Hand Delivery 
McKlveen, Chartered D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
1111 West Jefferson Stret:t, Suite 530 D Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1368 D Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
~\L~/ 
BRETT T. DELANGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OJ1 BETH A. KITTELMANN - 4
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vie~.v al! I accessories I tf)atured Cigarettes I 
value C!Cjdrettes I shop !Jy I!st 
JUMP T'O YOUR BRAND 
Select 
About Us i OUI Philosophy I My Account I Shopping Cart' Help I Horne 
Opal
 
A longer, slimmer 120 that offers an upscale taste for th 
discriminating smoker. 
Price: $28 
Full Flavor 120s Box - $28.99 
SMARTSMOKER.COM 
Where Smart Smokers Shop. 
Registered Users 
~mlj1oW 
not registered? 
Shopping Cart 
Your Cart is empty 
Popular Choices 
Warrior Filtered Cigars $1.00 
PremiumQne $4.99 
Ariva $9.99 
gignal$U.49
 
Jjarum $29.99
 
• ·.1arlbOJo Snus $19.99 
SmartSmoker also recommends ... 
Eve 
Scncca 
Ariva 
~ EIift~ 
SC).C)C) 
S26.99 
Opal from smartsmoker.com. Tobacco products at discount prices 
from our online store. We carryall major brands. Premium brands 
include cheap Kool, Salem, Newport, Camel, Winston and Marlboro 
cigarettes 
4 Aces $15.49 
Lariat $18.99 
Wrang1er$12.99 
Yankee ~Lend$12. 49 
Park Hawk Pipe Iobacco $1J.99 
couture $31.99 
•welD~ 
onlnne 
@2010 SmartSmoker.com 
All rights reserved. You must be 21 to purchase 
our cigarettes and tobacco products. Orders 
Require Adult Signature 
Surgeon General's Warning: QUitting Smoking 
Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your 
Health. 
Buyer responsible for payment of applicable 
taxes. 
6/18/1 0
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EXHIBIT 
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viet...- all I accessories I featured cigarettes I 
value uqarettes I shop by !Ist 
JUMP T'O YOUR BRAND 
Select 
SMARTSMOKER.COM 
Where Smart Smokers Shop. 
About Us I Our Plillosophy I ~1y Account Shoppinq Cart I Help I Horne 
Seneca 
Seneca is blended from the finest tobacco resulting in an 
unparalleled taste. For those who look for smoothness a 
full-bodied flavor, we recommend Seneca. 
Price: $26 
Full Flavor laOs Box - $26.99 
Registered Users 
~ffl_now 
no tregistered? 
Shopping Cart 
Your Cart is empty 
PopularChoices 
Warrior Filtered .Qg~00 
gremiuJn One $4.99
 
'\riva $9.99
 
• -jJgnaL$23.49 
SmartSmoker also recommends ... 
Warrior Opal 
LariatSkydancer Filtered 
Cigars 
'(~J('! I
S25-49 $18.99 
828.99Sl1.99• 
Seneca from smartsmoker.com. Tobacco products at discount prices 
from our online store. We carryall major brands. Premium brands 
include cheap Kool, Salem, Newport, Camel, Winston and Marlboro 
cigarettes 
Marlboro Snus$19.99 
nkeeBlend$1249 
;J'rk Hawk PipeTobacco$JL99 
•welD~ 
onlnne 
@2010 SmartSmoker.com 
All rights reserved. You must be 21 to purchase 
our cigarettes and tobacco products. Orders 
Require Adult Signature 
Surgeon General's Warning: QUlttlr1g Smoking 
Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your 
Health. 
Buyer responsible for payment of applicable 
taxes. 
EXHIBIT 
J p\.1­
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I 
Tel Enterprises, Inc.
 
• Pay Securely Online With Echeck.
 
• Delivered in 3 to 6 Business Days··.
 
ALL BRANDS ON SALE!
 
Cigarettes .. Cigars - Loose / Pipe Tobacco - Snus - Other Products
 
~Due to the large ,Imount of orders that have been placed, additional time may be required for delivery.
 
Important Update: Pleane place your final order by June 21st to ensure delivery. Note: (30 carton limit I per order)
 
Match All Words [ Search 
Home I Edit My AccoLlnt I Order History I View Shopping Cart 
MQJnJ3hoQ IAmerican Spirit I 6 
One I Berkley I Bishop I Boston I BridgePort I Bronco I Buffalo I Carnival I Cobra I Double 
DiC3mond I I;XC3ct I Exac:tl;lite I G<:lrni I Gr<:loc:iPrix I Heron IKentucky's Best I K.iC:k lK.ing 
Mountain Il<:lkes I Lewiston I Market I MC3vecic:k I Miss [)iC3mond Brands I Native I NY 
NY I Niagara's I Opal 120s I palermo I Pinnacle I Pride I Roger I Seneca I Seneca 72 I Seneca 
120s I SeneC:C3Chili I SkYc!Clnl~eJ I Smokin Joes1 QQ%NClJLlrc:lIS I SmokinJoes Qrigin<:lls I SDJokinJoes 
Premiums I Sonoma I Tucson I USA Gold I Yukon I Black & MildCigars I BogarCigars I Buffalo Little 
CigClCS I DClrkH<:l-,,~k_Cig<:lIS I DjClIum Filtered_CLove Cigars I EXC3c:taCigC3IS I NoJ.. imitCigaIS I Re_dBuck 
Cigars I RichwoodCigClrs I Senec:Cl Sweets I Smoker's Best Cigars I Srnokin Joes Filtered 
Cigars I Smokin Joes Little Cigars IWarrior Cigars I Dissolvable Tobacco I Loose Tobacco I Pipe 
Tobc:lC:~o I C_ClllJelSDLlS I Disc:reeLSnusl Norgic: lc:e_Snqs I AciV<:l1 Cigc:lIetteJ301IingMClc_oine I Red 
Man I Skoal I Stonewall I Warrior Snuff 
Opal 120s : 
1Opal 120s
 
Price: $23.10
 
Opal 120s Styles: Opal 120s .. Full Flavor Box
 
Price:
 
$23.10 a Carton* Quantity: [ Add to Cart 1
 
.. Additive Free.
 
.. All Natural Quality
 
Tobacco.
 
.. Native Made
 
.. Ultra Slim Style
 
Design, in Box.
 
Customers say they
 
love their Opals;!
 
To make a StyIE~
 
Selection:
 
Click on the styles drop
 
down menu (Right)
 
'PRICE REFLECTS:
 
- FEDERAL EXCISE TAX
 
INCREASE ON APRIL 1ST, 2009
 
ALL PACKS ARE
 
INDIVIDUALLY TAX STAMPED.
 
l~~fee SECURE:i 
EXHIBITTESTED D.AJL'f 1S-JUNE 
I
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Licensed Native American Shipper: 
TCl Enterprises 
12723 Route 438 
Irving, NY 14081 
Contact us: 
orders@internetsmokes.com 
Customer 10 Fax Line: 1-716-562-7098 
Order Securely Online: Fast and Easy with Echeck 
For Mail Orders: 
Place Order Online, Print off, and Mail 
10 Policy Requirement: 
You Must be 21 years of age or older to purchase Cigarettes and/or Tobacco Products Online or by Mail Order, 
SURGEON GENERALS WARNING: 
Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health, 
All Brands/Packs Sold Are SNI Tax Stamped.
 
All Natural and/or Additive Free Does NOT mean a Safer Cigarette,
 
Sale of Products Sold From This Site are For Personal Use Only.
 
Delivered Fast and Fresh b), USPS Priority Mail!
 
Also Available: blu Premiere Electronic Cigs.
 
For more infonnation or to purch,ase directly, click on the banner below.
 
(A new window will open. Your current order will NOT be lost. Thank you, Internet Smokes) 
• VAPOR IS THE NEW SMOKE.
,bIY'PRfMlERf ELECTRONK: 
THANK YOU SHOPPING WITH US 
"If you like our service, please tell your family and friends!" 
Copyright A,A©201 0 TCl Enterprises, Inc. - All Rights Reserved 
EXHIBIT
 
I ~-~
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TCl Enterprises, Inc.
 
• Pay Securely Online With Echeck,
 
- Delivered in 3 to 6 Business Days··,
 
ALL BRANDS ON SALE!
 
Cigarettes - Cigars - Loose I Pipe Tobacco - Snus - Other Products
 
-Due to the large ;~mount of orders that have been placed, additional time may be required for delivery.
 
Important Update: Plene place your final order by June 21st to ensure delivery. Note: (30 carton limit I per order)
 
Match All Words [ Search I 
Home I Edit My Account I Order History I View Shopping Cart 
M~l[LSbQQ , 8mericcwSpirit I 8 
One I Berkm I Bishop I Bost1m I BridgePort I Bronco I Buffalo I ~arniv~J I Cobrg I Qou1>le 
DiamOOd I I;xact I I;xactl;Jite I Gami I GraOdPrix I HerOD I Kentucky's Best I Kick I King 
Mountain I Lakes I Lewiston I Market I Maverick I Miss Diamond Brands I Native I NY 
NY I Niagara's I Opal 120s I palermo I Pinnacle I Pride I Roger I Seneca I Sel1eca 72 'Seneca 
120s I senec~ChiJII Skydao<;er I SmOkin JOes1.QQO/oNaturals I SmokinJoes Qriginals I Smokin Joes 
Premiums I Sonoma I Tucson I USA Gold I Yukon I Black & Mild Cigars I Bogar Cigars I Buffalo Little 
Cigars I Dark Hawk Cigars I Djarum EilteredCloveCigaJs I Exac:taCigars I No I..LmitCigars I Red Buck 
Cigars I Richwood Cigars I Seneca Sweets I Smoker's Best Cigars I SmokinJoes Filtered 
Cigars, Smokin Joes Little Cigars I Warrior Cigars' Dissolvable Tobacco I Loose Tobacco I Pipe 
Tobacc:o I C~meJ SOus I Disc:reetSous I NordicJc:e.SOus I Ariva I Cig,arette ROlling Mac:hioe I Red 
r..,-tan , Skoal I Stonewall I Warrior Snuff 
Seneca: 
Seneca CigarE~ttes 
Price: $21.80 
Seneca Styles: Seneca Full Flavor 100s - Soft Pack 
Price: 
$21.80 a Carton'~ Quantity: [ Add to Cart 1 
"BIG Flavor, small 
price!" 
- All Natural SenE~cas 
- 100% Pure Tobacco 
- "Additive Free Tobacco" 
- Premium Native Brand 
- All Seneca StyIE~S Are In 
Stock. 
"Seneca's are all natural,
 
additive
 
free, with a robust
 
tobacco taste!"
 
To make a Style
 
Selection:
 
Click on the styles drop down
 
menu (Right)
 
'PRICE REFLECTS: 
- FEDERAL EXCISE TAX INCREASE ON 
APRIL 1st, 2009 
ALL PACKS ARE INDIVIDlJALLY 
STAMPED. 
EXHIBIT 
I ~-~ 
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Seneca Cigarettes.:
 
A Product of The Mohawk Indian
 
Nation.
 
Seneca brand cigarettes are
 
manufactured by
 
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations.
 
Made under the Authority of Tobaccoville
 
USA,lnc.
 
Made in Canada
 
I~McAfee'SECURE:1 
TESTED DAlLY IS-JUNE 
Licensed Native American Shipper: 
TCl Enterprises 
12723 Route 438 
Irving, NY 14081 
Contact us: 
orden~@internetsr:nol<es.com 
Customer 10 Fax Line: 1-716-562·-7098 
Order Securely Online: Fast and IEasy with Echeck
 
For Mail Orders:
 
Place Order Online, Print off, and Mail
 
10 Policy Requirement:
 
You Must be 21 years of age or older to purchase Cigarettes and/or Tobacco Products Online or by Mail Order.
 
SURGEON GENERALS WARNING:
 
Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
 
All Brands/Packs Sold Are SNI Tax Stamped.
 
All Natural and/or Additive Free Does NOT mean a Safer Cigarette.
 
Sale of Products Sold From This Site are For Personal Use Only. 
Delivered Fast and Fresh by USPS Priority Mail! 
Also Available: blu Premiere Electronic Cigs. 
For more information or to purchase directly, click on the banner below.
 
(A new window will open. Your current order will NOT be lost. Thank you, Internet Smokes)
 
'9 VAPOR IS THE NEW SMOKE. 
PREMIERE ELECTRONIC 
ClGAI~ErrESbl~ 
THANK YOU SHOPPING WITH US 
"If you like our service, please tell your family and friends'" 
EXHIBIT 
j 
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SI/IIJlics-Spinl,.com 
GiHs 11 C.lnclv 5rwr.ks ~ Gourmet Food ...- !iorne Good'> II StOt (! Dollar!f II ~I Ilome II Ci9')lrH~!f II CI9.!11S 
for opalF'nd~y, hme 18, 2010 ~ r. :-;.~~'i 
~~ Order By Phone 1-866-247-2447 ~\arkflp["c, for alC your WfIOC.SlIC, n..ds,· 
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Delange, Brett 
From: Steve Kenyon [SKenyon@idcourts.net] 
Sent: Wednesday, June 2~1, 2010 9:07 AM 
To: Delange, Brett 
Subject: FW: Median time 
From: Steve Kenyon 
sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2010 2:04 PM 
To: bdelange@ag.idaho.gov 
Subject: Median time 
Brett, 
As of May 2010 the median number of days it took a case to go from notice of appeal to opinion was 536 days. 
Hope this helps 
Stephen Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
Idaho Supreme Court / Court of Appeals 
208-334-2210 
The information contained in this email and any attachments is confidential and may be subject to 
copyright or other intellectual property protection. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not 
authorized to use or disclose this information, and we request that you notify us by reply mail or 
telephone and delete the original message from your mail system. 
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954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through ) 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney ) 
General, and the IDAHO TAX ) 
COMMISSION, ) 
)
Plaintiffs, ) 
)
vs. ) 
)NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1 ) 
through 20, ) 
) 
Defendant. 
._----) 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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JUDGMENT-l ORIGINAL 000821
INTRODUCTION
 
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. Defendant Native Wholesale Supply 
Company (NWS) has unlawfully sold cigarettes to Idaho retailers, without the required cigarette 
wholesaler permit, and despite being warned in writing of its violations of Idaho's cigarette tax 
laws, NWS continues to unlawfully sell such cigarettes. 
NWS's violations fall into two specific categories. With respect to both categories, the 
facts are not in dispute. First, the cigarette brands NWS has sold (and continues to sell) to Idaho 
retailers are of brands manufactured by a tobacco manufacturer that was not (and today is not) on 
the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (the Idaho 
Directory) at the time of the sale. None of the cigarette brands at issue have ever been on the 
Idaho Directory either. Such sales violate the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement 
Complementary Act (Complementary Act), codified at title 39, chapter 84, Idaho Code. 
Second, NWS has sold cigarettes (and continues to sell cigarettes) at wholesale to Idaho 
retailers without obtaining a cigarette wholesaler permit required by Idaho Code 63-2503(1). 
NWS's unlawful actions undermine the Legislature's public policies and concerns with 
respect to cigarette sales and use and the cigarette tax laws it has enacted. Also of serious 
concern, NWS' s illegal sales continued even after NWS was advised of the requirements of 
Idaho's applicable tobacco laws. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact with 
respect to either category of violations, this Court should grant the Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment and assess a civil penalty of $2,000,000 to address the illegal sales of over 
one hundred million cigarettes. Plaintiffs also seek an award of attorney fees and costs. 
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
 
In 1999, the Legislature found that cigarette smoking presents serious public health 
concerns to Idaho and its eitizens. See Idaho Code § 39-780l(a). Noting that the United States 
Surgeon General has determined that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, and other 
serious diseases, the LegisIature found that cigarette smoking presents serious financial concerns 
for Idaho. Under certain health-care programs like Medicaid, Idaho may have a legal obligation 
to provide medical assistance to eligible persons for health conditions associated with cigarette 
smoking, and those persons may have a legal entitlement to receive such medical assistance. See 
Idaho Code § 39-7801(a)-(b). Under these programs, the Legislature has found, the State pays 
millions of dollars each year to provide medical assistance to persons for health conditions 
associated with cigarette smoking. See Idaho Code § 39-7801 (c). 
The Legislature further determined that the financial burdens imposed on the State by 
cigarette smoking should be borne by tobacco product manufacturers, rather than by the State, to 
the extent that such manufacturers either determine to enter into settlement agreements with the 
State or are found culpable by the courts. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(d). 
On November 23, 1998, leading United States tobacco product manufacturers entered 
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement," with Idaho. The 
Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers: 
(I) to pay substantial sums to the State; 
(2) to fund a national foundation devoted to the pursuit of public health interests; and 
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(3) to make substantial changes in their advertising and marketing practices and 
corporate culture with the intention of reducing underage smoking. See Idaho Code § 39­
7801(e).l 
Promptly thereafter, the Legislature declared that it would be contrary to the policy of the 
State if a tobacco product manufacturer could decide not to enter into such a settlement 
agreement (nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers) and thereby use the resulting cost 
advantage to derive large profits in the years before liability may arise, without ensuring that the 
State will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are proven to have acted 
culpably. This legislative determination was driven, in part, by the fact that many diseases 
caused by tobacco use often do not appear until many years after the affected individual begins 
smoking. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(a) & (t). 
The Legislature thus determined that it is in the interest of the State to require that 
nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee a source of 
compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, short-term profits and then 
becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise. See Idaho Code § 39-780 I(t). 
Accordingly, shortly after the Master Settlement Agreement was signed, the Legislature passed 
the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (Idaho MSA Act). The Idaho MSA Act 
requires tobacco product manufacturers to either: 
(I) join the Master Settlement Agreement or 
(2) place into a qualified escrow fund the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39­
7803(b)(1) of the Idaho MSA Act. 
The MSA has been described by the United States Supreme Court as a "landmark" public health agreement, 
Lori/lard Tobacco Corp. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001), that addresses "one of the most troubling public health 
problems facing the Nation today." Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
125 (2000). The MSA is a lengthy public document. The Idaho Attorney General has made the MSA electronically 
available at: http://www2.state.id.us/ag/consumer/tobacco/MSA.pdf. 
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In 2003, the Legislature determined that violations of the Idaho MSA Act by various non­
participating manufacturers threatened not only the integrity of the MSA, but also the fiscal 
soundness of the State and public health and responded with provisions to help prevent such 
violations through adoption of the Complementary Act. See Idaho Code § 39-8401. Relevant to 
this case, Section 39-8403 of the Complementary Act establishes the Idaho Directory of 
Compliant Tobacco Manufacturers and Brand Families (Idaho Directory) and makes it unlawful 
for any person to sell, ofter or possess for sale in Idaho, or import or cause to be imported for 
sale in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included on the 
Idaho Directory. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
NWS is a tobacco wholesaler, licensed by the Sac and Fox Nation and operating on the 
Seneca Reservation in New York State. Since at least January 1,2004, NWS has acquired, held, 
owned, possessed, transported, imported, and/or caused to be imported for sale and distribution 
in Idaho two cigarette brands - Seneca and Opal - that are manufactured by Canadian-based 
tobacco manufacturer Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (Grand River).2 NWS's sales 
and shipments into Idaho have totaled over 100 million cigarettes. 3 None of the Seneca and Opal 
brand cigarettes NWS has sold has ever been listed on the Idaho Directory and approved for 
sale.4 
On or about September 5, 2002, an Idaho district court issued an injunction (2002 
injunction) against Grand River, prohibiting it from selling any cigarettes in Idaho "whether 
2 Affidavit of Beth A. Kitlelmann Affidavit (hereinafter Kittelmann Affidavit), filed April 9, 2009, at p. 
2, ~ 3. 
3 Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 4, para. 12. 
4 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 2, ~ 4. 
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directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar intermediary or intermediaries."s The 2002 
injunction was based on Grand River's refusal to comply with the Idaho MSA Act (discussed in 
detail below). Because Grand River has yet to establish a qualified escrow fund, failed to certify 
its cigarettes to the Attorney General in compliance with Idaho's tobacco sales laws, and has not 
obeyed the district court's injunction, Grand River remains enjoined from selling cigarettes in 
Idaho. 6 
In February of 2008, the Attorney General obtained information indicating that, despite 
the district court's 2002 injunction, Grand River cigarettes were continuing to be sold into Idaho 
by NWS. Accordingly, on June 5, 2008, the Attorney General notified NWS of the 2002 
injunction, and informed NWS that its cigarette sales violated the Complementary Act. 7 In his 
letter, the Attorney General instructed NWS to cease its unlawful selling and shipping of Grand 
River cigarettes to Idaho retailers. 8 
Ignoring the Attorney General's June 5, 2008, letter, NWS continued to ship Seneca and 
Opal cigarette brands into Idaho. On June 13, 2008, NWS imported and/or caused to be 
imported into Idaho 1,460,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes.9 On July 21, 2008, NWS 
imported and/or caused to be imported into Idaho 1,634,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes. I 0 
On August 21, 2008, two days after NWS was served with the summons and complaint in this 
case, NWS sold over 600,000 more cigarettes, at wholesale, to an Idaho retailer. II In 2009, 
5 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3 ~ 6. 
6 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 7. 
7 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 8. 
8 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 8. 
9 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 9. 
10 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 9. 
II Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, '110. 
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NWS sold and shipped 2,508,000 more cigarettes, at wholesale, to an Idaho retailer. 12 None of 
these cigarettes are legal to be sold in Idaho. 
In total, since January 2004, NWS has imported and sold into Idaho over 100 million 
Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes. 13 Because these cigarettes have never been listed on the Idaho 
Directory, NWS has violated and continues to violate the Complementary Act. Additionally, 
NWS has never applied for nor received a cigarette tax permit required by Idaho Code Section 
63-2503. 14 Yet all of its 100 million plus cigarette sales have been at wholesale. IS NWS 
continues to violate Idaho's cigarette tax laws by importing cigarettes into Idaho and selling 
them at wholesale without the required cigarette tax permit required by Idaho's cigarette tax 
laws. 16 
ARGUMENT 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is (mtitled to judgment as matter of law." Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. It is true 
that this Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Thompson v. 
Pike~ 125 Idaho 897, 899., 876 P.2d 595, 597 (1994). The opposing party's case, however, must 
be based on more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a 
genuine issue of fact. Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., 125 Idaho 145, 150,868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994). 
The moving party has the burden of proving the absence of material facts. See Wick v. Eismann, 
12 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 11.
 
13 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 4, ~ 12.
 
14 Affidavit of Don Anderson (hereinafter "Anderson Affidavit"), filed April 9, 2009, at p. 2, ~ 4.
 
15 Anderson Affidavit at p. 2, ~I~ 5-6.
 
16 Anderson Affidavit at p. 2, ~~ 5-6.
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122 Idaho 698, 838 P.2d 301 (1992). The non moving party, however, may not rest on its 
pleadings but must offer affidavits or other admissible evidentiary materials which demonstrate 
that an issue of fact remains. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 803, 41 P.3d 228, 231 
(200 I). The parties' affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence. Id. 
II. NWS HAS VIOLATED THE COMPLEMENTARY ACT 
NWS's violations of the Complementary Act and the remedy for them are straight 
forward. As previously noted, the Complementary Act, in part, prohibits "any person" from (I) 
selling, offering, or possessing for sale in Idaho, or importing or causing to import for 
distribution or sale in Idaho "cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not 
included in the directory" Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). The undisputed fact is that since 
at least January 2004, NWS has sold at wholesale, and/or imported or caused to be imported for 
sale or distribution in Idaho, over 100 million cigarettes to Idaho retailers for which neither the 
cigarette brands nor their manufacturer, Grand River, were ever on the Idaho Directory. It is also 
an undisputed fact that NWS makes wholesale sales to Idaho retailers without first obtaining a 
cigarette wholesaler permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1). 
The Complementary Act provides various remedies for violations of Section 39-8403(3) 
of the Act. Specifically, the Complementary Act provides: 
Each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation of section 39­
8403 (3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each violation 
hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed 
the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes or 
five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of section 39­

8403(3), Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto.
 
Idaho Code § 39-8406(1).
 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-8 
000828
Applying Section 39-8406(1) is straight-forward and clear: the Complementary Act 
states that each cigarette sold in violation of the Act shalI constitute a separate violation. 
Section 39-8406 authorizes the court to assess civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $5,000 
per violation, or, in the alternative, 500% of the retail value of the cigarettes. 
NWS has sold over 100 milIion cigarettes. A $2,000,000 civil penalty would equal $0.02 
per illegal cigarette sold. 17 100 million cigarettes also equates to 5,000,000 illegalIy sold packs 
of cigarettes. IS A $2,000,000 civil penalty would thus equal $.40 per pack of cigarettes. 19 
100,000,000 cigarettes also equates to 500,000 illegalIy sold cartons of cigarettes.2o A 
$2,000,000 civil penalty would equal $4.00 per carton of cigarettes. 21 In short, a civil penalty of 
$2,000,000 falls into the statutorily authorized $5,000 per violation range for violations of the 
Complementary Act. 
Alternatively, as shown in the folIowing paragraphs, utilizing the Complementary Act's 
"not to exceed" 500% of the retail value of the illegally sold cigarettes penalty calculation, 
$2,000,000 civil penalty also falls well within what is statutorily alIowable. The Seneca and 
Opal cigarette brands that NWS has illegalIy sold are currently (as of June 18, 2010) for sale 
(pre-tax) at www.smartsmoker.com at the following per carton prices: 22 
Brand 
Seneca FulI Flavor 1OOs box 
Opal Full Flavor 120s box 
Manufacturer Retail price 
Grand River Enterprises $26.99 
Grand River Enterprises $28.99 
\7 $2,000,000 divided by 100,000,000 equals $.02.
 
\8 A package of cigarettes contains 20 cigarettes. 100,000,000 cigarettes divided by 20 equals 5,000,000.
 
19 $2,000,000 divided by 5,000,000 equals $.40.
 
20 A carton of cigarettes contains 200 cigarettes. 100,000,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 500,000.
 
21 $2,000,000 divided by 500,000 equals $4.00.
 
22 Third Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann (Third Kittelmann Affidavit), p. 2, para. 4.
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These same cigarette brands are also currently (as of June 18, 2010) for sale (pre-tax) at 
www.internetsmokes.com at the following per carton prices: 23 
Brand Manufacturer Retail price l 
Seneca Full Flavor 100s box Grand River Enterprises $21.80 
I Opal Full Flavor 120s box Grand River Enterprises $23.10 
-­
These same cigarette brands are also currently (as of June 18, 2010) for sale (pre-tax) at 
. . h .... II . . 24www.smokes-spmts.com at t e 10 owmg per carton pnces: 
Brand Manufacturer Retail price 
Seneca Full Flavor 100s box Grand River Enterprises $24.99 
Opal Full Flavor 120s box Grand River Enterprises $24.49 
The average of each of the retailers' lower-priced product equals $24.42.25 Utilizing this 
figure as the retail price of illegally sold cigarettes and multiplying it by 500,000 illegally sold 
cartons of cigarettes equals $12,210,000.26 500% of the retail price of the illegally sold 
cigarettes would equal $61,050,000.27 In short, and alternatively utilizing a conservative average 
retail value formula for evaluating the State's requested civil penalty, the amount of $2,000,000 
falls well below the statutorily authorized range of up to 500% of the retail value of the illegally 
sold cigarettes for violations of the Complementary Act. 
Even if the Court focuses only on NWS's illegal cigarette sales after the Office of the 
Attorney General expressly advised NWS ofthe provisions of Idaho's Complementary Act, a $2 
million penalty is more than justified. As set forth above, after NWS was advised in writing of 
the Complementary Act, NWS proceeded illegally, on multiple occasions, to sell, collectively, 
over six million more cigarettes. Six million cigarettes equates to 30,000 cartons. That sum 
23 Third Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 2, para. 5.
 
24 Third Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 2, para. 6.
 
25 The sum of $26.99 plus $21.80 plus $24.49, divided by 3 equals $24.42.
 
26 $24.42 multiplied by 500,000 equals $12,210,000.
 
27 $12,210,000 mu Itiplied by 500% equals $61,050,000.
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multiplied by $24.42 equals $732,600. That sum multiplied by 500% equals $3,663,000. $2 
million is still only 55% of the statutory amount the Legislature has authorized this Court to 
assess, and that is if the Court only considers NWS's repeated, defiant illegal sales after having 
been advised of the Complementary Act's provisions. 
A separate comparison of that which District Court Judge Kathryn Sticklen did at the trial 
court level in State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 1109 (2010) indicates the reasonableness 
of the requested civil penalties here. In Maybee, Judge Sticklen assessed a $163,225 civil 
penalty, which the defendant in that case, Scott Maybee, did not appeal, for 2,500,000 cigarettes 
sold in violation of the Complementary Act. Id., 148 Idaho at 526-27, 224 P.3d at 1115-16. 
Maybee's 2.5 million illegal cigarette sales are approximately three percent ofNWS's sales. The 
civil penalty assessed against him, however, is 8 percent of Plaintiffs' proposed $2,000,000 
penalty. In other words, Maybee's penalty, proportionately, is more than twice the size of that 
being proposed here. 
Civil penalties are a proper tool to implement and enforce a regulatory program. State ex 
rei Brown v. Howard, 444 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio App. 1981). Civil penalties deter future 
unlawful behavior by a defendant and those similarly situated. Kimmelman v. Henkels & 
McCoy, Inc., 527 A.2d 1368, 1371 (N.J. 1987). They also can serve to compensate society at 
large for the harm it has suffered at the hands of the violators and compensate the government 
for the cost of enforcing the applicable law. State v. Gaffe, 676 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Conn. App. 
1996). Applying these principles here, civil penalties are called for, authorized by, and should be 
imposed pursuant to Idaho Code Section 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act. 
Injunctive relief is also called for in this case. This Court has already granted the State a 
preliminary injunction. There is no basis to argue why this injunction ought not be made 
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permanent. The Complementary Act also states that "a person who violates section 39-8403(3), 
Idaho Code, engages in an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of the Idaho consumer 
protection act, chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code." Idaho Code § 39-8406(5). The State is 
authorized, under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, in part, to seek permanent injunctive relief 
for violations of that Act. See Idaho Code § 48-606(1 )(b). Thus, the State is also authorized to 
seek a permanent injunction in this case. 
It is important to note that "when a statute grants a specific injunctive remedy ... the 
party requesting the injunction 'need not aver and show, as under ordinary rules in equity, that 
great or irreparable injury is about to be done for which he has no adequate remedy at law ... :" 
Ackerman v. Tri-City Geriatric & Health Care, Inc., 378 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ohio 1978), quoting 
Stephan v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St. 527, 536 (Ohio 1875). Indeed, "[w]hen it is determined that the 
statute is being violated, it is within the province of the district court to restrain it. The doctrine 
of balancing of equities has no application to this statutorily authorized injunctive relief." Stale 
v. Texas Pel Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 800,805 (Tx. 1979). Moreover, "when the acts sought to 
be enjoined are unlawful, the plaintiff need not make a showing of irreparable harm or a balance 
of the hardship in his favor." I.E. Services, Inc. v. State Lottery Commission of Indiana, 646 
N.E.2d 334, 349 (Ind.App. 1995); Arizona State Board ofDental Examiners v. Hyder, 562 P.2d 
717,719 (Az. 1977). 
The Court should also impose injunctive relief here, enforceable by contempt 
proceedings, to enjoin NWS from selling cigarette brands that are not listed on the Idaho 
Directory. The facts reveal that NWS, despite knowledge of Idaho law and its provisions, will 
continue to violate those provisions. Only express Court order will stop NWS from making a 
charade of Idaho law. 
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III. NWS HAS VIOLATED IDAHO'S CIGARETTE TAX LAWS
 
No factual dispute exists under the State's cigarette tax laws either. NWS has never held 
a cigarette wholesaler permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503( I), and has never even 
applied for one. 28 Idaho's cigarette tax laws require wholesalers who sell cigarettes to Idaho 
retailers to obtain a cigarette tax pennit. Specifically, Idaho Code Section 63-2503( I) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for a person to act as a wholesaler of cigarettes without a 
permit. The pennit shall be obtained by application to the tax commission upon a 
fonn furnished by it, accompanied by a fee of fifty dollars ($50.00). The 
wholesaler permit shall be nonassignable and shall continue in force until 
surrendered or canceled. 
A "wholesaler" is defined in Idaho Code Section 63-2502(a) as "every person who purchases, 
sells or distributes cigarettes to other wholesalers or to retailers for the purpose of resale." 
Idaho Code Section 63-2519 of the cigarette tax laws expressly authorizes the Tax 
Commission to seek injunctive relief against any person engaged in the cigarette business as a 
wholesaler without holding a valid cigarette tax pennit. This authority is a separate, independent 
basis for the Plaintiffs to request, and this Court to grant, summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
No genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether NWS violated the Complementary 
Act and Idaho's cigarette tax laws. NWS has sold over one hundred million non-compliant 
cigarettes to Idaho retailers, violating Idaho's Complementary Act. NWS also sells these non­
compliant cigarettes to Idaho retailers without the wholesaler pennit required by the Idaho Code 
Section 63-2503(1) and the State's cigarette tax laws. Only a significant civil penalty and 
28 Anderson Affidavit at p. 2, ,-r,-r 4-6. 
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injunctive relief will stop NWS from continuing to violate Idaho law. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs 
request that their motion for summary judgment be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of June, 2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BY:B~~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
IDAHO TAX COMMISSION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of June, 2010, I caused to be served, by the method 
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following: 
Samuel A. Diddle ~ U.S. Mail 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & D Hand Delivery 
McKlveen, Chartered D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 D Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1368 D Facsimile 
Boise, ID 8370 I 
~Jb~~ 
BRETT T. DELANGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISH #4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& MeKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
~ 
--:--:=_=------:~'~,Q~
"'M...,-, ,:0,'II , ,'--"
,. ·"Ji .' ",~~,,,r'1f' 
'.' < . ,... ," • 
SEP , D2010 
J. DAV/O NAVARRO, Crerk 
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OEPUTY
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Eberl~:, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and submits this response 
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of this response, the Defendants rely upon the 
Affidavit of Arthur Montour dated May 6, 2009 and the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle dated June 30, 
2009 and the Affidavit ofSamuel A. Diddle filed contemporaneously herewith. 
I. THE STATE HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY COMPETENT
 
EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL SALE OR DELIVERY IN IDAHO
 
For the purpose of summary judgment, the Court must determine that there is no material 
dispute of fact on each essential element of the Plaintiffs' case. While this Court has entered a 
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•, 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the sale of cigarettes in violation of the Complementary Act, 
the State is not entitled to summary judgment establishing that actual sales or delivery in 
violation of the Complementary Act have occurred. The State has failed to submit proper proof 
of sales into the State of Idaho. First, the affidavits of Beth Kittelmann simply do not present any 
evidence of the actual sale or receipt of any cigarettes in the State of Idaho. Ms. Kittelmann's 
affidavit attached invoices to a Native American company, War Path, but provided no proof of 
actual receipt or delivery into Idaho. Further, Exhibit I to Ms. Kittelmann's April 9, 2009 
affidavit is completely lacking in foundation and entirely unsubstantiated. For the purposes of 
summary judgment, the: State needs to show more. The State's affidavits and its various 
attachments offer evidence of transactions but do not present any proof of the actual delivery or 
receipt of any cigarettes sold by NWS in Idaho. 
II. THE STATE MAY NOT REGULATE NWS'S SALES 
Even if NWS sold cigarettes to Warpath the State may not regulate those sales. "Indian 
tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). Tribal members retain their status 
"as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far 
not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided ...." 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973). Accordingly, "there is no 
rigid rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be applied to an 
Indian reservation or to tribal members." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142. The Supreme Court has 
enunciated "two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority 
over tribal reservations and members." Id. "First, the exercise of such authority may be pre­
empted by federal law." Id., citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm 'n, 380 U.S. 
685 (1965). "Second, [the assertion of state regulatory authority] may unlawfully infringe on the 
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right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id.; see also Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220. (1959) 
As an initial matter, "[w]hen on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, 
state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and 
the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." Bracker, 448 U.S. 
at 144. Conversely, "where, as here, a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians 
engaging in activity on the reservation," then "more difficult questions arise." Id. These 
questions are answered by examining "the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in 
terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have 
developed from historical traditions of tribal independence." Id. at 144-45. 
As to the first barrier to state regulatory authority, "[t]he tradition of Indian sovereignty 
must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by 
operation of federal law." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143. "[T]his tradition is reflected and 
encouraged in a number of congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy of 
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." Id. The congressional declarations 
of policy in the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §1451 et seq., and in the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,25 U.S.c. §450 et seq., are particularly significant: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of congress . . . to help develop and utilize 
Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully 
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management oftheir own resources and 
where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts 
comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities. 
25 U.S.c. §1451. 
In addition, "the Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the federal 
government's unique and <continuing relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people through the 
establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will pennit an orderly transition 
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from federal domination of programs for and servIces to Indians to effective and meaningful 
participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and 
services." 25 US.c. §450(a)(b). Accordingly, in order to find that state regulation is preempted by 
operation of federal law in the field of federal Indian law, an express congressional statement to 
that effect is not required. Bracker, 448 US. at 143. The foregoing analysis requires a 
"particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry 
designed to determine, whether in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would 
violate federal law." Id. at 145. 
The first step is to examine the federal statutes and regulations which govern the specific 
activity targeted for state regulation, and determine whether federal regulation is pervasive. The 
second step is to examine the state interest served by the statute sought to be imposed on 
reservation activity. Generalized interests are insufficient to support state regulation, when the 
tribe and its members have a strong interest in economic development and self-sufficiency via 
on-reservation economic transactions. 
"The Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical component 
to tribal sovereignty, a c:omponent which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry; 
though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in 
determining whether statl;: authority has exceeded permissible limits." Bracker, 448 US. at 151. 
"Indian nations ... long have been distinct political communities, having territorial 
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive." Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Sac and Fox 
Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993). The "presumption against state taxing authority applies to all 
Indian Country ...." Id. at 126. 
"In light of the unique sovereign status ofIndian tribes located in [Idaho]," it is clear that 
the state "cannot tax cigarettes sold on an Indian reservation to tribal members for their own use, 
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unless authorized to do so by Congress." Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Rising, 477 F.3d 
881, 883 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, 546 U.S. 95 
(2005). "The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations 
with Indian tribes ..., and in recognition of the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after 
formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals generally are exempt from state 
taxation within their own territory." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 
455 (1995) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)). Where, as here, the 
tax scheme has some effl~ct on an Indian tribe, "[t]he initial and frequently dispositive question .. 
. is who bears the legal incidence of [the] tax." Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99 ("States are categorically 
barred from placing the legal incidence of an excise tax on a tribe or on tribal members for sales 
made inside Indian country") (citations omitted). Accordingly, "the who and where of the 
challenged tax have significant consequences." Id. 
Here, the State of Idaho's argument that it may apply the Complementary Act to NWS, 
thereby requiring it to pay a fee to sell to tribal members on a reservation, proceeds from a false 
premise regarding the "who" and the "where" concerning the imposition of the fee. PlaintiffS 
repeatedly state that the transaction at issue occurs "in Idaho," relying on this as dispositive of the 
issue of "where" the transaction occurred. These statements are contradicted by the evidence in 
the record, which shows that the sale by NWS occurs on an F.O.B. basis with title and risk of 
loss occurring outside Idaho, to an Indian-owned business located within the bounds of the 
enrolled member's reservation. See Affidavit of Arthur Montour at ~~ 4-6. We are not here 
dealing with sales by Indians to non-Indian consumers. We are dealing strictly with the 
commerce solely among Indians at the wholesale or supply level- a circumstance that no court 
has ever permitted to be regulated by the State of Idaho. The evidentiary record also contradicts 
Plaintiffs' assertions concerning the "who," to the extent it characterizes the transaction as one 
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between a non-member and a member of an Indian reservation in Idaho, since NWS is owned by 
a member of the Tribe which occupies the reservation on which the sales are made, and is selling 
its products to an Indian owned business located within the reservation bounds of the emolled 
member that owns the business. See the Affidavit of Arthur Montour at ~ 7 and the Affidavit of 
Samuel A. Diddle dated June 30, 2009 at Exhibit A and Exhibit B. 
Turning to the "where" of the transaction at issue, courts have held that where an entity 
situated on a reservation in one state ships goods to an entity situated in another state, the 
delivery does not occur in either state crossed by the agent transferring the goods. In Winnebago 
Tribe ofNebraska v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892 (Kan. 2007), the State of Kansas tried to impose its fuel 
distributor tax on a tribally owned entity which shipped fuel to tribal retailers located on a 
reservation within the state. The tribal entity was located on a reservation in the state of 
Nebraska and shipped its fuel to the tribal retailer located on a reservation in the state of Kansas. 
On these facts, the State asserted that delivery of the fuel took place in the state the moment the 
transport agent traveled into Kansas. The court, however, rejected this argument, holding that 
"receipt is to be given its ordinary meaning." Id. at 904. Therefore, "[t]here was no delivery or 
receipt when HeI's fuel truck crossed the Kansas state line. Delivery and receipt of the fuel 
occurred later at the tribal gas station," which was situated on the reservation. Id. 
However, even if this Court accepts Plaintiffs' premise that the sale occurs on the 
reservation in Idaho with the tribally owned entity, Warpath, Inc., the State's arguments still fail 
because then the Supreme Court's decisions concerning sales by non-member wholesalers to 
members on the reservation are dispositive of the issues before the Court. 
In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), an off-
reservation enterprise owned by a non-member sold farm equipment to a tribe, wherein the sales 
were solicited on the reservation, contracted on the reservation, and payment and delivery of the 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN USPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT - PAGE 6 000841
equipment took place on the reservation. Id. at 161. The State sought to tax these transactions 
by imposing a "privilege of doing business" in the state tax on the non-member seller. Id. The 
state pointed out that the seller was located off the reservation and was not a licensed Indian 
trader, and therefore these distinguishing factors permitted the state to impose its tax. Id. The 
Supreme Court rejected these arguments, expressly finding that that it was "irrelevant that the 
sale was made to a tribal enterprise rather than to the Tribe itself." Id. The Court concluded that 
the preemptive force of the Indian trader statues applied to a "nonresident person who sells" 
goods to Indians on a reservation and therefore, the tax was preempted. Id. 
The Court later revisited this issue in Dept. of Taxation & Finance of NY v. Milhelm 
Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994), and confirmed that the State may not impose a tax directly on 
sellers of goods that trade with Tribes or tribal enterprises situated on reservations by noting that 
"[t]he specific kind of state tax obligation that New York's regulations are designed to enforce-
which falls on non-Indian purchasers of goods that are merely retailed on reservation-stands on a 
markedly different footing from a tax imposed directly on Indian traders . ..." Id. at 73. The 
Court confirmed that a tax "directly imposed upon Indian traders for trading with Indians" is 
impermissible. Id. at 74, citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm 'n, 380 u.s. 685, 
691 (1965). Here, the tax sought to be imposed on NWS falls directly on it as a wholesaler, and 
is not designed to collect lawful state taxes which non-Indians owe off reservation. Idaho's 
regulatory scheme which expressly exempts tribal enterprises like Warpath, Inc. from collecting 
any tax, the incidence of which would fall on non-Indians off the reservation, confirms that a 
seller like NWS bears the incidence of the fee imposed by Idaho's Complementary Act. See 
Idaho Admin. Code § 35.01.10, subdivision 014.01.b. ("Cigarette wholesalers may deliver 
cigarettes which do not have Idaho stamps fixed to Idaho Indian reservations when . . . the 
purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and operated by an enrolled member or 
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members of an Idaho Indian tribe"). Such a tax is simply impermissible and may not be imposed 
on NWS absent congressional authorization. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Hammond, 384 
F.3d 674,688 (9th Cir. 2004). 
In addition, the specific transaction sought to be taxed by the State of Idaho involves 
value created on the reservation since NWS is an Indian-owned entity situated on the reservation, 
which purchases cigarettl~s made by another Indian-owned entity situated on another reservation, 
which is subsequently sold to a member-owned entity situated on a third reservation. In seeking 
to impose the incidence of the tax on NWS, the State ofldaho is seeking to burden a transaction, 
the value of which is created exclusively on reservation lands. Milhelm, 512 U.S. at 73 (noting 
that tax may not be directly imposed on "value generated on the reservation by activities 
involving the Tribes") (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 156-57). Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, 
this transaction here is not one between a member and a non-member, but rather, is one between 
a member of one tribe :md a member of another tribe, with all activity occurring within the 
exclusive territorial and geographic jurisdiction of their respective nations. Therefore, any efforts 
by the State of Idaho to tax this transaction "infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them." 
In addition, even if this Court concludes that (l) NWS is like any other non-member or 
non-Indian wholesaler selling to reservation Indians; and (2) the incidence of the tax imposed by 
the Complementary Act falls primarily on the non-Indian consumer off the reservation, the tax is 
still invalid, as applied to NWS, because it imposes significant burdens on the transaction and is 
not "reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians." Milhelm, 512 U.S. at 
73. 
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Milhelm, the instant statute is an invalid tax on 
NWS since: (l) it contains no provisions which carve out an exception for cigarettes sold by 
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NWS to Warpath, Inc. which are destined for sales to tribal members; (2) it improperly imposes 
an unreasonable and significant burden on NWS's sales to Warpath, Inc., a tribal enterprise 
owned by tribal members; and (3) it improperly imposes an unreasonable and significant burden 
on Warpath Inc.'s concededly lawful receipt of cigarettes for resale to tribal members on the 
reservation. 
In Milhelm, the Court expressly approved of New York's regulation of wholesalers' sales 
to reservation Indians bt:cause they remained "free to sell to Indian tribes and retailers as many 
cigarettes as they wish, of any kind and at whatever price." Id. at 75. In addition, the regulatory 
scheme adequately assured that "tax-immune Indians will not have to pay New York cigarette 
taxes and neither wholesalers nor retailers will have to precollect taxes on cigarettes destined for 
their consumption." Id. Here, the Complementary and Directory statute provisions both demand 
payment of the tax, regardless of whether they are sold to tax-immune Indians or Tribes, or to 
non-Indians residing off the reservation. The state is precluded from burdening, in any way, 
whether characterized as a tax or not, sales to tribal members and Tribes, where that sale occurs 
exclusively on an Indian reservation. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 u.s. 145, 148 
(1973) ("in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal 
statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands 
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation").l 
Because the Complementary and Directory statutes apply to sales to tax-exempt tribal 
members and tribes, it is undisputed that general prohibition of those sales, absent payment of the 
I Plaintiff s have submitted no evidence that the Tribe in this case has ceded taxation jurisdiction to the State 
or that there is a federal statute that permits Idaho to apply the fees required by the Complementary Act to 
unstamped cigarettes which are destined for resale to tribal members situated on the reservation. In short, 
Plaintiffs' repeated characterization of Warpath, Inc. as an "Idaho business" subject to regulation by the 
Complementary and Directory statute is simply belied by both the facts and the law. 
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state tax, represents an unreasonable burden on NWS, the tribe, and its members, and therefore 
the statutes are not reasonably tailored to collect valid taxes from non-Indians.2 
The states are precluded from directly taxing reservation lands or reservation Indians. See 
County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 257; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 
(1995). The Supreme Court has invalidated state taxation on non-Indian contractors doing 
business with tribes on reservations. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 691 
(invalidating a state gross proceeds tax imposed on reservation store owned by a non-Indian 
because the vast majority of the store's customers were Navajo Indians); Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 
(1980) (invalidating a state motor carrier registration and fuel tax imposed on non-Indian 
company that hauled timber on reservation roads that had been cut from tribal lands); Ramah 
Navajo, 458 U.S. at 838 (striking down a State tax on the profits made by a non-Indian 
construction company that built a school on a reservation for the tribe, stating that "ambiguities 
in federal law should be construed generously, and federal pre-emption is not limited to those 
situations where Congress has explicitly announced an intention to pre-empt state activity."); 
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that federal law 
preempts the imposition of the California timber yield tax on the harvest by non-Indian 
purchasers of timber owned by the tribe, preempting taxes on "goods produced on the 
reservation."); Central Alachinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) 
(finding state could not impose "transaction privilege tax" on the sale of farm equipment where 
the sale took place on the reservation, the contract was signed on the reservation and payment 
occurred thereon, notwithstanding that the seller did not reside on the reservation, was not 
2 The state also has other means at its disposal to address the concerns at issue in this litigation as to sales to 
non-Indians off the reservation, including entering into a government to government agreement which 
assures that the burden of its tax is imposed downstream ofthe tribe and its members, or seeking recourse in 
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licensed to trade with the Indians and the Court found it was irrelevant that the sale was made to 
a tribal enterprise rather than to the Tribe itself or that the seller did not maintain a permanent 
place of business on the reservation). 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
APPLIES TO OFF-RESERVATION COMlVIERCIAL 
ACTIVITIES OF TRIBES OR TRIBAL ENTITIES 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that Indian tribes possess "the 
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). The United States Supreme Court has stated that this common-law 
immunity "is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance." Three Affiliated Tribes of 
the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476, U.S. 877, 890 (1986). Absent a clear and 
unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity, Indian tribes are not subject to civil suit in any 
state, federal, or arbitral tribunal. C & L Enter. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. 
532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001). Sovereign immunity presents a jurisdictional question and absent a 
waiver, presents an absolute bar to suits against tribes. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech, Inc., 523 U.S. 
75 L 754 (1998); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. Of Equalization, 757 F.2d 
1047, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 1985). 
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that tribal sovereign immunity applies 
to tribal commercial activities involving non-Indians as well as traditional governmental 
functions. Kiowa Tribe, 523 Us. at 754-55; see also Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (reaffirming tribal immunity from suit 
arising from state's attempt to impose taxation over cigarette sales). Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has made clear that tribal sovereign immunity applies to commercial activities undertaken 
the appropriate tribal forum which does have civil regulatory jurisdiction over sales between tribally owned 
entities on the reservation. 
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both on and off the reservation. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755 ("[t]hough respondent asks us to 
confine immunity from suit to transactions on reservations and to governmental activities, our 
precedents have not drawn these distinctions."). This includes actions by a state to enforce state 
law. 
In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977), the State of 
Washington obtained an order commanding an Indian Tribe to provide information about tribal 
members' off-reservation fishing activities in an effort to enforce state fishing regulations. The 
Tribe appealed, arguing that the order infringed on the Tribe's sovereign immunity. The United 
States Supreme Court agreed with the Tribe, stating 'the Tribe has attacked [the] order as an 
infringement on its sov~~reign immunity .... The attack is well founded. Absent an effective 
waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized 
Indian Tribe." Jd. at 172. 
In addition, tribal entities organized under tribal law are considered to be part of the Tribe 
and enjoy the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit. E.g., Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 
F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006); Wright v. Colville Tribal Enterprise Corporation, 147 P.3d 
1275, 1279 (Wash. 2006); see Barker v. Menominee Nation Casino 897 Supp. 389 (E.D. Wis. 
1995) ("commission" that was issued a corporate charter under tribal law was an arm of the Tribe 
and thus suit against it was a suit against the Tribe itself). Sovereign immunity from suit does 
not "tum on the particular form in which the Tribe chooses to conduct its business." Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 158 n.13 (1973). See also Redding Rancheria v. Superior 
Court, 898 Cal.App.4th 384,387 (2001) (tribal entity treated as Tribe for immunity purposes). 
IV.	 EVEN IF NWS WERE NOT CONSIDERED A TRIBAL ENTITY, IT IS 
NOT SUBJECT TO IDAHO'S REGULATORY POWER 
In 1832, the United States Supreme Court held that the regulatory power of the state, even when 
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it involved regulation of a non-Indian, did not extend into Indian country. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515, 561 (1932). The court stated that Georgia's legislative power stopped at the reservation boundary 
and could not cross it to regulate the behavior of the people within the Cherokee Nation. One hundred 
fifty years later, the United States Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 
U.S. 164, 173 (1973), reiiterated this point. The Court discussed "reservation Indians" and by this 
reference meant to include Indians who were within Indian country whether or not they were members of 
the reservation tribe. When the Court "concluded that the state power to tax did not extend to on­
reservation activities of 'reservation Indians,' [it] clearly meant Indians who were members ofa tribe and 
also those Indians who were members of other tribes." Scott Taylor "The Unending Onslaught on 
Tribal Sovereignty: State Income Taxation ofNon-Member Indians," 91 Marquette Law Review 917, 
958 (Summer 2008). 
Indeed, the Idaho legislature has recognized that Indians who live on a different tribe's 
reservation are still "Indians" and enjoy immunity from taxation. Idaho Code §63-3026A(4)(b)(iv) refers 
to "income earned within the original exterior boundaries of any federally created Indian reservation by 
an enrolled Indian in a federally recognized Indian tribe on a federally recognized Indian reservation ... 
." Thus, it is apparent the Idaho legislature does not discriminate between enrolled members of Idaho 
tribes and other Indians, as long as that Indian is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe in the United 
States. 
Tribal sovereignty claims are not limited to cases in which an Indian tribe is a party. 
Instead, there is substantial case law that tribally-chartered corporations have the same 
supremacy clause-protected status as tribes. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family 
Land and Cattle Co., No. CIV. 05-3002, 2006 WL 2055880 (D.S.D. JuL 17, 2006). 
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States have som~~ power to exercise jurisdiction over Indian territory in some cases or if 
they reach an agreement with the tribe. 25 U.S.C. §1322. In this case, there is no agreement 
between the state and the Coeur d'Alene tribe, and Idaho has not acted to assume jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the Idaho Administrative Rules specifically provide that cigarette wholesalers 
may deliver cigarettes without Idaho stamps to Indian reservations when: 
a.	 The purchaser is an enrolled member of an Idaho Indian tribe; 
b.	 The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and 
operated by an enrolled member or members of an Idaho Indian 
tribe; and 
c.	 The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and 
operated by an Idaho Indian tribe. 
IDAPA 35.01.10.014.01 
Warpath, Inc.'s Articles of Incorporation specifically provide that "all 
shareholders of this corporation shall be and are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 
State ofIdaho." See, Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle filed on June 30, 2009. 
Finally, the plain language of the statute simply precludes the sale of unlisted cigarettes in 
Idaho. Nothing in the statute states that it applies to wholesale distribution to Indians on their 
reservation. 
V. STATE J': MAYBEE IS NOT CONTROLLING. 
To the extent the State relies upon Idaho v. Maybee, that case was factually and procedurally 
distinct. However, the legal analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court supports the position of NWS. The 
opinion in Maybee reflects, and the State ofIdaho has agreed to stipulate, that the record before the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Maybee established Maybee's sale of cigarettes to Idaho residents who were not 
enrolled members of a fedc:rally recognized Native American Tribe and who were not residing on land 
within the borders of a federally recognized Tribe's reservation land (hereinafter referred to as "Indian 
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Countly"). In stark contrast, in this case, the only sales that exist are sales by NWS to an entity owned 
exclusively by enrolled members ofthe Coeur d'Alene Tribe and operating within the boundaries of the 
Coeur d'Alene Reservation. In Maybee, the Idaho Supreme Court observed: 
However, contrary to Maybee's contentions, the Acts do not regulate 
Maybee's on-reservation activities, but rather his off-reservation conduct 
of: (1) selling, and offering for sale Non-Compliant Cigarettes of Idaho 
Here, the regulated conduct occurred off-reservation and so the Bracker 
balancing test does not apply. 
The Supreme Court correctly observed when "on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is 
at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and 
the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." See State v. Maybee, p. 17 
(citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 488 U.S. 136, 144 (1980)). In this case, the State of 
Idaho is asking this Court to do something that the United States Supreme Court has never permitted and 
has repeatedly rejected, that is, authorizing civil regulation of commercial conduct between tribal 
members occurring in Indian Countly. 
The United States Supreme Court applied a categorical bar to civil regulation of tribal 
commercial activity on Indian Country in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 u.s. 
463 (1976). In Moe, the State of Montana sought to collect cigarette and personal property taxes from 
reservation Indians who pW'cha~ed cigarettes from an on-reservation "smoke shop" owned and operated 
by tribal members. See Moe, 425 U.S. at 467-68. The Court noted that the question whether states had 
authority to tax the on-resenlation activities of reservation Indians had been "la[iclJ to rest" in the negative 
by the Court's decision in lIfcClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). Moe, 
425 U.S. at 476 (quoting M'escalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)). The Supreme 
Court also refused to allow the State to charge vendor fees to on-reservation Indian vendors. 
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The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental principle that 
states may not regulate tribal commercial activity occurring inside Indian Country. In Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 113 S.Ct. 1985, the United States Supreme Court 
held that Oklahoma could not impose income taxes or motor vehicle taxes on tribal members who lived 
in Indian Country. The Court stated in part: 
But when a State attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe 
or its members inside Indian country, rather than on non-Indians, 
we have employed, instead of a balancing inquiry, "a more 
categorical approach: '[A]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other 
federal statutes permitting it,' we have held, a State is without 
power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians." Count}! of 
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 
U.S. 251, 258, 112 S.Ct. 683, 688, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992) 
(citation omitted). 
The Idaho statute the State seeks to apply to NWS sales is categorically barred. In State v. 
Maybee, the regulation was permitted because the sales were not to Indians and not on Indian Country. 
Any attempt to impose the escrow measure or the complementary listing measure on tribal sales is an 
attempt to regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal Indians. NWS is an on-reservation wholesaler 
whose business is directly affected by the measures. NWS's tribal sales are sales to an Indian Country 
retailer or in other words, on--reservation activities oftribal Indians. 
The United States Supreme Court held that a similar categorical bar precludes states from taxing 
Indian lands and Indian people who are engaged in on-reservation activities. See Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,457-59 (1995). 
A number of federal district courts have correctly followed the Supreme Court's prohibition of 
state regulation of tribal commercial activities on Indian Country. In Winnebago Tribe ofNebraska v. 
Morrison, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.Kan. 2007). Under this precedent, the Federal Indian Law's 
categorical bar would apply to the activities ofreservation Indians between reservations. 
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Another federal district court decision clearly and accurately applied the Supreme Court 
precedent to regulation of tribal cigarette sales. In Ward v. The State ofNew York, 291 F.Supp.2d 188 
(W.D. N.Y. 2003), the district court reviewed the applicability of a New York statute which banned the 
direct shipment and transportation of certain cigarettes to New York consumers. Id at 193. The district 
court evaluated three types oftransactions: 
Based upon the current record, this Court finds that the Statute 
implicates tribal sovereignty in so far as it restricts or prohibits the 
following transactions: (a) shipment or transportation of cigarettes 
by a tribe member from the reservation to a non-tribe member, (b) 
shipment or transportation of cigarettes by a tribe member from the 
reservation to another tribe member on the reservation, (c) 
shipment or transportation of cigarettes from an individual (who 
mayor may not be a tribe member) located off of the reservation to 
a tribe member located on the reservation. 
Id 
The court held that tribal sovereignty would not preclude application of the statute to shipment or 
transportation by a tribe member from the reservation to a non-tribe member. However, with respect to 
shipment or transportation of cigarettes by a tribe member from the reservation to another tribe member 
on the reservation, the COUlt found that the statute could not be applied. The court also held that in the 
third scenario, shipment by a person located off the reservation to a tribe member located on the 
reservation, the statute could not be applied. Id The District Court held: 
A different question is presented with respect to transactions 
between tribe members on the reservation. It is well-settled that 
"[w]hen on··reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, 
state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest 
is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal 
self-government is at its strongest." Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362. 121 
S.Ct. 2304 (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. 100 S.Ct. 2578). 
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has generally upheld 
state regulation of on-reservation commerce between tribe 
members and non-tribe members. See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S. at 
150-59. 100 S.Ct. 2069; Moe, 425 U.S. at 481-83. 96 S.Ct. 1634. 
However, the Court has been reluctant to allow state regulation of 
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on-reservation commerce between tribe members. See Moe, 425 
U.S. at 475-79, 96 S.O. 1634 (holding that Montana could not 
collect cigarette sales taxes with respect to on-reservation sales by 
tribe members to tribe members); see also Colville, 447 U.S. at 
162-64, 100 S.O. 2069 (ruling that Washington's motor vehicle tax 
could not be imposed on vehicles owned by tribe members inter 
alia because tax was not "tailored ... to the amount of actual off­
. ")reservatIOn use ... . 
Id. 
The United States Supreme Court and other courts following its rulings have repeatedly refused 
to allow state regulation of tribal commercial conduct occurring on Indian Country. In State v. Maybee, 
the Idaho Supreme Court allowed regulation of tribal commercial conduct because it occurred off 
reservation. Clearly, that is not the case here. 
VI.	 THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REGARDING THE PROPOSED FINE 
The Court can take judicial notice that, according to an article in the Idaho Statesman 
dated June 25, 20 10, Idaho spends about $2.3 million per year on tobacco prevention - less than 
a quarter of the amount recommended by the Centers for Disease Control. The rest of the 
tobacco money received by the State under the MSA goes to the General Fund. In the present 
case, the State is trying to raise additional revenue through an unfair and grossly excessive 
penalty. 
A. Assessmenlt of the Penalty is Improper on Summary Judgment. 
Even assuming that the issue of liability under the Idaho tobacco laws is proper for 
determination on a summary judgment, certainly the issue of any civil penalty, much less the $2 
million proposed penalty, is wholly unsuitable for summary decision. Imposition of a penalty, 
particularly a penalty this large, calls for reasoned determination after a full examination of the 
relevant evidence. 
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The statute on which the State relies, Idaho Code § 39-8406(1), states that the district 
court "may impose" civil penalties. The statute therefore, allows the court discretion. 
Discretion, however, must be exercised based on reason which in tum requires knowledge. 
There has been no evidence presented by the State that would provide this knowledge to the 
Court. 
The entire thrust of the parties' efforts has been directed toward the legal issues 
concerning the question of whether the cigarette laws have been violated and whether the State of 
Idaho has jurisdiction over a non-resident Indian company. There has been no evidence adduced 
on any issues that would allow the Court to make a reasoned decision on any amount of any 
penalty. The Court has little or no information regarding the Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company or its owner. It has little or no information regarding the ability ofNWS to pay 
such a huge fine. It has no information on what the State intends to do with this requested fine. 
The Court cannot exercise its discretion properly. Further, the State has admitted that it does not 
collect excise tax on any cigarettes bought by War Path from NWS when later resold by War 
Path. See Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle dated June 30, 2009. The State also 
would therefore, not collect escrow as a result of these sales under the Directory Statute. Thus, 
the State has lost no revenue as a result of the conduct it claims justifies a $2,000,000 fine. 
To pick a number out of thin air, as the State suggests, and use that as the amount of the 
penalty is the very essence of arbitrary action in violation of due process. There is no evidence in 
the record that would support the Court's adoption of the $2 million penalty suggested by the 
State. 
Moreover, NWS is entitled to a trial by jury on the question of the imposition of this civil 
penalty. This situation is very similar to the question presented to the Texas Supreme Court in 
State of Texas v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288 (Tx. 1975). The Court 
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considered whether the Texas Constitution gives a right to trial by jury when a suit for civil 
penalty is brought pursuant to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by the State of Texas. 
The statute under which the State brought the action allowed for civil penalties for each 
violation, as does the statute upon which the State of Idaho relies. The Texas Supreme Court 
noted the provision in the Texas Constitution providing for trial by jury and held that that 
constitutional right extended to suits for civil penalties. It noted a United States Supreme Court 
opinion that the right to a trial by jury exists when "the action involves rights and remedies of the 
sort typically enforced in an action at law. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 
L.Ed.2d 260 (1974); see also 5 Moore's Federal Practice, § 38.11 (7), 128 (2d.Ed 1974)." 530 
S.W.2d at 292. The Texas Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial to 
determine the amount of civil penalties which should be assessed against it. 
In United States v. Nordbrock, 941 F.2d 947 (9th Cif. 1991), the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial to determine liability in a 
government action seeking civil penalties, citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,417-25,107 
S.Ct. 1831, 1835-40,95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (the Seventh Amendment guarantees jury trial for 
determination of liability for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act). Id. at 949. In a similar 
case, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded in Idaho Dept. ofLaw Enforcement v. Free, 126 Idaho 
422, 885 P.2d 381 (1994), that the right to a jury trial existed in a civil forfeiture proceeding. 
The Court noted that the right to a jury trial in such civil proceedings existed at common law 
when the Idaho Constitution was adopted. The Idaho Constitution, Article One, Section 7, 
provides that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." NWS accordingly has a right to 
trial by jury on the issue of the imposition of civil penalties. That right cannot be denied merely 
because the Court in its equitable powers has issued an injunction finding a violation of the 
statute. 
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B.	 The Imposition of a $2 Million Penalty Would Violate Due Process and 
Constitutional Protection. 
The concept of due process prohibits arbitrary and capricious government action and 
requires notice and the opportunity to be heard before a person is deprived of property. If NWS 
were not entitled to a jury trial, which it is as explained above, it would certainly be entitled to an 
opportunity to present its case before the factfinder. Choosing an arbitrary number like $2 
million for a penalty does not comply with the due process clause. The Court has no guides to 
the proper amount to be assessed. 
The State will note that Section 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act allows the 
imposition of a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the greater of 500% of the retail value of 
the cigarettes or $5,000 upon the determination of a violation of Section 39-8403(3), Idaho Code, 
or any rule adopted pursuant thereto. The State asserts that each of the 100 million cigarettes 
which NWS has allegedly sold constitutes a violation permitting the Court to assess a penalty. 
That is, the State is claiming the Court has the discretion to award some $61,050,000 in penalties 
utilizing the 500% of the retail price measurement or, presumably, $500,000,000,000 using the 
$5,000 per violation of each of the 100 million cigarettes. Any statute that would allow a court 
to impose a $500 billion fine is unconstitutional on its face. A $2 million fine is grossly 
exceSSIve; the possibility of a $500 billion fine is absurd and reveals the statute to be 
unconstitutional on its face. 
Indeed, under the State's interpretation of the statute, bringing in one package of 
cigarettes (20 cigarettes) would allow the Court to impose a $100,000 penalty. Bringing in one 
carton of cigarettes (200 cigarettes) would allow the imposition of a $1 million penalty. This is 
absurd. It reemphasizes the arbitrary and capricious nature of the statute and the unbounded 
discretion the Legislature aillegedly would allow under the interpretation advanced by the State. 
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While the statute purports to authorize a "civil" penalty, in light of the harsh potential 
results and the reason behind the statute, the issue is whether this is a civil penalty or in reality a 
criminal penalty. The distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of some 
constitutional import. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636. 65 L.Ed.2d 742 
(1980). The protections under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution of a 
speedy and public trial by jury apply to criminal proceedings. So do the protections under the 
Eighth Amendment against excessive fines. 
The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a 
matter of statutory construction. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. The United States Supreme Court in 
Ward utilized a two-part test to determine the nature of the penalty. The first step is to determine 
whether the legislative body, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly 
or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. [d. A "civil" label is not always dispositive. 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361,117 S.Ct. 2072,138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). It is clear in 
this context that the Idaho Legislature intended a severe penalty more criminal than civil. 
The second step is to determine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate any legislative body's intention to create a civil penalty. Ward 
The question is whether the Idaho Legislature, even if its manifest intent was to create a "civil" 
mechanism, nevertheless provided for sanctions so punitive as to "transform what was clearly 
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Ward, 448 U.S. at 294 (quoting Rex Trailer 
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S.Ct. 219, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956)). Allowing 
imposition of a $1 million fine for importing a single carton of cigarettes is obviously so punitive 
as to transform the Complementary Act remedies into criminal penalties. Allowing the Court to 
impose a $500 billion penalty, as the State in this case appears to acknowledge, can only be 
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thought of as criminal in nature. Accordingly, NWS is entitled to a trial by jury under the Sixth 
Amendment and is protected against excessive fines by the Eighth Amendment. 
Moreover, the State sought injunctive relief against NWS. Thus, it requested the Court to 
sit in equity, rather than law. A court sitting in equity cannot impose civil penalties. Tull v. 
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424, 107 S.Ct. 1831 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987). This "civil penalty" 
the State is requesting is "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief," and may only be 
imposed in a legal proceeding after appropriate safeguards have been provided. Chauffeurs. 
Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, et at., 494 U.S. 558, 571, 110 S.Ct.1339, 108 
L.Ed.2d 519 (1990) (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 412.) 
C. The Court Cannot Stack Penalties. 
The State has claimed that NWS has violated the Complementary Act by making 
improper sales of cigarettes. The State has also claimed that NWS has caused to be imported 
cigarettes to Idaho retailers. It is not alleged that NWS has improperly affixed stamps for 
possessed cigarettes in violation of Section 39-8403(3). Accordingly, the only penalty that can 
be assessed is a single penalty for an allegedly improper bulk sale of cigarettes. Section 39-8406 
provides that "each sale or offer to sell" shall constitute a separate violation. It does not state that 
each individual cigarette sold within a carton or within the packs in a carton constitutes a 
violation. Accordingly, it is clear that the Legislature intended in this situation to restrict 
penalties to the number of sales, not the number of cigarettes. The State has not proven the 
number of sales that occurred and thus the State cannot seek imposition of any penalties. It does 
not matter that the State was able to manufacture an affidavit asserting the number of cigarettes 
allegedly sold; what matte:rs is that the State has not defined for the Court the number of sales 
alleged and therefore the Court has no basis on which to impose penalties. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN USPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 23 000858
The State should also not be able to assert penalties for the sales made before the State 
gave notice to NWS of the State's claim that an Indian corporation cannot sell cigarettes to 
Native American corporations on reservations within Idaho without violating the State's 
interpretation of the Tobacco Act. The State alleges that after the notice went out, NWS made 
some sales amounting to 6 million cigarettes. Since the State has not provided any information 
on the number of sales, the Court has no basis to impose penalties under Section 39-8406. Even 
if the Court concludes at least one sale was made, it should only impose a single $5,000 penalty. 
D. The State's Requested Penalty is Disproportionate to Previous Penalties. 
The State is attempting to punish NWS simply because it has sought a resolution of this 
complicated question of tribal sovereignty. The State in resolving other alleged violations has 
agreed to substantially lower fines. Attached to the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle dated 
September 30, 2010 are true and accurate copies of Complaints filed against companies allegedly 
violating the Complementary Act and Consent Decrees or Final Judgments agreed upon by the 
State ofIdaho. They reflect the following agreed upon fines: 
Blacksheep Distributing Number of cigarettes sold: 11,576,000 
Consent Decree: $25,000 ($30,000 in settlement and $5,000 
waived if Blacksheep complies with terms. 
Carolina Tobacco:	 Number of cigarettes sold: 29,362,600 
Judgment: Deposit escrow. 
Sought $3,993.50 in attorney fees 
Changde Cigarette Factory:	 Number of cigarettes sold: 3,635,200 
Consent Decree: $27,000 in attorney fees and costs. 
Smokin Joes:	 Number of cigarettes sold: 1,836,000 
Consent Decree: $7,500 as settlement; $3,750 waived if they 
comply with terms. 
Yakima Distributors:	 Number of cigarettes sold: 2,967,000 
Consent Decree: $22,000 
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It is apparent that because NWS is simply exercising its right to have these issues 
addressed by the Court, the State is seeking to punish NWS for exercising that right by seeking 
the grossly excessive and disproportionately high $2,000,000 fine. This is overreaching and 
arbitrary and capricious conduct on behalf of the State. 
Even the State's argument shows that it is seeking a disproportionately high fine. As 
stated in the State's brief" District Judge Sticklen assessed a $163,225 civil penalty in the State v. 
Maybee case based on illl~gal sales of2.5 million cigarettes. (State's Memorandum at 11.) The 
State is claiming that NWS sold some six million cigarettes after the State notified it of the 
State's claim that future sales would be violations of the cigarette laws. Six million cigarettes is 
2.4 times the 2.5 million eigarettes sold by Maybee. 2.4 times the penalty assessed by Judge 
Sticklen would equate to $391,740. That is a far cry from the $2 million penalty the State is 
seeking in this case. But even that $391,740 is greatly excessive and not justified under the 
relevant statute discussed above. Certainly it would be inappropriate at this juncture of the 
proceedings, as the Court has no basis to compare the culpability ofNWS to the culpability of 
Maybee. The State has not presented any relevant facts and this summary proceeding has not 
allowed NWS to produce witnesses or evidence. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 2010. 
By--r-----t~q---~-----'LJ..L-----=:::....:...L.----
S A. DIddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney this 30th day of September, 2010, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden U.S. Mail 
Brett T. DeLange Hand Delivery 
Office of the Attorn~~y General ] Overnight Mail 
650 W. State Street, Lower Level ] Fax (208) 334-4151 
Boise, Idaho 83702-001_0 '-1-------------1 
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr. ] U.S. Mail 
State Tax Commission ] Hand Delive 
PO BOX 36 [ ] Overnight 
Boise, Idaho 83720-·0410 [ ] Fax (20 
Sa 
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:,~-,-:::,-FU,~ 
----~._-­Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967 ~ 
-.­EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED SEP 302010 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 J. DAVID NAVARRO 
P. O. Box 1368 BYJ. RANDA. ,C'erk 
DEPuTY '"'4.LBoise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344··8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344··8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. 
DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
SAMUEL A. DIJDDLE being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant Native Wholesale Supply 
Company in this matter and as such have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUE:L A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
57032-100197965.000 
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2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified 
Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, ef 
at. v. Blacksheep Distributing, Inc., Case No.: CV OC 0616719. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and accurate copy of the Consent Decree 
filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et al. v. 
Blacksheep Distributing, Inc., Case No.: CV OC 0616719. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified 
Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, et 
al. v. Carolina Tobacco Company, Case No.: CV OC 03044510. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and accurate copy of the Final Judgment 
filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et al. v. 
Carolina Tobacco Company, Case No.: CV OC 03044510. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified 
Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, et 
al. v. Changde Cigarette Factory, et al., Case No.: CV OC 0206277D. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and accurate copy of the Consent Decree 
filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et at. v. 
Changde Cigarette Factory, et al., Case No.: CV OC 0206277D. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified 
Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, et 
al. v. Joseph Anderson dba Smokin Joes, Case No.: CV OC 0714037. 
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9. Attached hereto as Exhibit "H" is a true and accurate copy of the Consent Decree 
filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et al. v. 
Joseph Anderson dba Smokin Joes, Case No.: CV OC 0714037. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit "I" is a true and accurate copy of the Verified 
Complaint filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State ofIdaho, et 
al. v. Yakima Distributing Company, Inc., Case No.: CV OC 0303684D 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit "1" is a true and accurate copy of the Consent Decree 
filed in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, in the matter of State of Idaho, et al. v. 
Yakima Distributing Company, Inc., Case No.: CV OC 0303684D 
Further, your affiant sayeth not.
 
DATED this 30th day of September, 2010.
 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of September, 2010. 
~~)'--~ 
Residing: Nampa,ID 
My Commission Expires: 1/25/12 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney this 30th day of September, 2010, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Sa.m1lt(~ 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Brett T. DeLange 
Office of the Attorney General 
650 W. State Street, Lower Level 
Boise, Idaho 83702··0010 
Theodore V. Spangh~r, Jr. 
State Tax Commission 
PO BOX 36 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410 
] U.S. Mail 
] Hand Delivery 
] Overnight Mail 
] Fax (208) 334-4151 
U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 3 4-7844 
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.... ;.~.... 'to... 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
NO.----.:;~:c;n- _ 
AITORNEY GENERAL FlLEA.M -t3.u·
STATE OF IDAHO 
--­
. BREIT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) 
Depoty Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Unit 
Office of the Attome, General 
Len·B. Jordan Building 
650 W. State St., Lower Level 
P. O. Box 83720
 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
SEP 082006 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
 
ByJ BLACK
 
DEPlTTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATEOF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and throogh
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
 0016719General 
Plaintiff, 
vs. VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT
 
BLACKSBEEP DISTRIBUTING, INC.
 
a Washington corporation,
 
DefendanL 
BACKGROUND 
1. In 1999, the Idaho Legislatw'e. in enacting the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement Act, Idaho Code § 39-7801, et seq., found that cigarette smoking presents serious 
public health concerns to tile state of Idaho and to Idaho citizens. Indeed, the Surgeon General 
determined that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, and other serious diseases, and that 
there are hundreds of thousands of tobacco-related deaths in the United States each year. These 
dis~es most often do not appear until many years after the person in question begins smoking. 
2. The Idaho Legislature further found that cigarette smoking also presents serious 
fInancial concerns for the State of Idaho. Under certain health-care programs, the state may have 
a legal obligation to provide medical assistance to eligible persons for health conditions 
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associated with. cigarette smoking, and those persons may have a legal entitlement to receive 
such medical assistance. 
3. Under these programs, the Legislature found, the State of Idaho pays millions of 
dollars each year to provide medical assistance to persons for health conditions associated with 
cigarette smoking. 
4. The Idaho Legislature thus concluded that it would be the policy of the State of Idaho 
that rmancial burdens imposed on the State by cigarette smoking be borne by tobacco product 
manufacturers, rather than by the State, to the extent that such manufacturers either determine to 
enter into settlement agreements with the State or are found culpable by the courts. 
5. On November 23, 1998, leading United States tobacco product manufacturers entered 
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement,• with the State of Idaho. 
The Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers to pay substantial sums to the 
State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fund a national foundation devoted to the pursuit 
of public health interests; and to make substantial·changes in their advertising and marketing 
practices and corporate culture with the intention of reducing underage smoking. 
6. The Idaho Legislature declared that it would be contrary to the policy of the State of 
Idaho if tobacco product manufacturers who determine not to enter into such a settlement 
agreement (nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers) could use a resulting cost advantage 
to derive large, short-term profits in the years before liability may arise without ensuring that the 
state will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are ·proven to have acted 
culpably. The Legislature thus detennined that it is in the interest of the State of Idaho to require 
that nonparticipating tob8'::CO product manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee a 
source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, short-term 
profits and then becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise. 
7. Accordingly, shortly after the Master Settlement Agreement was signed, the Idaho 
Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (the Act). In essence, 
the Act requires "tobacco product manufacturers" to either: (1) "[b]ecome a participating 
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manufacturer (as that tenn is defined in Section II(jj) of the Master Settlement Agreement) and 
generally perform its financial obligations under the Master Settlement Agreement," or (2) place 
into a qualified escrow fund the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(1) of the Act. 
8. In 2003. the: Idaho Legislature decided that violations of the Act threaten the 
integrity of Idaho's Master Settlement Agreement, the fiscal soundness of the state and public 
health and enacted procedural enhancements to help prevent violations of the Act by adopting 
the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (the Complementary Act)• 
.codified at Title 39, Chapter 84, Idaho C~. Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the 
Complementary Act make.') it unlawful for any person to sell, offer or posses for sale in Idaho 
cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in Idaho's Directory of 
Compliant Tobacco Produc:t Manufacturers and Brand Families (Directory). 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
9. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter for the relevant time period 
that is the subject of this complaint pursuant to the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement 
Complementary Act. 
10. Based upon information and belief, Defendant Blacksheep Distributing, Inc. 
(D~fendant). is a Washington corporation and has its principal place of business at 2914 East 
Boone Street, Spokane, WA 99202. 
11. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and the Complementary Act, this Comt has 
personal jurisdiction over the Defendant because it is a licensed "Stamping Agent," as that term 
is defIned at Idaho Code Section 39-8402(8). and has-·-acquired, held, owned. possessed, 
transported, imported. or caused to be imported cigarettes that are not on Idaho's Directory. 
Defendant knew or should have known that these cigarettes were intended for distribution or sale 
in Idaho. 
12. Because the Defendant is a non-resident of the State of Idaho venue is proper in 
this Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
13. The Defendant sells, offers or possesses cigarettes that are distributed for sale in 
Idaho. Defendant is licensed to do business in Idaho. 
14. From 2003 to April 2006, Defendant sold a variety of unstamped cigarettes in 
Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturers that manufacture them were not 
included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
15. Specifically, in July to September 2003, Defendant had 2,129,800 unstamped 
Sixty-OneIMove brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product . 
manufacturer that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
16. In April to June 2004, Defendant had 409,200 unstamped Trackerlfucson brand 
family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that 
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
17. In April to June 2004, Defendant had 1,600 unstamped Sixty-OneIMove brand
 
family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that
 
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale.
 
18. In July to September 2004, DefendaIit had 684,200 unstamped Trackerlfucson 
brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer 
that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
19. In October to December 2004, Defendant had 768,600 unstamped TrackerfI'ucson 
brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacttirer 
that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
20. In January to March 2005, Defendant had 1,115,600 unstamped TrackerlTucson 
brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer 
that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
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21. In April to June 2005, Defendant had 1,477,000 unstamped TrackerlI'ucson brand 
family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that 
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
22. In April to Jwte 2005, Defendant had 48,000 unstamped Sabre brand family 
cigarettes sold in "Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that 
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
23. In July to September 2005, Defendant had 715!000 unstamped Sabre brand family 
cigarettes sold in Idaho.. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that 
manufactures them were Dl:)t included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
24. In July to September 2005, Defendant had 1,932,000 unstamped TrackerlflICSon 
brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer 
that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
25. In October to December 2005, Defendant had 261,000 unstamped Sabre brand 
family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer that 
manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
26. In Octobe:r to December 2005, Defendant had 1,572,000 unstamped 
Trackerlfucson brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product 
manufacturer that manufactures them were not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
27. In January to March 2006, Defendant had 1,462,000 unstamped Track:erffucson 
brand family cigarettes sold in Idaho. These cigarettes and the tobacco product manufacturer 
that manufactures them wc~ not included on the Directory as of the date of sale. 
28. In each instance, Defendant acquired, held, owned, possessed, transported, 
imported, or caused to bc~ imported the cigarettes identified above, knowing, or acting under 
circumstances where Defendant should have known, that these cigarettes were intended for 
distribution or sale in Idaho. 
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29. In short, all of these cigarettes were manufactured by tobacco product 
manufacturers not in compliance with Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act and 
Complementary Act and V\;ere not listed on the Directory. 
30. Accordingly, the Defendant has violated the Complementary Act by selling, 
offering or possessing for sale in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand 
family not included on the Directory. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
31. The Attorney General incorporates by reference the allegations contained in
 
paragraphs 1 through 30 hf~in.
 
32. The Defendant was notified in writing of its responsibilities as a Stamping Agent 
under the Complementary Act pursuant to various notices sent by the Office of the Attorney 
General. Defendant knew of its duties under the Complementary Act and of the law limiting it to 
only sell, offer or possess for sale in Idaho cigarettes of tobacco product manufacturers or brand 
families included in the Directory and, nevet1heless, Defendant proceeded to violate the 
Complementary Act's provisions by possessing for sale the various cigarette brand families 
. identified above, all of which were not included on the Directory at the relevant time. 
33. Idaho Code § 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act states that each sale or offer 
to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation of Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) constitutes a 
separate violation and provides that each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in 
violation of Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) shall constitute a separate violation. For each violation, 
the Comt may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the greater of five hundred 
percent (500%) of the retw value of the cigarettes or five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a 
determination of violation of Idaho Code § 39-8403(3). 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
 
The Attorney Gener.al respectfully asks that this Court:
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1. Find that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) of the Complementary 
Act by selling or offering for sale in Idaho cigarettes of tobacco product manufacturers or brand 
families not included in the Directory. 
2. Fmd that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the 
Complementary Act by possessing for sale in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product 
manufacturers or brand families not included in the Directory. 
3. Fmd that the Defendant's multiple violations of Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement Complementary Act constitute separate violations thereof; and award judgment 
against the Defendant for civil penalties in the amount of five hWldred percent (500%) of the 
retail value of the cigarettes unlawfully sold, offered for sale or possessed for sale or five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) per violatio~ whichever is greater. 
4. Award judgment against the Defendant for all of the Attorney General's reasonable 
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in bringing this action, as authorized by Idaho Code § 39­
7804(c) of the Act and by Idaho Code § 39-8407(5) of the Complementary Act. 
5. Award the Attorney General such other, furth.eJ", or different relief, as the Court 
considers appropriate. 
~ 
DATED this ~_, of I Js"p~ tV\ btA , 2006. 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATfORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
(L~L 
By 
R
--;Ui'nREPn=;;FIR1'l1,"iTW'.... --­DeLAN:-w-'T"'ItTG]::I"I'E
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Unit 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofAda ) 
SYDNEY DONAHOE, being first duly sworn on oat:h, deposes and says that she is a 
Tobacco Compliance Specialist in the Civil Litigation Division of the Office of the Attorney 
General, that she has read the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the facts therein are 1rUe to the 
best ofher knowledge, infbnnation, and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisl--_ day of'~~~~~~ 2006. 
NO ARY
 
Residence: ~ I ~
 Commission Expires: ~~ 
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LAWHENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
STATE OF IDAHO
 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney GeDeral 
Consumer Protection Unit 
Office of the Attome, (;eneral 
Len B. Jordan BuildlDg 
6SO W. State St., LoweI' Level 
P. o. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attomeys for the State of Idaho 
NO--..__-:::....:-:::­ _ 
FIJ,.EDA.M, __--JP.M, _ 
SEP 0 81005_ 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
 
ByJ BLACK
 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIcr OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney c·v 0C 06167 19GeDenl Case No. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. CONSENT 
DECREE 
BLACKSHEEP DISTRIBUTING, INC., 
a Washington corporation, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden 
(Attorney General), and defendant Blacksheep Distributing, Inc., a Washington corporation, 
have consented. to the entry of this Consent Decree, pursuant to the terms and conditions 
contained herein. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows: 
JURISDIcrION AND VENUE 
1. This Court. has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to the Idaho 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. The Court also has personal 
CONSENT DECREE - 1 
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jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 5-514 and 39-8406, and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 5-404. 
PARTIES 
2. The parties to this Consent Decree are as set forth in the above caption. The 
Attorney General is authorized, pursuant to the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement 
Complementary Act, to bring this action and settle it on behalfofthe State of Idaho. 
DEFINITIONS 
3. Unless otherwise specified, the following shall apply: 
A. Brand Family means all styles of Cigarettes sold under the same 
trademark and differentiated from one another by means of additional modifiers or 
descriptors including, but not limited to, "menthol," "lights," "kings," and "1 OOs," 
and includes any brand name (alone or in conjunction with any other word) 
trademark, logo, symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable pattern of colors, or 
any other indicia ofproduct identification identical or similar to, or identifiable with, 
a previously known brand ofCigarettes. 
B. Cigarette means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be 
burned or heated Wider ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (l) 
any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or 
(2) tobacco, in any form, that is fimctional in the product, which, because of its 
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is 
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of 
tobacco wrapped in any substance containing tobacco which, because of its 
appearance, the ~~ of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is 
likely to be offered 10, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette described in clause 
(1) of this definition. The tenn "cigarette" includes "roll-your-own" (i.e., any 
tobacco which, because of its appearance, type, packaging, or labeling is suitable for 
use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as tobacco for making 
cigarettes). For pmposes of this definition of "cigarette," 0.09 ounces of "roll-your­
own'~ tobacco shall constitute one (1) individual "cigarette." 
c. Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act means that act 
codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code, as amended. 
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D. Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complemenmry Act 
(Complementary Act) means that act codified at Title 39, Chapter 84, Idaho Code, 
as amended. 
E. Master Settlement Agreement means the settlement agreement (and 
related documents) entered into on November 23, 1998, by the State of Idaho and 
leading United States Tobacco Product Manufacturers. 
F. Nonparticipating manufacturer means any Tobacco Product 
Manufacturer that is not a member ofthe Master Settlement Agreement. 
G. Tobacco Product Manufacturer means an entity that after the date of 
enactment of this act directly (and not exclusively through any affiliate) (1) 
manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to be sold in the 
United States, including Cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through 
an importer (except where such importer is an original participating man~r (as 
that teon is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement) that will be responsible for 
the payments under the Master Settlement Agreement with respect to such Cigarettes 
as a result of the provisions of subsections II(mm) of the Master Settlement 
Agreement and that pays the taxes specified in subsection II(z) of the Master 
Settlement Agreement, and provided that the manufacturer of such Cigarettes does 
not market or advertise such Cigarettes in the United States); (2) Is the first 
purchaser anywhere for resale in the United States of Cigarettes manufactured 
anywhere that the manufacturer does not intend to be sold in the United States; or (3) 
Becomes a successor ofan entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection. 
The tenn "tobacco l,roduct manufacturertl shall not include an affiliate of a Tobacco 
Product Manufactw~r unless such affiliate itself falls within any of paragraphs (I) 
through (3) ofthis subsection. 
H Stamping agent means a person that is authorized or required to affix 
tax stamps to packages or other containers of Cigarettes under Title 63, Chapter 25, 
Idaho Code. 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
3. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Blacksbeep Distributing. (hereafter referred to 
as BJacksheep) shall: 
A Not possess, transport to, acquire for sale, sell or offer for sale to 
locations in Idaho or affix or cause to be affIXed Idaho excise tax stamps to 
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Cigarettes of Tobacco Product Manufacturers unless the Tobacco Product 
Manufacturer is Ji~1ed on the Attorney General's Directory of Compliant Tobacco 
Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (Directory). The Directory is located at: 
http://www2.state.iduslag/consumer/tobacco/directorv index.h1m 
B. Be!,7Uming July I, 2006, provide the Attorney General with quarterly 
reports ofCigarette sales on fonns provided by the Attorney General. All necessary 
forms are located at: 
http://www2.state.id.uslagiconsumer/tobacco/nonparticipating.htm#Forms 
C. Within 30 days of execution of this Consent Decree, provide the 
Attorney General a list, updated as necessary, of each Brand Family manufactured 
by a Non-Participating Manufacturer that Blacksheep intends to possess, transport 
to, or acquire for :sale in Idaho, or affix or cause to be affixed Idaho excise tax 
stamps. 
D. For a period of two years after execution of this Consent Decree, 
provide the Attorney General at least 15 days notice prior to possessing, 
transporting, acquiring for sale in Idaho or affixing or causing to be affixed Idaho 
excise tax. stamps to a Brand Family manufactured by a Non-Participating 
ManUfacturer that Blacksheep has not previously advised the Attorney General that 
it intends to possess, transport to, or acquire for sale in Idaho, or affix or cause to be 
affixed Idaho excise tax stamps. 
BLACKSHEEP PAYMENT TO THE ATIORNEY GENERAL 
4. Blacksheep shall pay Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00), payable to "Office of 
Attorney General, Consumer Protection Unit," for settlement of all d.iSputed issues concerning its 
duties under the Complementary Act with respect to Cigarettes for the time period of 2002 
through the end of July 2006; provided, however, that Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) of this 
amount shall be waived WId not payable so long as Blacksheep complies with all of the terms of 
this Consent Decree. Thus, within ten (l0) days after both parties sign this Consent Decree, 
Blacksheep shall make its payment to the Office ofthe Attorney General. Blacksheep's payment 
shall be by cashier's check. 
IDAG139767CONSENT DECREE - 4 
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REPORTING 
5. For a period of three years from the date of this Consent Decree, Blacksheep shall 
make available to the Attorney General upon 21 days notice all reasonable documents and 
records to assess compliance with this Consent Decree. These documents and records shall be 
provided at Blacksheep's expense unless the request is made more frequently than once in any 
three-month period, in which case the reasonable expense of copies for additional requests shall 
be borne by the Attorney (J·eneral. 
NON-WAIVER PROVISIONS 
6. Nothing ill this Consent Decree shall preclude the Attorney General from 
exercising any administrative, legal, or equitable remedies available to him to enforce the 
provisions of this Consent Decree, or to enforce the laws of the State of Idaho, in the event that 
Blacksheep violates any provision ofthis Consent Decree or any other laws ofthe State of Idaho. 
7. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed as relieving Blacksheep's duty 
to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, rules, or pennits. 
8. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to limit or modify any lawful 
powers of the Attorney General or the State of Idaho, including. the power to request, demand or 
compel production of documents or the testimony ofwitnesses. 
SEVERABILITY 
9 The provisions of this Consent Decree shall be severable and should any 
provision be declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unenforceable, the other 
provisions of this Consent Decree and Judgment shall remain in full force and effect 
APPLICATION 
10. This Consent Decree shall be binding upon Blacksheep and shall apply to 
Blacksheep, its agents, employees, representatives, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, 
while acting personally or through any corporation, other business entity, or person whose acts, 
practices, or policies are directed., formulated, or controlled by Blacksheep. 
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DISTRICT COURT APPROVAL
 
11. This Consent Decree shall be filed concurrently with the accompanying 
Complaint and shall be subject to the approval of the District Court ofAda County, Idaho.
 
SERVICE
 
12. Blacksheep agrees to accept service of a conformed copy of this Consent Decree 
by prepaid first class mail sent to Blacksheep's corporate office. Blacksheep expressly waives 
personal service of a conformed copy of this Consent Decree and the accompanying Complaint 
after they have been filed with the Court. 
REOPENING OF TInS MAITER 
13. Matters set forth in this Consent Decree may be reopened by the Attomey General 
for further proceedings ifBlacksheep violates any term of this Consent Decree. The Attorney 
General may seek all remedies available to him, both statutory and in the common law. If the 
Court finds that Blacksheep has violated any term of this Consent Decree, the Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000) presently waived in paragraph four shall be due and owing and shall be in 
ad~ition to and not in any replacement for any financial penalty the Court determines to impose 
upon Blacksbeep as a consequence ofits violations of the Consent Decree. 
NOTICE 
14. All notices under this Consent Decree shall be sent as follows: 
For the Attorney General: For Blacksheep:
 
Office of the Attorney General Blacksheep Distributing, Inc.
 
Civil Litigation Division Attn: Brian T. Donohue, President
 
P.O. Box 83720 2914 E. Boone Avenue
 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 Spokane, WA 99202
 
Attention: Blacksheep Distributing
 
Consent Decree	 David Groesbeck, PS 
422 Legion Building 
108 N. Washington St. 
Spokane, WA 99201 
IDAG139769 
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AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN THIS STIPULATION
 
15. Each person who signs this Consent Decree in a representative capacity warrants 
that he or she is duly authorized to do so.
 
MISCELLANEOUS
 
16. This Consent Decree shall be enforceable only by the Attomey General. 
17. This Consent Decree does not constitute an admission by Blacksheep that any of 
its acts and practices violates Idaho~s Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act or Idaho's 
Complementary Act. 
18. This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enabling the 
parties to apply for such ftnther order or directives as may be necessary or appropriate. 
19. This Consent Decree becomes effective upon execution by the parties and entry 
by the Court. 
WE CONSENT: 
1'= ~~ 
DATED this i~ day ofAapst, 2006. 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
By: --==~~l~t=----:_ 
BRETI' T. DeLANGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Civil Litigation Division 
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DATED this ~_ day ofSeptember, 2006. 
BLACKSBEEP DISTRIBUTING 
Name: ~ ~A'" i)t ....A'""'~ 
(printed) 
Signature: ---.,;:;;~~_-..;;.r_· ~..-.=.;;...=. _ 
Title: ~ 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
Deputy Attorney Generaf 
Consumer Protection Unit 
Office of the Attornel General t Len B. Jordan BuUdmg 
650 W. State St., Lower Level 
P. '0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424' 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
'_ IcoP~
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IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FOURm JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and throngh 
. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General Case No. CV OC 03011 451 0 
Plaintiff, 
vs. VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
CAROLINA TOBACCO COMPANY, a 
Virginia corporation, 
DefendanL---:.;;....~---- )) 
BACKGROUND 
1. The Idaho Legislature, in enacting the Idaho Tobacco Master Settl~ent Agreement 
Act, Idaho Code § 39-7801, et seq., found that cigarette smoking presents serious public health 
concerns to the state ofIdaho and to Idaho citizens. Indeed, the Surgeon General has determined 
that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, and other serious diseases, and that there are 
. 
hundreds ofthousands of tobacco-related deaths in the United States each year. These diseases 
most often do not appear until many years after the person in question begins smoking.
. . 
2. The Idaho Legislature further found that cigarette smoking also' presents serious 
financial concerns for the State of Idaho. Under certain health-care progrmns, the State may 
have a legal obligation to provide medical assistance to eligible persons for health conditions 
ID '. '.VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 1 ~GO 
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associated with cigarettc~ smoking, and those persons may have a legal entitlement to receive 
such medical assistance. 
3. Under these programs, the Legislature found, the State of Idaho pays millions of 
dollars each year to provide medical assistance to persons for health conditions associated with 
cigarette smoking. 
4. The Idaho Legislature thus concluded that it would be the policy of the State of Idaho 
that financial burdens imposed on the State by cigarette smoking be borne by tobacco product 
manufacturers, rather than by the State, to the extent that such manufacturers either detennine to 
enter into settlement agreements with the State or are found culpable by the courts. 
5. On November 23, 1998. leading United States tobacco product manufacturers entered 
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement," with the: State ofIdabo. 
The Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers to pay substantial sums to the 
. . 
State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fund a national foundation deyoted to the pursuit 
of public health interests; and·to make substantial changes in their advertising and marketing 
.practices and corporate culture, with the intention ofreducing underage smoking. 
6. The Idaho Legislature decreed that it would be contrary to the policy of the State of 
Idaho if tobacco· product manufacturers who determine not to enter into such a settlement 
agreement could use a resulting cost advantage to derive large, short-term profits in the years 
before liability may arise without ensuring that the State will have an eventual source of recovery 
from them iftbeYare proven to have acted culpably. The Legislature thus determined that it is in 
the interest oftbe State to require that such manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee a 
source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving iarge. short-term 
profits and then becoming judgment-proofbefore liabilitymay arise. 
7. Accordingly, shortly after th~ Master Settlement Agreement was signed, the Idaho 
Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act, (the "Actj. effective 
July 1, 1999. Iri essence, the Act requires "tobacco product manufacturen" to either: (l) 
"[b]ecome a participating manufacturer (as that tenn is defined in Section IT(jj) of the Master 
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Settlement Agreement) and generally perform its financial Oblig~ons l.der the Master 
Settlement Agreement," or (2) place into a qualified escrow fund by April 15 of the year 
following the year in question, the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(1) ofthe Act. 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
8. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(3) of the Act, the Attorney General is authorized 
to bring this civil action to enforce the tobacco manufacturer escrow requirements of the Act. 
9. Based upon information and belief, Defendant Carolina Tobacco Company 
("Carolina Tobacco") is incorporated in Virginia and headquartered in Portland, Oregon at 5620 
S'W Dover Lane, Portland, Oregon 97225. 
10. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and Idaho Code § 39-7803(3) of the Act, this Court 
has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant because it contracted to sell, sold, and profited from 
the sale of cigarettes through intermediaries to consumers in Idaho, thereby transacting business 
within this State and availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the State. 
Upon information and belief; these sales continue to occur in the State ofIdaho. 
11. Because the Defendant is a non-resident of the State ofIdaho, venue is proper in this 
Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
12. The Defendant has certified and represented itself to the Attomey General as a 
"tobacco prod~ manufacturer" as defined by Idaho Code §. 39-7802(i) of the Act 
13. During the period January 1,2002 to December 31,2002, the Defendant contracted to 
sell, sold, or profited froIIl the sale of cigarettes to consumers in the State of Idaho through 
intermediaries. Specifically for the time period Janumy 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002, the 
pefendant contracted to sell, sold, or profited from the sale of at least 29,362,600 cigarettes into 
Idaho, as measured by excise taxes collected by the Idaho State Tax Commission on cigarette 
packages bearing the excise tax stamp ofthe State ofIdaho. 
14. The Defendant has not fulfilled its obligations under the Act beca~e it has neither 
become a participating manufacturer by signing the Master Settlement Agreement and generally 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 3 - .a.__ ­
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performing its financial obligations under the Agreement, nor has it placed into a qualified 
. . 
. , 
escrow fund by April 15 of the year following the year in question, the atnounts required by 
Idaho Code § 39-7803(bXl) of the Act. 
15. Because the Defendant has not signed the Master Settlement Agreement, Idaho Code 
§ 39-7803(b)(l) of the Act requires the Defendant to place in escrow $.0136125 per cigarette 
sold in Idaho, as adjusted for inflation. The adjusted for inflation amount for 2002 sales is 
$.0153785 per cigarette. For the year 2002, this amount totals $451,552.74. 
16. The Defendant was notified in writing of the obligations to place money on behalf of 
the State of Idaho into a qualified escrow account pursuant to the Act by notice and letters dated 
March 14,2003 and May 28,2003. 
17. The Defendant knew of its obligations to place money on behalf Qf the State ofIdaho 
into a qualified escrow account because it had previously placed money into escrow for sales 
made in the years 2000 and 2001. 
18. By infonnation and belief, the Defendant has been informed of similar escrow 
obligations by other states that have adopted virtually identical statutes to the Act
 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
 
19. The Attorney General incorporates by reference the allegations ·contained m 
paragraphs 1 through 18 herein. 
20. The Defendant kn~ of the law requiring it to place money into. a qualified escrow 
account as alleged herein. 
21. The Defendant's failure to join the Master Settlement Agreement or deposit the 
required funds in a qualified escrow account as :required by Idaho Code § 39-7803 of the Act is a 
knowing violation of the Act. 
22. For a knowing violation of the Act, the civil penalty to be assessed against the 
Defendmt, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3)(B), should be an amount not to exceed 15% 
of the amount improperly withheld from escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount 
not to exceed 300% of the original amount improperly withheld from escrow. At the rate of 15% 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 4 
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per day the civil penalty for the total amount Carolina Tobacco improperly withheld each day 
from April IS, 2003 exceeds 300%. Therefore, this Court should impose a civil penalty in the 
amount of300%, or $1,354,658.22 for the Defendant's knowing violation oftie statute. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACI10N 
23. The Attorney General incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 
22 herein. ' 
24. Alternatively, the Defendant's failure to join the ,Master Settlement Agreement or 
deposit the required funds in a qualified escrow account as required by Idaho Code § 39-7803 of 
the Act is a non-knowing; violation of the Act. 
25. For a non-knoVving violation of the Act, the civil penalty as~sed against the 
Defendant should be an amount not to exceed 5% of the amount improperly withheld from 
escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount not to exceed 100% of tle original amount 
improperly withheld from escrow for the Defendant's yiolation of the Act. Atthe rate of5% per 
day the civil penalty for the total amount Carolina Tobacco improperly withheld each day from 
April 15, 2003 exceeds 100%. Therefore, this Court should impose a civil penalty in the amount 
of 100%, or $451,552.74 for the Defendant's non-knowing violation of the statute. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
 
The Attorney General respectfully asks that this Court:
 
1. Find that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(1) ofthe Act by failing 
to deposit the reqUired funds into a qualified escrow account on behalf of the State of Idaho for 
cigarettes sold within thc~ State of Idaho for the time period of January: 1, 2002 :'through 
December 31, 2002. 
2. Find that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code § 39-7803(h)(3) ofthe Act by failing 
to certify its compliance with the Attorney General ofits escrow obligations. 
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3. Order the DefendaDt, within fifteen days 'of entry of judgIrient, to place $451,552.74 
in a qualified escrow fund in order to bring the Defendant into compliance with Idaho Code § 
39~ 7803(b)(1) ofthe Act, and to certify its compliance to the Attorney General. 
4. Order the D~fendant, within :fift~n days of entry of Judgment, to provide Plaintiff 
With a list of the rianies of all cigarette brands manufactured by Carolina Tobacco, as well as " 
cigarette sales infonnation and supporting documentation for sales in Idaho in 2002. 
5. Grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 'ordering that the Defendant be 
prohibited from selling cigarettes to consumers within the State. of Idaho, whether directly or 
through a distributor, ~etailer, or similar intermediary or intermediaries,' until the Defendant 
establishes a qualified escrow fund as defined by Idaho Code § 39-7802(f) of the Act and 
. certifies their compliance ~o the Attorney General. 
6. Find that the Defendant's violations of Idaho Code' § 39-7803(b)(l) constitute 
knowing violations, for purposes of Idaho Code § 39..7803(b)(3)(B) of the Act, and award 
judgment against the Defendant for civil peD.a1ties in the amount of300% oftbe es'crow amounts 
improperly withheld, for a total of$I,354,658.22. 
. . 
.7. Tn ~e alternative, if the Court finds that the Defendant's violations were not knowing
 
violations, award judgment against the D~fendant for civil penalties in the amount of 100% of
 
the. escrow amounts improperlywitbheld, for a total of$451,55~.?4.
 
8. Award judgment against the Defendant for all of the Attorney General's reasonable
 
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in bringing this action, as authorized by Idaho.Code § 39­

7803(b)(4).
 
. 9. Award- the Attomey General such other, further, or different reliet: as the Court 
. ~nsiders appropriate. 
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DATED this t(~ day ofJune, 2003. 
LAwRENCEG. WASDEN
 
ATI'OR.~YGENERAL
 
STATE OF IDAHO
 
BY:'_~~~~~"I"C'DeLrTA'1tTi"N'-""I:'E-~~,­

Deputy Attorney General

Consumer Protection Unit
 
--- ----
----------'­
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 VERIFICATION
 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 55.. 
County ofAda ) 
MELODY R WIDGAM, being .first duly swom on oath, deposes and says that she is an 
Investigator in the CivilUtigation Division of the Office of the Attorney General, that she bas read 
the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the facts therein are true to the best:of her knowledge, 
informatio~ and belief 
tI\ . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this..u:.:.- day of 3ofl.l It. .2003.\ 
~~~~
 
Residence: -~...;:=F;.="'~="------'-~""""7""--_ 
Commission Expires: 'r<:J./tif. !g(JXJ'I 
.~ - _-....••~_ . 
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A.M: :w---­LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
•ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
STATE OF IDAHO
 OCT 14 2003 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) J.iOAVlONAVARBO C ' Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Unit I~ -:!liIlo~/erfj 
Office of the Attorney General 
Len B. Jordan Building
650 W. State St., Lower Level 
P. o. BOI 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, ~Attorney General, Case No. CV OC 0304ilSlD 
Plaintiff, 
vs. FINAL JUDGMENT 
CAROLINA TOBACCO COMPANY, 
a Virginia corporation, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to this Court's October 3,2003, Memorandum Decision ofPlaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 
THIS COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. This Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over defendant Carolina 
Tobacco Company (Carolina Tobacco). 
2. Defendant Carolina Tobacco has violated the Idaho Tobacco ~aster Settlement 
Agreement Act, codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code. 
3. Because Carolina Tobacco has now deposited into escrow the ~ount of money 
requested by the State, this item ofrelief is now moot. 
.---'-­EXHIBIT 
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4. Defendant Carolina Tobacco shall not be required to pay civil penalties as a result 
ofits violation. I 
5. All issues relating to the award, if any, of reasonable attomer fees and costs 
awardable to the State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(4), shall be reserved for· 
later decision by the Court. The amount of attorney fees and costs, if any, that is awarded shall 
automatically be deemed to be included within this judgment without further action and without 
the entry ofa newjudgment by the Court. 
6. This Final Judgment shall take effect immediately upon entry beteaf. 
DATED this --J!:J- day of_~C~1 ~bpy;..x;.....JI~ ' 2003.th::;..;.·
MJCHAEl McLAUGHUN 
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN 
District Judge' 
'. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this --il. day of~ 2903, I caused to be 
seIVed a true and correct copy of the foregoing by placing a copy thereof it the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: : 
Brett T. Delange
 
Deputy Attorney General
 
Conswner Protection Unit
 
Idaho Attorney General's Office
 
STATEHOUSE MAIL
 
Scott Hess
 
Jones Gledhill Hess
 
P.O. Box 1097
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
KRISTIN M. B 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
FlNAL JUDGMENT - 3 000892
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lLAWRENCE G. WASDEN' 
OFFICE OF THE EC .j. ::: 7:Cl3ATTORNEY GENERAL An-ORNEV GENERAL. 
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BREIT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628) . oS'\IIY 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Unit 
Office of tbe Attorney General 
Len B. Jordan BuDding 
650 W. State St., Lower Level 
P. O. BOI 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, 
Attorney General, Case No. CV OC 03044510 
Plaintiff, 
VS. FINAL JUDGMENT 
AS TO EXPENSES AND FEES 
CAROLINA TOBACCO COMPANY, 
a Virginia corporation, 
Defendant. I 
-------------- ) 
Pursuant to this Court's December 10, 2003 Memorandum Decisian on the State's 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and Carolina Tobacco '5 Motion for Reconsideration, 
THIS COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The State of Idaho is the prevailing party in this action. 
2. Defendant Carolina Tobacco _Company shall remit to the Office of the Attorney 
General the sum of three thousand nin~ himdred ninety-three dollars and fifty cents ($3,993.50). 
3. This Final Judgment shall take effect immediately upon entry hereof. 
--­ ---­
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,2003.DATED~s_m-daYOf ~~ 
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN 
District Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of . \ , 3, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the~ingby placing a copy thereof' the United States 
Mail~ postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Brett T. DeLange
 
Deputy Attorney General
 
Consumer Protection Unit
 
Idaho Attorney General's Office
 
STATEHOUSE MAIL
 
..	 _. . . Scott Hess _ 1 ..._ . 
Jones Gledhill Hess 
P.O. Box 1097
 
Boise, In 83701
 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
J.	 o..A,VH:- NA,V.A.P.RO 
JEN.NY BEAN 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
FIN~.u JUDGMENT AS TO EXPENSES AND FEES- 3 000895
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AII.:.--_-fJA.:-.--­ALAN G. LANCE
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL
 Wlfll1..4ZOOt)=:1 STATE OF IDAHO 
~ BRETT T..DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628)
 
:- ~':':"= Deputy At..torD~Y General .
 
::-' ...... , Consumer Protection Unit
 
_".~~.' Office of the Attorney General 
---': LeD B. Jor:dan Building 
~! ~ 650 \V. State Sf., Lower Level 
~.,	 P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720..0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State ofIdaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICL~ DlSTRICT OF 
. 1lIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
ALAN G. LANCE, Attorney General 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CIlANGmt CIGARETIE FACTORY 
also knowll as CHANGDE JUAN YAN 
CHANG, a foreign corporation, 
CaseNoGV DC 02062770 
VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
DereDdant	 ) 
PARTIES, JURISDICfiON, AND VENUE 
1. Pl,lrSUant to Idaho' Code § 39-7803(3) of the Tobacco Master Settlement Act, Idaho 
Code § 39-780I, et seq., the Attorney General is authorized to bring this civil action to enforce 
the tobacco manufacturer escrow requirements ofthe Act. 
2. ~ed ,upon information and belief, Defendant Changde Cigarette Factory also known 
as Changde ~uan Yan Chang (UChangdej is a Chinese corporation .whose addreSS'is HuNan 
Sheng ChangDe ShiDong TingXi. Lu415000, People's Republic of China. 
3. Pursuant to Idaho Code, § 5-514 and Idaho Code § 39-7803(3) of the Act, this Court 
has personal jmisdiction over the Defendant because it contracted to sell, sold, and profited from 
the sale of cigarettes eith~r directly or through distributors, retailers, or similar intennediaries 
EXHIBIT 
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within the ~tate of Idaho, thereby transacting business within this State and availing itself of the 
privilege of. conducting activities within the State. Upon information and belief, these sales 
continue to .occur in the State ofIdaho. 
4. Because the .Defendant is a non-resident of the State ofIdaho, venue is proper in this 
Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 
5. Upon information and belie,4 the Defendant is a "tobacco product manufacturer" as 
defined by tdaho Code § 39-7802(i) of the Act because it manufactures cigarettes that it intends 
to be sold ill the United States and/or because it is a first purchaser anywhere for resale in the 
United Stat~ of ci~ettes that it intends to be sold in the United States. 
6. The Act requires "tobacco product manufacturers" to either: (1) u[b]ecnme a 
participatin& manufactW'er (as that term is defined in section n(ij) of the Master Settlement 
Agreement) and generally perform its financial obligations under the Master Settlement 
Agreement,'~.or (2) place into a qualified escrow fund by April15 of the year following the year 
in question, the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(I) oithe Act 
7. During the period January 1,2001 to December 31,2001, the Defendant contracted to 
selI, sold, or"profi1edftom the sale ofcigarettes to consumers in the State ofIdaho. either directly 
or through gistributors, retailers) or similar intennediaries. Specifically for the time period 
JanuaIY 1. 2001 to December 31,,2001, the Defendant contracted to sell, sold, or profited from 
the sale of ~t least 3,635,220 cigarettes (brand Ideal) into Idaho, as measured by excise taxes 
collected by the Idaho State Tax Commission on cigarette pac;kages bearing the excise tax stamp 
ofthe State Qfldaho. 
8. The Defendant has not. fulfilled its obligations under the Act because it has neither 
become a p~cipating manufacturer by signing the Master Settlement Agreement and generally 
perfonning i:fs financial obligations under the Agreement, nor has it placed into a qualified 
escrow fund by April 15 of the year following the year in question, the amounts required by 
Idaho Code §39-7803(b)(1) of the Act 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 2 JDAG052943 
000897
•
....­
-" 
9. B.ecause the Defendant b,as not signed the Master Settlement Agreement, Idaho Code 
§ 39-7803(b)(1) of the Act requires the Defendant to place in escrow $.0136125 per cigarette 
sold in Idaho, as adjusted for inflation. For the year 2001, this amount totals $54,276.02. 
10. TPe Defendant .was notified.in writing of the obligations to place money on behalfof 
the State ofIdaho into a qualified escrow account pursuant to the Act by notice and letters dateq 
December 7,-2001, January 8, 2002, March 20,2002 and June 11,2002. 
11. By information and belie.£: the Defendant has been informed of its escrow obligations 
by one or more of its agents (cigarette importers and distributors). and has been informed of 
similar escrow obligations by other states that have adopt~d virtually identical statutes to the Act 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. The Attorney General incolporates by reference the allegations contained In 
- paragraphs 1. through 11 herein. 
13. The Defendant knew of the law requiring it to place mqney into a qualified escrow 
account as alleged herein. 
14. The Defendant's failure to join the Master Settlement Agreement or deposit the 
required fundS in a qualified escrow account as required by Idaho Code § 39-7803 of the Act is a 
knowing violation ofthe Act. 
15. For a knowing violation of the Act, the civil penalty to be assessed against the 
Defendant. pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3)(B), should be an amount not to exceed 15% 
of the amount improperly withheld from escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount 
not to exceed300% of the C?riginal amount improperly withheld from escrow. At the rate of 15% 
per day the civil penalty for the total amount Changde improperly withheld each day from April· 
15,2002 exceeds 300%. Therefore, this Court should impose a civil penalty in the amo.unt of 
300%, or $162,828.06 for the Defendant's knowing violation ofthe statute. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
16. The Attorney General incozporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 
15 herein.
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17. bltematively, the Defendant's failure to join the Master Settlement Agreement or 
deposit the required funds in a qualified escrow account as required by Idaho Code § 39-7803 of 
the Act is a ~on-knowing violation ofthe Act 
18. ~or a non-knowin1~ violation of the Act, the civil penalty assessed against the 
Defendant ~hou1d be an amount not to exceed 5% of the amount improperly withheld from 
escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount not to exceed 100% of the original amount 
improperly withheld from escrow for the Defendant's violation ofthe Act At the rate of 5% per 
day the civiT"penalty for the total amount Changde improperly withheld each day from April 15. 
2002 exceeds 100%. Therefore, this Court should impose a civil penalty in the amount of 100%. 
or $54,276.02 for the Defendant's non-knowing violation ofthe statute. 
REQUEST FOR REIJEF
 
The Attorney General respectfully asks that this Comt:
 
1. Find that the Defendant has "iolated 14aho Code §39-7803(b)(1) of the Act by failing 
to establish a qualified escrow ftmd on belfa.lfof the State of ~daho for cigarettes sold within the 
State ofIdaho for the time period oflanumy 1, 2001 through December 31,2001. 
2. Find that the Defendant has violated Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3) of the Act by failing 
to certify its compliance with the Attorney General ofits escrow obligations. 
3. Order the Defendant, within fifteen days of entry ofjudgment, to place $54,276.02 in
 
a qualified eScrow fund in order to bring the Defendant into compliance .with Idaho Code § 39­

7803(b)(1) ofthe Act, and to certify its compliance to the Attorney General.
 
4. Order the Defendant, within fifteen days of entry of judgment, to provide Plaintiff 
with a list of the n~es of all cigarette brands manufactured by Changde, as well as cigarette 
sales information and supporting documentation for sales in Idaho in 2001. 
5. Grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief ordering that the Defendant be 
prohibited from selling cigarettes to consumers within the State of Idaho, whether directly or 
through a distributor, retailer, or similar intermediary or intermediaries, until the. Defendant 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 4 lDAG052945 000899
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establishes a qualified escrow fund as defined by Idaho Code § 39-7802(f) of the Act and 
certifies their compliance to the Attorney General 
. 
6. Find that the Defendant's violations of Idaho" Code § 39~7.803(b)(1) constitute 
knowing violations, for pUIpOses of Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3)(B) of the Act, and award 
judgment against the Defendant for civil penalties in the amount of300% ofthe escrow amounts 
improperly withheld, for a total ofS162,828.06. 
7. I:p. the alternative, if the Court finds that the Defendant's violatio~ were not knowing 
violations, !ward judgment against the DefendaIlt for civil p"enalties in the amount of 100% of 
the escrow amounts improperly withheld, for a total of$54,276.02. 
8. ~ward judgment against the Defendant for all of the Attomey General's reasonable 
costs, expeI1!.es, and attomey's fees in bringing this action, ~ authorized by Idaho Code § 39­
7803(b)(4). 
9. Award ~ Attorney General such other, further~' or different reIicf~_as the Court 
considers appropriate. 
_ DA~~ this ('(fJ- day.of ;4-v ~ ,2002. 
ALAN G•.LANCE 
AITORNEY GENERAL
 
STATE OF IDAHO
 
By:rz~b-
T.De
 
Deputy Attorney General

Consumer Protection Unit
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VERIFICATION
 
• '-tl....-. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) S8. 
County ofAda ) 
:MELODY R. WHIGAM, being first duly swom on oath, deposes and says that she is an 
Investigator in the Civil Litigation Division ofthe Office ofthe Attorney General, that she has read 
the foregoini Verified Complaint, and that the facts therein are true to the best.of her knowledge. 
information. and belief. 
- SUBSCRIBED AND SWQRN ~o.before me this ~day of[1 I~(;t 2002. 
66:,JVU.~ t t1 ~ A 
NOTARY  
Residence~h.Si . J :;1...'O'"""'r----­Co~ssi~nExpires: Q);(Q 00'\" 
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~. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
~ITORNEY GENERAL 
:. STATE OF IDAHO 
]).. jJRETT T. DeLANGE (ISH No. 3628) 
.;.:.:' ... peputy Attorney Genera! 
r ·.~onsumer Protection UnIt 
~::: Office of the Attorney General 
;. ~~Len B. Jor~ BuDding 
~650 '\v. State Sf., Lower Level 
P. O. Box 83720
 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
 
Attorneys for the State ofIda.ho 
RECEIVE!' 
._-: 0" ".-' ~ • 
DEC Z42003 
OFFICE OF 11-lE 
ATI'ORNEY GENERAL 
NO.!"-.............,P1!!1':i.ao!lll>"""""--­
--._~ ~~P.M. _ 
DEC 222003 
J. DAVID NAVAR..'llO. CJeIIl 
By M6I.ANIE ClAGNEPIJN 
D&I'UrY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE FOVRm JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO b)' and through
 
LAWREN~E G. WASDEN,
 
Attorney General,
 Case No. CV OC 0206277D 
Plaf~ifJ, 
FINAL JUDGMENT
 
VS.
 
CHANGDE. CIGARETIE FACTORY 
also known-as CHANGDE JUAN YAN 
CHANG, a foreign corporation, 
Defendant. ~ 
----) 
P~t to this Cowt's December 18, 2003, Order to Show Cause hearing, 
THIS: COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. - This Comt has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over defendant Changde 
Cigarette Factory (Changde). 
2. .. Defendant Changde has violated the terms of its Consent Decree with the State of 
Idaho, which this Court approved. on October 9,2003. It is, accordingly, in contempt, pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 7-601(5). 
FINAL JUDGMENT - 1
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3. ~ Defendant Changde shall deposit into a qualified escrow fun~ as that tenn is 
defined by Idaho Code § 39-7802(f), the amount of $54)76.02 (Fifty-Four Thousand, Two 
Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars and Two Cents). 
4. Defendant Changde shall remit to the State ofIdaho, as civil penalties, the amount 
of $1 62,828J)6 (One Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand, Eight Hundred Twenty-Eight Dollars and 
Six Cents). 
S. . All issues relating to the award, if any, of reasonable attorney fees and costs 
awardable to the State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(4), shall be reserved for 
later decision by the Court. The amount of attorney fees and costs, if any, that is awarded. shall 
automatically be deemed to be included within this judgment without fiu1:her action and without 
the entry ofa_new judgment by the Court. 
6. _ Post-judgment interest shall accrue as provided by law. 
7. This Final Judgme'Jlt shall take effect immediately upon entry hereof. 
DArED this z:z-day of D----=t;....;;c_~;;....:..:.M~.h::::.J~"'~~~_...~----~. 2003. 
JOEL D. HORTON 
JOEL D. HORTON 
.~trict Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I.HE&S3YCERIIFYthatonthis 2---~ayof Ge.e ,2003, I caused to be I 
seIVed a true" and correct copy of the foregoing by placing a copy thereof in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Brett T. DeLange
 
Deputy Attorney General
 
Consumer Protection Unit
 
Idaho Attorney General's Office
 
STATEHOUSE MAIL
 
Changde Cigarette Factory
 
HUl;lan Sheng,
 
Changdeshi
 
Dongting Xilu 199
 
People's Republic ofChina
 
Postal Code 415000
 
CLERK OF TIlE DISTRICT COURT 
M~L4Nllt GAGNEPAfN 
.. By: 
Deputy Clerk 
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OIJPY
.-.....t4 
---"ur.---­
AJlt:--_--.I.P.M._--­
LA~ [iENeE G. WASDEN OCT 09 21m 
AlTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Unit 
Office of the Attorney General 
Len B. Jordan BuRdiDg
650 W. State St., Lower l.eve) 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
lNTIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUliTH JUDICIAL D1511O(;1 OF 
- THE STATE OF' IDAHO, IN Al''D Jo'OR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General Case No. CV OC 0206277D 
Plaintiff, 
-
vs. CONSENT DECREE 
CHAN'GDE CIGARETTE FACTORY 
also known as CHANGDE JUAN YAN 
CIIAN"G, a fordgn eorporabcn, ) 
__----.De.;;.:fi=en=d=a=n=l ~ 
Plaintiff State of Idaho. by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden 
(Attorney General). defendant Changde Cigarette Factory also known as Cbangde loan Yan 
Chang (collectively "Changdej, a foreign cotpOratio~ has consented to the entry of this 
Consent Decree. pursuant to tbe tenns and conditions contained herein. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as foHows: 
EXHIBITCONSENT DECREE - 1 
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JURlsnlcnoN AND VENUE 
I. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 1-705; and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
PARTIES 
2. The parties to this Consent Decree are as set forth in the above caption. The 
Attorney General is authorized, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7804(c), to bring this action and 
...... .'
settle it 'on behalfof the State of Idaho. 
DEFINITIONS 
j. Unless otherwise specified. the following shall apply: 
A. Cigarette means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be 
burned or heated under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (I) 
any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or 
(2) tobacco, in any fOIm, that is functional in the product, which, because of its 
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is 
likely to be offered to,. or purchasecJ by, consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of 
tobacco wrapped in any substance cOi!taining tobacco wbicn, because of its 
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is 
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette described in clause 
(I) of this defmition. The teIIIl "cigarette" includes "roll-your-own" (i.e., any 
tobacco whi~ because of its appearance, type, packaging, or labeling is suitable for 
use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as tobacco for making 
cigarettes). For purposes of this defInition of "cigarette," 0.09 ounces of "roll-your­
own" tobacco shall constitute one (1) individual "cigarette." 
B. Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act means that act
 
codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code, as amended.
 
C. Master Settlement Agreement means the settlement agreement (and
 
related documents) entered into on November 23, 1998, by the State of Idaho and
 
leading United States Tobacco Product Manufacturers.
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D. Tobac;co Product Manufacturer means an entity that after the date of 
enacUDent of this act directly (and not exclusively through any affiliate) (I) 
manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to be sold in the 
United States. including Cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through 
an importer (except where such importer is an original participating manufacturer (as 
that term is defIned in the Master Settlement Agreement) that will be responsible for 
the payments under the Master Settlement Agreement with respect to such Cigarettes 
as a result of the provisions of subsections II(mm) of the Master Settlement 
Agreement and that pays the taxes specified in subsection II(z) of the Master 
'Settlement Agreement, and provided that the manufacturer of such Cigarettes does 
not market or advertise such Cigarettes in the United States); (2) Is the first 
p.urchaser anyw'here for resale in the United States of Cigarettes manufactured 
.mywht:re tlUlt the manufacturer does not intend to be sold in the United States; or (3) 
Becomes a successor ofan entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection. 
The tenn "Tobacco Product Manufacturer" shall not include an affiliate of a 
Tobacco Product Manufacturer unless such affiliate itself falls within any of 
P-!iragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection. 
INJUNCTIVE REI.IEF 
4. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Changde shall: 
_ A. Within. 15 days of the execution of this Consent Decree, or in a 
different amount of time as agreed to in writing by the parties, establil;h a "qualified 
escrow fund," as that term is dermed by Idaho. Code § 39-7802(f), and deposit all 
amounts due for the units ofthe Ideal brand sold in Idaho in the calendar year 2001. 
Upon making such deposits, Changde shall certify its compliance with the Idaho 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act for sales in the calendar year 2001. 
B. Comply with the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement and 
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Acts. 
CHANGDEC1GARETTEFACTORYPAYMENTTOTHE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
-

5. Within 15 days of the execution of this Consent Decree, or in a different amount 
of time~-as agreed to in writing by the parties. Changde shall pay Twenty-Seven Thousand 
.. Dollars ($21,000.00), as reimbursement of the legal costs and expenses incurred by the Attorney 
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General in connection with this action. Such payment shall be made by a certi1ied check. 
cashier's check or money order made payable to "Office of Attorney General, Consumer 
Protection Unit." 
REPORTING 
6. For a period of three years from the date of this Consent Decree, Changde shall 
make available to the. Attorney General upon 30 days notice all reasonable documents and 
records to assess compliance with this Consent Decree. These documents and records shall be 
provided at Changde's expense unless the request is made more frequently than once in any 
three-month period. in which case the reasonable expense ofcopies for additional requests shall 
be borne by the Attorney General. 
NO~W~RPRO~~ONS 
7. Nothing in firis Consent Decree shall preclude the Attorney General from 
exereis-QJg any administrative. legal. or equitable remedies available to him to enforce the 
provisions of this CO'1sent Decree, or to enforce the laws of the State of Idaho, in the event that 
Changde violates any provision ofthis Consent Decree or any other laws of the State ofIdaho. 
8. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed as relieving Changde's duty to 
comply with all applicable federal. state. and local laws, regulations, rules. or pennits. 
9. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to limit or modify any lawful 
powers of the Attorney General or the State of Idaho. including the power to request, demand or 
compel production ofdocuments or the testimony ofwitnesses. 
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SEVERABILITY
 
-10. The provisions of this Consent Decree shall be severable and should any 
provision be declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unenforceable, the other 
provisions of this Consent Decree and Judgment shall remain in full force and effect. 
APPLICAnON 
1 I. This Consent Decree shall be binding upon Changde and shall apply to Changde, 
its agents, employees, representatives, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, while acting 
pcrsonaUy or through any corporation, othc: business entity, or pCrsO:l whose bets, practices, or 
policies.are dir(.'Cted, formulated, or controlled by Changde. 
DISTRICT COURT APPROVAL 
12. This Consent Decree shall be filed with and subject to the approval of the District 
Court ofAda County, Idaho, which has subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39­
7804 and personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514. 
SEk\tICE 
-
J3. Changde agrees to accept service of a conformed copy of this Consent Decree by 
prepaid f11'St class mail sent to Changde's counsel Changde expressly waives personal service of 
a conformed copy of this Consent Decree and the accompanying Complaint after they have been 
fiJed with the Court. 
REOPENING OF THIS MATTER 
14. Matters set forth in this.Consent Decree may be reopened by the Attorney General 
for further proceedings if Changde violates any tenn of this Consent Decree. The Attorney 
General may seek all remedies available to him, both statutory and in the common law. 
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Spccifkally, should Changde. as de(em1ined by (he Court, fail to comply in any respect with the 
Act in the future: 
A. Upon detennination by the Court, Changde shall pay the amount 
improperly withheld from the qualified escrow fund, plus a penalty in the amount of 
300 percent of the amount originally withheld from the qualified escrow fund; and 
B. Such non-compliance shall be deemed a second knowing violation, 
entitling the State. by and through the Attorney General. to an injunction prohibiting 
Changde from selling cigarettes to consumers within the State of Idaho for a period 
not to exceed two years. 
NOTICE 
15. Al.l notices under this Consent Decree shall be sent as follows: 
For the Attorney General: For Cbangde: 
"Office oftbe Attorney General DeHeng Chen Chan, LLC 
Civil Litigation Division Attention: Michael M. Yi 
~.O.	 Box 83720 225 Broadway, Suile 1910 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 New York, New York 10007 
Attention: Changde Consent Decree 
AUTHORlZATION TO SIGNTHIS STIPULATION 
16. Each person who signs this Consent Decree in a representative capacity warrants 
that he or she is duly authorized to do so.
 
MISCELLANEOUS
 
17. This Consent Decree shall be enforceable only by the Attorney General. . 
.18. This Consent Decree does not constitute an admission by Changde that any of its 
acts anapractices violates Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act. 
19. This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enabling the 
parties to apply for such further order or directives as may be necessary or appropriate. 
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20. This Consent Decree becomes effective upon ext:cution "by the parties and entry 
by the Court. 
\VE CONSENT: 
TL 0 c-\-b~
 
_. DATED this ~_ day or-Septembe.r:,. 2003.
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
~LL-By:. ~=:=:::'=-:~-=--~=- _ 
BRETT T. DeLANGE 
Deputy Attorney General
 
Civil Litigation Division
 
~ATED thl'£_d.YOf~::~. 
APPROVED AND SO ORDERED.
 
JOEL D. HORTON 
District Court Judge 
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NO. ~---
KATHRYN A. snCKLEN A.M. 
Fll.£O 
.....P.M.. _ 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
AUG 0 3 2007 
STATE OF IDAHO J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clem ByABBYTER 
OEf'lJ'rY 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
Len B. Jordan Building 
650 W. State 8t, Lower Level 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Teleph~ne: (208) 334-2424 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073 
breftdelange@ae.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through ) 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General Case No. C¥ oc 0714037 
Plaintiff, 
VERIFIED 
vs. COl\1PLAINT 
JOSEPH ANDERSON, d/b/a 
SMOKIN JOES, 
__---=D....::.e~fe;.=:n=d:.::;;;an;::.;t.=--- ) 
BACKGROUND 
1. In 1999, the Idaho Legislature found that cigarette smoking presents serious 
public health concerns to the State of Idaho and to Idaho citizens. Idaho Code § 39-7801(a). 
Indeed, the Legislature has detennined that "[t]obacco is the number one killer in Idaho causing 
more deaths by far than alcohol, illegal drugs, car crashes, homicides, suicides, fires and AIDS 
combined," and that tobacco usage is "the single most preventable cause of death and disability 
in Idaho." Idaho Code § 39-5701. 
EXHIBIT 
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2. Noting that the Surgeon General of the United States has also detennined that 
smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease and other serious diseases, the Idaho Legislature 
found that cigarette smoking presents serious financial concerns for the State of Idaho. Under 
certain health-care programs, the State may have a legal obligation to provide medic~ assistance 
to eligible persons for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking, and those persons 
may have a legal entitlement to receive such medical assistance. Idaho Code § 39-7801 (a) and 
(b). Under these programs, the Legislature found. the State pays millions of dollars each year to 
provide medical assistance to perSons for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking. 
Idaho Code § 39-7801 (c). 
3. The Idaho Legislature has also concluded that the financial burdens imposed on 
the State by cigarette smoking should be borne by tobacco product manufacturers, rather than by 
the State, to the extent that such manufacturers either detenrune to enter into settlement 
. agreements with the State or are found culpable by the courts. Idaho Code § 39-7801 (d). 
4. On November 23, 1998, leading United States tobacco product manufacturers 
entered into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement, II with the State 
of Idaho. The Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers to pay substantial 
sums to the State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fund a national foundation devoted to 
the pursuit of public health interests; and to make substantial changes in their advertising and 
marketing practices and corporate culture with the intention of reducing underage smoking. 
Idaho Code § 39-7801(e). 
5. Promptly thereafter, the Idaho Legislature declared that it would be contrary to 
the policy of the State of Idaho if a tobacco product manufacturers could detennine not to enter 
into such a settlement agreement (nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers) and thereby 
use the resulting cost advantage to derive large profits in the years before liability may arise, 
without ensuring that the State will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are 
proven to have acted culpably. This legislative detennination was driven. in part, by the fact that 
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many diseases caused by tobacco usage often do not appear until many years after the affected 
individual begins smoking. Idaho Code § 39-7801 (a) and (£). 
6. The Idaho Legislature thus determined that it is in the interest of the State of 
Idaho to require that nonparticipating tobacco product manufacturers establish a reserve fund to 
guarantee a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, 
short-tenn profits and then becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise. Idaho Code § 
39-7801(£). 
7. Accordingly, shortly after the Master Settlement Agreement was signed, the Idaho 
Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (the Master Settlement 
Agreement Act). In essence, the Master Settlement Agreement Act requires ''tobacco product 
manufacturers" to either: (l) "[b]ecome a par:ncipating manufacturer (as that term is defmed in 
Section lIuD of the Master Settlement Agreement) and generally perfonn its fmancial 
obligations under the Ma\1er Settlement Agreement," or (2) place into a qualified escrow fund 
the amounts required by Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(1) of the Master Settlement Agreement Act. 
8. In 2003, the Idaho Legislature decided that violations of the Master Settlement 
Agreement Act threatem~ not only the integrity of Idaho's agreement with the tobacco 
companies, but also the fiscal soundness of the state and public health and responded with 
procedural enhancements to help prevent such violations through adoption of the Idaho Tobacco 
Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (the Complementary Act), codified at Title 
39, Chapter 84, Idaho Code. Idaho Code § 39-8401. Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) of the 
Complementary Act makes it unlawful for any person to sell, offer or possess for sale in Idaho 
cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included on Idaho's Directory 
of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and. Brand Families (Idaho Tobacco Directory). 
9. This lawsuit is being filed because Defendant Joseph Anderson has been advised 
of these provisions of Idaho law relating to the sale of tobacco products, but has nevertheless 
violated them. His unIa"i~ actions, spelled out below, undermine and undercut the Idaho 
Legislature's stated goals and concerns with respect to tobacco sales and usage. Specifically, 
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Defendant has sold over one million eight hundred thousand cigarettes of a brand family that is 
not and has never been on the Idaho Tobacco Directory. 
JUlUSDICTION, PARTIES, AND VENUE 
10. This Court bas subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and this matter for the 
relevant time period that is the subject ofthis Verified Complaint pursuant to the Complementary 
Act 
11. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and the Complementary Ac~ this Court has 
personal jurisdiction over Defendant Joseph Anderson. Specifically, for purposes of Section 5­
514, Defendant has transacted business within Idaho. For purposes of the Complementary Act, 
Defendant is a person who has sold or offered for sale in Idaho over one million cigarettes of a 
brand family not included on the Idaho Tobacco Directory. Furthermore, Defendant has 
expressly, and in writing, consented "to be sued in Idaho District Court for the purposes of the 
State of Idaho enforcing any provisions of .. Jdaho Code § 39-8401 et seq...." 
12. Lawrence G. Wasden is the Attorney General of the State of Idaho. He is 
authoriz~ and has the duty, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 39-8406, and 39-8407 (Supp.) of the 
Complementary Act, to investigate and prosecute violations of the Act on behalf of the State of 
Idaho. 
13. Defendant is an out-of-state individual doing business as Smokin Joes. Defendant 
both manufacturers and sells cigarettes. 
14. Because Defendant is a non-resident of the State of Idaho venue is proper in this 
Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 
15. Defendant Joseph Anderson sells, offers for sale, and ships cigarettes to Idaho 
consumers, including retailers located in Idaho. 
16. Defendant's principal place of business is located at 4900 Indian Hill Road, 
Le'wiston, New York, 14092-9721. 
17. Defendant also manufacturers a variety of cigarette brand families. 
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18. According to reports Defendant has provided, for the time period 2005 through 
2006 he sold 1,836.000 Buffalo cigarettes to Idaho conswners. including Idaho retailers. 
19. During the time period of 2005 through 2006 the Buffalo cigarette brand family 
has not and is not on the Idaho Tobacco Directory. Even today the Buffalo cigarette brand is not 
on the Directory. 
-CAUSE OF ACTION­
VIOLATIONS OF THE IDAHO COMPLE:MENTARY ACT
 
20. The Attorney General incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the 
preceding paragraphs. 
21. Defendant Joseph Anderson has been notified in writing of his responsibilities as 
a manufacturer and seller of tobacco products under the Complementary Act. Specifically. 
Defendant has been advised, in part. that the Complementary Act prohibits selling and offering 
to sell cigarettes ofbrand families that are not included on the Idaho Tobacco Directory. 
22. Despite receiving such notice. Defendant violates the Complementary Act's 
provisions by selling the Buffalo cigarette brand family, which is not listed on the Idaho Tobacco 
Directory. Defendant's sales of cigarettes of a brand family that is not included on the Idaho 
Tobacco Directory violates Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) ofthe Complementary Act. 
23. Idaho Code § 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act states, in Part. that each sale 
or offer to sell of a cigarette in violation of Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of that Act 
constitutes a separate violation. For each violation, the Court may impose a civil penalty in an 
amount not to exceed the greater of five hundred percent (5000.10) of the retail value of the 
cigarettes or five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a detennination of violation of Section 39­
8403(3). 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
 
The Attorney General respectfully asks that this Court:
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1. Find that Defendant Joseph Anderson has violated Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) of the 
Complementary Act by selling or offering for sale cigarettes of a brand family not included in 
the Idaho Tobacco Directory. 
2. Find that Defendant's multiple violations of the Complementary Act constitute 
separate violations thereof and award judgment against Defendant for civil penalties in the 
amount of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes unlawfully sold, or 
five thousand dollars ($5,000) per violation, whichever is greater. 
3. Award judgment ag$lst Defendant for all of the Attorney General's reasonable costs, 
expenses, and attorney's fe.e5 in bringing this action, as authorized by Idaho Code § 39-8407(5) of 
the Complementary Act. 
4. Award the Attorney General such other, further, or different relief, as the Court 
considers appropriate. 
-rei 
DATED this .;,. of August, 2007. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IDAG142762 
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VERIFICATION
 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofAda ) 
BElli A. KlTTELMANN, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that she is a 
Paralegal in the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General, that she has 
read the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the facts therein are true to the best of her 
knowledge, information, and belief. 
~~
 
BETH A. KITTELMANN . 
Office of the Attorney General 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3,-d-day of @~ ,2007. 
~&:6Idf?
NOTARY ,
 
Residence: trltJudiaA , z:I)
 
Commission Expires: 1(-30 ...-1)7
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
STATE OF IDAHO AUG a?ZfJJlJ
 
J. U/I,'·!IO NAVARRO, ClerkBRE'IT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628) 
ByJ KENNEDYDeputy Attorney General . DEPUTYConsumer Protection Division 
.Office of the Attorney General 
Len B. Jordan Building 
650 W. State St, Lower Level 
P. O. Box 83720
 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424
 
Attomeys for the State of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
. THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General 
Plaintiff, 
CONSENT 
vs. DECREE 
JOSEPH ANDERSON, d/b/a 
SMOKIN JOES, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden 
(Attorney General), and defendant Joseph Anderson, doing business as Smokin Ioes, have 
consented to the entry of this Consent Decree, pursuant to the terms and conditions contained 
herein. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to the Idaho 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. The Court also has personal 
jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 5-514 and 39-8406, and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 5-404. 
EXHIBIT
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE .
 
I . This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to the Idaho 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. The Court also has personal 
jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 5-514 and 39-8406, and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 5-404. 
PARTffiS 
2. The parties to this Consent Decree are as set forth in the above caption. The 
Attorney General is authorized, pursuant to the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement 
Complementary Act, to bring this action and settle it on behalf of the State ofIdaho. 
DEFINITIONS 
3. Unless otherwise specified, the following shall apply: 
A. Brand Family means all styles of Cigarettes sold under the same 
trademark and differentiated from one another by means of additional modifiers or 
descriptors including, but not limited to, Itmenthol,n "lights,n "ldngs," and "100s,'­
and includes any brand Dame (alone or in conjunction with any other word) 
trademark, logo, symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable pattern of colors, or 
any other indicia ofproduct identification identical or similar to, or identifiable with, 
a previously known brand ofCigarettes. 
B. Cigarette means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be 
b\lIIled or heated under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (1) 
any roll of tcffiacco Wrapped "iii paper"or'ili aily su15stmee- riot coritairiiiig" tooacco; .or 
(2) tobacco, in any form, that is functional in the product~ which, because of its 
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is 
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of 
tobacco wrapped in any substance· containing tobacco which, because of its 
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is 
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette described in clause 
(1) of this definition. The term "cigarettell includes "roll-your-own" (i.e., any 
tobacco which, because of its appearance, type, packaging, or labeling is suitable for 
use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, "consumers as tobacco for making 
cigarettes). For purposes of this definition of "cigarette," 0.09 ounces of "roll-your­
own" tobacco shall c:onstitute one (1) individual tlcigarette.r' 
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C. Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act means that act 
codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code, as amended. 
D. Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act 
(Complementary Act) means that act codified at Title 39, Chapter 84, Idaho Code, 
as amended. 
E. Master Settlement Agreement means the settlement agreement (and 
related documentc;) entered into on November 23, 1998, by the State of Idaho and 
leading United States Tobacco Product Manufacturers. 
F. Nonparticipating manufacturer means any Tobacco Product 
M~ufacturer that is not a member of the Master Settlement Agreement. 
G. Tobacco Product Manufacturer means an entity that after the date of 
enactment of this act directly (and not exclusively through any affiliate) (1) 
manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to be sold in the 
United' States, including Cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through 
an importer (except where such importer is an original participating manufacturer (as 
that term is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement) that will be responsible for 
the payments under the Master Settlement Agreement with respect to such Cigarettes 
as a result of the provisions of subsections II(mm) of the Master Settlement 
Agreement and that pays the taxes specified in subsection II(z) of the Master 
Settlement Agreement, and provided that the manufacturer of such Cigarettes does 
not market or advertise such Cigarettes in the United States); (2) Is the first 
purchaser anywhere for resale in the United States of Cigarettes manufactured 
anywhere that the manufacturer does not intend to be sold in the United States; or (3) 
Becomes -3 ,successor·afan entity deseribed-in paragraph (1) Of- (2} af.this subsection. 
The term "tobaccoproduct manufacturer" shall not include an affiliate of a Tobacco 
Product Manufacturer unless such affiliate itself faIls within any of paragraphs (1) 
through (3) oftbis subsection. 
H Stamping agent means a person that is authorized or required to affix 
tax stamps to packages or other containers of Cigarettes under Title 63, Chapter 25, 
Idaho Code. 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
3. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Joseph Anderson, doing business as Smolcin 
Joes (hereafter referred to as Smokin Ioes), shall: 
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A. Not possess, transport to, acquire for sale, sell or offer for sale to 
locations in Idaho or affix or cause to be affixed Idaho excise tax stamps to 
Cigarettes of Tobacco Product Manufacturers unless the Tobacco Product 
Manufacturer is listed on the Attorney General's Directory of Compliant Tobacco 
Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (Directory). The Directory is located at: 
http://www2.st:dte.id.us/aglconsumerltobacco/directoryindex.htm 
B. Provide the Attorney General with quarterly reports of Cigarette 
sales on fonns provided by the Attorney General. All necessary foons are located 
at: 
http://www2.state.id.us/aglconsumer/tobacco/nonparticipating.htm#Forms 
C. Within 30 days of execution of this Consent Decree, provide the 
Attorney General a list, updated as necessary, of each Brand Family manufactured 
by a Non-Participating Manufacturer that Smokin Joes intends to possess, transport 
to, or acquire for sale in Idaho, or affix or cause to be affixed Idaho excise tax 
stamps. 
. D.	 For a period of two years after execution of this Consent Decree, 
provide the Attorney General at least 15 days notice prior to 
possessing,. transporting, acquiring for sale in Idaho or affixing or 
causing to be affixed Idaho excise tax stamps to a Brand Family 
manufactured by a Non-Participating Manufacturer that Smokin 
Jaes-has-net-pre'ViG1:ls1y-adv-ised-the-Attemey--Gener-al-that-it-i-atenElss---­
to possess, transport to, or acquire for sale in Idaho, or affix or 
cause to be affixed Idaho excise tax stamps. 
SMOKIN JOES PAYMENT TO THE AITORNEY GENERAL 
4. Smokin JOf~ shall pay Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), 
payable to "Office of Attorney General, Consumer Protection Division," for settlement of all 
disputed issues concerning its duties under the Complementary Act with respect to Cigarettes for 
the time period of 2005 through the date this Consent Decree is executed; provided, however. 
that Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($3,750) of this amount shall be waived and 
not payable so long as Smokin loes complies with all of the terms of this Consent Decree. 
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Smokin 10es shall remit the above-referenced $3,750 in two payments. The first payment 
of One Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($1,875) shall be due within ten (10) days 
of the execution of this Consent Decree. The second payment of One Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($1,875) shall be due within sixty (60) days of the execution of this 
Consent Decree. Both checks shall be in the fonn of a cashier's check and sent to the notice 
address provided in paragraph 14 below. 
If, after a period of five (5) years from the date of the execution of this Consent Decree, 
Smokin Joes has continued to comply with all of its tenns, this Three Thousand Seven Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($3,750) shall be permanently waived. 
REPORTING 
5. For a period of three years from the date of this Consent Decree, Smokin Joes 
shall make available to the Attorney General upon 21 days' notice all reasonable d~cuments and 
records to assess compliance with this Consent Decree. These documents and records shall be 
provided at Smokin Joes' expense unless the request is made more frequently than once in any 
three-month period, in which case the reasonable expense of copies for additional requests shall 
be borne by the Attorney General. 
_______________--NON-WAJYER.:eRO'V-ISIONS 
6.	 Nothing in this Consent Decree shall preclude the Attomey General from 
. .,
exercising any administrative, legal, or equitable remedies available to him to enforce the 
provisions of this Consent Decree, or to enforce the laws of the State of Idaho, in the event that 
Smokin Joes violates any provision of this Consent Decree or any other laws of the State of 
Idaho. 
7. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed as relieving Smokin Ioes' duty 
to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, rules, or pennits. 
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8. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to limit or modify any lawful 
powers of the Attorney General or the State of Idaho, including the power to request, demand or 
compel production of documents or the testimony ofwitnesses. 
SEVERABILITY 
9 The provisions of this Consent Decree shall be severable and should any 
provision be declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unenforceable, the other 
provisions ofthis Consent Decree and Judgment shall remain in full force and effect. 
APPLICATION 
10. This Consent Decree shall be binding upon Smokin loes and shall apply to 
Smokin Joes and Smokin Joes' agents, employees, r~presentatives, successors and assigns, 
jointly and severally, while acting personally or through any corporation, other business entity, 
or person whose acts, practices, or policies are directed, formulated, or controlled by Smokin 
loes. 
DISTRlCf COURT APPROVAL 
11. This Consent Decree shall be filed concurrently with the accompanying 
Complaint and shall be subject to the approval of the District Court ofAda County, Idaho.
 
SERTICE
 
12. Bmokin Joes agrees to accept service ofa confonned copy of this Consent Decree 
by prepaid' fiiSt 'ClaSs mail seritto Sinoldri. Joes' corporate office. Smokin' loes'expressl:f waives 
personal service of a conformed copy of this Consent Decree and the accompanying Complaint 
after they have been filed with the Court. 
REOPENING OF TIUS MATTER 
13. Matters set forth in this Consent Decree may be reopened by the Attorney General 
for further proceedings if Smokin Joes violates any term of this Consent Decree. The At1;orney 
General may seek all remedies available to him, both statutory and in the common law. If the 
Court finds that Smokin Joes has violated any tenn of this Consent Decree, for a period of five 
(5) years from the date ofexecution of this Consent Decree, the Three Thousand Seven Hundred 
CONSENT DECREE - 6 IDAG142369 000924
~'. 
Fifty Dollars ($3,750) presently waived in paragraph four shall be due and owing and shall be in 
addition to and not in any replacement for any financial penalty the Court determines to impose 
upon Smolcin Ioes as a consequence of its violations of the Consent Decree. 
NOTICE 
14. All notices under this Consent Decree shall be sent as follows: 
For the Attorney General: For Smokin Joes : 
Office of the Attorney General Smokin Joes 
Consumer Protection Division 4900 Indian Hill Road 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 Lewiston, NY 14092-9721 
Attention: Smoldn loes Consent Decree 
Paige S. Fitzgerald 
Troutman Sanders LLP 
1001 Haxall Point 
Richmond, VA 23219 
AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN THIS STIPULATION 
15. Each person who signs this Consent Decree in a representative capacity warrants 
that he or she is duly authorized to do so.
 
MISCELLANEOUS
 
16. This Consent Decree shall be enforceable only by the Attomey General. 
17. This Consent Decree does not constitute an admission by Smokin Ioes that any of
-----------_.---------------------:------------......;"....--­
its acts and practices violates Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act or Idaho's 
ComplementaryAot.­
18. This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enabling the 
parties to apply for such further order or directives as may be necessary or appropriate. 
19. This Consent Decree becomes effective upon execution by the parties and entry 
by the Court. 
IDAG142370 
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WE CONSENT: 
DATED this:> day of~iloolj-
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
AlTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
By: L 
BREIT T. DeLANGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
DATED this aD day of July, 2007. 
Anderson, doing business as Smokin Joes 
._--------------------------.. 
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DATED this Ji.~_ day Of--l~lL!I!!!:.:pt::==.....+--.:..-- --" 2007. 
~cP.fIt~DISTRICTGE 
Fourth Judicial District . 
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,c-..,... ." 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of 2007, rcaused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by placing copy thereof in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Brett T. DeLange
 
Deputy Attorney General
 
Consumer Protection Division
 
Office ofthe Attorney General
 
STATEHOUSE MAIL
 
Smokin Joes
 
4900 Indian Hill Road
 
Lewiston, NY 14092w 9721
 
Paige S. Fitzgerald 
Troutman Sanders LLP 
1001 Haxall Point 
Richmond, VA 23219 
_._._----------_._-----------~ 
CONSENT DECREE - 10 IDAG142373 
000928
--------
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (lSB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Unit 
Office of.the Attorney General 
Len B. Jordan Building 
650 W. State St., Lower Level 
P. O. BOI 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through ) 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General ~ ) 
Plaintiff, ~ 
n. ~ 
YAKIMA DISTRIBUTING COMPANY ) 
INC., a Washington corporation,	 ~ 
Defendant. ) 
1. In 1999, the Idaho Legislature, in en 
Agreement Act, Idaho Code § 39-7801, et seq., 
public health concerns to the state of Idaho and to 
has determined that smoking causes lung cancer, 
that there are hundreds of thousands of tobacco-r ~ 
These diseases most often do not appear until m 
smoking. 
2. The Idaho Legislature further found 
financial concerns for the State of Idaho. Under c 
EXHIBIT 
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'ng the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement 
d that cigarette smoki g presents serious 
aho citizens. Indeed, e Surgeon General 
disease, and other s .OllS diseases, and 
ted deaths in the Unite States each year. 
years after the person 'n question begins 
presents serious 
'n health-care programs, the state may have 
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.ne not to enter into such a settlement 
turers) could use a resul ing cost advantage 
c..,
 
a legal obligation to provide medical assistan health conditions 
associated with cigarette smoking, and those itlement to receive 
such medical assistance. 
3. Under these programs, the Legisla 0 pays millions of 
dollars each year to provide medical assistance t ersons for health condit ns associated with 
cigarette smoking. 
4. The Idaho Legislature thus concluded it would be the policy f the State of Idaho 
that financial burdens imposed on the State by c· tte smoking be borne y tobacco product 
manufacturers, rather than by the State, to the ext that such manufac either determine to 
enter into settlement agreements with the State or found culpable by the 
S. On November 23, 1998, leading Unite ufacturers entered 
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master S 
The Master Sett1e~ent Agreement obligates thes 
State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fun a national foundation de oted to the pursuit 
of public health interests; and to make substanti hanges in their adverti ing and marketing 
,practices and corporate culture with the intention 0 
6. The Idaho Legislature declared that it 
Idaho if tobacco product manufacturers who de 
agreement (nonparticipating tobacco product man: 
to derive large, short-term profits in the years befo liability may arise witho t ensuring that the 
state will have an eventual source of r~overy en to have acted 
'. 
culpably. The Legislature thus detemrined that it . 
them if they are pli 
establish a reserve 
f Idaho to require 
that nonparticipating tobacco product manufactu d to guarantee a 
source of compensation and to prevent such m large, short-tenn 
profits and then becoming judgment-proofbefore Ii 
7. Accordingly, shortly after the Master lement Agreement was signed, the Idaho 
Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settle nt Agreement Act (the' ct"). In essence, 
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me a participatingOf to either: 
..) of the Master Settle 
Master Settlement A ment:' or (2) place 
the Act requires ''tobacco product manufac 
manufacturer (as that term is defined in Section 
generally perform its financial obligations under 
into a qualified escrow fund the amounts requir 
8. In 2002, the Idaho Legislature fo 
product manufacturers are not complying with 
tobacco product manufacturers). Finding that co 
State of Idaho, the Legislature detemrined that r 
only to affixing or causing to be affixed Idaho e 
tobacco product manufacturers that are either si 
are complying with Idaho's Act would significan 
9. Thus, in 2002 the Idaho Legislature 
or stamping agents from affixing or causing to be 
non-compliant tobacco product manufacturers. 
PARTIES, JURISDIC 
10. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7804(c) 0 
bring this civil action to enforce the Act 
II. Based upon information and belief, 
("Yakima") is a Washington corporation and has 
Avenue, Yakima, Washington 98902-3537. 
12. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514 and I 
has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant becau 
caused to be affixed Idaho excise tax stamps to 
cigarettes for sale in Idaho, thereby transacting bus 
privilege ofconducting activities within the state. 
13. Because the Defendant is a non-residen 
Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
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FACTUALBA 
14. The Defendant affixes or causes to b 
which are then distributed for sale in Idaho, and i 
15. According to tax reports filed by fendant with the Idab Tax Commission, 
Defendant affixed or caused to be affixed Idaho cise tax stamps to 2,96 000 cigarettes from 
July to November 2002. All of these cigarettes ere manufactured by no -compliant tobacco 
product manufacturers. 
16. Accordingly, the Defendant has violat the Act by affixing or llSing to be affixed 
Idaho excise tax stamps to cigarettes of these non- mpliant tobacco product anufacturers. 
17. The Defendant was notified in wri . of its responsibilities a distributor and 
stamping agent under Idaho Code § 39-7804 of Act, pursuant to lette!s ted May 20, 2002, 
July 9, 2002, September 20, 2002 and October 2, 
Act and nevertheless proceeded to violate the Act' 
FIRST CAUSE 
18. The Attorney General incorporates reference the m 
paragraphs 1 through 17 herein. 
19. The Defendant knew of the law limiti it only to affixing or c "ng to be affixed 
Idaho excise tax stamps 1.0 cigarettes of tobacco pr ct manufacturers compl .ng 'with the Act. 
20.1be Defendant's affixing or causing 
2,967,000 cigarettes from July to November 2002 of non-compliant 
tobacco product manufacturers, are knowing viola: of the Act.
'. 
21. Idaho Code § 39-7804(c) of the Act s 
agent that affixes or causes to be affixed Idaho exc" tax stamps to cigarettes f a non-compliant 
tobacco product manufacturer is subject to the s liability provisions that a tobacco product 
manufacturer faces for violating Section 39-78 ) of the Act, purs Section 39­
7803 (b)(3). i I 
-.­ .11 
r-···-·· ....--·­
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d/or distributing 
Specifically» the 
22. For a knowing violation of the Act» civil penalty to be as essed against the 
Defendant, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)( ) of the Act, should b 
exceed 15% of the amount improperly withheld ft .olation and in a 
total amount not to exceed 300% of the amount im w. At the rate of 
15% per day, the civil penalty for the total amount' properly withheld fro 
to November 2002 exceeds 300%. Therefore» 
Defendant in the amount of 300% ofthe amount im 
23. The amount improperly withheld fro o Code § 39­
7803(b)(l) oftbe Act, is $45,628.01 (2,967,000 cig penalty of300% 
is $136,884.03 ($45,628.01 times 3.00), which this urt should assess agains the Defendant for 
its knowing violations ofthe Act. I, 
SECOND CAUSE FACTION 
- ~ome-y-Gener:al·-inGOIpeFates-I:ll·.e-aJ:egatiGns-set-f.grth..in- p graphs. 1- tbrQugh­
23 herein. 
25. Idaho Code § 39-7803(b)(3)(C) of th ct provides that in the case of a second 
knowing violation, a tobacco product manufac er shall also be prohi ited from selling 
cigarettes to consumers within the State of Idaho fi a period not to exceed 
any cigarette distributor or stampmg agent may be ohibited from stamping 
cigarettes in Idaho for a period not to exceed 2 ye . 
26. The Defendant has committed two kno ng violations of the Ac 
Defendant has knowingly violated the Act by ~ ping and distributing
'. 
August, September, October and November 2002, d did so after separate 
Act's applicability to distributors and stamping ag 
.. 
fDAG084535
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - S 
II
 
000933
eld, for a total of 
'. 
award judgment against the Defendant for 
itionallyenjoin and pro Obit the Defendant 
State of Idaho for the, 
c
'" 
27. The Attorney General incoIporates th 
26 herein. 
28. Alternatively, Defendant's violations 
knowing violations ofthe Act. 
29. For a 
Defendant, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-7803(b) I 
I daho Code § 39-7804(c 
non-knowing violation of the ct, the civil penalty 
egations set forth in p 
exceed 5% ofthe amount improperly withheld fro 
amount not to exceed 100% of the amount impro 
per day, the civil penalty for the total amount' 
November 2002 exceeds 100%. Therefore, thi 
Defendant in the amount of 100% ofthe amount i 
30. 'The amount improperly withheld 
7803(b)(1) of the Act, is $45,628.01. A l?enalty 0 
which this Court should assess against the Defend 
REQUESTFO 
The Attorney General respectfully asks that 
1. Find that the Defendant has violated I 
stamps to cigarettes ofnon-compliant manufacture 
2. Find that the Defendant's violations a 
two separate violations thereof; and that these vio 
7803(b)(3)(B) of the Act, knowing violations; an 
civil penalties in the amount of 300% of the escro 
$136,884.03. 
3. Upon finding two knowing violations, 
from stamping and distributing cigarettes within 
two years. 
a Code § 39·7804 of e Act by affixing 
from July to November 002. 
I abo Code § 39-7804 0 the Act constitute 
ions are, for purposes 0 Idaho Cod~ § 39­
ID ..... 
r

-'
 
sessed against the 
(A) of the Act, should e an amount not to 
escrow per day ofthe vi lation and in a total 
ly withheld from escro At the rate of 5% 
crow from July to 
ourt should impose a civil penalty upon 
escrow, pursuant to dalio Code § 39­
i
 
,00% is $45,628.01 ($45 28.01 times 1.00),
 
tions of the Act. 
agraphs 1 through 
of the Act are non­
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 6 ~GO I 5. 36III 
000934
4. In the alternative, if the Court finds were not knowing 
violations, award judgment against Defendant fo t of 100% of the 
escrow amounts improperly withheld, for a total $ 
5. Award judgment against the Defendan or all of the Attorney 
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in bringing action, as authorized 
7804(c) ofthe Act 
6. Award the Attorney General such 0 ,further, or different 
considers appropriate. rc-
DATED this (:3 day of May, 2003. I 
AWRENCE G. WA 
ITORNEY GENE 
TATE OF IDAHO 
y-~==-:=~,....-:;<'-1:-:;~;::;:-----BREITT. e GE 
Deputy Attome General 
Consumer Prot dian Unit 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 7 
II 
000935
-4-L-->::>..Io"'T7"1-----" 2003. 
VERIF1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofAda ) 
MELODY R. WHIGAM. being first duly 
Investigator in the Civil Litigation Division ofthe 
the foregoing Verified Complaint, and that the f1 
information, and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before m 
TJON 
om on oath, deposes d says that she is an 
Ice of the Attorney Gen that she has read 
therein are true to the b st of her knowledge, 
~"- .. 
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• 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
'. ~""" 
'. 
--, 
__ ..:t ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
- BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Unit 
.' Office of the Attorney General
 
Len B. Jordan Building

'" ... > 650 W. State St., Lower Level
 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
COpy 
N~, 
flfH)A~.1._._->f.M. _ 
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~. D~MD NAVAF..RO, C!edt 
B~ L.VNOA M&eKINNON 
OfJ"'i'TY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Fe ~lURTH JUDICIAL DI1STRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND fOR THE COUNTY 0 FADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by: and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
~ONSENT 
trECREE 
Plaintiff State of Idaho, by and through i is Attorney General, Lawence G. Wasden 
(Attorney General), defendant Yakima Distributinl Company Inc., ,a WashiI gton corporation, 
has consented to the entry of this Consent Decree, p ~~uant to the tenns and co ditions contained 
herein. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJl II GED, AND DECREED, as follows: 
JURISDICTION ANil VENUE 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the p II'ties and this matter pursu mt to Idaho Code 
I 
§ 1-705, and venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
EXHIBIT IDAG084523 
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2. The parties to this Consent Decre , are as set forth in the bove caption. The 
Attorney General is authorized, pursuant to Idah ode § 39-7804(c), to b g this action and 
settle it on behalf ofthe State ofIdaho. 
3. Unless otherwise specified, the folIo 
A. Cigarette means any product t at contains nicotine, is i tended to be 
burned or heated under ordinary conditions f use, and consists of 0 contains (1) 
any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in substance not containin tobacco; or 
(2) tobacco, in any form, that is functiona the product, which, b ause of its 
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the lier, or its packaging an labeling, is 
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, co ers as a cigarette; or ( ) any roll of 
tobacco wrapped in any substance cont . g tobacco which, be ause of its 
appearance, the type of tobacco used in the ller, or its packaging an labeling, is 
likely to be offered to, or purchased by, co ers as a cigarette descri ed in clause 
(1) of this defInition. The term "cigarett" includes 'Iroll-your-o (i.e., anyII 
tobacco which, because of its appearance, ,packaging, or labeling i suitable for 
use and likely to be offered to, or purchase 'y, consumers as tobacc for making 
cigarettes). For purposes of this definition 0 cigarette," 0.09 ounces f "roll-your­
own" tobacco shall constitute one (1) individ Ilcigarette." 
. B. Idaho Tobacco Master Settl ent Agreement Act m s that act 
codified at Title 39, Chapter 78, Idaho Code, amended. 
C. Master Settlement Agreemen eans the settlement a
 
related documents) entered into on Novemb r 23, 1998, by the State
 
leading United States Tobacco Product Manu turers.
 
D. To~acco Product Manufactur Imeans an entily that aile the date of 
enactment of tllis act directly (and not ·Iusively through any lliate) (1) 
manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such ufacturer intends to b sold in the 
United States, including Cigarettes intended !be sold in the United St tes through 
an importer (except where such importer is . 'ginal participating man aeturer (as 
that term is defined in the Master Settlement eement) that will be re onsible for 
the payments under the Master Settlement A ment with respect to sue Cigarettes 
as a result of the provisions of subsectio s ll(mm) of the Master Settlement 
-~~~~~~~2~ -­
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Agreement and that pays the taxes speci d in subsection II(z) 0 the Master 
Settlement Agreement, and provided that manufacturer of such C' arettes does 
not market or advertise such Cigarettes' the United States); (2 Is the first 
purchaser anywhere for resale mthe Uni e States of Cigarettes anufactured 
anywhere that the manufacturer does not int to be sold in the United. tates; or (3) 
Becomes a successor of an entity described' aragraph (1) or (2) ofth s subsection. 
'The tenn flTobacco Product Manufacture 
Tobacco Prpduct Manufacturer unless su 
paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection. 
INJUNCTIVE 
3. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
(hereinafter Yaldma Distributing) shall: 
A. Not affix or cause to be affiX 
of Tobacco Product Manufacturers unless 
either a signatory to the Master Settlement 
the Attorney General, in writing or purs 
compliant with Idaho's Tobacco Master Settl 
B. Beginning June 1, 2003, 
complete list of each brand of Cigarette th 
Idaho excise tax stamps for the previous 
brand of Cigarette, Yakima Distributing sh 
each brand listed that it has affixed or cause 
for that month. Yakima Distributing shal 
paragraph upon providing the monthly CG­
Commission. 
C. Provide the Attorney General 
or causing to be affixed Idaho excise tax st 
that Yakima Distributing has not previously 
affixing or causing to be affixed Idaho excise 
YAKIMA DISTRIBUTING PAYMENT 
4. Yakima Distributing shall pay T 
payable to "Office of Attorney General, Cons 
shall not include an Hate of a 
affiliate itself falls of1thin any 
LIEF 
at Yakima Distributin 
Idaho excise tax stamps 
I 
Company Inc. 
0 Cigarettes 
e Tobacco Product Ma ufacturer is 
I eement or is expressly dentified by 
. t to an Internet po . g, as being 
ent Agreement Act. 
vide the Attorney Ge eral with a
 
t has affixed or caused 0 be affixed
 
; tho Included in the Ii ing of each
 
identify the number of igarettes of 
o be affixed Idaho exc' tax stamps
 
e deemed in complian e with this
 
I tax reports to the Id 0 State Tax
 
least 15 days notice pri r to affixing 
s to a brand or brands f Cigarettes 
vised the Attorney Oen ral that it is 
stamps. 
THE ATTORNEY G NERAL 
ty-Two Thousand Dol ars ($22,000.00), 
r Protection Unit," for settlement of all 
disputed issues concerning a stamping agent's duti 1and the fixing of Idaho. xcise tax stamps 
". '-. 
. . 
........
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on cigarettes by Yakima Distributing for the tim eriod of July, August, eptember, October 
and November 2002. This amount shall be due te 10) days after both parti s sign this Consent 
Decree and will b~ made by cashier's check. 
5. For a period of three years from of this Conse Decree, Yakima 
Distributing shall make available to the Attorney eneral, upon 30 days no .ce, all reasonable 
documents and records to assess compliance wi .s Consent Decree. Th se documents and 
records shall be provided at Yakima Distributing expense unless the req est is made more 
frequently than once in any three·month period, in hich case the reasonabl expense of copies 
for additional requests shall be borne by the Attorn 
NON·WAIVERP 
6. Nothing in this Consent Decree all preclude the Atto ey General from 
exercising any administrative, legal, or equitabl : emedies a.vailable to 
provisions of this ConSent Decree, or to enforce th aws of the State of Idah ,in the event that 
Yakima Distributing violates any provision of this nsent Decree or any oth r laws of the State 
of Idaho. 
7. Nothing in. this Consent Decree hall be construed as elieving Yakima 
Distributing's duty to comply with all applicable fe ral, state, and local laws,' regulations, rules, 
or permits. 
8. Nothing in this Consent Decree sh e construed to limit or odify any lawful 
powers of the Attorney General or the State of Idah including the power to :r quest, demand or 
compel production of documents or the testimony 0 
9. The provisions of this Consent be severable and should any 
provision be declared by a court of competent .sdiction to be unenfo eable, the other 
provisions of this Consent Decree and Judgment sh 1remain in full force and 
CONSENT DECREE - 4 
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APPLICA1: IN 
10. This Consent Decree shall be bindin upon Yakima Distributi g and shall apply 
to Yakima Distributing, its agents, employees, repfesentatives, successors d assigns, jointly 
and severally, while acting personally or through lilly corporation, other b iness entity, or 
person whose acts, practices, or policies are dire :ted, formulated, or con lIed by Yakima 
Distributing. 
DISTmCTCOURT~PPROVAL 
11. This Consent Decree shall be fi e~ concurrently with e accompanying 
Complaint and shall be su~ject to the approval of the District Court ofAda Co ty, Idaho, which 
has subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Idaho ode § 39-7804 and per onal jurisdiction, 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514. 
SERVIC 
12. Yakima Distributing agrees to accept ~rvice of a conformed co y of this Consent 
Decree by prepaid first class mail sent to Yakim Distributing's corporate office. Yakima 
Distributing expressly waives personal service of a nformed copy of this C nsent Decree and 
the accompanying Complaint after they have been fi l with the Court. 
REOPENING OF Tl SMATTER 
13. Matters set fi)rth in this Consent Dec ~l may be reopened by the Attorney General 
for further proceedings if Yakirna Distributing viol ~tes any term of this Co ent Decree. The 
Attorney General may seek all rem.edies available to Ili m, both statutory and in e common law. 
NOne] : 
14. All notices under this Consent Decree Shall be sent as follows: 
For the Attorney General: For Yakima Distri uting: 
Office of the Attorney General Bill Vernon 
Civil Litigation Division 521 S. 2nd Avenue 
P.O. Box 83720 Yakima, WA 9890 -3537 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Attention: Yakima Distributing Consent Dec ~c e 
IDAG084527
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us 
cree in a representative 
.. a Distributing 
that any of its acts and practices violate Idaho's Tob 
18. This Court retains jurisdiction over 
parties to apply for such further order or direptives a 
19. This Consent Decree becomes effect upon execution by the parties and entry 
of enabling the 
0 Master Settlement Agr ement Act. 
.. 
AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN 
15. Each person who signs this Consent 
that he or she is duly authorized to do so.
 
MISCELL
 
16. This Consent Decree shall be enforce e only by the Attorney 
17. This Consent Decree does not cons te an admission by Y 
by the Court. 
WE CONSENT: 
DATED this (1) 17-.day of May, 2003. 
LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY NERAL 
STATE OF T~I"';ITTO 
BRETT T. De 
Deputy Atto 
Civil Litigatio 
BY:~~" 
apacity warrants 
....... 
.... ". 
CONSE1\"7 DECREE - 6 000942
DATED this -L-day of May, 2002. 
YAKIMADI 
Name: --I!+-----I~Io.J;__;~~'---X,;~-----
Signature: --fI+--~IlQ..-_~--+------
Title: __-#+_---..;.~_ft.._~_5_~ f__---­
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APPROVED AND SO ORDERED. 
DATED: _--z.::J!1AY 1 4 1111 
----~"''''''J ~ ~~.., 
District ourt Judge 
! . 
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---------------
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney G(~neral 
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4151 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Tax Commission 
800 Park Boulevard 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150 
Telephone: (208) 334-75:30 
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844 
Attorneys for the Idaho Tax Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General, and the IDAHO TAX 
)
)
 
) Case No. CV OC 0815228 
COMMISSION,
 
Plaintiffs, 
)
)
)
 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM
 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT)
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1 
)
)
)
 
through 20, ) 
)
 
Defendant. ) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nothing has changl;:d factually or legally since the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax 
Commission (Plaintiffs) filed their motion for summary judgment in this case. The material facts 
are still not in dispute. The relevant, applicable law has not changed. The analysis employed by 
this Court in granting the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is still valid and 
availing. These facts, the relevant law, and the applicable analysis establish that Defendant 
Native Wholesale Supply Company (NWS) has unlawfully sold and imported into Idaho 
cigarettes to Idaho retailers, and has done so despite being warned in writing of its violations of 
Idaho's applicable tobacco laws. 
NWS's violations fall into two specific categories. With respect to both categories, the 
facts are not in dispute. 
First, the cigarette brands NWS has sold to Idaho retailers are of brands manufactured by 
a tobacco manufacturer that was not on the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product 
Manufacturers and Brand Families (the Idaho Directory) at the time of the sale. In fact, none of 
the cigarette brands at issue has ever been on the Idaho Directory. Such sales violate the Idaho 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act), codified at 
title 39, chapter 84, Idaho Code. 
Second, NWS has sold these cigarettes at wholesale to Idaho retailers without obtaining a 
cigarette wholesaler permit required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1). NWS has never even 
applied for a permit. 
NWS's response to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is unpersuasive. It opposes 
Plaintiffs by asserting arguments (I) already rejected by this Court; (2) not relevant to this case; 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
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and (3) not recognized by the Idaho or United States Supreme Court. Specifically, NWS argues 
that because it is owned by a tribal member and, in its view, conducts its business on the tribal 
member's reservation, it m:ed not comply with Idaho's laws relating to tobacco sales, including 
the Complementary Act and the Idaho Cigarette and Tobacco Products Tax Act, because the 
purchaser of its cigarettes is located on a separate Indian Reservation in Idaho. Finally, NWS 
does not think it ought to pay civiI penalties for the 100 million plus illegal cigarettes it has sold 
into Idaho. 
NWS's arguments do not withstand analysis, run counter to the Legislature's intent, and 
are not supported constitutionally. Indeed, these arguments, if adopted, would gut the 
Legislature's public policil;:s and concerns with respect to tobacco sales and use, as discussed in 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3 - 5. They also 
would tum Indian law principles on their head. Because there are no genuine issues of material 
fact, this Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the relief requested 
therein. 
ARGUMENT 
By way of quick background, NWS's violations of the Complementary Act and the 
remedy for them are straight forward. The Act, in part, prohibits "any person" from (l) selling, 
offering, or possessing for sale in Idaho, or importing or causing to import for distribution or sale 
in Idaho "cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in the 
directory." Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). Civil penalties and injunctive relief may be 
imposed for violations of the Act. Idaho Code § 39-8406. 
The undisputed fact is that since at least January 2004, NWS has sold at wholesale, 
and/or imported or caused to be imported for sale or distribution in Idaho, over 100 million 
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cigarettes to Idaho retailers for which neither the cigarette brands nor their manufacturer, Grand 
River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd (Grand River), were ever on the Idaho Directory.) And the 
further undisputed fact is that NWS continued to engage in such sales after being advised by the 
State of Idaho that such sales violated Idaho law. NWS makes various arguments in opposition, 
none ofwhich is availing. 
I.	 PLAINTIF'FS MAY REGULATE AND ADDRESS NWS'S ILLEGAL 
CIGARETTE SALES 
NWS first argues that it may, with impunity, sell and import or cause to be imported into 
Idaho millions of cigarettes, regardless that Idaho law prohibits such sales. Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment (Defendant's Memo.), pp. 2 - 10. NWS's 
argument is essentially, if not verbatim, the very same contention that it raised previously in its 
failed motion to dismiss and in opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, 
which the Court granted. In essence, it is that because NWS is owned by a member of the 
Seneca Nation and is located on Seneca Nation land, it may with impunity sell its illegal 
cigarettes in this case because the purchaser of these cigarettes, Warpath, Inc., is owned by a 
member of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and is located on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in Idaho. 
These arguments were rejected by this Court in its May 20, 2010 Memorandum Decision 
and Order (Court Order), pp. 4 - 6. The Court's reasoning for doing so is still correct today for 
several reasons. 
After Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment, NWS finally provided Plaintiffs NWS's 
sales invoices for its cigarette sales to Idaho retailers pursuant to Plaintiffs' longstanding discovery 
requests. NWS's own documents establish even more unlawful sales than that previously reported by 
Plaintiffs in their motion for summary judgment papers, which relied upon documents obtained from the 
Las Vegas Foreign Trade Zone. NWS's own records establish that NWS imported or caused to be 
imported into Idaho over 115 million cigarettes "of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not 
included in the directory." Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). See Fourth Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann 
(Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit), filed contemporaneously with this Reply Memorandum. 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
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First, the fact is that the recipient ofNWS's cigarettes-Warpath, Inc.-is not a member 
of an Indian tribe but is instead a corporation created pursuant to Idaho law. See Dole Food Co. 
v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,474-75 (2003) (corporations have identities separate from that of 
their owners); Baraga Prods., Inc. v. Comm'r, 971 F. Supp. 294, 296 (W.D. Mich. 1997) 
(incorporated business entity not an enrolled member of an Indian tribe simply because its sole 
shareholder is); id. at 298 ("a corporation is not an 'Indian' for purposes of immunity" from the 
application of state law). This Court recognized this point in its Court Order at page 4. 
As an Idaho corporation, Warpath is a nonmember of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. It has no 
special status on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 161 (1980) ("[n]on-member [Indians] are not 
constituents of the governing Tribe. . [T]hose Indians stand on the same footing as non-
Indians resident on the reservation.") NWS's preemption arguments based upon the recipient of 
its cigarettes are thus of no avail. Accord Court Order, p. 4.2 
NWS's preemption inquiry is equally unsuccessful if we look at the ultimate destination 
of its cigarettes, a city located on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in Idaho. This is so because the 
Supreme Court has "recognized the rights of States, absent a congressional prohibition, to 
exercise criminal (and, implicitly, civil) jurisdiction over non-Indians located on reservation 
lands." County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 
251, 257-58 (1992). Tribal nonmembers, in other words, enjoy no special dispensation from 
2 NWS contends that "[w]e are not here dealing with sales by Indians to non-Indian consumers," 
Defendant's Memo., p. 5, and that the characterization of Warpath as an "Idaho business" is "belied by 
both the facts and the law." Jd. at p. 9, n. 1. The undisputed fact is that Warpath is an Idaho corporation. 
See Second Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann, filed June 23, 2009, pp. 2 - 7, ,-r,-r 3 - 20. It is not a member of 
the Coeur d' Alene Tribe. Further, the evidence is that Warpath sells its cigarettes, in part, to members of 
the general public, including persons who are not Native Americans. See Affidavit of Mark Ausman, 
filed June 23, 2009, pp. 1 .. 2, ,-r,-r 2 .. 5. It is thus incontrovertible that NWS is selling cigarettes to 
nonmembers of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe who are in tum selling cigarettes to other nonmembers of the 
Tribe. 
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state law with respect to transactions with other nonmembers, regardless of where those 
transactions occur. 
NWS's argument that state law cannot apply to sales that originate on one reservation and 
terminate on another reservation has not been accepted by the Courts. In fact, it has been 
rejected. As this Court noted in its May 20,2010 Court Order, p. 4, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that Native American tribes do not have "supersovereign authority to interfere with another 
jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax" activities within its borders. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. 
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,466 (1995); see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 733 (1983) 
("'Congress did not intend to make tribal members 'super citizens' who could trade in a 
traditionally regulated substance free from all but self-imposed regulations.") Time and time 
again the Supreme Court has emphasized that Indian law preemption focuses on commerce 
within a tribe, not among tribes. Rice, 463 U.S. at 720 & n. 7. Thus, as this Court also correctly 
noted in its May 20, 2010 Court Order, p. 4, the State, for example, can require a tribal retailer to 
obtain a state license for any sales to '''all non-Indians and all Indians who are not members of 
the particular tribe.'" Quoting Colville. 447 U.S. at 160-61.3 
The words of the federal district court in Oklahoma are directly applicable to this case: 
What [NWS] ultimately seeks in this case is something that no other 
sovereign has-the ability of a Tribe to immunize goods made within its borders 
J NWS cites to Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) as support for its 
position here. The case does not uphold NWS. Moe contains four holdings: (I) Montana's personal 
property tax could not be imposed on motor vehicles owned by tribal members residing on reservation: 
(2) Montana's cigarette tax could not be imposed on Indian-to-Indian reservation sales; (3) Montana's 
cigarette vendor license fee could not be charged to tribal retailers; and (4) Montana could require tribal 
retailers to collect and remit cigarette taxes imposed on non-Indians with respect to reservation sales. 
425 U.S. at 480-81,483. The Supreme Court did not announce any holdings immunizing from state law 
anything remotely close to what NWS seeks here. As a side note, subsequently in Colville, the Supreme 
Court made clear that with respect to Moe's second holding, a State is only precluded from taxing 
cigarette sales made to a member of the governing reservation. Nonmembers of the reservation, even if 
Native American, are subject to state taxation. Colville, 447 U.S. at 161. 
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from taxation and regulation by other sovereigns once those goods leave its 
boundaries. Just as China or New York State may not decree that their products 
are immune from Oklahoma taxation when those goods enter this State, neither 
maya Native American tribe claim such special treatment. 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Henry, No. CIV 10-019-JHP, 2010 WL 1078438, at *3 
(E.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2010) (internal citations omitted) 
In summary, there is no such thing in the law as "reservation-to-reservation" or "super-
sovereignty" preemption that immunizes NWS from its tens of millions of illegal cigarette sales 
and importation thereof into Idaho. It is as responsible to comply with Idaho law as any other 
business that seeks to sell or ship cigarettes into Idaho.4 
II.	 TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT PROTECT NWS FROM 
ITS ILLEGAL CIGARETTE SALES 
NWS cites to cas(~s for the unremarkable proposition that federally recognized tribes 
enjoy immunity from suit It further argues that such tribal immunity should apply to it. For 
several reasons, such immunity is not available here. Defendant's Memo., pp. 11 - 14. 
There is precedent that an enterprise may be clothed with a tribe's sovereign immunity 
from suit if it operates as an extension of the tribe. See, e.g., Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 
F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1231 (2007). Determining whether an 
entity acts as an arm of the tribe, however, rests on several factors, including incorporation under 
tribal law, whether the business is managed by tribal official and operated to fulfill the tribe's 
governmental objectives, and whether the business is owned by the tribe. State of Oklahoma v. 
Native Wholesale Supply Company, 237 P.3d 199,210 (Okla. 2010). 
~ Repeatedly in its discussion of Indian law, NWS contends that Plaintiffs may not require NWS to pay 
a fee under the Complementary Act. See, e.g., Defendant's Memo., pp. 5, 7, 9. NWS also discusses "the 
incidence of the tax imposed by the Complementary Act." Id., pp. 8, 9. NWS is seriously misguided. 
The Complementary Act imposes no fees or taxes and the Plaintiffs have never made such an assertion. 
NWS's decision to argue the point is therefore off-base and unhelpful, even as it is in error too. 
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Here the facts do not support applying tribal sovereignty to NWS. While incorporated 
under Sac and Fox tribal law, NWS operates out of a totally separate reservation, the Seneca 
Nation.s There is no evidence that it is managed or owned by either tribe. Likewise, there is no 
evidence that it is operated to further either tribe's governmental objectives.6 NWS operates 
solely as a private busine:ss for the personal profit of its owner who happens to be a Native 
American belonging to the Seneca Nation. Native Wholesale Supply Company, 237 P.3 rd at 
210-11. It is for these reasons, no doubt, that when NWS made these identical arguments to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Court rejected them. Id. The Court should reject them here anew 
as it has done already. See Court Order, p. 5. 7 
III.	 NWS'S EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH STATE V. MAYBEE ARE 
UNPERSUASIVE 
NWS contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 
520,224 P.3d 1109 (2010), cert. denied 79 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010) (No. 09-1471), is 
not applicable to this case. Defendant's Memo., pp. 14 - 18. NWS errs. 
The Court in Maybee decided a number of issues, several of which are applicable to this 
case. Specifically, the Maybee Court held that: 
5 Court Order, p. 5. 
6 Indeed, according to the President of the Seneca Nation, Barry E. Snyder Sr., the Seneca Nation has no 
role whatsoever with Seneca brand cigarettes. "Snyder Vows Probe of Seneca Cigarettes," The Buffalo 
News, March 10, 2009, accessed at http://www.buffalonews.com/cityregion/story/602680.htm! (last 
viewed July 10,2009). 
7 NWS cites to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), for the proposition that state law does not 
"extend into Indian country." Defendant's Memo., p. 13. This rule was long ago discarded. As the 
United States Supreme Court stated over 30 years ago, it was the rule even then that "[I]ong ago the Court 
departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view that 'the laws of [a State] can have no force' within 
reservation boundaries." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980), quoting 
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561. NWS's citation to Worcester is decades too late. 
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(1) Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act "regulates 
cigarettes, as defined by the [Idaho Master Settlement Agreement Act], not merely 
'units sold. '" Maybee, 148 Idaho at _' 224 P.3d at 1116. 
(2) Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act "is intended to 
govern interstate as well as intrastate sales of cigarettes to consumers in the state of 
Idaho," id., and because it is triggered by the sale of noncompliant cigarettes to 
consumers in Idaho, it does not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution. ld., 148 Idaho at , 224 P.3d at 1120-21. 
(3) The purpose of the Complementary Act is "to prevent the cigarettes of 
Noncompliant Manufacturers from being sold to Idaho consumers," ld., 148 Idaho at_, 
224 P.3d at 1120, and where title to the cigarettes at issue passes is irrelevant to that 
determination. ld. 
(4) The Complementary Act does not regulate the on-reservation activity of the 
tribal member Internet cigarette seller in that case, but rather his "introduction of 
Noncompliant Cigarettes into Idaho," ld. (emphasis added), and because this constitutes 
conduct going off his reservation, pursuant to applicable federal Indian law precedent, 
the tribal member Internet cigarette seller is properly subject to the Complementary 
Act's provisions. ld. at ]48 Idaho at _,224 P.3d at 1122-24, citing Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,148-49 (1973). 
In short, the Maybee case stands for the proposition that selling cigarettes which are 
destined for Idaho but are non-compliant under the Complementary Act is an act that gives Idaho 
Courts jurisdiction to enforce the requirements of that Act. Maybee's membership in the Seneca 
Tribe did not protect him from application of Idaho's laws to activity that involved selling 
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8 
cigarettes to Idaho consumers. Likewise, the Native American status ofNWS's owner does not 
somehow protect NWS here. 
NWS's response is to attempt to distinguish Maybee on one ground, and it is that the 
Idaho purchaser of NWS's cigarettes, Warpath, Inc., is located on a reservation, whereas the 
purchasers of Maybee's products reside throughout Idaho. Defendant's Memo., p. 14. This is a 
distinction without a difference. The fact is that Warpath, Inc. is not a member of an Indian tribe 
but is instead a corporation created pursuant to Idaho law. Because it is a nonmember of the 
Coeur d' Alene Tribe, it has, as noted above, no special status on the Coeur d'Alene 
Reservation. See Colvilh~, 447 US at 161 ("[n]on-member [Indians] are not constituents of the 
governing Tribe. . .. [T]hose Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on the 
reservation.") Thus, as far as Indian law is concerned, NWS's sales to Warpath are no different 
than Maybee's sales to a consumer in Boise. In short, the Maybee case is dispositive here. 8 
IV. CIVIL PENALTIES MAY BE APPROPRIATELY ASSESSED HERE 
NWS objects to the assessment of a civil penalty. It contends there is no evidence to 
allow the Court to assess such a penalty, that the amount sought is excessive, and that the matter 
can only be decided by a jury. Defendant's Memo., pp. 19 - 25. None of these arguments are 
sustainable. 
NWS cites to Ward v. State of New York, 291 F.Supp.2d 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) as support for its 
position. Defendant's Memo., pp. 17 - 18. The case does not support NWS. The controversy there 
involved enforcement of a New York statute prohibiting the direct shipment of cigarettes to consumers, 
with a limited exception not applicable here. 291 F. Supp. 2d at 194 n. 3. The court there considered a 
facial preemption challenge to the statute in several scenarios, including direct shipment from an on­
reservation tribal business to a nonmember. It declined in that context to grant a preliminary injunction. 
291 F. Supp. 2d at 203-05. That is the same scenario before the Court here. The fact that the court did 
enjoin the statute from applying to transactions "from a tribe member on the reservation to another tribe 
member on the reservation," id., 207, is of no relevance here, because that is not the case here. This case 
is about New York-based NWS introducing into Idaho to an Idaho corporation millions of cigarettes 
unlawful to be sold and imported into this State. It is not about NWS's cigarette sales to Seneca Nation 
members on the Seneca Nation. 
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A.	 The Incontrovertible Evidence In This Case Establishes That NWS 
Unlawfully Sold And Introduced Into Idaho Over 100 Million Cigarettes 
NWS claims that there is no evidence supporting the assessment of a civil penalty. This 
belies the undisputed facts of the case, which are that since January 2004, NWS has imported 
and sold into Idaho over 100 million Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes.9 Because these cigarettes 
have never been listed on the Idaho Directory, NWS has violated the Complementary Act. 
Also undisputed, the Office of the Attorney General wrote NWS on June 5, 2008. 
notifying NWS that its cigarette sales violated the Complementary Act and requested that NWS 
cease its unlawful selling and shipping of Grand River cigarettes to Idaho retailers. 1O NWS 
ignored the Attorney Gem~ral Office's letter and continued to sell and ship the unlawful Seneca 
and Opal cigarette brands into Idaho. In fact, since the Idaho Attorney General's Notice of 
Violation letter was sent to NWS on June 8, 2008, NWS has sold and imported or caused to be 
imported into Idaho 14,272,000 unlawful cigarettes. J J Since August 20, 2010, when NWS was 
served with the Summons and Complaint in this action, NWS sold or imported or caused to be 
imported into Idaho 8,850,000 unlawful cigarettes. 12 
Equally clear is the law related to violations of the Complementary Act. As previously 
noted, the Complementary Act, in part, prohibits "any person" from (l) selling, offering, or 
possessing for sale in Idaho, or importing or causing to import for distribution or sale in Idaho 
"cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in the directory" 
Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). That is precisely what the undisputed evidence here shows 
NWS has done. 
9 Affidavit of Beth A. Kittelmann (Kittelmann Affidavit) filed April 9, 2009, at p. 4, ~ 12; see also 
Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 2, ~ 4, which documents from NWS's own records, recently received 
from NWS, 115 million unlawful cigarette sales. 
10 Kittelmann Affidavit at p. 3, ~ 8. 
II Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 5. 
12 Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, at p. 2, ~ 6. 
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The Complementary Act provides various remedies for violations of Section 39-8403(3) 
of the Act. Specifically, the Complementary Act provides: 
Each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation of section 39­
8403(3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each violation 
hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed 
the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes or 
five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of section 39­

8403(3), Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto.
 
Idaho Code § 39-8406(1).
 
Applying Section 39-8406(1) is thus straightforward and clear, namely that the Court is
 
statutorily authorized to assess civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $5,000 per violation, 
or, in the alternative, 500% of the retail value of the cigarettes. 13 
B.	 The Plaintiffs' Request For A Two Million Dollar Penalty Is Authorized By 
Law 
As stated above, the Legislature entrusted to the sound discretion of this Court the 
amount of civil penalties to assess for violations of the Complementary Act. Exercising that 
discretion here, Plaintiffs have respectfully requested that NWS be assessed civil penalties and, 
given the record in this case, suggested that $2,000,000 is an appropriate amount of penalties. It 
certainly falls within the range of penalties the Legislature has authorized this Court to assess. 
But if the Court determines, in its discretion, based upon the record in this case, to assess a 
different amount, it clearly has the authority to do so. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs' civil penalty request falls well within that allowed for by 
the Complementary Act. NWS has sold and imported or caused to be imported into Idaho over 
13 NWS's claim that it is (~ntitled to a jury trial on the issue of civil penalties misses the mark. Any 
matter, whether subject to trial by jury or not, may be resolved pursuant to a motion for summary 
judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, I.R.C.P. where there is no genuine issue of material fact, as is the case 
here. E.g., G & M Farms v. Funk In. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). In any event, Section 
39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act expressly states that it is the "district court" which may assess a 
civil penalty. 
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100 million illegal cigarettes. It sold them in cartons of 200 cigarettes. 100,000,000 cigarettes 
equates to 500,000 illegally sold cartons of cigarettes. 14 A $2,000,000 civil penalty would equal 
$4.00 per carton of cigarettes. 15 In short, a civil penalty of $2,000,000 falls into the statutorily 
authorized $5,000 per violation range for violations of the Complementary Act. 
Alternatively, as also explained in Plaintiffs' summary judgment papers, utilizing the 
Complementary Act's alternative "not to exceed" 500% of the retail value of the illegally sold 
cigarettes penalty calculation, a $2,000,000 civil penalty also falls well within what is statutorily 
allowable. 16 Shortly before Plaintiffs filed their summary judgment papers, the average retail 
value of the Seneca and Opal cigarette brands that NWS has illegally sold equals $24.42. 17 
Utilizing this figure as the retail price of the illegally sold cigarettes and multiplying it by 
500,000 illegally sold cartons of cigarettes equals $12,210,000. 18 In short, and alternatively 
utilizing an average retail value formula for evaluating Plaintiffs' requested civil penalty, the 
amount of $2,000,000 falls well below the statutorily authorized range of up to 500% of the retail 
value of the illegally sold cigarettes for violations of the Complementary Act. 19 
NWS nevertheless argues that the Plaintiffs have acted capriciously In seeking civil 
penalties here because all NWS has done is "simply exercise[e] its right to have these issues 
addressed by the Court," and that what Plaintiffs are doing in response "is seeking to punish 
NWS for exercising that right ...." Defendant's Memo., p. 25. NWS does not cite any support 
for the proposition that a tobacco seller can continue to violate specific Idaho law and avoid 
consequence for such lawbreaking so long as the case addressing the violations is ongoing. The 
14 100,000,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 500,000. 
15 $2,000,000 divided by 500,000 equals $4.00. 
16 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 9 - 11. 
17 Id. 
18 $24.42 multiplied by 500,000 cartons equals $12,210,000. 
19 500% of the retail pric~: of the illegally sold cigarettes would equal $61,050.000. ($12,210,00 
multiplied by 500% equals $61,050,000) 
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record reflects that regardless of the warning letter received and regardless of the filing of this 
litigation, NWS did not stop selling and importing cigarettes into Idaho in violation of Idaho law. 
Rather, NWS opted to continue to sell millions and millions of cigarettes that were and are today 
illegal to be sold in Idaho under the Complementary Act. These are not facts of good faith and 
innocent mistake. They are facts indicative of a business determined to sell as many cigarettes as 
possible for as long as possible until judicially stopped. They are facts indicative of the need for 
the deterring effect of civil penalties.2o Indeed, it is the rule that a defendant's refusal to cease 
the illegal conduct is a reason to support the imposition of civil penalties. See, e.g., City and 
County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (Cal. Ct.App. 2000) (Defendant's failure 
to cease its unlawful conduct when notified the conduct was illegal is one reason for upholding 
the penalty) and People ex reI. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 (Cal. 
Ct.App. 2002) ($2.5 million civil penalty upheld, the court observing that the defendant 
continued to sell policies after it had been notified by the Department of Insurance that the policy 
language was deceptive). In short, NWS has not acted reasonably. Its conduct does not justify 
an award of zero or de minimus civil penalties. Rather, it justifies the imposition of civil 
penalties reflective of the violations in this case. 
C. The Plaintiffs' Request is Constitutional 
NWS claims that an award of $2,000,000 in civil penalties would be unconstitutionaL 
both as violations of due process and the Eighth Amendment. Defendant's Memo., PI'. 21 - 22. 
It also argues that any penalty assessed would be criminal in nature affording protections under 
20 As Plaintiffs pointed out in its summary judgment papers, civil penalties are a proper tool to 
implement and enforce a regulatory program. State ex reI. Brown v. Howard, 444 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 
App. 1981). Civil penalties deter future unlawful behavior by a defendant and those similarly situated. 
Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 527 A.2d 1368, 1371 (N.J. 1987). They also can serve to 
compensate society at large for the harm it has suffered at the hands of the violators and compensate the 
government for the cost of enforcing the applicable law. State v. Goffe, 676 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Conn. 
Ct.App. 1996). 
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the Sixth Amendment. Id., p. 22. None of these arguments is persuasive. 
Preliminarily, NWS argues that the civil penalty provisions of the Complementary Act 
are "unconstitutional on its face." Defendant's Memo., at p. 21. A facial challenge to a statute 
or rule is "purely a question of law." State v. Cobb. 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 
(1998). To succeed on a facial constitutional challenge, the party must demonstrate that the law 
is unconstitutional in all of its applications. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3 rd 126, 
132 (2003). In other words, "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the [law] would be valid." Id. NWS has not and cannot do that here because 
clearly there are circumstances in which a civil penalty could be assessed that even NWS would 
agree is not excessive (the Court could determine to impose no penalties for example). Thus, 
NWS is left with an "as applied" challenge, in which the party challenging the statute must show 
that, "as applied to the defendant's conduct, the statute is unconstitutional." Id. In that regard. 
NWS does not show how a $2 million civil penalty is unconstitutional given NWS's 100 million 
plus illegal cigarette sales. 
1. NWS's Due Process Rights Have Not Been Violated 
In deciding whethe:r due process has been denied, courts engage in a two-step analysis. 
First, they determine what interest of the aggrieved party is in play and then whether the interest 
claimed is constitutionally protected. This is a threshold question: "Only after finding the 
deprivation of a protected interest do we look to see if the State's procedures comport with due 
process." American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). A protected 
interest exists "where there is a legitimate claim or entitlement to the asserted benefit under 
either state or federal law." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63,72,28 P.3d 1006, 
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1015 (2001). The court must examine relevant statutes to determine whether the interest in 
question is protected. Jd., 136 Idaho at 73,28 P.3d at 1016. 
Second, if a protected interest is found, courts determine what process is due. Jd., 
(internal citation omitted). It will look to both statutory and constitutional procedural 
protections. "(D)ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). 
a.	 NWS Has No Constitutionally Protected Interest Violated Under Due 
Process 
NWS does not identify a constitutionally protected right which Plaintiffs have violated 
under due process. Then~ certainly is no right to violate relevant state law and not face the 
consequences of such conduct. More generally, even the assertion of the right to engage in 
business fails because there is no such constitutionally cognizable property interest. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that "business in the sense of the activity of doing business, or the 
activity of making a protH is not property" protected by due process. College Savings Bank v. 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 674 (1999) (emphasis in 
original). In short, NWS has not identified a constitutionally protected right for which its due 
process rights have been violated. 
b.	 Even if NWS Had A Right Due Process Protects, It Has Been Afforded 
Adequate Notice And An Opportunity To Be Heard 
Even if NWS were found to possess a protected interest either constitutionally or under 
state law, procedural due process requires that it be "provided with notice and an opportunity to 
be heard ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. 
v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999) (internal citations omitted). NWS does 
not explain how these requirements have not been satisfied here and indeed NWS cannot. The 
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fact is NWS has been notified of Plaintiffs' request for civil penalties, the size of the penalties, 
and the basis for the assessment of such penalties. And NWS has further been granted an 
opportunity to be heard and has done so. In short, NWS cannot seriously argue that it has been 
denied adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard concerning Plaintiffs' request for civil 
penalties. 
2. The Civil Penalties Plaintiffs Seek Do Not Violate the Eighth Amendment 
Concerning NWS' s claim that Plaintiffs' requested civil penalties are unconstitutionally 
excessive under the Eighth Amendment, where there is an allegation that a civil penalty is 
unconstitutional, "[t]he burden of demonstrating a violation of the Eighth Amendment is on the 
person asserting the constitutional violation." Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 
142 Idaho 893, 899, 136 P.3d 364, 370 (CLApp. 2006). What must be shown is that the civil 
penalty is "grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant's offense." Id. This is a 
difficult standard for NWS to meet here, given two fundamental principles: 
First, "judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first 
instance to the legislature." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998). 
Second, courts have consistently held that civil penalty awards in which the amount of 
the award is less than the statutory maximum do not run afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause. 
See Balice v. USDA, 203 F.3d 684, 699 (9th Cir. 2000) ($225,000 fine did not violate Eighth 
Amendment where the maximum fine was $528,000); Pharaon v. Bd. of Governors, 135 F.3d 
148, 156 (C.A.D.C. Cir. 1998) ($37 million did not violate Excessive Fines Clause since "the 
penalty [was] proportional to [the] violation and well below the statutory maximum [of $111.5 
million]"); United States v. Emerson, 107 F.3d 77,79 (1 st Cir. 1997) (holding that "a fine one-
half the size of that permitted by the relevant statute, ... though substantial, is constitutionally 
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permissible."); see also United States v. Eghbal, 475 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (C.D.Cal 2007); U.S. 
v. Mackby, 221 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1110 (N.D.Cal. 2002). 
NWS has not met its burden of proof and persuasion here. The fact is that the size of the 
requested penalty, $2,000,000, is a function of the 100 million plus illegal cigarettes it sold and 
imported into the State. The size and totality of NWS' s violation are breathtaking and 
unprecedented. As noted, the average retail value of 100 million illegally sold and imported 
cigarettes is $12,210,000. A civil penalty of $2,000,000 is thus less than one-sixth the average 
retail value of these cigarettes. This is not an amount so "grossly disproportionate to the gravity 
of the defendant's offense," Nez Perce County Prosecuting Att'y, 142 Idaho at 899, 136 P.3d at 
370, as to sustain NWS' s burden that such an award or one like it is unconstitutional. Compare 
Mayers v. USDHHS, 806 F.2d 995, 999 (11 th Cir. 1986) (Civil penalty seventy times the amount 
of money defendant improperly collected from government not unconstitutional); BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore. 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (holding punitive damages should not exceed a 10 
.) 2\to 1 ratIO. 
NWS notes that the State has settled cases with various tobacco related entities for 
amounts less than that requested here. This is true. Plaintiffs support and seek amicable 
resolution and the various settlements are proof of the reasonableness of the State in seeking to 
resolve disputes under Idaho's tobacco related laws. That has not been the case here to date 
where NWS has insisted on selling its illegal cigarettes throughout this case. 
The closest case to the present one is the State v. Maybee case, which NWS discusses, 
but errantly. In the Maybee case, the district court assessed a $163,225 civil penalty against the 
defendant in that case, S,:ott Maybee, for his 2,500,000 cigarettes sold in violation of the 
21 It is important to note that actual damages are not required for imposition of a civil penalty. U.S. ex 
reI. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Geise, 656 
N.W.2d 30, 40 (S.D. 2002). 
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Complementary Act. Jd., 148 Idaho at _,224 P.3d at 1115-16. Maybee's 2.5 million illegal 
cigarette sales are approximately 2.5 percent of NWS's 100 million illegal cigarette sales here. 
The civil penalty assessed against him, however, is 8 percent of Plaintiffs' proposed $2,000,000 
penalty in this case. In other words, Maybee's penalty, proportionately, is more than three times 
the size of that being proposed here. If anything, Maybee suggests that Plaintiffs would have 
been correct to seek even greater civil penalties here.22 
3.	 The Assessm(~nt Of A Civil Penalty Here Does Not Implicate the Sixth 
Amendment 
NWS argues that because it is hypothetically possible that this Court could assess a very 
large civil penalty, this transforms any such award into a criminal one for which the Sixth 
Amendment applies. Defendant's Memo., p. 22. This is in error. 
NWS does not cite to one case holding that civil penalties like those under the 
Complementary Act are actually criminal in nature. When the issue has been raised in similar 
contexts, courts have rejected Sixth Amendment applicability. For example, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals has statt:d the following in reviewing civil penalty claims under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act: 
(W)hen Congress has characterized the remedy as civil and the only 
consequence of a judgment for the Government is a money penalty, the courts have 
taken Congress at its word.... In the face of a long line of contrary authority, 
appellants have not directed our attention to any civil penalty provision that has been 
held sufficiently 'criminal' in nature to invoke the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment. 
22 NWS's discussion of the Maybee case is also confused. NWS acknowledges that Maybee was 
assessed a civil penalty of $163,225 based upon his illegal sales of 2.5 million cigarettes. Defendant's 
Memo., p. 25. It inexplicably compares, however, that figure to the six million (which is actually 14 
million) cigarettes NWS asse,rts it illegally sold and imported into Idaho after the State notified it of 
NWS's violations of the Complementary Act and complains that a two million dollar penalty on six 
million illegal cigarettes is far greater than a $163,225 dollar penalty for 2.5 million cigarettes. Jd. NWS 
is comparing apples to oranges. The correct comparison is $163,255 for 2.5 million cigarettes to 
$2,000,000 for 100 million illt:gal cigarettes. 
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United States v. 1. B. Williams, Inc., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974). 
NWS nevertheless urges the Court to overlook the Legislature's express characterization 
of the penalties imposed :in this case as "civil," see Idaho Code § 39-8406(1), and to hold that 
whatever might be imposed in this case must be criminal because the size of the penalties 
assessed in this case could potentially be large. And because a potentially large civil penalty 
would allegedly serve no legitimate civil purpose, in NWS's view, the penalty must be criminal 
in the first instance. The argument goes much too far. A hypothetically excessive penalty is not 
grounds for ruling that any penalty is criminal in nature and subject to Sixth Amendment 
applicability. Rather, the argument is more fittingly addressed to the Court's exercise of its 
discretion. And as demonstrated herein a two million dollar civil penalty is not, in fact, 
excessive or too large, givt~n NWS's massive illegal cigarette sales and would be well within the 
Court's discretion. In short, there is no basis to conclude that the Sixth Amendment applies or 
that the assessment of civil penalties in this case is criminal in nature. 
D. Civil Penalties Are Warranted And Should Be Assessed Against NWS 
It is important to note that absolving NWS of any civil penalty, or imposing one that is 
not commensurate with the unlawful conduct involved in this case, will produce negative results 
for at least two reasons. First, it will send a message to tobacco companies disobeying Idaho law 
that it makes more financial sense to litigate and not settle: Why settle when, even if you are 
found to have violated Idaho law, there will be no or trivial financial consequence for continued 
illegal cigarettes sales? 
Second, absolving NWS punishes the companies who were willing to be accountable for 
their conduct and amicably and promptly resolve those problems. In short, absolving NWS here 
will reduce other future settlements and cause the Court to have to deal with significantly more 
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tobacco related litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
No genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether NWS violated the Complementary 
Act and Idaho's cigarette tax laws. NWS has sold over one hundred million non-compliant 
cigarettes to Idaho retailers, violating Idaho's Complementary Act. NWS also sells these non­
compliant cigarettes to Idaho retailers without the wholesaler permit required by the Idaho Code 
Section 63-2503(1) and the State's cigarette tax laws. Only an appropriate civil penalty and 
permanent injunctive relief will stop NWS from continuing to violate Idaho law. Accordingly, 
the Plaintiffs request that their motion for summary judgment be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of October, 2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
By:~k~ 
BRETT T. DELANGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
IDAHO TAX COMMISSION ~ 1
c---:'/; 
. ~d7H ~4'./_---, 
WILLIAM VON TAGEN 
Deputy Attorney General / 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of October, 2010, I caused to be served, by the 
method indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following: 
Samuel A. Diddle ~U.S. Mail 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKlveen, Chartered 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
P.O. Box 1368 
o Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAl.. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney Gcmeral 
954 West Jefferson, 2nd F'loor 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State oJ Idaho 
WILLIAM VON TAGEN (ISB No. 2671) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Tax Commission 
800 Park Boulevard 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150 
Telephone: (208) 334-7530 
Facsimile: (208) 334-7844 
Attorneys for the Idaho Tax Commission 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Beth A. Kittelmaml, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
I. I am a Paralegal for the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Idaho 
Attorney General. One of my duties is to oversee and maintain records received and compiled 
by the Office of the Attorney General that relate to the matters set forth in this Affidavit. I have 
personal knowledge and information of the facts set forth herein, as well as their accuracy. I also 
have personal knowledge of the records referred to in this Affidavit. 
2. I prepared the Excel spreadsheet attached to my April 9, 2009 Affidavit as Exhibit 
I, from records received from the Nevada Foreign Trade Zone and the various shipping 
companies used by Native Wholesale Supply (NWS), pursuant to Civil Investigative Demands 
served upon them by the Idaho Attorney General's Office. 
3. After this case was filed, Plaintiffs served discovery requests upon NWS. 
Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs' discovery requests. On 
September 20,2010, NWS answered Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Attached to this affidavit as 
Exhibit B is a true and con'ect copy of the discovery responses received from NWS. 
4. The records produced by NWS show new and additional sales of Opal and Seneca 
cigarettes into Idaho. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit C is a revised Excel spreadsheet I have 
prepared based upon the records produced by NWS. Attached as Exhibit D are true and correct 
copies of the invoices produced by NWS and referenced in the spreadsheet. This shows that to 
date, NWS has sold, imported and/or caused to be imported into Idaho at least 115,998,000 
cigarettes. 
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5. Since the Idaho Attorney General's Notice of Violation letter was sent to NWS on 
June 8, 2008, NWS has sold, imported and/or caused to be imported 14,272,000 cigarettes into 
Idaho. 
6. Since August 20,2010, when NWS was served with the Summons and Complaint 
in this action, NWS sold, imported and/or caused to be imported 8,850,000 cigarettes into Idaho, 
~~.",~~~ 
BETH A. KITTELMANN ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of October, 2010. 
tw ,! Itlih.....~......iiulAAlt .JENNIFER L. BITHELL 
'" NOTARY PUBLIC Notary Publi or aho,~: STATE OIF IDAHO Residing at: fntJuckAA, J2j+~~~,~~~~i~~~~"~):~ My Commission Expires: 11- 30-(3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
1 hereby certify that on the 19th day of October, 2010, I caused to be served, by the 
method indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, addressed to the following: 
Samuel A. Diddle [gJ U.S. Mail 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & o Hand Delivery 
McK1veen, Chartered o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 o Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1368 o Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE (ISB No. 3628) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424 
Attorneys for the State of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney
 
)
)
 
General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX ~ Case No. CV OC 0815228 
COMMISSION, 
) STATE OF IDAHO AND THE 
Plaintiffs, ) IDAHO STATE TAX 
) COMMISSION'S FIRST 
vs. ) DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
)
 
NATIVE WHOLESALI~ SUPPLY ) 
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1 ) 
through 20, ~ 
__--=D:...;e=~..::.;en=_d=.:a=n:::...::t:.:..... ) 
The State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden, and the 
Idaho State Tax Commission (collectively "State of Idaho" or "Idaho"), pursuant to Rules 33(a), 
34(a), and 36(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, propounds the following Interrogatories, 
Requests for Production, and Requests for Admissions ("Discovery Requests") to Defendant 
Native Wholesale Supply Company ("Native Wholesale"). 
I. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
A.	 Deadline to Respond. Pursuant to Rules 33(a)(2), 34(b)(2), and 36(a) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the information, documents, and responses requested herein must be 
STATE OF IDAHO AND THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S FIRST 
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received by the State of Idaho on or before thirty (30) days after Native Wholesale's 
receipt of these Disc:overy Requests. 
B.	 Reasonable InquirY:, In answering these Discovery Requests, Native Wholesale shall 
provide all infonnation and documents that are available to it or subject to its reasonable 
inquiry, including documents available to it, but in possession of its employees, 
representatives, or other agents. 
C.	 Complete Answers Required. If a specific Discovery Request has subparts, Native 
Wholesale shall answer each part separately and fully. If Native Wholesale cannot 
answer a Discovery Request fully, it shall answer to the extent possible, specify the 
reason for his inability to answer the remainder, and provide whatever information and 
knowledge it has regarding the unanswered portion. 
D.	 Document Protection; Copies Authorized. The State of Idaho requests that you permit 
counsel for the Stat,e to inspect and copy the documents and things requested herein on 
the 18th day of May, 2009, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., at the Office of the Attorney 
General, Consumer Protection Division, 954 W. Jefferson Street, Second Floor, Boise, 
Idaho, or at such other time and place as the parties may agree upon in writing. 
Concerning documents and other materials that Native Wholesale is requested to 
produce, as an alternative, accurate, legible, and complete copies may be attached to its 
answers and responses and served within the same 30-day period. 
E.	 Electronic Copies Authorized. Concerning documents and other materials that Native 
Wholesale is requested to produce, also as an alternative, accurate, legible, and complete 
copies may also be scanned onto a CD in Adobe Acrobat® PDF fonnat and served within 
the same 3D-day period. 
F.	 Privilege Claims. If Native Wholesale makes a claim of privilege to any question, it 
must state the basis for its claim and describe the claimed privileged item in reasonable 
and sufficient detail so that the State of Idaho can decide whether the claim of privilege is 
valid. 
G.	 Supplementation. If additional infonnation becomes available to Native Wholesale 
after the State ofIdaho receives Native Wholesale's complete and accurate responses to 
these Discovery Requests, Native Wholesale shall supplement its answers and responses. 
II. 
DEFINITIONS 
Unless otherwise de:fined, specified, or indicated, the following definitions shall be 
applicable to these Discovery Requests: 
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A.	 "And" and "or" are terms of inclusion and not of exclusion and shall be construed so as
 
to bring within the scope of these Discovery Requests any document or information that
 
might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. For ease of readability, neither
 
word will be bo1ded as follows.
 
B.	 "Any" means one or more. For ease of readability, the word will not be bolded as 
follows. 
C.	 "Cigarette" means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be burned or heated 
under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (1) any roll of tobacco 
wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or (2) tobacco, in any form, 
that is functional in the product, which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco 
used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, 
consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of tobacco wrapped in any substance containing 
tobacco which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its 
packaging and labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a 
cigarette described in clause (1) of this definition. The term "cigarette" includes "roll­
your-own" (i.e., any tobacco which, because of its appearance, type, packaging, or 
labeling is suitable for use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as 
tobacco for making cigarettes). For purposes of this definition of "cigarette," 0.09 ounces 
of "roll-your-own" tobacco shall constitute one (1) individual "cigarette." 
D.	 "Communication" means any contact or act by which any information is transmitted or 
conveyed, including written contact by such means as e-mail, letters, invoices, sales 
receipts, bills, correspondence, memoranda, telegrams, telexes, telecopies, facsimile, or 
by any document, any oral contact such as face-to-face meetings or conversations, and 
telephone or any other electronically-transmitted communications or conversations. 
E.	 "Complaint" means the Verified Complaint filed by the State against Native Wholesale 
in this case on or about August 14,2008. 
F.	 "Concerning," "rt!lating to," or "related to," any subject matter means any 
documents, communication, or any other tangible item that discusses, describes, refers 
to, reflects, contains, analyzes, studies, reports on, comments on, evidences, constitutes, 
sets forth, considers, recommends, or pertains to, in whole or in part in any manner to the 
subject. 
G.	 "Document(s)" means any written, recorded, or graphic matters, however produced or 
reproduced, pertaining in any way to the subject matter of these Discovery Requests, 
including any originals, copies, or drafts of any of the following: records, notes, 
summaries, organizational documents, financial statements, taxing authority filings, 
contracts, agreemen1ts, advertising, promotional materials, brochures, pamphlets, flyers, 
newsletters, magazines, drawings, plans, patent or copyright applications, scientific or 
other test results, peer reviews, scientific journal articles, invoices, purchase orders, 
checks, manuals, policies, rules, reports, forecasts, appraisals, memoranda of 
understanding, telephone logs, letters, telegrams, telexes, cables, tapes, transcripts, 
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audio/video recordings, emails, web pages, photographs, pictures, films, computer 
programs, or other graphics, symbols, and recorded or written materials of any nature 
whatsoever. Any document that contains a comment, notation, addition, insertion, or 
marking of any kind that is not part of another document is to be considered as a separate 
document. 
H.	 "Each" means each and every. For ease of readability, the word will not be bolded as 
follows. 
I.	 "Grand River Enterprises" means (i) Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd., 
(referred to as "Grand River" in the Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, dated September 24, 2008, and filed in Case 
No.1 :08-cv-00396-EJL (U.S. District Court, District ofIdaho)), and any of its principals, 
owners, officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, consultants, 
or attorneys, past and present; (ii) any other persons acting or purporting to act on their 
behalf or under their direction, authorization or control; and (iii) any predecessors, 
successors, subsidiaries, parents, assignees or affiliates of the foregoing. 
J.	 "In Idaho," within Idaho," "to Idaho," and "in the State of Idaho," mean within the 
exterior limits of the: State of Idaho and includes all territory within these limits owned by 
or ceded to the United States of America, including Indian Country as defined by 18 
U.S.C.	 § 1151. 
K.	 Where asked to "identify" or describe a "document," the description should include, but 
not be limited to, the following: 
a.	 The name, address, telephone number, occupation, and job title of the present 
custodian of the record, and, if applicable, the employer of the present custodian 
of the document; 
b.	 The date the document was made or entered into and the name, address, telephone 
number, occupation, job title, and employer of each person whose testimony 
could be uSI~d to authenticate such document and lay the foundation for its 
introduction into evidence; 
c.	 The name, address, telephone number, occupation, job title, and employer of the 
author(s) or person(s) who prepared the document; 
d.	 The identity of the person(s) to whom the document was addressed, and who 
received each and every copy of the document; 
e	 A description of the nature and contents of the documents in such a manner that 
the custodian of the document would be able to locate it in response to a subpoena 
or request for production; and 
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f.	 The identity and location of the file(s) where the original and each and every copy 
of the document is located. 
L.	 Where asked to "identify" a "person" who is a natural born individual, or where an
 
answer refers to such a person, please state his or her name, last known address,
 
occupation, last known business address, and last known personal and business telephone
 
numbers.
 
M.	 Where asked to "id€mtify" a business entity or federal or state government agency, please 
give its correct name, and if it is a business entity, state whether it is a corporation, 
limited liability company, partnership, sole proprietorship, or unincorporated association 
and describe the nature of its business. If the business entity is a partnership or sole 
proprietorship, identify the person or persons who are its partners or owners and give the 
address and telephone number ofthe entity's principal office. 
N.	 "Including" means including but not limited to. 
O.	 "Lake Erie Tobacco Company" means Lake Erie Tobacco Company, and any of its 
principals, owners, officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, 
consultants, or attorneys past or present; (ii) any other persons acting or purporting to act 
on their behalf or under their direction, authorization, or control; and (iii) any 
predecessors, successors, subsidiaries, parents, assignees or affiliates of the foregoing. 
Upon information and belief of the State, Lake Erie Tobacco Company is or has been 
located at 6564 or 6558 Route 417, Kill Buck, New York. 
P.	 "NITCO" means the Nevada International Trade Corporation, also known as Foreign 
Trade Zone #89 and as the Southern Nevada Trade Zone. 
Q.	 "Person" means any natural person, corporate entity, partnership, association, joint 
venture, government entity or trust, and any other business operation or legal entity. 
R.	 "Seneca Territory Bonded Warehouse" means the "bonded warehouse on the Seneca 
Cattaraugus Indian Territory" referred to in the Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, dated September 24, 2008, and 
filed in Case No.1 :08-cv-00396-EJL (U.S. District Court, District ofIdaho). 
S.	 "Warpath" means Warpath, Inc., an Idaho corporation, currently located at North 165, 
Highway 95, Plummer, Idaho. 
T.	 "Western New York FTZ" means the Western New York Foreign Trade Zone in 
Lackawanna, New York, referred to in the Affidavit of Arthur Montour in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, dated September 24,2008, and filed 
in Case No.1 :08-cv·-00396-EJL (U.S. District Court, District of Idaho). 
U.	 "You," "your," "Native Wholesale Supply Company," "Native Wholesale," and 
NWS means (i) Native Wholesale Supply Company, and any of its principals, owners, 
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officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, consultants, or 
attorneys past or pn:sent; (ii) any other persons acting or purporting to act on their behalf 
or under their direction, authorization, or control; and (iii) any predecessors, successors, 
subsidiaries, parents, assignees or affiliates of the foregoing. 
III. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1. Identify each business entity that you in whole or in part 
own, control, contract with, associate with, or that is a subsidiary, successor, or predecessor in 
interest of Native Wholesale. 
INTERROGATORY NO.2. Identify each person who may have information about 
the sale of Seneca or Opal brand cigarettes in Idaho and provide an explanation of what 
information each person may have. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3. If you deny in whole or in part any of the Requests for 
Admission in these Discovery Requests, identify each fact, each person who has knowledge of 
each fact, and each document evidencing each fact, which supports the basis for your denial. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4. Identify each communication or document between 
NWS and any person located in Idaho relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, 
possession, shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes. 
IV. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REQUEST FOR :PRODUCTION NO. 1. Produce any documents relating to 
shipments or releases to or from NITCO, the Western New York FTZ, or the Seneca 
Territory Bonded Warehouse, of cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS to any person located 
in Idaho, including (a) invoices; (b) orders; (c) bills of lading; and (d) documents relating to 
compliance with U.S. Customs requirements. Please note: " any person located in Idaho " 
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limits and describes the "cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS" referenced in the request; it is 
not meant to limit or describe to whom or where the "shipments or releases" referred to in the 
request are directed. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2. Produce any documents relating to 
communications between NITCO, the Western New York FTZ, or the Seneca Territory 
Bonded Warehouse and NWS relating to the storage, handling, or shipment of cigarettes, 
including (a) contracts and (b) agreements. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3. Produce any communications between 
NITCO and NWS relating to cigarettes shipped from NITCO or released by NITCO from 
January 1,2004 to present. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4. Produce any communications between 
NWS and any common or private carriers, including (a) Con-Way Freight, Inc., (b) APT 
Transportation, Inc., and (c) Leader Express relating to shipments or transportation into or 
within Idaho of cigarettes sold, imported, or distributed by NWS, including cigarettes shipped 
from or released by NITCO. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5. Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, 
bills, or communications between NWS and Grand River Enterprises relating to the sale, 
offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation, 
distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, where a purchaser or 
recipient of such cigarettes was Warpath. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6. Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, 
bills, or communications between NWS and Grand River Enterprises relating to the sale, 
offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation, 
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distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, and where a purchaser or 
recipient of those cigarettes was any person located in Idaho other than Warpath. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7. Produce any contracts, agreements, or 
communications between NWS and Warpath, or any other person located in Idaho relating 
to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation, 
distribution, or delivery of cigarettes. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8. Produce any financial documents, including 
invoices, sales receipts, bank statements showing the transfer 'of funds, statements of accounts 
receivable and accounts payable, profit and loss statements, and other financial statements, 
relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, 
importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, where a 
purchaser or recipient of such cigarettes from NWS was Warpath, or any other person located 
in Idaho. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9. Produce any documents relating to your 
sale of any cigarettes to any person located in Idaho that state the location of the sale, that the 
sale is on an F.O.B. Seneca Nation basis, and/or that title and risk of loss transfer to the 
purchaser at the time of sale on the Seneca Cattaraugus Indian Territory. (See Affidavit of Arthur 
Montour in Support of Motilon to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, dated September 24, 
2008, and filed in Case No.1 :08-cv-00396-EJL (U.S. District Court, District of Idaho)). 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10. Produce any documents relating to NWS's 
corporate organization, including charters, constitutions, articles of incorporation, applications 
and filings submitted to any governing authority, including documents showing its officers and 
directors from Jan. 1,2000 to present. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11. Produce any contracts, agreements, or 
communications' between NWS and Gene Mack or any other customs broker, relating to the 
purchase, importation, sale, shipment, or release from Customs of cigarettes sold or distributed 
by NWS to any person located in Idaho, including Warpath. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12. Produce any documents relating to the 
importation to, or shipment from, any person other than NITCO, the Western New York FTZ, 
or the Seneca Territory Bonded Warehouse of cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS to any 
person located in the state of Idaho. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13. Produce any documents relating to travel 
to or within Idaho by any ofNWS's principals, owners, officers, directors, shareholders, agents, 
employees, representatives, consultants, or attorneys. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14. Produce any documents identified in your 
response to Interrogatory No.4. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15. Produce any contracts, agreements, 
invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Lake Erie Tobacco Company relating 
to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation, 
distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, where a purchaser or 
recipient of such cigarettes was Warpath. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16. Produce any contracts, agreements, 
invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Lake Erie Tobacco Company relating 
to the sale, offer for sale, pmchase, ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation, 
distribution, or delivery of c:igarettes anywhere in the United States, and where a purchaser or 
recipient of those cigarettes was any person located in Idaho other than Warpath. 
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V.
 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1. Please admit that you transported, imported or 
caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho Seneca brand family cigarettes 
manufactured by Grand River. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.2. Please admit that you transported, imported or 
caused to be imported Dor sale and distribution in Idaho Opal brand family cigarettes 
manufactured by Grand River. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.3. Please admit that in 2004 you transported, 
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least 
24,650,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4. Please admit that in 2005 you transported, 
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least 
21,406,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5. Please admit that in 2006 you transported, 
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least 
22,830,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6. Please admit that in 2007 you transported, 
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least 
24,442,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River. 
REQUEST FOR iffiMISSION NO.7. Please admit that in 2008 you transported, 
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho retailers at least 
14,152,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8. Please admit that in January 2009 you 
transported, imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho to Idaho 
retailers at least 2,508,000 Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9. Please admit that (a) on June 5, 2008, the Idaho 
Attorney General's Office mailed a letter, certified mail, return receipt requested, to the president 
of Native Wholesale, Arthur Montour, Jr.; and (b) the letter was sent to Native Wholesale's 
mailing and street addresses. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10. Please admit that the document attached hereto 
as Exhibit A (Bates Numbers IDAG 150677 - IDAG 150678, inclusive) is a true and correct 
copy of the letter referenced in Request for Admission No.9, and of the return receipts (IDAG 
150810 - IDAG 150811), signed on June 9, and 10,2008 for this letter. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11. Please admit that after June 10, 2008, you 
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho at least 11,620,000 Seneca 
and Opal brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12. Please admit that Grand River is not listed on 
the Idaho Compliant Tobacco Manufacturer and Brand Family Directory as of the dates you 
imported or caused to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13. Please admit that the Seneca cigarette brand is 
not listed on the Idaho Compliant Tobacco Manufacturer and Brand Family Directory as of the 
dates you imported or caused it to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14. Please admit that the Opal cigarette brand is 
not listed on the Idaho Compliant Tobacco Manufacturer and Brand Family Directory as of the 
dates you imported or caused it to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15. Please admit that Arthur Montour is the 
President and sole owner of Native Wholesale. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16. Please admit that Arthur Montour as the 
President and sole owner of Native Wholesale, has knowledge of, directs, or controls Native 
Wholesale's importing and causing to be imported Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes for sale and 
distribution in Idaho. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17. Please admit that Native Wholesale does not 
now and had never possessed a cigarette permit, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 63-2503. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18. Please admit that Native Wholesale never 
applied for a cigarette permit, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 63-2503. 
DATED this 9th day ofApril, 2009. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
By $ A ~«};~-'~ 
BRETT T:"DELANGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
By ~~ 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE AlTORNEY GENERAL 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
June 5, 2008 
VIA CERTIFIED MAlL; RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Arthur Montour, Jr. 
Native Wholesale Supply Company 
10955 Logan Road 
Perrysburg, NY 14129 
P.O Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
Re:	 Notice of Apparent Liability Under Idaho law-Violations of Idaho's Tobacco 
Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act) 
Dear Mr. Montour: 
It has come to our attention that Seneca brand cigarettes manufactured by Grand River 
Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. (Grand River Enterprises), imported by your company and held at 
the Nevada International Trade Corporation, Foreign Trade Zone #89, in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
have been sold and shipped at your company's direction from that location to at least one 
purchaser in the ~tate ofIdlaho, namely War Path, North 165 Hwy 95, Plummer, ID 83851. 
Idaho Code § 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act makes it unlawful for any person to 
sell, offer for sale, possess, acquire, hold, own, import, or cause to import for sale or distribution 
in Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not on the Idaho Directory 
of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brand Families (Idaho's Directory). Neither 
Seneca brand cigarettes nor Grand River Enterprises are listed on Idaho's Directory. 
Additionally, sale in Idaho of cigarettes manufactured by Grand River Enterprises, including 
Seneca, have been enjoine:d by order dated September 5, 2002, of the Fourth Judicial Court, in 
and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, in the case entitled State of Idaho, by and through 
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, v. Grand River Enterprises, Case No. CV DC 0205249M. 
EXHIBIT
 
Consumer Protection Division
 
Len B. J()rdan Building, Lower Level, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
 
Telephone: (208) 334-2424, FAX: (208) 334-4151
 
(800) 432-3545, Toll Free in Idaho; TOO Accessible
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,	 • ~ f 
U.S. Postal Service. ". ~ . . ., 
- CERTIFIED MAli. RECEIPT ) i: ,. 
(Domestic Mail-Only,' No Insurance.Cov.eragePr-olfidefi) 
, r,.. , . '. 
0 F F 
Postage 
Certified Fee 
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_ 
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$ 
$ 
\ ,'" ,I _ _ 
l 
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Here \\,S\~~
 
COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY 
•	 Complete Items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete 
Item 4 If Restricted Delivery Is desIred. 
•	 Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
•	 Attach this card to the back of the mallpiece, 
or on the front if space permits.. 
1. Article Addressed to: 
Arthur Montour Jr.
 
Native Wholesale Supply Co.
 
P.O. BOJ( 214 
Gowanda NY 14070 
D Insured Mall .D C.O.D. 
4. Restricted Delivery? (E:xtra Fee) CJ Yes 
3. ServIce Type
..J:I certlfled Mall 
.rrReglstered 
o Agent
tJ Addressee 
C. Date of Delivery 
2.	 Article Number . \.\' (). :\ C'\. \ . 
(rransferfromservfcefabe(l '\\)~\:) 6}·j~ ~~\:) .-:-~\\.2,i' .. :'-'~. 
I PS Form 3811, February 2004 Domestlc Retum Receipt	 102S95-02·M·1540 
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SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
•	 Complete Items 1, ~!, arid 3. Also complete 
item 4 If Restricted Delivery Is desired. , 
•	 Print your,n.ame al1c1 address on the reverse 
so that we cari:return'lhe card to you. 
•	 Attach thl~hcard tei the back of the mallplece, 
or on. t,he .,front if space permits. DYesD. Is delivery address different from Item 1? 
o NoIf YES, enter delivery address below: 1. Article Addressed to: 
Arthur Montour Jr.
 
Native Wholesale Supply Co.
 
10955 Logan Road
 
Perrysburg NY 14129
 3.	 Service Typa 
1li\ Certified Mall 0 Express Mall 
o Registered 0 Return Receipt for Merchandlst' 
o Insured Mall 0 C.O.D.. 
4. ,Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) 0 Yes 
~Agent 
o Addressee 
B. D e 0 Delivery
? ,/, 113 
2.	 Article Number (Copy tram service labeQ ()\ -:~ '~1S\> \S3\J \::)\)~'U ~\\Q '"'\ \~~ 
102595-00·M·0952PS Form 3811, July 1999 Domestic Return Receipt 
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Track &Confirm 
Search Results 
Label/Receipt Number. 7000 1530 0000 9416 9180 
Detailed Results: 
.• Delivered, June 09, 2008,1:03 pm, GOWANDA, NY 14070 
• Notice Left, June 09,2008,8:33 am, GOWANDA, NY 14070 
• Arrival at Unit, June 09', 2008, 8:33 am, GOWANDA, NY 14070 
Track & Confirm 
Enter ~C1b~I/Rece.ll?tN..LJrn~er . 
( RorunJ to USPS-com Homf) >- ) 
------------------------------------
r~"7
Conlac! l& Privacy Policy Terms orUse National & Premier Accounts 
Copyrlghl© 1999-2007 USPS. All Rights Reserved. No FEAR Act EEO Data FOIA 
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RECEIVED 
Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW .~EP LO 2010 
CONSUMERP& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
. : .. DIV/Sj~~TECTION1111 West Jefferson Stre,et, Suite 530 
P. O. Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY'S FIRST 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES 
TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, hereby supplements its 
responses to Plaintiffs' First Discovery Requests ("Requests"), as follows: 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they seek infonnation that is neither relev<l..TJ.t 
nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with respect to claims 
and defenses in this action. 
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2. NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they purport to impose obligations beyond 
those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. NWS objects to producing any documents that contain NWS' confidential, proprietary, 
and business-sensitive information until the Court enters an appropriate Protective Order, as a 
means ofprotecting against the inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of such information. 
4. NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they seek documents protected by the attomey­
client privilege, the work··product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or rule. 
5. NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they seek documents that are publicly 
available, and to which the Plaintiffs have access and may obtain for themselves. 
6. NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they seek information, documents, or things 
that are already in Plaintiffs' possession, custody, or control, or which are not reasonably or 
readily available to NWS. 
7. NWS objects to the Requests to the extent they fail to specify the information, 
documents, or things requested with reasonable particularity; to the extent they are vague, 
ambiguous, unreasonably repetitive, cumulative or duplicative, overbroad, unduly burdensome, 
oppressive, or propounded for the improper purpose of annoying, harassing, oppressing, or 
unduly burdening NWS; or to the extent they require NWS to make a legal conclusion. 
8. To the extent NWS provides or produces any information, documents, or things in 
response to Requests to which it has specifically or generally objected, such production is 
without waiver of any such objection. 
9. NWS objects to thle Requests on the ground that they do not contain any limitation as to 
time, and therefore, they are overbroad and unduly burdensome as they are not limited to the 
time period and events rele~vant to the allegations in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. 
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10. These General Objections apply to each Response below, whether specifically stated in 
the Response or not.
 
OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS
 
1. NWS objects to Instructions "B" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond 
those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. NWS objects to Instruction "C" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond 
those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. NWS objects to Instruction "D" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond 
those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. NWS objects to Instruction "E" to the extent it purports to impose obligationsbeyond 
those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. NWS objects to Instruction "F" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond 
those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. NWS objects to Instruction "G" to the extent it purports to impose obligations beyond 
those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS 
1. NWS objects to the definition of "Communication" to the extent it purports to impose 
obligations beyond those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
2. NWS objects to the definition of "Document" to the extent it purports to impose 
obligations beyond those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
3. NWS objects to the definition of "Each" on the grounds it is vague, ambiguous and 
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confusing. 
4. NWS objects to the definition of "Grand River Enterprises" on the grounds it is overly 
broad, burdensome and confusing, and on the further grounds that the terms "predecessors" and 
"successors," as utilized in the defmition, are vague and ambiguous. 
5. NWS objects to the defmitions of "In Idaho," "within Idaho," ''to Idaho" and "in the State 
ofIdaho" on the grounds they are vague, ambiguous and confusing. 
6. NWS objects to the defmitions and instructions set forth in Defmition K on the grounds 
they are overly broad and burdensome, and to the extent they purport to impose obligations 
beyond those provided for by any applicable law, court rule and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
7. NWS objects to the: definitions and instructions set forth in Definition L to the extent they 
purport to require the disclosure of confidential information without the Court entering an 
appropriate Protective Order. NWS further objects on the ground the phrase "natural born 
individual" is vague, ambiguous and confusing. 
8. NWS objects to the: definitions and instructions set forth in Definition "M" to the extent 
they purport to require the disclosure of confidential, proprietary and/or sensitive business 
information without the Court entering an appropriate Protective Order, and to the extent they 
purport to require the production of information that is not relevant to the claims and defenses in 
this action. 
9. NWS objects to the definition of "Lake Erie Tobacco Company" on the grounds it is 
overly broad, burdensome and confusing, and on the further grounds that the terms 
"predecessors" and "successors," as utilized in the definition, are vague and ambiguous. 
10. NWS objects to the defmitions of the "You," "your," "Native Wholesale Supply 
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Company," "Native Wholesale," and "NWS" on the grounds they are overly broad, burdensome 
and confusing, and on the further grounds that the terms "predecessors" and "successors," as 
utilized in the definition, are vague and ambiguous. 
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REQUEST NO.1 
Produce any documents relating to shipments or releases to or from NITCO, the Western New 
York FTZ, or the Seneca Territory Bonded Warehouse, of cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS 
to any person located in Idaho, including (a) invoices; (b) orders; (c) bills oflading; and (d) 
documents relating to compliance with U.S. Customs requirements. Please note: "any person 
located in Idaho" limits and describes the "cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS" referenced in 
the request; it is not meant to limit or describe to whom or where the "shipments or releases" 
referred to in the request are directed. 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, further objects to this Request on the ground that the phrase 
"documents relating to compliance with u.S. Customs requirements" requires NWS to make a 
legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the ground that the second sentence of the 
Interrogatory is confusing. NWS also objects on the ground the Request has no limitation as to 
time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive 
documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or control and which relate to the time 
period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 000001­
NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that any 
responsive documents are located, NWS shall supplement. 
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REQUEST NO.4 
Produce any communications between NWS and any common or private carriers, including (a) 
Con-Way Freight, Inc., (b) APT Transportation, Inc., and (c) Leader Express relating to 
shipments or transportation into or within Idaho of cigarettes sold, imported, or distributed by 
NWS, including cigarettes shipped from or released by NITCO. 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the ground it contains no 
limitation as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will 
produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or control and which 
relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 000001­
NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that any 
responsive documents are located, NWS shall supplement. 
REQUEST NO.5 
Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Grand 
River Enterprises relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, 
transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, 
where a purchaser or recipic~nt of such cigarettes was Warpath. 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, :NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
to the subject matter of the Verified Complaint, the purported improper sale of cigarettes in the 
State of Idaho, and instead seeks all documents relating to the sale, shipment, etc. of cigarettes 
anywhere in the United States. NWS also objects to this Request to the extent it requires NWS 
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to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the grounds the terms "offer for sale," 
"ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. NWS also objects on the ground the 
Request contains no limit.ation as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of 
same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or 
control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
No such documents exist. 
REQUEST NO.6 
Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Grand 
River Enterprises relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, shipment, 
transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the United States, 
and where a purchaser or recipient of those cigarettes was any person located in Idaho other than 
Warpath. 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
to the subject matter of the Verified Complaint, the purported improper sale of cigarettes in the 
State of Idaho, and instead seeks all documents relating to the sale, shipment, etc. of cigarettes 
anywhere in the United States. NWS also objects to this Request to the extent it requires NWS 
to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the grounds the terms "offer for sale," 
"ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. NWS also objects on the ground the 
Request contains no limitation as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of 
same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or 
control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. 
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Supplemental Response 
No such documents exist. 
REQUEST NO.7 
Produce any contracts, agreements, or communications between NWS and Warpath, or any other 
person located in Idaho relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, 
shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes. 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to DefInitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
to the time period that is n:ferenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to this Request 
to the extent it requires NWS to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the 
grounds the tenus "offer for sale," "ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. 
Subject to these Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive 
documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or control and which relate to the time 
period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 000001­
NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that any 
responsive documents are liocated, NWS shall supplement. 
REQUEST NO.8 
Produce any financial documents, including invoices, sales receipts, bank. statements showing the 
transfer of funds, statements of accounts receivable and accounts payable, profit and loss 
statements, . and other financial statements, relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, 
ownership, possession, shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of 
cigarettes anywhere in the United States, where a purchaser or recipient of such cigarettes from 
NWS was Warpath, or any other person located in Idaho. 
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Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to this Request 
to the extent it requires NWS to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the 
grounds the terms "offer for sale," "ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. 
NWS further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks the production of confidential, 
proprietary and/or sensitive business infonnation without the entry of an appropriate Protective 
Order. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive 
documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or control and which relate to the time 
period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry, NWS has been unable to locate any documents that are 
responsive to Request for Production No.8. Efforts to locate responsive documents are ongoing 
and NWS will supplement to the extent responsive documents are located. 
REQUEST NO. 9 
Produce any documents relating to your sale of any cigarettes to any person located in Idaho that 
state the location of the sale, that the sale is on an F.O.B. Seneca Nation basis, and/or that title 
and risk of loss transfer to the purchaser at the time of sale on the Seneca Cattaraugus Indian 
Territory. (See Affidavit ofArthur Montour in Support ofMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction, dated September 24,2008, and filed in Case No.1 :08-cv-00396-EJL (U.S. District 
Court, District of Idaho)). 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
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to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. Subject to these Objections and 
without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its 
possession, custody or control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the 
Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 000001­
NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that any 
responsive documents are located, NWS shall supplement. 
REQUEST NO. 10 
Produce any documents relating to NWS's corporate organization, including charters, 
constitutions, articles of incorporation, applications and filings submitted to any governing 
authority, including documc~nts showing its officers and directors from Jan. 1,2000 to present. 
Response 
In addition to the: foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Interrogatory on the ground that it seeks 
information that is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence with respect to the claims and defenses in this action. Subject to these 
Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce a copy of its Certificate of 
Incorporation, Articles of Incorporation and Amended Articles of Incorporation, to the extent 
such documents are in its possession, custody or control. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry, NWS produces the documents Bates labeled NWS 
000001- NWS 000393. Efforts to locate additional documents are ongoing on to the extent that 
any responsive documents are located, NWS shall supplement. 
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REQUEST NO. 11
 
Produce any contracts, agreements, or communications between NWs and Gene Mack or any 
other customs broker, relating to the purchase, importation, sale, shipment, or release from 
Customs of cigarettes sold or distributed by NWS to any person located in Idaho, including 
Warpath. 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Defmitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to this Request 
to the extent it requires NWS to make a legal conclusion. Subject to these Objections and 
without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its 
possession, custody or control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the 
Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry, NWS has been unable to locate documents responsive to 
Request for Production No. 11. Efforts to locate responsive records are ongoing and to the 
extent any such records are found, NWS will supplement. 
REQUEST NO. 12 
Produce any documents relating to the importation to, or shipment from, any person other than 
NITCO, the Western New York FTZ, or the Seneca Territory Bonded Warehouse of cigarettes 
sold or distributed by NWS to any person located in the state of Idaho. 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to this Request 
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to the extent it requires NWS to make a legal conclusion. Subject to these Objections and 
without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its 
possession, custody or control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the 
Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry, no records responsive to this request have been located. 
REQUEST NO. 13 
Produce any documents relating to travel to or within Idaho by any ofNWS's principals, owners, 
officers, directors, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, consultants, or attorneys. 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
. to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. NWS also objects to the Request 
to the extent it seeks documents relating to travel to Idaho by the referenced individuals that are 
unrelated to the sale of cigarettes in Idaho or the shipment of cigarettes to Idaho. Subject to these 
Objections and without waiver of same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that 
are in its possession, custody or control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in 
the Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
No such documents exist. 
REQUEST NO. 15 
Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Lake 
Erie Tobacco Company relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, 
shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the 
United States, where a purchaser or recipient of such cigarettes was Warpath. 
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Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Deflnitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
to the subject matter of the Verified Complaint, the purported improper sale of cigarettes in the 
State of Idaho, and instea.d seeks all documents relating to the sale, shipment, etc. of cigarettes 
anywhere in the United States. NWS also objects to this Request to the extent it requires NWS 
to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the grounds the terms "offer for sale," 
"ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. NWS also objects on the ground the 
Request contains no limitation as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of 
same, NWS Will produce: responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or 
control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry NWS was unable to locate documents responsive to this request. 
Efforts to locate documents responsive to this request are ongoing to the extent such records are 
located, NWS will supplement. 
REQUEST NO. 16 
Produce any contracts, agreements, invoices, bills, or communications between NWS and Lake 
Erie Tobacco Company relating to the sale, offer for sale, purchase, ownership, possession, 
shipment, transportation, importation, distribution, or delivery of cigarettes anywhere in the 
United States, and where a purchaser or recipient of those cigarettes was any person located in 
Idaho other than Warpath" 
Response 
In addition to the foregoing General Objections, Objections to Instructions, and 
Objections to Definitions, NWS further objects to this Request on the grounds that is not limited 
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to the subject matter of the Verified Complaint, the purported improper sale of cigarettes in the 
State of Idaho, and instead seeks all documents relating to the sale, shipment, etc. of cigarettes 
anywhere in the United St.ates. NWS also objects to this Request to the extent it requires NWS 
to make a legal conclusion. NWS additionally objects on the grounds the terms "offer for sale," 
"ownership" and "possession" are vague and ambiguous. NWS also objects on the ground the 
Request contains no limit:ttion as to time. Subject to these Objections and without waiver of 
same, NWS will produce responsive documents, if any, that are in its possession, custody or 
control and which relate to the time period that is referenced in the Verified Complaint. 
Supplemental Response 
After reasonable inquiry NWS was unable to locate documents responsive to this request. 
Efforts to locate documents responsive to this request are ongoing to the extent such records are 
found, NWS will supplement. 
DATED this 17th day of September, 2010. 
EBERLE, BERLIN ~ lNG, TURNBOW, 
/~TdERE~D;; e 
V". " 
By ~ \ ! 
S i. Diddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney this 17th day of September, 2010, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Brett T. DeLange 
Office of the Attorney General 
650 W. State Street, Lower Level 
PO Box 83702 
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010 
(208) 334-2424 
lYJ U.S. Mail 
[ JHand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 334-4151 
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr. 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Tax Commission 
PO BOX 36 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410 
(208) 334-7530 
S
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA
 
YEAR
 INVOICEflf BRAND CASES UNITS TOTAL UNITS INVOICE AMT MONTH 
OPAL 30 40 240,0002004 12-Feb 4876 
SENECA 50 160 1,600,000 
SENECA 60 95 1,140,000 2,980,000 $109,105.00 
2004 OPAL 30 45 270,0005-Apr 4995 
SENECA 50 200 2,000,000 
SENECA 60 100 1,200,000 3,470,000 $127,002.50 
2004 305140 OPAL 30 180,00024-May 
SENECA 50 180 1,800,000 
SENECA 60 105 1,260,000 3,240,000 $118,260.00 
2004 5234 OPAL 30 55 330,00013-Jul 
170 1,700,000SENECA 50 
SENECA 60 1,080,000 3,110,000 $114,222.50 
2004 
90 
09-Auq 5302 OPAL 30 0 
SENECA 50 145 1,450,000 
1,860,000SENECA 60 155 3,310,000 $119,987.50 
2004 5425 OPAL 30 40 240,0005-0ct 
1,600,000SENECA 50 160 
1,680,000 3,520,000SENECA 60 140 $128,680.00 
2004 2524-Nov 5533 OPAL 30 150,000 
SENECA 50 122 1,220,000 
SENECA 60 100 1,200,000 2,570,000 $93,837.50 
2004 OPAL 30 30,0003'I-Dec 5599 5 
SENECA 50 110 1,100,000 
SENECA 60 1,320,000 2,450,000110 $88,947.50 
24,650,0002004 TOTAL $900,042.50 I 
EXHIBIT 
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA 
YEAR MONTH BRAND CASES UNITS TOTAL UNITS INVOICE AMT 
2005 11-Feb 5641 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 129 1,290,000 
SENECA 60 130 1,560,000 2,850,000 $110,437.50 
2005 3-Mar 5663 OPAL 30 85 510,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 0 0 510,000 $22,057.50 
2005 11-Apr 5756 OPAL 30 19 114,000 
SENECA 50 70 700,000 
SENECA 60 235 2,820,000 3,634,000 $141,330.50 
2005 25-May 5905 OPAL 30 30 180,000 
SENECA 50 35 350,000 
SENECA 60 130 1,560,000 2,090,000 $81,797.50 
2005 28-Jun 5972 OPAL 30 5 30,000 
SENECA 50 61 610,000 
SENECA 60 179 2,148,000 2,788,000 $108,170.00 
2005 28-Jul 6051 OPAL 30 28 168,000 
SENECA 50 50 500,000 
SENECA 60 220 2,640,000 3,308,000 $125,016.00 
2005 15-Sep 6174 OPAL 30 43 258,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 245 2,940,000 3,198,000 $123,007.50 
2005 12-0ct 6232 OPAL 30 50 300,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 230 2,760,000 3,060,000 $120,075.00 
2005 14-0ct 6237 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 20 240,000 240,000 $9,300.00 
2005 7-Dec 6360 OPAL 30 55 330,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 185 2,220,000 2,550,000 $100,462.50 
2005 TOTAL 24,228,000 $941,654.00 
Page 2 Revised 10/5/10 
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPL'( COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA 
YEAR MONTH BRAND CASES UNITS TOTAL UNITS INVOICEAMT 
2006 17-Jan 6452 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 100 1,200,000 1,200,000 $45,600.00 
2006 17-Jan 6454 OPAL 30 35 210,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 185 2,220,000 2,430,000 $93,547.50 
2006 13-Mar 6593 OPAL 30 40 240,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 305 3,660,000 3,900,000 $149,580.00 
2006 16-May 6764 OPAL 30 60 360,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 240 2,880,000 3,240,000 $125,190.00 
2006 20-Jul 7011 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 230 2,760,000 2,760,000 $104,880.00 
2006 9-Aug 7096 OPAL 30 75 450,000 
SEt\IECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 0 0 450,000 $19,687.50 
2006 22-Aug 7141 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 275 3,300,000 3,300,000 $125,400.00 
2006 22-Aug 7142 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 0 0 
SENECA 120 30 180,000 180,000 $7,875.00 
2006 9-0ct 7374 OPAL 30 45 270,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 145 1,740,000 2,010,000 $77,932.50 
2006 6-Nov 7509 OPAL 30 40 240,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 245 2,940,000 3,180,000 $122,220.00 
2006 TOTAL 22,650,000 $871,912.50 
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA 
YEAR MONTH BRAND CASES UNITS TOTAL UNITS INVOICE AMT 
2007 2-Jan 7708 OPAL 30 30 180,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 270 3,240,000 3,420,000 $130,995.00 
2007 27-Feb 7933 OPAL 30 60 360,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 230 2,760,000 3,120,000 $120,630.00 
2007 11-Apr 8128 OPAL 30 30 180,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 280 3,360,000 3,540,000 $135,555.00 
2007 5-Jun 8359 OPAL 30 50 300,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 116 1,392,000 1,692,000 $64,281.00 
2007 28-Jun 8471 OPAL 30 25 150,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 165 1,980,000 2,130,000 $81,802.50 
2007 27-Jul 8614 OPAL 30 45 270,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 260 3,120,000 3,390,000 $130,372.50 
2007 31-Jul 70731 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 10 120,000 120,000 $4,410.00 
2007 11-Sep 8853 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 185 2,220,000 2,220,000 $84,360.00 
2007 2-0ct 8945 OPAL 30 35 210,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 10 120,000 330,000 $13,747.50 
2007 19-0ct 9026 OPAL 30 15 90,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 220 2,640,000 2,730,000 $104,257.50 
2007 6-Dec 9222 OPAL 30 10 60,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 148 1,776,000 
SENECA 120 35 210,000 2,046,000 $79,300.50 
2007 TOTAL 24,738,000 $949,711.50 1 
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA 
YEAR MONTH BRAND CASES UNITS TOTAL UNITS INVOICE AMT 
2008 12-Feb 9459 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 89 1,068,000 
SENECA 120 18 108,000 1,176,000 $45,309.00 
2008 11-Mar 9590 OPAL 30 0 0 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SEI\IECA60 112 1,344,000 
SENECA 120 0 0 1,344,000 $51,072.00 
2008 12-Mar 9598 OPAL 30 20 120,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 
SENECA 120 17 102,000 222,000 $9,712.50 
2008 7-Apr 9721 OPAL 30 17 102,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 80 960,000 
SENECA 120 0 0 1,062,000 $40,942.50 
2008 9-May 9907 OPAL 30 16 96,000 
SEI\IECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 130 1,560,000 
SENECA 120 0 0 1,656,000 $63,480.00 
2008 12-Jun 10114 OPAL 30 35 210,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 125 1,500,000 
SENECA 120 0 0 1,710,000 $66,187.50 
2008 18-Jul 10368 OPAL 30 49 294,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 134 1,608,000 
SEt\IECA 120 0 0 1,902,000 $73,966.50 
2008 18-Aug 10552 OPAL 30 5 30,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 178 1,780,000 
SENECA 120 0 0 1,810,000 $93,310.50 
2008 16-Sep 10709 OPAL 30 31 186,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 227 2,724,000 
SENECA 120 10 60,000 2,970,000 $129,124.50 
2008 6-Nov 11003 OPAL 30 50 300,000 
SENECA 50 0 0 
SENECA 60 220 2,640,000 
SENECA 120 0 0 2,940,000 $128,145.00 
2008 TOTAL TO DATE 16,792,000 $701,250.00 
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NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY SHIPMENT DATA 
YEAR MONTH BRAND CASES UNITS TOTAL UNITS INVOICE AMT 
2009 9-Jan 11264 OPAL 30 
SENECA 50 
SENECA 60 
SENECA 120 
37 
0 
86 
0 
222,000 
0 
1,032,000 
0 1,254,000 $53,908.50 
2009 26-Jan 11315 OPAL 30 
SENECA 50 
SENECA 60 
SENECA 120 
21 
0 
130 
0 
126,000 
0 
1,560,000 
0 1,686,000 $71,272.50 
2009 TOTAL TO DATE 2,940,000 $125,181.00 
TOTAL SHIPPED TO DATE 115,998,000 $4,489,751.50 
TOTAL SHIPPED SINCE 6/8/08 VIOLATION LETTER 14,272,000 $615,915.00 
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INVOICEUBILL Of LAr''JG NA"rJVE NATION INVOICE # 4876 
Dale OfSillo 12-Feb-04 """"­ ....., Shipped Oate: 
Siller: Native Wholesale Supply Sold To War Path 
PO Box 214 Purchaser; North 165 Highway 95 
Gowanda. N.Y. 14070 Plummer 10 63851 
Seneca Nation Territory at Seneca Nation Territory 
Place of Native Wholesale Supply Billed To: War Path 
eale: 11037 Old Logan Rd North 165 Highway 95 
Perrysburg, NY 14129 VIA 
Selleea NatlC)n TerrItory o ShippIng Charges Pending Plummer 10 83851 
DESCRrPTION OF GOODS 
Item Code: Item: Case: Quantity: Price Per Unit: Extension: 
3134 OPAL Menthollt H/Lid 120'5 30 10- $244.50 $2,445.00
._, .. '.. . . - . " .. _. --. ­
OPAL Menthol H/Lid 120'5 30 5 ­3133 
.. --- ------- ..........•.. _-_ .. - - ." _- -- $244.50 .. ...J! .2.2.?..:..5q. 
3132 OPAL Ullra Lt H/Ud 120 30 10­
~" . --~_ .. -----_ ..... "'-- - ._-.. . .... , ...._.. _-.~._--_ .. ~?~~:~9.._ . ~?~~~.~:p_~ ... 
3131 q~~~_~i~~~)·UL~d 1.?2~~._._.. __ ... _~o.__ 15 - $244.50 ~~,~6~:.~Q.
.-..._---­
SENECA MentholLt H/Lid 1oo's 50 35,2351 
••.. _. ._ .• _...--••• •• '_'_0' •••• .~~~~~~__ .. $,1_2,~.~.Z:~Q_, - •. " __ ' _ 
".-
2348
-..__ . 
~_~~~.f~.U~~tH/U~_tO_~! . _ _ .. _.~9_... 15- $362.50 _._~~!43~:..~9 __. 
_~ ..... ~~~~_.... $1.~ ..~~!.~~... 2347" ," SEt'J.r~~A.~~!B~v~'r H/L!d J.Q9'~. . §P .._. ...3.5 ­
A •• __ ••• ... _$4.35.~ _$}.?,225.:~9. __ .1070 SENECA MentholLt SIP 100 60 35 ,­_._--_.-, •• ."._. _ •••• __ 
106B· SENECA UUra It SiP 1OO'.s 60 10­
.._.- - ._._---- _.. . ,- .-- .. -...._',....._.... " . --_.-.... '-- ~~_3_~:~ ..._..... $~ •.~.?~.gQ ..~ 
.... _..
1067 ~E~ECAUg~~ S!r:>100 _.._.. .. ~P_... 15- $435.00 .. _S6!.52E:QQ._. _' __' 
_~_.  
SENECA Full Flavor SIP 100 60 35­
~ ._.~_._ 
1066 ' "'_' '__ __" __. _  __ .. ..__.
". -_.... - ~~~~:~_........ ~1~,?-?5 ..QQ
 
2065\ .. .._._-- SE~.§.~~!'I~~. F.i!l.~!.~!!-l~ing . ~Q__.. 15_~ ..... .J362.5~.~~!':"~?:~._ ..._~ 
2060 SENECA Full Flavor H/Lid King 50 35­
.....__ .._.. 
...._-- , .. --."-"--- -----_ _._--- - ~363~ .. ~.1?,~~!..?.Q.. ._---:---~_ 
2054 ~E~~9~.full ~Iave.~.~!?ft Kln~ ..._._.~Q_ .. 25~..._._ $362.50 .... _ .. ~~2.5q . . 
Pagel D/3 EXHIBIT 
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DESCRIPTION OF GOODS 
Item Code Item: Pack: Quantity: ~PerUnlt; Extension: 
Total Quantity Delivered 
Total Cartons Delivered 
Total Packs Delivered 
Total Sticks Delivered 
295 
14,900 
149,000 
2,980,000 
Add one extra handling u.l)jt to. 
any fraction of the whole number. 
Units 9.8 
Sub Total $109,105.00 
Shipping $2,065.00 
Discounts $0,00 
CONDJTION OF SALE 
Total Weight (Lbs) 7788 TOTAL THIS ORDER $111,170.00 
These goods have been sold to PurchasE!r at the Seneca Nation Territory. They are for delivery only at Seneca Nation Tertitory and may be 
transported by Purchaser. only at Seneca Nation Territory or to the TerriIory of another native nation. The goods so sold and delivered are only for 
transported resale to dlstr1buterS1Jt Senll1::a Nation Territory or such other Native Territory to which they are transported. 
Purchaser's Signature x 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEl.IVERY AT THE POINT AND TIME OF SALE 
Purchaser's signature below hereby acknowledge!, delivery and receipt Of lhe above described goods at SENECA NATioN 
TERRITORY on this __day of .2004 
_P_U~~~~~~~'S Signature :============~~~~~~==~~~~=~==~~=::==~:;:}_X 
BILL OF LADING: [I . II IITRANSPORT AUTHORIZATION Product Class: 851IProduct: Tobacco Stackable 
Purchaser's Transport Destination Purchaser's Transporter: Transporter Infonnation:
 
War Path AR~NGE FOR SHIPPING Volume Disc. Trackfl:
 
North 165 Highway 95 Roadway Pro#:
 
FOR SHIPPING Web Address: 
Plummer lD 83851 Please allow 5 to 7 days for shippIng 
(208) 68f)·5427 Tracking Ph# (does not include holidays or weekends)
 
Purchaser's signature below hereby authtlrizes and directs ,he .ransport~r 10 transport Pu!cllase(s goods. which have been purchased at Seneca
 
Nation Territosy, to Pu!cllaser's Transport Destination as eel forth above. .
 
Purchaser's Signature X
 
VERIFICATiON OF ARRIVAL ,"T PURCHASER'S TRANSPORT DESTINATION
 
Purcha.sel·s Transport Destination Tribe 5tate _
 
Date Arrived at Purchaser's Transport Destination I I 
Signature of person who received at Purchaser's Transport Destination X 
NWS 000005 
IDAG 172223 
001009
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
P.O. Box 214 
GowRndft, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho &3&S 1 
QUANTITY 
3S 
35 
15 
JS 
25 
.5 
5 
25 
5 
15 
JO 
30 
30 
IS 
10 
15 
]0 
IS 
15 
S 
10 
345 
DESCRIPTION 
Seneca Full Flavor SIP IOD's 
Seneca Light SIP tOO's 
Seneca Ultra Ll SIP 100's 
Seneca Menthol SIP 100's 
Seneca Full Fltavor Soft King 
Seneca Ullra Lt Soft King 
Seneca Menthol Soft King 
SeneCll Full Flavor HlLid King . 
Seneca Menthol H/Lid King 
Seneca Non- Filtcr HlLid King 
Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt son 100'5 
Seneca Full FII!vor HlLid l00's 
Scueca Light H/Lid 100's 
Seneca Ultra Lt HlLid 100's 
Seneca Menthol HlLid 100's 
Seneca Meilthe,1 U HlLid JOO's 
Seneca Mentho" Ullre Ll HlLid 100's 
Opal Full Flav(1I' HlLid 120'5 
Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5 
Opal Menthol fI/Lid 120'5 
Opal Menthol Lt HlLid 120'5 
Shipping 
Discounl-16000 Seneca ctns@$O.SO per ctn 
Invoice
 
DATE INVOICE # 
41512004 4995 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 838S1 
P.O. NO. TERMS PROJECT 
RATE AMOUNT 
435.00 
435.00 
435.00 
435.00 
362.50 
362.50 
362.50 
362.50 
362.50 
362.50 
362.50 
362.50 
362.50 
362.50 
36250 
362.50 
362.50 
244.50 
244.50 
244.50 
244..50 
7.00 
-8,000.00 
15,225.00 
15.225.00 
6,.52.5.00 
6,,525,00 
9,062.50 
J,812.50 
1,812.50 
9,062.50 
1,812.50 
5,437.50 
3,625.00 
10,875.00 
10,875.00 
5,437.50 
3,62.5.00 
5,437.50 
3,625.00 
3,667.50 
3,661.50 
1,22250 
2,445.00 
2,415.00 
-8,000.00 
Total $121,417.50 
----­
Payments/Credits so.oo 
Balance Due $121,417.50 
NWS 000013 
IDAG 172231 
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Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
DATE INVOICE # 
5/1812004 5140 
BILL TO SHIP TO 
. 
War Path 
North 165 HighwllY 9$ . 
Plummer, IdAho 83851 
War Palh 
North 1.65 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
DESCRIPTIONQUANTITY 
70 Seneca Full Flavor SIP laO's 
20 Seneca Lighl SiP l00's 
IS Seneca UlIrll Lt SIP 100's 
35 Seneca Full Flavor Soft King 
35 Sencca Full Fhwor HJLid King 
Seneca Full Flavor HlLid IDO's 
30 
65 
Seneca Light I·I/Lid 100's 
15 Seneca UIII1l Lt H/Lid 100's 
15 Opal Lighl HlLid 120'$ 
15 Opal·U1lra LI H/Lid 120'5 
Discount· 15,300 Seneca cartons@S.50Jcarton 
Shipping ..315 
TERMS PROJECT 
RATE AMOUNT 
435.00 30,450.00 
435.00 8,700,00 
435.00 6,525.00 
362.50 12,687.50 
362.50 12,687.50 
362.50 23,562,50 
362.50 10,875.00 
362.50 5,437.50 
244.50 3,667.50 
2-14.50 3.667.50 
·7,650.00 -7,650.00 
2,205.00 . ·7.00 
Total $112,815.00 
Payments/C red its so.oo 
Balance Due SI12,815.00 
NWS 000021 
IDAG 172239 
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IN\10ICE/BILL OF lADI~,i NATIVE NATION INVOICE # 5234 
......, 
Dale ofS.le 13.Jul·04	 ShIpped 011.: 
Seller: Native Wholesale Supply	 Sold To War Path
 
Purchaser: North 165 Highway 95
PO Box214 
Gowanda. N. Y. 14070 PlummerlO 83851 
Seneca Nation Territory	 at Seneca Natlon Territory 
Place of NaUv8 Wholesale SUpply Billed To:	 War Path
 
North 165 Highway 95
 sale: 11037 Old Logan Rd 
Perrysburg, NY 14129 VIA 
Seileca Nation Territory o Shipping Charges Pending Plummer to 83851 
-------_.. 
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS 
Item Code: Item: Case: QuantIty: Price Per Unit: ExtensIon: 
2347 SENECA Full Flavor H/lid 100's 50 25 $362.50 $9,062.50 
1055 SENECA Li£}ht ~/P ~I~~ 60 10 $435.00 $4,350.00 
1066 SENECA Full Flavor SIP 100 60 25 $435.00 $10.875.00 
... . . . -. -_ .. -.. ". .~ 
1061 S~.N~~~ Li9h~ S/F.' .11~ .. 60 
. . 
20
_.., ... .. 
$435.00 $~!~~Q..Q0. 
_~._
1069 SENECA
. 
Menthol 
_ 
SIP 100 
. 
60 15
_ - - ... _. 
$435.00 $.~,~?~:~9_.	 ... 
50 202060 S!=~.'~C.A Full F~l;Iv.~! ~!!:i~ Ki~~L .. 
......-	 .-, ..... , 
$362.50 $7!25.0.0q 
1054	 . 60 20 $435.00 $8,700.00S.~~.~9.A FUII£:!~v~t~~~~~~~...	 
. . .. -.- ---_ .. . _._ . 
2065	 50 15 $362.50 $5,437.50SENE<;;A .N_c>~ F!l~~~..~.~~~~ .~~~$t.	 
... - .._..- ... . ..-_._----_.. _. 
3134 OPAL Menthol Lt H/lid 120's 30 15 $244.50 $3,667.50
... . .. _ .. -_ ..__ .. _. .. --_ .... ...... '" .. _.... , ...._- .. ,-_.-. . ... _. --- ..~._~ 
2348	 50 30 $362.50SEN.~CA .~!Q~~ t-I!.~!d.. ~ Q~'S.. 
-- -_ .. --.-.- - .... .........---_. 
$~9.'~?~:.og.. __.. 
2349 SENECA Ultra Lt H/Lid 100'8 50 50 $362.50 $1 ~,,1~.~.gl! _._._
- , - .... " .... - ' .. ~ ..... . _..... _. . ...._.
 
2351 SENECA Menthol It IH/lid 100's $362.50
 
- . . _. - .- .. -_ _.. , . 
50 20 
. ..._--- - ._. . - ..- ----_ _.. 
... $7!?~QJ~9.. . 
3130 OPAL Full Flavor Hflid 120's 30 15 $244.50 $3,667.50
",. - ._- --.-. ---, --_.- .. _•.. _ --_ .. . , _-- . . .._-----_._ __ .. ­
3131 30 15OPAL ligh.t H/~!~..12.~:~ . ._ .. 
...._-- -.-_._-	 ~2~~ ..?~_ .. ~~!.~!.:.~E _.. _ 
3132 OPAL Urtra Lt H/Lid 120 30 10	 $2,445.00 
.. '. .. - " ." ....... -"'" $24~:?~_. , . ....._... - -'-.' - . 
2061 . 50 10 $362.50 $3,625.00?~N ~~'."'- ~!~~~ !it~i-,!. ~~Jt .._	 . _-_ - . . ..... -~--_.-_.._. - -. --­
PageJof2 
ll.1\1I'C nnnn'?7 
IDAG 172245 001012
-----------
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS
 
Item Code: Item: Ca.se: Quantity: Pri 'er Unit Extension:

......" _ ---_._.__ _-, -_._--_ ..- . 
Total Cases Delivered 315 Add one extra handling unit to Sub Total $114,222.50
15550Total Cartons Delivered any fraction of the whole number. Shipping $2,205.00 
Total Packs Delivered 15fi.500 
Units 1Q.4 DIscounts $0.00 Total Sticks Delivered 3110000 
TOTAL THIS ORDER $116,427.50Total Weight (Lbs) 11340 CONDITION OF SALE
 
These goods have been sold to Pur~Sllr at the Seneca Nation Territory. They are for delivery only at Seneca Nation Territory plld may be
 
transported by Purchaser, only at Seneca Nation Tetrltory or to the Territory of another native nation. The gaoels 80 sold anel delivered are
 
only for transported resale to distributers at Seneca Nation TerritoI}' or aueh other Native Territory to which they are transported.
 
Purchaser's Signature X 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DELIVERY AT THE POINT AND TIME OF SALE
 
Purchaser's slgllature below hereby acknowledges defi"ery and receipt of the above described goods at SENECA
 
NATION TERRITORY on this __da)" of ,2004
 
Purchaser's Signat~~re:"'-~X~============~~~~~==~~==~~~==;:;====~I ~~~~~~~~~:~RtzATION 'IPrOductC'a~s: 851IPrOduct: TObaccol!Stackablel} 
Purchaser's transport Destination Purchaser's Transporter: Transporter 'nformation:
 
War Path ARRANGE FOR SHIPPING Volume 01Sl;. Track':
 
North 165 Highway 95 Roadway Pro#:
 
FOR SHIPPING Web Address: 
Plummer 10 83851 Please allow 5 to 7 days for shipping 
(208) 686-5427 (does not Include holidays or weekends 
Purchaser's signature below hereby authorizes anel directs the transporter to transport Purchaser's goods. whIch have been purchased at 
Seneca Nation Territory. to Purchaser's Transport Destination 8S set forth abDve. 
Purchaser's Signature X 
VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL ArpURCHASER'S TRANSPORT DESTINATION 
Purchaser's Transport Destination Tribe State 
-----..._----- ---­
.pate Arrived at Purchaser's Transport Destination I I 
Signature of person who recei"'ed at Purchaser's Transport Destination· x 
Pt1Il~ 2011 
NWS OOOn?A 
IDAG 172246
 001013
5302 
DATE INVOICE # 
819/2004 
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO SHIP TO 
Wac Palh 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idano 8385 I 
War Palh 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
TERMS PROJECT 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNTITEM 
NV·I1054 30 Seneca Full FlAvor SIP King 435.00 13,050.00 
NV·11066 35 Seneca Full Flavor SIP loo's 435.00 15,225.00 
NV-1l067 30 Seneca Light SIP 100's "435.00 13,050.00 
NV·II068 3D Seneca Ullra Ll SIP 1OD's 435.00 13,050.00 
NV-1J070 30 Seneca Menthol U SIP 100's 435.00 13,050.00 
NV·22058 5 Seneca Menthol Lt Soft King 362.50 1,812.50 
NV-22060 35 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid King 362.50 12,687.50 
. NY-220M S Senecll Menthol U HlLid King 362.50 /,812.50 
NV·22065 15 Seneca Non· Filter HlLid King 362.50 :5,437.50 
NV·22347 30 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid 100's 362.50 10.875.00 
NV-22348 30 Seneca Light HJLid 100's - 362.50 10,875.00 
NV-223S1 25 Seneca Menthol U HlLid JOO's 362.50 9,062.50 
2 300 Shipping 7.00 " 2.100.00 
Total $122,087.50 
Payments/Cred its $0.00 
Balance Due $122,087.50 
NWS 000036 
IDAG 172254 001014
INVOICE/BILL OF LADI 1 NATIVE NATION INvorCE # 5425 
~.. 
Date of Sale 05-0ct-04	 Shipped Date: 
Seller: NBtive Wholesale Supply	 Sold To Warpath
 
Purchaser: NQrth 165 Highway 95
PO 80)(214
 
Gowanda,N:V.14070 Plummer 10 83851
 
Toll Free: 1·877·628-4833 
Place of Nalive Wholesale Supply Billed To: War Path 
sale: North 165 Highway 9510955 Logan Rd
 
Perrysburg, NY 14129
 VIA 
Seneca NatIon Territory [J Shipping Charges Pending Plummer 10 83851
 
-----------'--'---'--'
 
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS 
Item Code: Item: Case: Quantity: Price Per'Unlt: Eldension: 
SENECA Full Flavor HlLid 100's 50 75 $362.50 $27,187.502347	 
..._..... . ... . .. . . .
~. 
1066 SENECA Full Flavor SIP 100 60 75 $435.00 $3.~,6?.~:O.o 
1067 ~ENE~A Light SIP 1.00 60 15 $435.00 . ~~.5?-5.0Q . 
1068 .SENECA Ultra Lt SIP 100's 60 10 $435.00 $4,350.00
............ -- -.. .. " ._-- _.
 
1070 SENECA Menthol Lt SIP 100 60 10 $435.00 $4,350.00
 
1071 SENECA Menthol Ultra Lt SIP 100 60 10 $435.00 $4,350.00

.. ., '. ... . .- "_. . ... .. - ..- - . ..	 - . - ...- ... 
2059	 5
. ~~~E.CA. Me!lt~.'?J..':lJ~~~·.~~~~~~i.'."'.~_ .__ §.~ ...._.. 
... - . 
$3~.?~_o.. . $~,81~.~O..
 
1054 S~NECA Full.F.'avor S/f.>.Ki~g 60 20 $435.00 $8,700.00 .
 
. . .. _.... _.....- .. 
2065 S~~I::CA .Non ~ilt~.r t1'/L.i~.K!~g 50 20 $3.6.~.~~ _._ ·$7~~~~:OQ __ .
 
3134 OPAL Menthol Lt HlLid 120'5 30 5
 
..... ..... ._._--_._-,.,	 . - ... $~~~:~Q J1 ..~~~~~~ ._-.~~. 
2348 SENECA Light H/Lid. ·I.(){).'.~ 50 15 $362.50 $5,437.50
".- .. _." -"-' - ...'. 
2349 SENECA Ultra Lt H1Ud 1oo's 50 15 $.36?.~(). _. . $.?,~.~!:.?Q. ..'
 
2351 ~~~ECA M~~th.ol~t.t:!~~c:!.1.QQ:~_ .. __ ?~ .... 
...
10
----_ . 
$~~~~?Q_.. __ .. .~~.~2~:Q.o. .
 
~. 
2352 SENECA Menthol Ultr,a Lt H/Lid 100' 50 10 
... - -_ .... ~~~?..~Q.. ... .~~~~?~~~.. ..
 
3131 OPAL Light H/Lid 1~l?'s 30 15
 $~~~:~Q._. ---- . ~~~.'~~!~~~. ...­
3132 OPAL Ultra Lt H/Ud 1~~0 3D 15
- .. .. . '.' _.... . . ._-_.._ . $~~~:~. .. . .. . . $.~.~~7:~.~_ .. "'"
 
. ·3133· OPAL Menthol H/lid 120'5 30 5 
. $244.50 . ~ti~2..?:~() __ .
 
2060 Sf:~ECA Full F.lavor..I·Y~!~ Ki~~J. ~~Q. 10 ~~6.?:~~.._._.. . ~.?.'~2~:Q~ '_'
 
.. , -_ - " .. _ "-'--- .. -. --_ .. ­~. 
I 
i 
I 
Pogelo/2 I 
I 
! 
IDAG 172260 I 
NWS 000042 
001015
-------------
DE!iCRIPTION OF GOODS 
Item Code: Item: ........ Case: Quantify: Pri~rUn.lt:. . .....~~~~s.!~~;_. 
Tota r Cases Delivered 
Total Cartons Delivered 
Total Packs Delivered 
Total Sticks Delivered 
340 
17eOO 
176000 
3520000 
Add one extra handling unit to 
any fractlon of the whole number. 
Units 11.7 
Sub Total $128,680.00 
ShIpping $2,380.00 
DlscoLJnts $0,00 
CONDITION OF SALE Total Weight (Lbs) 12240 
TOTAL THIS ORDER $131,060.00 
These goods have been sold 10 Purchaser althe Seneca Nation Terrilory. They are for delivery only al Seneca Nalfon Territory and ms)' be 
transported by Purchaser, only alSeneca Nation Territory or to the Territory of anaIller nalive nation. The goods so sold and delivered are 
only for transported resale to dislributers at Seneca Nation Ternlory or such oloer Native Territory to which they are transported. 
Purchaser's Signature X 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DELIVERY AT THE POINT AND TIME OF SALE 
Purchaser's signature below hereby acknowledges delivery and receipt of the above described goods at SENECA 
NATION TERRITORY on this __day IJf .2004 
Purchaser's Signature X ..._ 
BILL OF LADING: E~t Class: 8511 Product: To'b8ccolfstackableJl TRANSPORT AUTHORIZATION 
Purchaser's Transport Destination Purchaser's Transporter: Transporter Information:
 
War Path ARRANGE FOR.SHIPPING Volume DIsc. Trackt:
 
North 165 Highway 95 Roadway Pro#:
 
FOR SHIPPING Web Address: 
Plummer 10 83851 Please allow 5 to 7 day. for shipping 
(208) 686-5427 (does not include holidays or weekends 
Purchaser's sllJnature below hereby authorizes and directs the transporter 10 transport Purchaser's goods. which have been purchased at 
Seneca Nation Territory, 10 Purchaser's Tr~lnsport Destination as set forth above. . 
Purchaser's Signature x 
IERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AT PURCHASER'S TRANSPORT DESTlNA1'ION 
Purchaser's Transport Destination TrIbe ...._.._. .. State 
Date Arrived at Purchaser's Transport Destination I I 
Signature of person who received at Purchaser's Transport Destination ·x 
Page2,,!Z' 
NWS 000043 
IDAG 172261 001016
DATE INVOICE # 
1112412004 5533 
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WIlT Path 
North 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho &38:51 
SHIP TO 
W81'Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
P.O. NO. 
RATE 
TERMS 
AMOUNT 
NV-I1054 30 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 435.00 13,OSO.OO 
NV-II055 S; Seneca Light SIP King 435.00 2,175.00 
NV·1I056 5 Seneca UllTO Light SIP King 435.00 2,175.00 
NV·IlQ66 25 Seneca Full Flavor SIP laO's 435.00 10,875.00 
NV·1l067 25 Seneca Light SIP 100's 435.00 10,875.00 
~V·11070 10 Seneca Menthol Ll SIP 100's 435.00 4,3S0.00 
NV·22060 30 Seneca Full Flavor HlLfd King 362.50 10,875.00 
NV·22061 S Seneca Light HlLid King 362.50 1,812.50 
NV-22062 5 Seneca Ultra Lt HlLid King 362.50 1,812.50 
NV-22347 25 Seneca Full Flavor HlLidlOO's 362.50 9.062.50 
NV-22348 2.S Seneca Light HlLid 100's 362.50 9,062.50 
NV-22349 2S Seneca Ultra Lt HlLid 100's 362.50 9,062.50 
NV·22351 7 Seneca Menthol UHlLid 100's 362.50 2,537:50 
NV·33 130 IS Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's 244.50 3,667.50 
NV-33133 .s Opal Menthol HlLid 120's 24UO 1,222.50 
NV·33 134 5 Opal Menthol Lt WLid 120's 244.50 1,222.50 
2 247 Shipping 7.00 1,729.00 
Total $95,566.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due 595,566.50 
NWS 000051 
IDAG 172269 
001017
DATE INVOICEfI 
12/3112004 5599 
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
SHIP TO BILL TO 
WarPathWarPath 
North 16S Highway 95North 165 Highway 95 . 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 IPlummer, Idaho 83851 
P.D.NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-IIOS4 30 [Senea Full FJavor SIP King 435.60 n,oso.OO 
NV-IIOS6 5 Seneca Ultra Light SIP King 435.00 2,175.00 
NV-l10S8 5 ,Seneca Menthol Light SIP King 435.00 2,175.00 
NV-I.1066 30 Seneca Full "'Javor SIP !OD's 435.00 13,050.00 
NV-I1068 2S Seneca Ultra J.t SIP 100's 435.00 10,875.00 
NV-l1070 IS Seneca Menthol Lt SIP IDO's 435.00 6,525.00 
NV·22060 30 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid King 362.50 10,875.00 
NY-22063 5 Seneca Menthol HlLid King 362.50 1,812.50 
NV·22065 20 Seneca Non- Filter HlLid King )62,50 7,250.00 
NV·22348 2S Seneca Light HlLid IDO's 362.50 9,062.50 
NV·223S0 10 SenccllMenthol HJLld lOO's 362.50 3,625.00 
NV-22JSI 20 'Seneca Menthol Lt IYLld 100's 362.50 7,250.00 
NV·33 134 5 Opal Menthol Lt· HlLid 120's 244.50 1,222.50 
2 225 Shipping 7.00 1,575.00 
Total $90,522.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due S90,522,SO 
NWS 000059 
IDAG 172277 
001018
2fl1l2005 
DATE 
5641 
INVOICE #Invoice 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda. NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
BilL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer. Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer. Idaho 8385 I 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV·1I0S4 20 Seneca Full flavor SIP King 465.00 9,300.00 
NV·IIOSS 
NV·1/066 
10 Seneca Light SIP King 
.'0 SeneCll Full Flavor SIP IOD's 465.00 465.00 4,650.00 18.600.00 
NV·II067 35 Seneca Light SIP 1OD's 465.00 16,275.00 
NV·1J068 ~!5 Seneca UUra U SIP loo's 465.00 11,625.00 
NV-2~060 40 Seneca Full Flavor Hll..id King 387.50 15,500.00 
NY·22065 IS Seneca Non- Filter HJLid King 387.50 5,812.50 
NV·22347 40 Seneca Full Flavor H/Lid 100's 387.50 15,500.00 
NV·22348 5 Seneca Light HlLid 10O's 387.50 1,937.50 
NY·22349 25 Senecll Ultra Lt HlLid 100's 387.50 9,687.50 
NV·22352 ,4 Seneca Menthol Ullra u HlLid 100's 387.50 1,550,00 
2 2S'!> Shipping 7,<lO 1,813.00 
Total $112,250.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $112,250.50 
NWS 000066 
IDAG 172284 001019
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowftndas NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
DATE INVOICE # 
3/3/2005 5663 
BILL TO 
War Palh 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
Norlh 16.5 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANriTY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-33130 2(. Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's 259.50 5,190.00 
NV·331)1 20 Opal Light HlLid 120's 259.50 5,190.00 
NV-33132 20 Opal Ultra U H!Lid 120's 259.50 5,190.00 
NY-33 133 ~: Opal Menthol HlLid 120's 259.50 1,297.50 
NV-33134 20 Opal Menthol Lt Hn...id 120's 259.50 5,190.00 
2 85 Shipping 7.00 595.00 
Tota" $22,G5~.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due· Sll,65l.S0 
NWS 000073 
IDAG 172291 
001020
5756 
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
4/1112005
P.o. Box214 
GowandA, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO SHIP TO 
WarPalh 
North 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho &3851 
WarPath 
North J6S HighwB)' 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNTITEM 
NV·11054 30 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 465.00 13,950.00 
NV·l1057 .5 Seneca Menthol SIP King 465.00 2,325.00 
NV-11066 50 SeneclI Full Flavor SIP 100's 465.00 23,250.00 
N¥·11067 30 Seneca Light SIP 100's 465.00 13,950.00 
NV-I1068 20 SeneclI U\l~ Lt SIP 100's 465.00 9.300.00 
N-11070 fO Seneca Menthol Lt SIP IOD's 465.00 4,650.00 
NY·IIO?! 10 .Seneca Menlhol Ultra U SIP 100's 465.00 4,650.00 
NY-I10n 10 Seneca Full Flavor BIL 100's 465.00 4,650.00 
NY-f1073 SO Seneca Light HIL IOD's 465.00 23,250.00 
NV·II074 20 Seneca Ultra Lighl HIl. 100's 46S.00 9,300.00 
NV·22060 25 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid King 381.50 9,687.50 
NV·22061 15 Seneca Lighl HlLid King 387.50 5,812.50 
NV·22062 S Seneca Ultra Ll HlLid King 387.50 1,937.50 
NV-22065 10 Seneca Non- Filter (-{/Lid King 387.50 3,875.00 
NV-2235I 15 Senec..\ MenthOl Ll HlLid lOO's 387.50 5,S1Z.S0 
NV-33J30 10 Opal full FI~vor HII,id f20's 259050 2,595.00 
NY·33131 4 Opal Lighl HlLid 120's 259.50 . 1,038.00 
NV-33 133 5 Opal Mcnrhol HlLid 120's 259•.50 1.297.50 
2 324 Shipping 7.00 2,26&.00 
Total $143,598.50 
Payments/Credits SO.uO 
Balance Due $143.598.50 
NWS 000080 
IDAG 172298 
001021
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
512512005 5911S 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532:6fj6 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO SHIP TO 
WarPath WarPath 
·Nonh HiS Highway 95 ·North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 . Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT· 
NV-1l054 3S Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 465.00 16,275.00 
NY-I 1066 35 Seneca Full Flavor-SIP 100's 465.00 16,275.00 
NV·I1067 10 Seneca Light SIP 100's 465.00 4,650.00 
NV·I1068 10 Seneca Ultra Lt Sf? lOO's 465.00 4,650.00 
NV·11069 5 Seneca Menthol Sf? 100'5 465.00 2,325.00 
NV-II072 35 Seneca Full Flavor HIL lOO's 465.00 16,275.00 
NV-22060 35 Seneca Full Flavor H1Lid King 387.50 13,562.50 
NV·33 131 15 Opal Light HlLid 120's 259.50 3,892.50 
NV-33 132 IS Opal Ultra LI H/Lid 120'5 259.50 3,892.50 
2 195 Shipping 7.00 1,365.00 
l.....­ ....,..-­ ._. 
Total
-+­ $83,162.50 ~ 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due 
NWS 000093 
lOAG 172311 
001022
5972 
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
6/28/2005 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
War Path 
Nonh 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highwuy 95 
Plummer. Idaho 83851 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
P.O. NO. 
RATE 
TERMS 
AMOUNT 
NV-II054 3 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 465.00 1.395.00 
NV-I JOSS 10 Seneca Light SiP King 465.00 4,650.00 
NV·l1057 5 Seneca Menthol SIP King 465.00 2,325.00 
NV-11066 45 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's 465.00 20,925.00 
NV-IIOQ7 16 Seneca Light SIP 100's 465.00 7,440.00 
NV-11068 10 Seneca Ullra Lt SIP loo's 465.00 4,650.00 
NV-II069 10 Sentea Menthol SIP 100's 465.00 4,650.00 
NV-II070 15 St:neca Menthol Lt SIP LOO's 465.00 6,975.00 
NV·llon 40 Seneca Full Flavor BIL 100's 465.0D 18,600.00 
NV-f1075 10 Seneca Menthol HIL 100's 465.00 4,650.00 
NV·11076 15 Seneca Menlhoi Light HIL IOD's 465.00 6,975.00 
NV-22060 21 SeneclI Full Flavor H/Lid King 387.50 8,137.50 
NV-22061 10 Seneca Light HlLid King 387.50 3.815.00 
NV·2206J 5 Seneca Menthol WLid King 387.50 1,937.50 
NV·22065 25 SenecK Non- Filter !·IILid King 387.:50 9,681.50 
NV-33131 5 Opal Light HlLid 120's 259.50 1,.297.50 
. 2 245 Shipping· 7.00 1,7 J5.00 
Totar SI09,885.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $109,885.00 
NWS 000096 
IDAG 172314 
001023
712812005 
DATE 
6051 
INVOICE #Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WarPatll 
North 165 Hig.hway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highwily 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P:O.NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTIW DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-IIOS4 30 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 450:00 13,500.00 
NY-I 1055 10 Seneca Light SIP King 450.00 4,500.00 
NV-11066 30 Seneca-Fu II Flavor SIP lOG's 450.00 13,500.00 
NY-II 067 15 Seneca Light SIP IDO's 450.00 6,750.00 
NY-I 1068 15 Sencca Ultra LI SIP 100's 450.00 6,750.00 
NY· 11 069 10 SenecR Menthol SIP 100's 450.00 4,500.00 
NY·11070 15 Seneca Menthol U SIP 100'5 450.00 6,750.00 
NY-lIOn 30 Sencca Full Flavor HIL 100'5 450.00 13,500.00 
NY-I 1073 30 Seneca Light HIL 100's ·450.00 13,500.00 
NY·l1074 IS Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100's 450.00 6,750.00 
NY. I 1075 10 Seneca Menthol HIL fOO's 450.00 4,500.00 
NV·11076 10 Seneca Menthol Light HIL IOD's 450.00 4,500.00 
NV·22060 30 Seneca Full Flavor HlLid King 375.00 11,250.00 
NV-22061 10 Seneca Light HlLid King­ 375.00 3,750.00 
NV·22065 10 Seneca Non- Filter HlLid King 375.00 3,750.00 
NV-33 1_30 8 Qpal Full Flavor H/Lid 120'5 259.50 2,076.00 
NY-33l31 5 Opal Light HlLid f20's 259.50 1,297.:50 
NV·33132 5 Opal Ultra Ll HlLid 120's 259.50 1,297.50 
NY-33 133 5 Opal Menthol H/Lid 120's 259.50 1,297.50 
NV·33 134 5 Opal Menthol Lt HlLid 120's 259.50 1,297.50 
2 298 Shipping 7.00 2,086.00 
Total S127,102.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $127,[02_00 
NWS 000105 
IDAG 172323 
001024
• 
-Invoice 
.INVOICE #DATE 
9JJ4/2005 6174 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowancla, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WluPlIlh 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idabo 8385 I 
SHIP TO 
Was Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
RATEITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
NY-I 1054 25 Seneca Full flavor SfP King 456.00 11,400.00 
NY·11060 25 Senecn Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 11,400.00 
NY· 11066 30 Seneca Full Flavor SIP laO's 456.00 13,680.00 
NY-I 1067 25 Seneca Light SIP 100's 456.00 11,400.00 
NY-I 1068 15 Seneca Ultra Ll SIP 100'5 456.00 6,840.00 
'lY·11069 10 Seneca Menthol SIP IDO's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY·1I070 20 Seneca Menthol U SIP 100's 456.00 9,120.00 
NY·1I071 5 Seneca Menthol Ultra U SIP 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NY-lIOn 20 Senccll.Full FlavorH!L 100's 456.00 9,120.00 
NY-llO?3 25 Seneca Light HIL 100'5 456.00 11.400.00 
NY·[ 1074 IS Seneca Ultra Lt HIL 1M's 456.00 6,840.00. 
NY·I1075 10 Seneca Menthol HIL 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY·II076 20 Seneca Menthol U H!L IDO's 456.00 9,120.00 
NY-33130 10 Opal Full Flavor H!Lid 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NY-3Jljl 9 Opal Light HlLid 120's 262.50 2,362.50 
NY-33 132 14 Opal Ultra Lighl WLid PO's 262.50 3,675.00 
NY-33133 . 5 Opal MCOlhol HlLid 120's 262.50 1.312.50 
NY-33134 5 Opal Menthol Lt H/Lid 120's 262.50 1,3/2.50 
2 :~88 Shipping 7.00 2,016.00 
Total $125.023.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due 1125,023,50 
NWS 000114 
IDAG 172332 
001025
DATE INVOICE # 
J011212005 6232 
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
Bill TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 838Sl 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-II054 20 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 465.00 9.300,00 
NY·JJ060 40 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 465.00 18.600,00 
NY-I 1061 10 Seneca Light HIL King 465.00 4,650.00 
NV·11065 10 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King 465.00 4.650.00 
NV·II066 40 Seneca Full Fillvor SIP 100's 465.00 18.600.00 
NV.l1067 20 Seneca Light SIP 100's 465.00 9,300.00 
NV-lJ068 15 Seneca Uhrll Lt SIP 100's 465.00 6,975.00 
NY·lI012 40 Seneca Full Flavor HIL IDO's 465.00 18,600.00 
NY-I 1013 20 Seneca Light HIL JOD's 465,00 9,300.00 
NV-I1074 IS Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100's 465.00 6,975.00 
NV-33 130 IS Opal Full Flavor HlLirl 120's 262.50 3.937.50 
NV·33 13 I IS Opal Light HlLld 120'5 262.50 3,937.50 
NV·33132 15 Opal Uhl1l Lt HlLid 120'5 262.50 3,937.50 
NV-33134 5 Opal Menthol Lt HlLid 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
2 280 Shipping 7.00 1,960,00 
-
Total $122,035.00 
Payments/Credjts $0.00 
Balance Due $121,035.00 
NWS 000117 
IDAG 172335 
001026
1011412005 
DATE 
6237 
INVOICE #Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO SHIP TO 
WarPath War Path 
North 165 Highway 95North 165 HighwllY 9S 
Plununer, Idaho 83851 Plummer. Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTIlY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NY. I1054 20 Seneca Full flavor SIP King 465.00 9,300.00 
20 Shipping2 1.00 140.00 
Total $9,440.00 
Payments/Credits SO.oo 
Balance Due $9,440.00 
NWS 000121 
IDAG 172339 
001027
Invoice DATE INvorCE# 
121712005 6360 
P.O. Box 214 
GowAnda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
Bill TO 
War Path 
. North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer. Idallo 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NY. I 1054 25 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 465.00 11,625.00 
NY-I 1055 5 Seneca Light SIP King 465.00 2,325.00 
NY-I 1060 25 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 465.00 11,625.00 
NV·11061 5 SenccR Light HIL King 465.00 2,325.00 
NY·H065 10 SenecR Non-Filter HlLid King 465.00 4,650.00 
NV·I1066 3D Seneca full Flavor SIP 100's 465.00 13,950.00 
NY-I 1067 15 Seneca Light SIP lOO's 465.00 6,975.00 
NY-lI06B 20 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 465.0D 9,300.00 
NV-II070 10 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP lOO's 465.00 4,650.00 
NY-I 1073 15 Seneca Light HII.. 10D's 465.00 6,975.00 
NV·11074 :W Seneca Ultra Light HJL 100's 465.00 9,300.00 
NV·11077 5 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt HIL 100's 465.00 2,325.00 
NV-33 130 15 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's 262.50 3.937.50 
NY-33 13 I :z.s Opal Light HlLid 120's 262.50 6,562.50 
NV-33 132 lS Opal Ultra Lt H/Lid 120's 262.50 3.937.50 
2 240 Shipping 7.00 1.680.00 
Total $102,142.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due SI02,142.50 
NWS 000125 
IDAG 172343 
001028
Invoice DATE ~ I--__ _ --t_'N_VO_IC_E_#-i 
~~ ~~. 1/17/2006 6452
--=-rO.-;:;2~ L..-__---" --.-.J 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Higltway 95 
Plummer. Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Ptummor,ldano 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
1 ITEM 
NY-Ilon 
NY·I1073 
NY·l1074 
2 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
65 Seneca Full Flavor HIL 1OD's 
20 Seneca Light HIL 1OD's 
15 Seneca Ultra U HIL l00's 
100 Shipping 
RATE 
456.00 
456.00 
456.00 
7.00 
AMOUNT 
29,640.00 
9.120.00 
6,840.00 
700.00 
Total $46,:100.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $46,300.00 
NWS 000132 
IDAG 172350 
001029
-

Invoice JNVOrCE#DATE 
1/1712006 6454 
·P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idllbo 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV·lIOS4 30 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 456.00 13,680.00 
NV-II060 30 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 13,680.00 
NV-11062 5 Seneca Ultra Light HJL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-l1063 S Seneca Mentbol HIL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·11066 65 Seneca Full Flavor Sfp 100's 456.00 29,640.00 
NV-1I067 20 Seneca Light SIP 100's 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-1I068 IS Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-11070 15 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-3313! 10 Opal Light HlLid 120'5 262.50 2,625.00 
NV·33132 10 ' Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5 262.50 2,625.00 
NV-33 133 5 Opal Menthol HlLid 120'5 262.50 1,312.50 
NV-33134 10 IOpal Menthol Lt H1Lid 120's 262.50 2,625W 
2 220 Shipping 7.00 1,540.00 
Total S95,OB7.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due 595,087.50 
NWS 000131 
IDAG 172349 
001030
DATE INVOICE # 
3/13/2006 6593 
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
War Path 
Noeth 165 Highway 95 
Plummer. Jdaho 838~ I 
SHIP TO 
W81 Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer. Idaho 8385 I 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTIIY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-II054 2S Seneca Pull Flavor SIP King 456.00 11.400.00 
NV-IIOSS 10 Seneca Lighl SIP King 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-l1060 25 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 11,400.00 
NV-II061 10 Seneca Ught H/L King 456.00 4.560.00 
NV·1I06S IS Seneca Non·Filter Jl/Lid King 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·II066 50 Sencca Full Flavor SIP 100's 456.00 22,800.00 
NV·II067 20 Seneca Light SIP IDO's 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-II068 15 Seneca Ullra Lt SIP lOO's 456.00 6,840.00 
. NY·I1069 10 SeneclI Menthol SIP 100's 4~6.00 4,560.00 
NV-I1070 IS Seneca Menthol Lt SIP IOO's 456.00 .6,840.00 
NV-IIOn 50 Seneca Full Flavor HIL IOD's 4.56.00 22,800.00 
NV·II073 20 Seneca Light HlL IOD's 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-II074 15 Seneca Ultra Light HII. 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·II075 10 g,eneclI Menlhol HIL 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-1I076 15 Seneca Mcnthol Light HIt 100's 1\56.00 6,840.00 
NV-3J130 10 Opal Full Flayor H/Lid 120'5 262.50 2.625.00 
NV-HI31 10 Opal Light lilLid 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NV-33132 10 Oplll Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5 26'2.50 2,625.00 
NV-33 133 5 Opal Menthol H!Lid 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
NV-33 134 5 Opll Menthol Ll H/Lid 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
2 345 Shipping 7.00 2,415.00 
Total $15 I ,995.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $151,995.00 
NWS 000136 
IDAG 172354 
001031
6764 
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
5/1612006 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda. NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
:NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WAr Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highwll)' 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-1I054 20 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-11055 10 Seneca Light SIP King 456.00 4.560.00 
NV-I1056 10 Seneca Ullra Light SIP King " 456.00 4.560.00 
NY-IID57 5 Seneca Menthol SIP King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-1I060 25 Seneca Full flavor HIL King 456.00 11,400.00 
NV-II061 10 Seneca Light HIL King 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·11062 10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL King 456.00 , 4,560.00 
NV-II063 5 Seneca Menthol HlI.. King 4$6.00 2,280.00 
NY.110M 5 'Seneca Menthol Light HIL Killg 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·II06S 10 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·1I067 10 Seneca Light SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·11068 10 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100'5 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-l1071 10 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-Ilon 50 Sencca Full Flavor HIL lOO's 456.00 22,800.00 
NY-1I073 20 Seneca Light HIL 100's 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-1I074 JO Sellcca .Ultra I.ighl HIL 100's . 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-It075 10 Seneca Menthol HIL 100's 456.00 4,560~{}O 
NV-II071 10 Seneca Menlhol Ultra Lt HIL 100's 456.00 ' 4,560.00 
NV-33130 10 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120'5 262.50 2,625.00 
NV-33 13 I 15 Opal Light HlLid 120'5 262.50 3,937.50 
NV-33132 10 Opal Ultra U HlLid 120's 262.50 2,62.5.00 
NV-33133 10 Opal Menthol HfLid 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NV-33134 IS Opal Menlhol Lt HlLid )20's 262.50 3,937.50 
Total $125,190.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $125,190.00 
NWS 000141 
IDAG 172359 
001032
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE· WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
7120/2006 
DATE 
7011 
INVOICE # 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NY-I 1055 20. Seneca Light SIP King 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-ll0S8 5 Seneca Menthol Light SIP King 456.00 2,280.00 
NY·11060 30 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 13.680.00 
NV·ll061 5 Seneca Light HIL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·1I062 5 Seoeca Ultra Light HtL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·11063 5 Seneca Menthol HIL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NY·11065 7 Seneca Non·Filler HlLid King 456.00 3,192.00 
NV·11066 26 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 1DO's 456.00 11,856.00 
NV·II061 10 Seneca Light SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·1l068 6 Seneca Ultra LI SIP IOO's 456.00 2,136.00 
NY·1I069 1 Seneca Menthol SIP 1000s 456.00 3,192.00 
NY-I 1070 6 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP 100's 456.00 2,136.00 
NY·JlOn 30 Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's 456.00 13,680.00 
NV-1I0"!3 30 -Scneca Light H1L 100's 456.00 13,680.00 
N,V-l1074 20 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100', 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-l1075 6 Sencca Menthol HIL 100's 456.00 2,736.00 
NV-11076 12 Seneca Menthol Light HlL IDO's 456.00 5.472.00 
2 230 Shipping 1.00 1,610.00 
Total $106,490.00 
Payments/Credits so.oo 
Balance Due $106,490.00 
NW~ UUU14tl 
IDAG 172366 
001033
DATE INVOICE # 
8/912006 7096 
. BILL TO 
WarPnth 
North 16S Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
P.D.NO; TERMS 
ITEM QUANTllY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV·J3130 IS Opal FuJI Flavor H/Lid 120'5 262.50 3,937.50 
NY·3313J IS Opal Light I-lILid 120's 262.50 3,937.50 
NV-33t32 20 Opal Ultra Ll H!Lid 120's 262.50 5,250.00 
NV·33m 10 Opal Menthol HlLid 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NV·33J34 15 Opal Menthol Lt H/Lid 120's 262.50 3,937.50 
2 75 Shipping 7.00 525.00 
Total $20,212.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $20,212.50 
NWS 000151 
IDAG 172369 
Invoice
 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
N"ATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
001034
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
8/2212006 
DATE 
7141 
lNvorCE# 
BilL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 High\\'IlY 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATEITEM AMOUNT 
NV·1I054 40 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 456.00 18.240.00 
NV·II060 40 Scoecs Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 18,240.00 
NV·II06S 15 8encca Non·Filter H/l...id King 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-II066 30 Seneca Full Flavor SfP IOD's 456.00 13,680.00 
NV-II061 15 Seneca Light SIP 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NY. I1068 20 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-II069 10 Seneca Menthol SIP IOO's 4.56.00 4,560.00 
NV·11070 10 Seneca Menlhol Lt SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY.) !O72 40 Seneca Full Flavor HIL IDO's 456.00 18,240.00 
NY. I 1073 15 Seneca Lig~t HIL 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·11074 20 Seneca Ultra Light HJL 100's 456.00 9,120.00 
NY. I1075 I0 SenecB Menthol HIL 100's 4.56.00 4,560.00 
NV·ll076 )0 SeneCR Mentholl_i~ltl HIt 1OD's 4.56.00 4,560.00 
Total $125,400.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due SI25.!lJI_O.OO
"'1M" nnn~ ... , 
IDAG 172375
 
001035
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
DATE INVOICE # 
8122/.2006 7142 
BILL TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 16S Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NY·33054 10 Seneca full Flavor HIL 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NY·33055 10 Seneca Light HIL 120'8 262.50 2,625.00 
NY-33056 10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
2 30 Shipping 7.00 210.00 
Total 
Payments/Credits so.oo 
Balance Due $8.085.00 
NWS 000156 
IDAG 172374 
001036
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE' WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
DATE INVOICE # 
10/912006 7374 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 16.5 Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer. Idaho 83851 
ITEM QUANTITY 
NV·llOS4 
NV·11060 
NV-1l061 
NV-1I065 
NY·I1066 
NV-1l067 
NY-liOn 
NV·11073 
NV·11074 
NV-IIOn 
NY-33130 
NV-J313J 
-NV-33 132 
NY·33134 
DESCRIPTION 
10 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 
25 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 
10 Seneca Light HIL King 
10 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King 
20 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's 
10 8enccB Light SIP 100's 
30 Seneca Full Flavor HI!. 100's 
IS Seneca Light HIL 100's 
10 SeneCft Ultra Light HfL 100's 
5 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt HIL 100's ' 
10 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120'5 
IS Opal Light HlLjd 120'5 
5 Opal Ultra Lt JllLid 120'5 
15 Opal Menthol Lt 1-lfLid 120's 
" 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
RATE AMOUNT 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 11,400.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 4,S60.0q 
456.00 9,120.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 13,680.00 
456.00 6,840.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 2,280.00 
262.50 2,625.00 
262.50 3,937.50 
262.50 1,3J2.50 
-262.50 3,937.50 
Total $77,932.50 
iPayments/Credits i 
I$0,00 
I 
I 
!Balance Due $71,932.50 
NWS 000162 
172380IDAG 
001037
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
11/612006 7509 
-P.O. Box 214 
Gowan(la, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-l1054 25 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 456.00 11,400.00 
NV-II056 5 Seneca Ultra Light SIP King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-II060 30 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 13,680.00 
NV~II06l 10 Seneca Light HlL King 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-JI062 5 Seneca Ultra Light HIL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-l1063 5 Seneca MentholH/L King 456.00 2,2&0.00 
NV-1106S 10 I Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-ll066 .40 I Seneca Full Flavor SIP 1OD's 456.00 18,240.00 
NY-I 1068 IS Seneca UUra Lt SIP 100's 456.00 '6,840.00 
NV-1I069 10 Seneca Menthol SIP IOD's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY-1l070 10 Senecll Menthol Lt SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-II072 40 Seneca Full Flavor WL loo's 456.00 18,240.00 
NY-1I073 IS SeneclI tight HIL 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NY-11074 15 Seneca UltrA Light HlL 100's 456.00 6;840.00 
NY-JI07S 10 Seneca Menthol H/L. 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-33 130 10 Opal Full Plavor H/Lid 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NV·33l31 10 Opal Light H/l..id 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NV-33 132 IS Opal Ultra Lt H/l..id 120's 262.50 3,937.50 
NV-33133 S Opal Menthol HlLid 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
Total $122,220.00 
Payments/Credits so.oo 
Balance Due $122,220.00 
NWS 000169 
IDAG 172387 001038
7708 
..... 
Invoice
 DATE
 INVOICE #
F~-~

112/2007JI~
~O.;;2~
 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highw'lly 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-11055 10 Seneca Light SIP King 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-11056 5 Seneca Ultra Light SIP King 456.00 ' 2,280.00 
NV-\lOW 50 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 22,800.00 
NV-II061 15 Seneca Light HIL King 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-II062 5 Seneca Ultra Light H/L King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·II067 30 Seneca Light SIP IOD's 456.00 13,680.00 
NV-II068 10 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP IOD's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-1l0n 60 Seneca Pull Flavor BIL IOD's 456.00 27.360.00 
NV-II073 40 Seneca Light WI. 100's 456.00 18,240.00 
NV·11074 IS Seneca Ultra Light I~ 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·11075 5 Seneca Menthol HIL 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NY· I 1076 IS Seneca Menthol pght HIL 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NY· 11077 10 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt HIL laO's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY-33 131 15 Opal Light HlLid 120's 262.50 3.937.50 
NV·33132 5 Opal Ultra It HlLid 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
NV-J3134 10 0P1l1 Menthol Lt IJlJ-!id 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
.. 
Totar $130,995.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due· $130,995.00 
NWS 000175 
IDAG 172393
 
001039
Invoice
 
BILL TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
QUANTITYITEM 
NV~11054 
NV·II060
 
NV·I1065
 
NV·1I066
 
NV·11067
 
NV·I1068
 
NV·11069
 
NV-11070
 
NV-l1072
 
NV·1I073
 
NV-! 1074
 
NV·I1075
 
NV·11076
 
NV-33 130
 
NV-~3131 
NV-33132 
NV-33 133 
NV·33I34 
DATE INVOICE # 
2/27/2007 7933 
P.O. BOI 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070
 
716.532.6136
 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
30 
20 
5 
40 
10 
15 
5 
15 
40 
10 
15 
10 
15 
15 
15 
IS 
10 
DESCRIPTION 
Seneca full Flavor SIP King 
Seneca Full flavor HIL King 
Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King 
Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's 
Seneca Light SIP laO's 
Seneca Ultr8 Lt SIP 100's 
Senecn Menthol SIP 100's 
Seneca Menthol Lt SIP 100's 
Seneca Full Flavor H/L 100's 
Seneca light HlL 100's 
Seneca Vllra Light H/L 100's 
Seneca Menthol WL 1000s 
Seneca Menthol Light HlL 100's 
Opal Full Flavor I·I/Lid 120's 
9pal Ligbt J-!"!Lid 120's 
Opal Ullrn Ll HlLid 120'$ 
Opal Menthol HlLid 120's 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
RATE AMOUNT 
456,00 13,680,00 
456.00 9,120.00 
456.00 2,280.00 
456.00 18,240.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 6,840.00 
456.00 2,280,00 
456.00 6,840.00 
456.00 18,240.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 6,840.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 6,840.00 
262.50 3,937.50 
262.5() 3.937.50 
262.50 3.937.50 
262.50 2,625.00 
262.505 Opal Menthol Lt I-J/Lid 120's 1,312.50 
Total $120,630.00 
-.------_... __ ._---.--­..."""""-~..,..---.--~.-..---
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due S120,630.00 
NWS 000179 
IDAG 172397 
I 
001040
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
4/11/2007 8128 
.P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda. NY 14070 
716:532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO SHfPTO 
War Parh 
Norrl! 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer,ldaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV·II054 50 Seneca FuU Flavor SIP King 456.00 22,800.00
 
NV·1I060 50 Sencca filII Flavor HIL King 456.00 22,800.00
 
NV-II065 10 Sencca Non·Filter HlLid King 456.00 4,560.00
 
NV-II066 40 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's 456.00 18,240.00
 
NV·l1067 IS Seneca Light SIP 1000s 456.00 6,840.00
 
NV-II069 5 Seneca Menthol SIP 100's 456.00 2,280.00
 
NV-IIOn 60 Seneca full Flavor HfL 100's 456.00 27,360.00
 
NV-1107) 20 Seneca Light HIL 100's 456.00 9,120.00
 
NV·11074 15 Seneca Ultra Light HfL 100's 456.00 6,840.00
 
NV.11075 5 Seneca Menthol HIL 100's 456.00 2,280.00
 
NV-11076 5 Seneca Menthol Light HtL 100's 456.00 2,280.00
 
. .5NV·l1077 Seneca Menthol Ultra LI HJL 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·33130 10 Opal Full Flavor HfLid J20's 262•.50 2,625.00 
NV·33l31 10 Opal Light HfLid 120's 262.50 2,625.00. 
NV·33 132 10 Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
Total S135,555.oo 
Payments/Credits SO.OO 
Balance Due $135,555,00 
NWS 0001R!l 
IDAG 172403 
001041
615/2007 
DATE 
8359 
INVOICE #Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 , 
·NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer. Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Higbway 95 
. Plummer. Idaho 83851 
P,O.NO. TERMS 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNTITEM 
NV·II060 /5 Seneca Pull Flavor I-IIL King 456.00 6,840.00 
NV.II061 6 Seneca tight HlL King 456.00 2,736.00 
NV·II062 5 Seneca Ullra Light HIL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·11063 5 Seneca Menthol H/L King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV· 11 068 10 Seneca Ultra L.t SIP 100's 456.00 4.560.00 
NV-Jl070 10 Seneca Menthol Ll SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-110n 20 Senecn Full Flavor lIIl. 100's 456.00 9,120.00 
NV·I1073 IS Seneca Light Hit. 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-II074 15 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-11075 5 Seneca Menthol HJL 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
. NV·1t076 10 Seneca Menthol Light H/L 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·33 130 10 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NV·33 131 25 Opal Light HlLid 120's 262.50 6,.562.50 
NY·33133 .5 Opal Menthol HlLid 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
NV-33134 10 Opal Menthol Lt HI!-:id .120's 262.50 2,625.00 
Total 
.$66,021.00 
I--.--.----~---------I 
PaymentsfCredits $0.00 
Balance Due S66,021.00 
NWS 000189 
IDAG 172407 
001042
6f21f2007 
DATE 
8471 
INVOICE #Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowamla, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plulnmer, Idaho 8385\ 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM· QUANrllY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-l1055 S Seneca Lighl SIP King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-11057 5 Seneca Menthol SIP King 456.00 2,2&0.00 
NV-l1060 30 Seneca full flavor HIL King. 456.00 13,680.00 
NV~II061 5 Seneca Ligh! Hn. King 456.00 2,280.00 
NY·11063 5 Seneca Menthol HlL King 4.56.00 2,280.00 
NV-II065 10 Seneca Non-Filler H/Lid King 456.00 4,560.00 
NY-I 1066 IS Seneca Pull Flavor SIP lOD's 456.00 6,840.00 
NY-II06? IS Seneea Light SIP 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NY-I 1068 10 Seneca Ullrn Lt SIP IDO's 456.00 4,560;00 
NV-IIOn ;10 Seneca Full Flavor HlL 100's 456.00 13,680.00 
Ny·n073 15 Seneca Light H/L IDO's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·l1074 10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL IOO's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-11076 10 Scncea Menthol Ligh! HIL 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-33130 .5 Opal Full Flavor Hn...id 120's 262.50 1.312.50 
NV-3~ 131 5 Opal Ligh! HlLid 120's ·262.50 1,312.50 
NV-33132 10 Opal Ul'ra Ll HlLid 120'$ 262.50 2,625.00 
NV·33134 S Opal Menthol Lt HIlid 120'5 262.50 1,312.50 
Total $8 J,1l0~ .50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $81,802.50 
NWS 000195 
IDAG 172413 001043
7127f2007 
DATE 
8614 
INVOICE #Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowflnda, NY i4070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
Bill TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 9.5 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.D.NO. TERMS 
QUANTllY DESCRIPTIONITEM RATE AMOUNT 
NY-IIOS4 10 Seneca Full flavor SIP King 456.00 4,560.00 
NY·IIOSS 9 Seneca Light SIP King 456.00 4,104.00 
NY-1l0S6 5 Seneca Ultra Light SIP King 456.00 2,280.00 
NY-I 1057 J Seneca Menthol SIP King 4S6.00 1,368.00 
NY-\ JOS8 .5 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP King 456.00 2,280.00 
NY· 11060 iS4 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 29,184.00 
NY·II061 8 Seneca Light HlL King 456.00 3,648.00 
NY-I 1062 16 Seneca Ullra Lt HIL King 456.00 7,296.00 
NY· 11 063 4 Seneca Menthol HlL King 456.00 1,824.00 
NY·II066 5 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NY-I 1067 5 Seneca Light SIP 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NY-I 1068 8 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 456.00 3,648.00 
NY·II069 4 Seneca Menthol SIP 100's 456.00 1,824.00 
NY·II072 60 Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's 456.00 27,360.00 
NY·I/o13 24 SCllCClI Light HIL 100's 456.00 10,944.00 
NY·11074 10 Seneca UlIra U H/L JDO's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY·I1Q75 15 Seneca Menlhol HlL laO's 456.00 6,840.00 
NY-I 1076 5 Seneca Menthol Ll HIL IDO's 4.56.00 2,280.00 
NY·33131 20 Opal Light HlLid 120's 262.50 ~,250.00 
NY-33132 5 Opal Ultra Light HlLld 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
NY-33IH 20 Opal Menthol WLid 120's 262..50 5,250.00 
2 305 Shipping 1.00 2,135.00 
Total $132,501.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $132,507.50 
NWS 000200 
IDAG 172418 
001044
DATE INVOICE # 
7/31/2007 070731 
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, IdRho 83851 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NYO·II064 
NYO-1107I 
2 
5 Seneca Menthol Light HlLid King 
5 Seneca Menthol Ultra Light Soft 100's 
10 Shipping 
441.00 
441.00 
7.00 
2,205.00 
2,205.00 
70.00 
*REVlSED* 
Total $4,480.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due 
.$4,480;00 
NWS 000201 
IDAG 172419 
001045
9/1112007 
DATE 
8853 
INVOICE #Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
PlummeT, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WaTPllth· 
North 165 Highway 95 
PlunulJcT, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTln' DESCRIPTION 'RATE AMOUNT 
NV·ll054 20 ·Senecll. Full Flavor SIP King 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-ll060 20 Seneca Pull flavor H/L. Klog 456.00 9,120.00 
NV·11061 10 Seneca Light HIL King 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-11065 15 Seneca Non-Filter Hltid King 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-11066 40 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's 456.00 18,240.00 
NV-ll067 IS Seneca Light SIP 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-l1068 10 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·l1070 10 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP IOD's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-II071 5 Seneca Menthol Ullra Lt SIP IOO's 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·1I073 15 Seneca Light HIt loo's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·l1074 IS Seneca Ullra Light HIL 1DO's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·llOn 10 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt H/L. 100's . 456.00 4,560.00 
2 185 Shipping 7.00 1,295.00 
Total $85,655.00 
PaymenlsJCredits SO.oo 
Balance Due $85,655.00 
NWS 000205 
IDAG 172423 
001046
1012120078945 
-DATE INVOICE #Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda. NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
War Path 
North 16~ Highway 95 
Plummer. Idaho 83851 
S~IPTO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
RATE AMOUNTQUANTITY DESCRIPTIONITEM 
NV-II076 10 Senecll Menthol Light HIL lOO's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY-33130 IS Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120's 26250 3,931.50 
NY-33 132 20 Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120's 262.50 5,250.00 
2 27.S Shipping 7.00 192.50 
Total $13,940.00
1-'----------------­
Payments/Credits 
·$0.00 
Balance Due S13,940.00 
NWS 000211 
IDAG 172429 
001047
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
10/19/2007 9026 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6U6 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
PIUnl111er, Idaho 8385 I 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer,Idaho 83851 
P.C.NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-11054 10 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-II060 40 Seneca Full Flavor WL King 456.00 18.240.00 
NV-! 1061 10 Seneca Light HIL King 456.00 4.560.00 
NV-11062 15 Seneca Ultrli Light HlL King 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-II063 5 Seneca Menthol HIL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-II066 10 Seneca Full flavor SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·II067 .5 Seneca Light SIP 100's 456.00 2.280.00 
NV·II068 10 Seneca Ultra U-SIP laO's 456.00 4.560.00 
NV-II069 5 Seneca Menthol SIP 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NV·llon 40 Seneca Fu I[ Flavor HIL 100's 456.00 18.240.00 
NV· 11 OJJ 25 Seneca Ughl HII. 100's 456.00 11,400.00 
NV-IID74 20 Seneca Ultra Light HIL lOD's 456.00 9,120.00 
NY-1107S 15 Seneca Menthol I-YL 10D's 456.00 6,840.00­
NV-11076 10 Seneca Menthol Light HlL IOD's ­ 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·33132 IS Opal Ultra LI I·llLid 120's 262.50 3,937.50 
.. 
Total SI 04,257.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due 
NWS 000216 
IDAG 172434 
001048
DATE INVOICE # 
12/6/2007 9222 
.....---------------------..;....., 
BILL TO SHIP TO 
WarPath WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95North 165 Highlvay 95 
Plummer, l<Iaho 83851Plummer, IdaiJO 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
QUANTiTY DESCRIPTION RATEITEM AMOUNT 
Invoice 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda. NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
Total $79,300.50 
PaymentsfCredits $0.00 
Balance Due $19,300.50 
NV·II060 
NV·ll061 
NV·l1063 
NV-II064 
NV·lI06S 
NV·II061 
NV·II068 
NV-II072 
NV-11073 
NV·II074 
NV-lI07S 
NV·II076 
NV-I1077 
NV·33054 
NV·330SS 
NV-33lJZ 
20 SeneclI Full Flavor H/f., King 
S Seneca Light H/L King 
S Seneca Menthol HIL King 
3 Seneca Menthol Light WI. Kill~ 
5 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King 
S Seneca Light SIP IDO's 
S Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 
50 Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's 
JS Seneca Light HIL loo's 
10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100's 
5 Seneca Menthol HIL IDO's 
10 Sencca Menthol Light HlL 100's 
10 Seneca Menthol Ultra Ll BIL 100's 
10 Seneca full Flavor HlLid 120's 
25 Sencca LighL J-llLid 120's 
lO Opal Ultra Lt HlLid J20's 
456.00 9.120.00 
456.00 2,280.00 
456.00 2,280.00 
456.00 1,368.00 
456.00 2,280.00 
456.00 2,280.00 
4S6.00 2,280.00 
456.00 22,800.00 
456.00 6,840.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 2,280.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
456.00 4,560.00 
262.50 2,625.00 
262.5U 6.562:SO 
262.50 2,625.00 
NWS 000220 
lOAG 172438 
001049
PAGE 64/6702/15/2068 17:12 17165326137 NW5 
-, 
Invoice 
211Zl2008 
DATE 
!J4S9 
INVOICE # 
Po Boll 2tL, O~Ild«, NY' ,.D70
 
P11o~: (1i1lJ SI2.e.1f
 
FIX: (7ftJ 121..137
 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
~-------~._---------. 
BILL TO 
WlirPlIlh 
Norlh 165 l-ligbwly 95 
Plummer, ldaho 8385 I 
SHIP TO 
WorPalth 
North165 RighwllY9S 
Plummer. MallO 8~llS 1 
P.o. NO. TERMS 
I'EM aUANnTY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV·U054 2 St:ntca Full FllIvor SIP King 456.00 912.00 
t-/V.J }oc,O 20 Senc:en full Flavor H1L KillS 456.00 9,120.00 
NV·lJ06J 4 SC'1euJ.igbt HlL King 456.00 1,824.00 
NV·1l065 .2 Stncc.n Non-Filter li/Lid King 456.00 912.00 
NV·I1066 12 Seneca Full FlIlVOl' SIP \00'$ 4S6.00 5.472.00 
NV.J lOti? 3 Seneca lialtt SIP lOO's 456.00 U68.00 
NY·l106S 4 SenecA Ultra Lt SIP 1(lO's 456.00 1,824.00 
NY. H070 2 Seneca Menthol Ll SIP l00's 456.00 912.00 
NV-1l07~ :20 Scncoa Full F):l.I·or HlL lOO's 4~6.00 9,120.0() 
NV"1I07~ 7 SelIcca Light H/L IOO'~ 4~6.00 3,192.00 
NY.) '014 8 SllI'IllC<l UlInI Light HfL 100's 4.56.00 3,648.00 
NV·l10'15 S Seneca MentltollJlL IOO's 456.00 2,281}.OO 
NV-330S>l a ScnOCll Fun Ffavor FIlLld /20's 2tl2,S0 2:100.00 
NV·330SS QO Seneca Mcrtlho1 Light Mid 120's 262.50 2,<'25.00 
Total $45.309.00 
PaymentslCredlts 
Balance Due 545,309.00 
NWS 000226 
IDAG 172444 
001050
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
3/1 1/2008 9590 
P.O. Box 214
 
Gowanda, NY 14070
 
716~53Z.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TE~MS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-1I060 20 Seneca Full Flavor H/L King 456.00 9,120.00 
NV·11061 .. Seneca Light HlL King 456.00 1.824.00 
NV·11065 IS Seneca Non-Filler HlLid King 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-II066 10 Seneca FuJI Flavor SIP 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·11067 5 Seneca Light SIP 1OO's 456.00 2,280.00 
,'IV·' 1072 20 SenecA Full Flavor un, IOD's 456.00 9,120.00 
NV-l1073 IS Seneca Light WI, 100's 456.00 6.840.00 
NV·11074 15 Seneca Ultra Ught IiIL 100's 456.00 6.&40.00 
NV-11075 3 Seneca Menthol HIL l00's 456.00 1,368.00 
NV-l1076 5 Seneca Menthol Light HIL 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
Total $51.072.00 
--,------------_.­
p'ayments/Credits SO.OO 
Balance Due 551,072.00 
NWS 000233 ' 
IDAG 172451 
001051
....' 
Invoice 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
DATE INVOICE # 
3/1212008 9598 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
,...---------_.----'-------, 
SHIPTOBilL TO 
War PalllWar Path 
North 165 Highwlly 95North 16S Jlighwft)' 9S 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTIW DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NY·33056 10 Seneca Ultra Light HlLid 120's 262.50 2,625.00 
NY·BOS8 7 Seneca Menthol Light HlLid 120's 262.50 1,837.50 
NY·33 130 1 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120'5 262.50 1,831.50 
NY·33l3J 8 Opal Light H/Lid 120's 262.50 2,100.00 
NY·33 13) 5 Opal Menthol H/Lid 120's 262.50 I,J 12.50 
Total $9.712.50 
Payments/Credits­ $0.00 
Balance Due $9,711.50 
NWS 000237 
IDAG 172455 
001052
417f2008 
DATE 
9721 
INVOICE #Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
,..--------_.----------, 
BILL TO SHIP TO 
WarPalhWar Path 
North 165 Highway 95North 165 Highway 95 
PlunJlller, Idaho 83851 Plummer, Idiilio 8385 I 
P.O. NO.' TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NY-3130 5 Opal Full FhlVor HlLid 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
NY·31J1 7· Opal Lighl WLid 120's 262.50 1,837.50 
NY-3133 5 Opal Menlhol HlLid 120's 262.50 1,312.50 
NY·I072 30 Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's 456.00 13,680.00 
NY· 1060 20 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 9,120.00 
NY'. 1066 5 Seneca Full flavor SIP 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NY-I054 2 Scncca Full Flavor SIP King 456.00 912.00 
NY-1013 10 Sencca Ligl!l WL 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY-1061 2 Seneca Light SIP 100's 4.56.00 912.00 
NV-1075 I Seneca Menthol HIL IPO's 456.00 456.00 
NY-I063 2 Seneca Menthol HIL King 456.00 912.00 
NY-J06S I Scneca Non-Filter HlLid King 456.00 456.00 
NY-I014 7 Seneca Ultra Light H1L 100's 456.00 3,192.00 
Total $40.942,50 
PaymentslCredits so.oo 
Balance Due $40,942.50 
NWS 000241 
IDAG 172459 
001053
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
5/9/2008 
DATE 
9907 
INVOICE # 
BILL TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV·IOGO 25 Seneca Full Flavor HIt King 456.00 11,400.00 
NY-I061 15 Seneca Light HIt King 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-1D63 5 SellCCa Menlhol WL King 456.00 2.280.00 
NY-I067 5 Seneca Ughl SIP 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NY· JOGS 5 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-1069 3 Seneca Mentho! SIP 100's 456.00 1,368.00 
NY·I070 :3 Seneca MenlhoJ Lt SIP IDO's 456.00 1,368.00 
NV·IO?I 2 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt SIP laO's 456.00 912.00 
NV-J072 2.5 Seneca Full Flavor H/L 100's 456.00 11,400.00 
NV·I073 15 Seneca Ligltl H1L 1DO's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·1074 ~i Seneca Ultra Light tilL 100~ 456.00 2.280.00 
NV·I07S HI Seneca MenthOl H/L JOO's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV·IO'l6 10 Seneca Menthol Light HIL 100's 456.00 4,560.00 
NY·IOn 2 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt HIL lOOts 456.00 912.00 
NV·313l 8 OpalLight H/Lid 120's 262.50 2,100.00 
NV-3132 8 Opal Ullra LI HlLid 120's 262.50 2,100.00 
Total $63,480.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $63,480.00 
NWS 000246 
IDAG 172464 
001054
DATE INVOICE # 
6/1212008 101 [4 
'-'", 
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer. Idaho 83851 
P.D.NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-1060 25 Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 456.00 11,400.00 
NV-1066 10 Seneca Full Flavor SIP IDO's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-1061 10 Seneca Light SIP 1DO's 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-1068 5 Seneca UUra U SIP loo's 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-IOn 40 Seneca Full Flavor HJL IOO's 456.00 18,240.00 
NV-I073 15 Seneca Light BIL 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV·I074 15 Seneca Ullra Light HIL 100's 456.00 6,840.00 
NV-IOn S 'Seneca Menthol Uhra Lt HIL IDO's 456.00 2,280.00 
NV-3130 IS Opal Full Flavor HlLid I20's 262.50 3,937.50 
NV·3132 IS Opal UUra Lt HlLid 120's 262.50 3,937.50 
NV.)t34 5 Opal Menthol Lt HlLid 120's 262..50 1,312.50 
Total $66,181.50 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $66,187.50 
NWS 000251 
lDAG 172469 
001055
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
7/18/2008 I0368 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda, NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
~-------------------, 
BILL TO SHIP TO 
WarPath WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.C.NO. TERMS 
QUANTflY DESCRIPTION RATEITEM AMOUNT 
NY·IOS4 10 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 456.00 4,560.00 
NY-IOS5 3 Seneca Light SIP King 456.00 1,368.00 
NY-I060 20 Seneca Full Flavor WL King 456.00 9,120.00 
NY·1061 1 Seneca Light HlL King 456.00 456.00 
NY-I06J 5 Seneca Menthol HIL King 456.00 2,280.00 
NY-I065 10 Seneca Non·Filler HlLid King 456.00 4,560.00 
NY-1066 10 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100'$ 456.00 4,560.00 
NV-1067 3 Seneca Light SfP H)O's 456.00 1,368.00 
NY·IOGS· 3 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 456.00 1,368.00 
NV-I070 I Seneca Menthol LI SIP 100'5 456.00 456.00 
NV·IOn 35 Sencca Full Flavor HIL 100'5 456.00 15.960.00 
NY·1073 7 Seneca Light BIL 100's 456.00 3,192.00 
NV·1074 10 Seneca Ultra Light HIL 100'5 456.00 4,560.00 
NY·IOn 8 Seneca Menthol HIL 100'5 456.00 3.648.00 
NV-I076 8 Seneca Menthol Light HIL 100'5 4S6.00 3,648.00 
NV-3130 12 Opal Full Flavor I-l/Lid 120'5 262.50 _ 3.150.00 
NY-313 \ I' Opal Light HlLid 120's 262.50 3,937.50 
NY-3132 15 Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5 26250 3,937.50 
NY·3133 2 Opal Menthol H/Lid 120'5 262.50 525.00 
NY·3134 5 Opal Menthol La HlLid 120'5 262.50 1,312.50 
Total sn,966.S0 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $73,966.50 
NWS 000258 
IDAG 172476 
001056
~, 
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
8/1812008 10552 
P.O. Box 214
 
Gowanda, NY 14070
 
716.532.6136
 
r- .-A..N~·A!L..!!T~'I_L..V~E__!.W...!....iH!!..£.[C~LElr~A'-=L===-E""'--""'S-'=l.J..... .. ------,
p'.e....:P:L=-Y~·_~ 
BilL TO 
Wllr Path 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
SOLO TO 
War Path 
North 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-105" 6 Seneca Pull Flavor SIP King 516.00 3,096.00
 
NV-\060 35 Seneca Full Flavor H/L King 516.00 18,060.00
 
NV-I06J 7 Seneell Light H/L King . 516.00 3,612.00
 
NV-1065 3 Seneca N01I·Filler H/Lid King 516.00 1,548.00
 
N~.1066 15 Seneca Full Flavor SIP loo~s 516.00 7,740.00
 
NV·I067 10 Seneca Light SIP I OD's 516.00 5,160.00
 
NV·)068 7 Sentell Ullm Lt SIP 100's 516.00 3,612.00
 
NV~I069 8 Seneca Menthol SIP 100's 516.00 4,128.00
 
NV·1070 5 Seneca Menthol Lt SIP 100's 516.00 2,580.00
 
NV·lon :35 Seneca FilII Flavor HILWO's 516.00 18,060.00
 
NV·I07J 15 SenecR Light H/L /oO's 516.00 7,740.00
 
NV·1074 15 Seneca Ultra Light H/L JOO's 516.00 7,740.00
 
NV-1075 8 Seneca Menthol HfL 1000s 516.00 4,128.00

.­
NV-1076 4 S~lIeca Menthol Light WL lOO's 516,00 2,064.00 
NV-I077 5 Seneca Menlnol Ultra Lt HIL 100's 516.00 2,580.00 
NV-3133 5 Opal Menthol Hftid 120's 292.50 .1,462.50 
Total $93,3 10.50 
Payments/Credits $-93,310.50 
Balance Due $0.00 
NWS 000227 
IDAG 172445 
001057
Invoice 
P.O. Box 214 
DATE INVOICE # 
9/16/2008 10709 
Gowanda, NY 14070
 
716.532.6136
 
r--- ----'N=...J;A~l~ (LES#~ VA- --..
T:IVE~~W..l..<rH~r~ A~lTbU·R!::L£S·U.!=U:.-PP&..!=4.l~
SOLO TOBILL TO 
WuPathWllrPath 
North 165 Highway 9SNorth 165 Highway 95 
Plummtr, Idllho 83851 Plummer, JdRho S3SSJ 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-IOS4 15 Seneca Full Flavor SIP King 516.00 7,740.00 
NV-W56 3 Seneca Ultra Light SIP King 516.00 1,548.00 
NV-1060 30 Seneca Full Flav~r HlL King 516.00 15.480.00 
NV-I061 IS Seneca Light HlL King 516.00 7,140.00 
NV-1063 8 Seneca Menthol HIL King 516.00 4,128.00 
NV-Hl65 to Sencca Non-Filter WLid King 516.00 5,160.00 
NV-I066 IS Seneca FulJ Flavor SIP lOO's 516.00 7,740.00 
NV-I067 IS Seneca Light SIP 100'5 516.00 7,740.00 
NV-I068 8 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP 100's 516.00 4, I2B.OO 
NV-I069 5 Sen.CC8 Menthol SIP 100's 516.00 2.580.00 
NV-1070 10 Seneca Menthol it SIP 100'5 516.00 S.16().OO 
NV-I01l 3 Seneca Menthol Ultra Lt SIP IOO's 516.00 1,548.00 
NV·I0n 40 Seneca Full Flavor H/L 100's 516.00 20,640.00 
NY-I 073 IS Se.J1¢Cll Ligbt HIL 100'8 516.00 7.740.00 
NY-l 074 10 Scnc:ca Ultra Light HIL 100'5 S)6.00 5,160.00 
NV-I07S 15 Scric:ca Menthol HlL JOO's 516.00 7.740.00 
NY.I076 10 Scneca Menthol LisJ1t HIL 100'8 516.00 5,160.00 
NV~3{)55 10 Seneca Light HlLid 120's 292.50 2,925.00 
NV-3130 8 Opal Full Flavor HlLid 120'5 292.50 2,340.00 
NY·3132 10 Opal Ultra Lt I-lILid )20'5 292.50 2,925.00 
NY·3133 5 Opal Menthol HlLid 120's 292.50 1,462.~0 
NY·3t34 8 Opol Menthol Lt HlLid 120'8 29250 2,340.00 
Total $129,124.50 
Payments/Credits $.129,124.50 
Balance Due $0.00 
NWS 000001 
IDAG 172219 001058
Invoice DATE INVOICE # 
11/612008 11003 
P.O. Box 214 
Gowanda t NY 14070 
716.532.6136 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLYr---------------------, 
BIll TO 
War Path 
North 16S Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 8385 I 
SHIP TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Iiighw8y 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY DESCRIPTION RATE AMOUNT 
NV-lOS5 5 Seneca Light SIP King 516.00 2,580.00 
NV·I060 40 Seneca Full flavor HI!. King ·516.00 20,640.00 
NV·I064 .s Seneca Menthol Light HIL King 5/6.00 2,580.00 
NV·1065 5 Seneell Non·Filler HlLid King 516.00 2,580.00 
NV.I066 20 Seneca Full Flavor SIP 100's 516.00 10,320.00 
NV·I068 10 Seneca Ultra Lt SIP /OD's 516.00 5,160.00 
NV·1072 40 Seneca full Flavor filL 100's 516.00 20,640,00 
NV-1073 40 Seneca Light filL laO's 516.00 20,640.00 
NV-1074 40 Seneca Ultra Light lUL 100's 516.00 20,640.00 
NV-1076 5 Seneca Menthol Light H/LIOO's 516.00 2,580.00 
NV·fon 10 Seneca Menthol Ullra Lt HIL 100's 516.00 5,160.00 
NV-3130 15 Opal Full flavor HlLid 120's 292.50 4,387.50 
NV·3131 15 Opal Ughr HILfd 120'5 292.50 4,387.50 
NV·3132 15 Opeltlllra Lt HlLid t20's 192.50 4,387.50 
NV·3134 5 Opal Menthol Lt H/Lid 120's 292.50 1,462.50 
'. 
Total $128,145.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due $118,145.00 
NWS 000262 
---------------- ~!IDAG 172480 
001059
Invoice
 
.-­
. 
BILL TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
DATE INVOICE # 
1/9n009 11264 
P.O. Box 214
 
Gowanda, NY 14070
 
716.532.6136 
.......N ............."""[()",LE~'¥'~A~L .......... ................. -.,.....f:.A~T:...:I~[VE~WH ES~U:P·PIJ,Y:......--­
SOLD TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer, Idaho 83851 
P.O. NO. TERMS 
ITEM QUANTITY 
NV-I060
 
NV-I061
 
NV-1063
 
NV-1065
 
NV-JOn
 
NY-I075
 
NV~1076 
NY·J077
 
NV-3130
 
NY-3J3l
 
NV-3132
 
NV-3133
 
NV-3134
 
! 
DESCRIPTION 
2S Seneca Full Flavor HIL King 
10 Seneca Light HIL King 
3 Seneca Menthol HIL King 
5 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King 
25 Senc:ca Full Flavor H1L 100's 
7 SenCCll Menthol JIlL 100's 
8 SCJlf.ca Menthol Light HIL 100's 
3 Seneca Menthol UltraLtHIL roo's 
6 Opal FuJI Flavor HlLid 120's 
to Opal Ughf HJLid 120's 
15 Opal Ultra Lf fllLidl20's 
3 Opal Menthol HlLid r20's 
3 Opal Menthol U HlLid 120's 
RATE 
S01.00 
501.00 
SO),oo 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
292.50 
292.50 
292.50 
292.50 
292.50 
Total $53.908.50 
Payments/Credits $-53,908.50 
Balance Due 50.00 j. 
I 
iNWS 000002 
IDAG 172220 
AMOUNT 
12,525.00 
5.010.00 
1.503.00 
2,505.00 
12.525.00 
3,507.00 
4,008.00 
1.503.00 
1.755.00 
2,925.00 
4,387.50 
Sn.50 
877.50 
001060
Invoice DATE INvorCE# 
112312009 11315 
P.o. Box 214
 
Gowanda, NY 14070
 
716.532.6136
 
r---- -----*-NJ.,·.,s.. TL.A..LlVE WLl,...:!,.;!~H~OLESr=A=L=,E~S~·UP~·P............... -----.
A60JL IJy"'--­
BILL TO 
WarPath 
Nortb 165 Highway 9S 
Plummer,Idaho 83851 
SOLD TO 
WarPath 
North 165 Highway 95 
Plummer, Idaho 838S I 
ITEM 
NY-1OOO 
NV-I061 
NV-1063 
NV-106S 
NY-IOn 
NV-1073 
NV-1074 
NV·I075 
NV-I076 
NV-I077 
NV-3130 
NV-3131 
NV-3132 
NV-3133 
. NV-3134 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
35 Seneca Full FlavOf' HIL King 
10 Seneca Light HIL King 
3 Seneca Menthol HIL King 
5 Seneca Non-Filter HlLid King 
35 Seneca Full Flavor HIL 100's 
20 Se.neca Light HlL 100's 
10 Seneca Ultra tight HIL 1OD's 
2 ScnccaMenthollIIL 100's 
8 Seneca Menthol Ught HIL 100's 
2 Seneca Menthol U1lra Lt HIL 100's 
5 Opal Full Flavor HlLld 120'8 
5 Opal Light HlLid 120'5 
5 Opal Ultra Lt HlLid 120'5 
3 Opall Mallhol HlLid 120's 
3 Opal MenthOl Lt HlLid 120'8 
P.O. NO. 
RATE 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
501.00 
292.50 
292.50 
292.50 
292.50 
292.50 
Total 
Payments/Credits 
Balance Due 
TERMS 
AMOUNT 
17,535.00 
5,010.00 
1,503.00 
2,505.00 
17,535.00 
10,020.00 
5,010.00 
1,002.00 
4,008.00 
1,002.00 
1,462.50 
1,462.50 
1,462.50 
877.50 
877.50 
$71,272.50 
$-71,272.50 
$0.00 
NWS000003 
lOAG 172221 
001061
Session: Hansen102610	 Page 1 
"	 :.;I. 
Session: Hansen102610 Division: DC ...... Courtroom: CR503 
Session Date: 2010/10/26 Session Time: 10:56 
Judge: Hansen, Timothy 
Reporter: Gosney, Vanessa 
Clerk(s): 
Olson, Miren 
State Attorney(s) : 
Armstrong, Shelley 
Public Defender(s) : 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0002 
Case numbel:: CVOC0815228 
Plaintiff: Idaho, State of 
Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett 
Defendant: Supply, Native Wholesale 
Co-Defendant (s) : 
Pers. Attorney: McFeeley, Neil 
State Attorney: 
Public Defemder: 
2010/10/26 
15:05:20	 - Operator
 
Recording:
 
15:05:20	 - New case
 
Supply, Native Wholesale
 
15:05:52	 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy 
Calls case, parties are present and identifed - reviews file 
15:06:40	 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
 
argues the motion for summary judgment
 
15:20:47	 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
 
no questions
 
15:20:55	 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
 
Mr. Von .Tagen has nothing to add
 
15:21:21	 - Pers. Attorney: McFeeley, Neil
 
argues the motion for summary· jUdgment
 
15:42:17	 - Judge: Hansen,Timothy 
qeustion to Mr. DeLange on the oral'Motionto"strike 
15:42:36	 - Plaintiff. Attorney: Delange, Brett
 
will address the motton to strike
 
15: 47: 35 - Judge: HanSen, Timothy .... 
15:47:38	 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange,' Brett
 
final comments on tlt1e. Motion for. su.~. jUdgment.

15: 57: 30 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy ...
 
question to Mr.- McFe1ely .
 
15:58:14 - Pers. Attorney: McFeeley, Neil 
. ..., 
r . 
001062
Session: Hansen102610	 Page 2 
.~ ::: 
'-'	 '...,,/
response to the Court 
15: 58: 47 - Judge: Hansen" Timothy
 
comments to counsel
 
15:59:26	 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
 
comments to the Court
 
16:01:54	 - Pers. Attorney: McFeeley, Neil
 
no additional comments
 
16:02:01	 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
 
comments to counsel
 
16:02:12	 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
 
the Court finds that it has enough information to rule on the motion to
 
16:02:33	 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy 
strike - with one exception as to footnote 6 - the Court will not consider 
16:02:53	 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
 
that in the MSJ - will grant the motion to strike as to that footnote.
 
16:03:15	 - Plaintiff Attorney: Delange, Brett
 
Mr. Von Tagen has nothing to add as to the motion for SJ
 
16:03:32	 - Judge: Hansen, Timothy
 
will take the matter under advisement
 
16:04:23	 - operator
 
Stop recording:
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·v 
n~ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, m AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY
 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
 
through 20,
 
Defendants. 
~~--~A~':~.~:-.d.c .'J= 
NOV 26 2010
 
. ! 
f 
ByJ·lp 
Case No. CV l0815228 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
BACKGROUND 
This is a case involving the wholesale sale and distribution of cigarettes allegedly in violatio 
of the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act, I.C. § 39-8401, et seq., an 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48-601, et seq. The procedural history of this case, whic 
will not be repeated here, is set forth in the Court's September 15,2009, Order and its Memorandum 
Decision and Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed on May 20, 2010. The Cou 
incorporates those orders into this order by reference. On August 24, 2010, the Court issued 
Preliminary Injunction Order enjoining and restraining Defendant from engaging in the conduc 
described in the Verified Complaint. 
On June 24, 2010, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, along with
 
supporting memorandum and the Third Affidavit of Beth A. Kittelmann (hereinafter Thir
 
Kittelmann Affidavit). On September 30, 2010, Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of it
 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum i
 
Opposition) and the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion fo
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Summary Judgment (hereinafter Diddle Affidavit) were filed. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum i 
Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and the Fourth Affidavit of Beth A. Kittelman 
(hereinafter Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit) were filed on October 19,2010. 
Hearing on this matter was held on October 26, 2010, at which time the Court took Plaintiffs' 
summary judgment motion under advisement, as well as an oral motion to strike by Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file
 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and tha
 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(e). If the moving part
 
demonstrates the absence of a question of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party "t
 
demonstrate an issue of material fact that will preclude summary judgment." Wattenbarger v. A. G.
 
Edwards & Sons, Inc., --- P.3d ---, ---, 2010 WL 2560036, at *5 (Idaho June 28, 2010) (citation
 
omitted). If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences fron
 
the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v.
 
Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 779,215 P.3d 494, 499 (2009), citing Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valle~
 
Hasp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473, 476 (2009). However, if "uncontroverted facts exist whic
 
lead to a definite disposition as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate." Callies v.
 
O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 846,216 P.3d 130, 135 (2009), quoting G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.,
 
119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991).
 
DISCUSSION 
Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs summary judgment motion is based upon their memorandum and the Thir 
Kittelmann Affidavit filed contemporaneously with the motion, as well as the First and Secon 
Kittelmann Affidavits, filed on April 9 and June 23, 2009, respectively; the Affidavit of Do 
Anderson filed April 9, 2009; and the Affidavit of Mark Ausman filed June 23, 2009. Plaintiffs als 
filed the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit with their reply memorandum on October 19, 2010. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 2
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Although no written motion to strike was filed, at the hearing on this matter Defendan 
objected to the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs on several grounds. First, Defendant asks the Cou 
to find the affidavits inadmissible due to a lack of foundation. Second, Defendant argues that th 
Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit is untimely filed. Finally, Defendant objects to a portion of Plaintiffs' 
reply memorandum that contains inadmissible hearsay. The Court will treat Defendant's objection 
as an oral motion to strih. 
Plaintiffs concede that footnote six in their reply memorandum, which refers to a newspape 
story, contains hearsay. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant's motion to strike this referenc 
on the record. As to the issue of the timeliness of the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, I.R.C.P. 56(c 
provides that a summary judgment motion, affidavits, and supporting brief shall be served at leas 
twenty-eight days before the time fixed for hearing. As noted above, the hearing on this matter wa 
held on October 26, and the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit was filed not with Plaintiffs' supportin 
memorandum, but with their reply memorandum, on October 19, 2010. The court may alter 0 
shorten the time periods and requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(c) "for good cause shown." See, e.g., Sun 
Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 5, 981 P.2d 236, 240 (1999). 
Further, I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that a court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed b 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
The Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit consists of Defendant's discovery responses as well a 
records that were prepared from documents produced by Defendant in discovery. Plaintiffs asse 
that they were unable to submit these documents earlier because they did not receive the discover 
from Defendant until September. The Court finds that because the information contained in th 
Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit was not available to Plaintiffs at the time they filed their summar 
judgment motion, there is good cause for the delayed filing of the affidavit. See Sun Vallev Potatoes 
133 Idaho at 6, 981 P.2d at 241. Further, because the information is based upon responses or record 
that were produced by Defendants in discovery, Defendants are not prejudiced by the delayed filing. 
See id. Therefore, Defendant's motion to strike the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit on the basis 0 
untimeliness is denied. 
MEMORANDUM DEClSION AND ORDER - Page 3
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As to the admissibility of Plaintiffs' affidavits as a whole, I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides tha
 
affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible i
 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters state
 
therein." The Court is satisfied that the Anderson and Ausman affdavits meet these requirements'
 
however, portions of the Kittelmann affidavits contain inadmissible hearsay.
 
Exhibits D, E, F, G, and H to the First Kittelmann Affidavit consist of invoices, bills of lading~ 
and various warehouse records regarding shipments of cigarettes by Defendant. These documents ar '
 
not admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule set forth in I.R.E. 803(6), a
 
the documents were not prepared by Ms. Kittelmann, nor does Ms. Kittelmann appear to hav
 
personal knowledge oftht~ recordkeeping system used by the entities that created the documents. See.,
 
e.g., State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 628, 97 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Ct. App. 2004). Although Ms.
 
Kittelmann's duties include overseeing and maintaining such records received and compiled by th
 
Office of the Attorney General, "mere receipt and retention of a document created by another entit
 
cannot transform the document into a business record of the recipient for the purposes of the busines
 
record exception." ld. The documents also do not fall within the public records exception set forth i
 
I.R.E. 803(8), as this exception does not encompass "investigative reports prepared by or for 
government, a public office or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party." I.R.E. 
803(8)(B). 
Further, Exhibit I to the First Kittelmann Affidavit contains compound hearsay, as it is a 
Excel spreadsheet Ms. Kittelmann prepared based upon the inadmissible invoices and shippin 
documents noted above. For these reasons, Defendant's motion to strike is granted as to Exhibits D, 
E, F, G, H, and I to the First Kittelmann Affidavit. For the same reasons, Defendant's motion t 
strike is also granted as to Exhibits F, I, and J to the Second Kittelmann Affidavit. 
As to the Third Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibits A, B, and C consist of copies of web page
 
showing the retail prices for the Opal and Seneca cigarette brands. The Court finds that there i
 
insufficient foundation for these exhibits, and they also do not fall within any of the hearsa
 
exceptions set forth in I.R.E. 803. Defendant's motion to strike is therefore granted as to Exhibits A,
 
B, and C of the Third Kittelmann Affidavit.
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As to the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibit D is admissible, as it contains records tha 
were produced by Defendant in discovery, including Defendant's own invoices. Exhibit C to th 
Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit is also admissible, as the data for this spreadsheet created by Ms. 
Kittelmann came from Defendant's records. Finally, the Court is satisfied that the remaining portion 
of the Kittelmann affidavits not specifically mentioned above meet the requirements of I.R.C.P. 
56(e). Therefore, Defendant's motion to strike is granted as to Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, and I to th 
First Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibits F, I, and J to the Second Kittelmann Affidavit, and Exhibits A, B 
and C of the Third Kittelmann Affidavit. Defendant's motion to strike is denied as to the remainde 
of Plaintiffs' affidavits. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs assert their evidence demonstrates that Defendant has violated I.C. §§ 39-8403(3 
and 63-2503(1). Before turning to the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs, the Court will briefly se 
forth the nature of these Idaho Code provisions. 
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions 
Idaho's Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (hereinafter MSAA), I.C. § 39-7801, et 
seq., states that cigarette smoking "presents serious health concerns" to the state of Idaho and it 
citizens, as well as presenting "serious financial concerns" for the state. I.C. § 39-7801 (a), (b). 
Accordingly, "[i]t is the policy of the state that financial burdens imposed on the state by cigarett 
smoking be borne by tobacco product manufacturers rather than by the state to the extent that suc 
manufacturers either determine to enter into a settlement with the states or are found culpable by th 
courts." I.C. § 39-7801(d). Any tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to consumers withi 
the state, whether directly or through a distributor or other intermediary, must either become 
"participating manufacturer" and perform its financial obligations under the Master Settlemen 
Agreement, or place specified amounts into a qualified escrow fund. I.C. § 39-7803. 
The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (hereinafter Complementar 
Act), I.e. § 39-8401, et seq., was enacted to help prevent violations of the MSAA. Idaho Cod 
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section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act makes it unlawful for any person to "sell, offer 0
 
possess for sale in this state" cigarettes of a tobacco manufacturer or brand family not included i
 
Idaho's compliant tobacco manufacturer directory, or to "acquire, hold, own, possess, transport,
 
import, or cause to be imported cigarettes that the person knows or should know are intended for
 
distribution or sale in the state" in violation of this section. I.C. § 39-8403(3)(b), (c). Further, an
 
person who violates this section is deemed to have engaged in "an unfair and deceptive trade practic
 
in violation of the Idaho consumer protection act," I.C. § 48-601, et seq. I.e. § 39-8406(5). Finally,
 
I.C. § 63-2503(1) provides that it is unlawful for any person to act as a wholesaler of cigarette 
without obtaining a pemlit from the state tax commission. The term "wholesaler" as defined in I.e. 
§ 63-2502(a) "includes every person who purchases, sells or distributes cigarettes to othe 
wholesalers or retailers for the purpose of resale." 
B. Plaintiffs' Evidence 
The Affidavit of Don Anderson demonstrates that Defendant has never applied for or obtaine 
an Idaho cigarette tax pennit. Anderson Affidavit at ~~ 4, 6. Mr. Anderson is a Principal Financia 
Specialist in the Tax Discovery Bureau and Audit and Collections Division of the Idaho State Ta 
Commission, whose duties include the enforcement and administration of Idaho's Master Settlemen 
Agreement. Anderson Affidavit at ~~ 1, 2. Defendant does not dispute Mr. Anderson's statemen 
that Defendant has never applied for or obtained an Idaho cigarette tax permit. 
The first affidavit of Beth A. Kittelmann demonstrates that the Seneca and Opal cigarett
 
brands and their manufacturer, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., have never been listed i
 
Idaho's compliant tobacco manufacturer directory. First Kittelmann Affidavit at ~ 4. Ms. Kittelman
 
is a paralegal for the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Idaho Attorney General
 
whose duties include maintaining the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturer
 
and Brand Families. First Kittelmann Affidavit at ~ 1. Defendant does not dispute the assertion tha
 
the Seneca and Opal cigarette brands are not listed in Idaho's compliant tobacco manufacturer
 
directory.
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As to the alleged violations of the Complementary Act, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs hav 
not presented proof of the actual delivery or receipt of any cigarettes sold by Defendant in Idaho. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 2. The Court has granted Defendant's motion to strike a 
to the various invoices and warehouse records attached as exhibits to the First and Second Kittelman 
Affidavits. However, Exhibit D to the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit consists of invoices produced b 
Defendant in discovery. These invoices show sales of the Opal and Seneca cigarette brands b~ 
Defendant to Warpath, Inc., in Plummer, Idaho, between February of 2004 and January of 2009. 
Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibit D. The invoices show that Warpath is the purchaser of th 
cigarettes, and they indicate "bill to" and "ship to" Warpath. Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibit D. 
Additionally, the Court notes that as no answer to Plaintiffs' complaint has been filed by Defendant i 
this matter, there is no pleading in the record challenging Plaintiffs' allegations as to the sale an 
shipment of the cigarettes to an Idaho retailer. 
Pursuant to I.e. § 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act, it is not only unlawful for a perso
 
to sell, offer, or possess for sale noncompliant cigarettes in Idaho, but also to transport, import, 0
 
cause to be imported noncompliant cigarettes that the person knows or should know are intended fo
 
distribution or sale in the state of Idaho. Defendant's sales of noncompliant cigarettes to a retaile
 
located in Idaho demonstrates that Defendant knew or should have known such cigarettes wer
 
intended for distribution or sale in Idaho. Further, in State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 110
 
(2010), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that whether Maybee, a member of the Seneca Nation,
 
delivered noncompliant cigarettes "to Idaho consumers personally, or through a common carrier, thi
 
conduct is ultimately tracl~able to Maybee." ld. at ---, 224 P.3d at 1123. Similarly, the delivery 0
 
noncompliant cigarettes to Idaho consumers in this case is ultimately traceable to Defendant.
 
C. Applicability of the Statutory Provisions to Defendant's Conduct 
Defendant argues that its conduct may not be regulated by the state of Idaho and is not subjec
 
to the statutory provisions set forth above. Similar arguments were presented in connection wit
 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction. In its May 20,
 
2010, order on Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court concluded that Defendant's conduct i
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subject to the Complementary Act and I.C. § 63-2503(1). While the Court is not inclined to revisi 
these issues, it will briefly set forth its conclusions as they apply to Plaintiffs' motion for summar 
judgment. 
Defendant asserts that the cigarette sales at issue in this case involve commerce solely amon 
Indians, in which both the buyer and the seller are Indian-owned businesses, and the buyer is located 
within the boundaries of its enrolled owner's reservation. Defendant's Memorandum in OppositiOl 
at 5. Defendant is a cigarette wholesaler incorporated by the Sac and Fox Tribe in Oklahoma, with it 
principal place of business on the Seneca Nation reservation in New York. Affidavit of Arthu 
Montour in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at ,r 2 (hereinafte 
Montour Affidavit). Its president and sole owner is a member of the Seneca Nation. Montou 
Affidavit at,-r 1. Warpath, Inc., is an Idaho corporation located on the Coeur d' Alene reservation, th 
shareholders of which are enrolled members of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe. See Affidavit of Samuel A. 
Diddle filed June 30, 2009, Exhibits A, B. Warpath sells cigarettes to the public, including person 
who are not Native American. See Ausman Affidavit at ,-r,-r 2-5. 
The Court previously noted that an incorporated business cannot argue that it should b
 
considered an enrolled member of a tribe simply because its sole shareholder is a member of tha
 
tribe. See Baraga Prds., Inc. v. Comm'r, 971 F.Supp. 294,296 (W.D. Michigan 1977); Ariz. Dept. 0
 
Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 34 (1999). "[A] corporation is not an 'Indian' fo
 
purposes of immunity" from the application of state law. Baraga Prds., Inc., 971 F.Supp. at 298.
 
Accordingly the cigarette sales at issue in this case take place between non-Indians for purposes 0
 
the applicable statutes.
 
Defendant also argues that the authority Plaintiffs seek to exercise pursuant to the statutes se
 
forth above is preempted by federal law. This issue was recently addressed in Maybee, in which th
 
Idaho Supreme Court conduded, "There is no conflicting federal law that would prevent the State 0
 
Idaho from regulating how tobacco may be sold or offered for sale in Idaho." 148 Idaho at ---, 22
 
P.3d at 1123. In Maybee, the court considered whether Idaho's Complementary Act and Preventio
 
of Minors' Access to Tobacco Act were preempted under the Indian Commerce Clause, which arise
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from Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. The court set forth the applicable analysi 
as follows: 
In determining how to analyze any state statute that allegedly is in conflict with 
the Indian Commerce Clause, it is crucial to determine, as a preliminary inquiry: (1) 
whether the regulated conduct occurs on or off a reservation; (2) whether or not the 
party being regulated is a tribal member; and (3) if the conduct being regulated does 
occur on a reservation, whether State interests outside the reservation are implicated. 
Id. at ---, 224 P.3d at 1123. 
The Maybee court noted that both Acts regulated the activities of Maybee, a member of the 
Seneca Nation residing on an Indian reservation in New York who sold cigarettes to Idaho 
consumers. "However," the court stated, "the Acts do not regulate Maybee's on-reservation 
activities, but rather his off-reservation conduct of: (1) selling, and offering for sale, Noncompliant 
Cigarettes in Idaho; and (2) selling, and offering for sale, tobacco products in Idaho without having 
first obtained a tobacco permit." Maybee, 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d at 1123. As in Maybee, 
Defendant's activities in this case also constitute off-reservation conduct. 
Defendant also argues that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case because the Cou 
must apply the balancing test set forth in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 13 
(1980), which Defendant asserts is a factual inquiry. The Bracker balancing test involves " 
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry 
designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violat 
federal law." Maybee, 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d at 1123, quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically stated that where the regulated conduct occur 
off-reservation, application of the Bracker test is inappropriate. Maybee, 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d a 
1124, citing Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 110 (2005). In Maybee, th 
court also noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine had reached the same conclusion wit 
regard to Maybee's sales of cigarettes to consumers in Maine, stating that the B,racker balancing tes 
was inapplicable "because Maybee's interactions with consumers in Maine extend beyond th 
boundaries of the reservation." 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d at 1124, quoting Dept. of Health an 
Human Svcs. v. Maybee, 965 A.2d 55, 57 (Me. 2009). As in Maybee, the Court concludes that th 
statutory provisions in question are non-discriminatory statutes regulating off-reservation conduc( 
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and as there is no conflicting federal law, the statutes are not preempted by the Indian Commerc 
Clause. See 148 Idaho at ---, 224 P.3d at 1124. 
Defendant argues that Maybee is distinguishable because Maybee sold cigarettes to Idaho 
residents who were not enrolled members of a Native American tribe and who were not residing 0 
land within the borders of an Indian reservation. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 14. 
contrast, Defendant argues, the cigarettes sales here were "to an entity owned exclusively by enrolle 
members of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe and operating within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alen 
Reservation." Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 15. However, as the Court noted above, 
Warpath, Inc., is not an "Indian" for purposes of immunity from state taxation. Further, althougl 
Defendant asserts that this case does not involve "sales by Indians to non-Indian consumers," th 
record contradicts this assertion. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 5. Clearly cigarette 
sold by Defendant to V{arpath have, in tum, been sold to non-Indian consumers. See AusmaJ 
Affidavit at ~~ 2-5. The Court concludes that the Maybee decision is controlling, and that is no 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
Defendant also argues that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs' action t 
enforce state law in this case. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 11-12. 
sovereign immunity "extends to a tribe's commercial as well as to its governmental activities an 
protects the tribe or tribal entity regardless of whether its activities take place on or off a reservation.' 
State ex rei. Edmonson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 237 P.3d 199,210 (Okla. 2010), citing Kiow 
Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998), and Native American 
Distributing v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1293 (loth Cir. 2008). It does not, 
however, "automatically extend to every business that happens to be tribally chartered or owned b 
individuals of Native-American ancestry," but only to an enterprise that "operates as an extension 0 
a tribe." Edmonson, 237 P.3d at 21 0 (citations omitted). 
While Defendant Native Wholesale is an enterprise incorporated by the Sac and Fox Tribe i 
Oklahoma, incorporation under tribal law is only one factor to be considered in assessing th 
relationship of an enterprise to a tribe: "Also important are whether the business is managed by triba 
officials, whether it is operated to further tribal governmental objectives, and whether the business' 
property is owned by the tribe." Edmonson, 237 P.3d at 210, citing Gristede's Foods, Inc. v. 
Unkechuage Nation, 660 F.Supp. 2d 442, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). There is no evidence in the recor 
upon which the Court could conclude that Defendant is a tribal entity for purposes of tribal sovereig 
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immunity. Native Wholesale's principal place of business is not on tribal land of the Sac and Fo 
Tribe, but on the Seneca Nation reservation in New York. Further, there is no indication that Nativ 
Wholesale is managed by officials of either tribe, or that it is operated to further the governmenta 
objectives of either tribe. In analyzing whether Native Wholesale was a tribal entity for purposes 0 
tribal sovereign immunity, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that "[t]ribal freedom from suit is a 
attribute of Indian sovereignty and may not and should not be extended to cover private entitie 
operating for private gain based solely on the ethnicity of their owners." Edmonson, 237 P.3d at 210. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court ultimately held that Native Wholesale was "not clothed with triba 
immunity from suit." Ill. at 211. Similarly, in this case Defendant Native Wholesale has no 
demonstrated that it is a tribal enterprise such that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity woul 
bar Plaintiffs' action. 
Finally, Defendant argues that even if it is not considered a tribal entity, it is nonetheless no 
subject to Idaho's regulatory power. Defendant cites Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1932), fo 
the proposition that the regulatory power of a state does not extend into Indian country. Defendant' 
Memorandum in Opposition at 12-13. However, Native American immunities from state taxatio 
and regulation "only extend to commerce 'within a particular tribe, not to commerce among differen 
tribes or their members." Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Henry, 2010 WL 1078438, at *3 (E.D. Okla. 
Mar. 18,2010), citing Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,720 n.7 (1983). There is no support for th 
notion that a tribal entity may immunize goods made within its borders from taxation and regulatio 
by other sovereigns once those goods leave its boundaries. See Henry, 2010 WL 1078438, at *3 
(quoting defendant's assertion that just as China or New York State may not decree that theiI 
products are immune from Oklahoma taxation when those goods enter the state of Oklahoma, neithe 
may a tribe claim such special treatment). The Court concludes that Defendant's conduct 0 
importing or causing to be imported noncompliant cigarettes into Idaho, and selling cigarettes t 
Idaho retailers without obtaining a cigarette wholesaler permit, is subject to regulation and taxatio 
by the state of Idaho. 
D. Conclusion 
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whethe 
Defendant violated I.C. § 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act. The evidence shows that th 
Seneca and Opal cigarette brands, manufactured by Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., hav 
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never been listed in Idaho's compliant tobacco manufacturer directory. First Kittelmann Affidavit a 
~ 4. The evidence also shows that Defendant sold these noncompliant cigarettes to Warpath, Inc., i 
Plummer, Idaho, between February of 2004 and January of 2009. Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit 
Exhibit D. There is no genuine issue of fact regarding whether Defendant sold, offered, or possesse 
noncompliant cigarettes for sale in the state of Idaho, or acquired, held, owned, possessed 
transported, imported, or caused to be imported noncompliant cigarettes that Defendant knew 0 
should have known were intended for distribution or sale in the state of Idaho. Therefore, the Cou 
grants Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion as to the issue of Defendant's violation of th 
Complementary Act. 
Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that there is no genume Issue of fact as to whethe 
Defendant violated I.e. § 63-2503(1) ofIdaho's cigarette tax laws. This statute makes it unlawful fo 
any person to act as a wholesaler of cigarettes without obtaining a wholesaler permit. The activitie 
Defendant engages in when selling cigarettes to retailers in Idaho constitute wholesale sales unde 
Idaho's cigarette tax laws. See Anderson Affidavit at ~ 5; I.e. § 63-2502(a). The evidence show 
that Defendant has never applied for or obtained a wholesaler permit. Anderson Affidavit at ~ 4. 
Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion as to the issue of Defendant' 
violation of I.C. § 63-2503(1). 
Applicable Penalty and Injunctive Relief 
Plaintiffs request that the Court impose a civil penalty for Defendant's violations of th 
Complementary Act and grant a permanent injunction, enforceable by contempt proceedings, 
enjoining Defendant from selling cigarette brands that are not listed in Idaho's compliant tobacc 
manufacturer directory, and from engaging in wholesale sales of cigarettes in Idaho without holding 
valid cigarette tax pennit. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summar 
Judgment at 8-13 (hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum). 
A. Permanent Injunction 
Idaho Code section 63-2519 permits the state tax commission to seek an injunction to preven 
a person from continuing to engage in business as a wholesaler without holding a valid cigarette ta 
permit. The state is also authorized, pursuant to I.e. § 48-606(1 )(b), to seek a permanent injunctio 
for violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. As noted above, a violation of I.e. § 39 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 12 
001075
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
-' 
8403(3) of the Complementary Act is deemed an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation 0 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. I.C. § 39-8406(5). 
The Court issued a preliminary injunction order in this matter on August 24, 2010, enjoinin 
and restraining Defendant from engaging in the conduct described in Plaintiffs' complaint. Citin 
several decisions from the courts of other states, Plaintiffs assert that when a statute provides fo 
injunctive relief and it is determined that the statute is being violated, a balancing of the equities i 
not necessary and the plaintiff need not make a showing of irreparable harm for the court to issue 
permanent injunction. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 12. There is no Idaho case law to support thi 
assertion. There is, however, federal case law that provides guidance with respect to the issue. 
An injunction is an equitable remedy. The United States Supreme Court has stated, "I 
exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the publi 
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction." Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Morrison & Foerster LIP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 
2d 1125, 1129 (D. Colo. 2000) (citations omitted) (noting that because an injunction is a 
extraordinary remedy, "the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal"). In Weinberger, the Cou 
also stated that 
the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in 
the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many 
words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in 
equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. 
456 U.S. at 313; see also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2007) (holdingl 
I 
that a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act is subject to traditional standards in equit ' 
for injunctive relief). In this case, although the relevant statutes authorize the state to seek a 
injunction, the Court cannot conclude that the statutes explicitly or implicitly restrict the court' 
equitable jurisdiction with regard to determining whether a permanent injunction should issue. 
Accordingly, the traditional standards for injunctive relief are applicable here. 
The United States Supreme Court has described the standard for granting a preliminar 
injunction as "essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintif 
must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success." Amoco Production Co. 
v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 (1987), citing University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 
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390, 392 (1981). In applying the traditional standards for determining whether to grant a permanen 
injunction, a court should consider whether: 
(1) the moving patty has shown actual success on the merits; (2) the moving party will 
be irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive relief; (3) the granting of the 
permanent injunction will result in even greater harm to the defendant; and (4) the 
injunction would be in the public interest. 
Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3 fd Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Public Service Co. 
ofColo. v. Andrus, 825 F. Supp. 1483, 1505 (D. Idaho 1993) (deciding to follow the approach take 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Amoco with regard to the standard for granting a permanen 
injunction). 
In granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Court has already determined tha 
Plaintiffs have shown success on the merits. Having considered the findings and purpose of th 
MSAA and the Complementary Act, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs would be irreparably injure 
by the denial of injunctive relief in this case. In enacting the MSAA, the legislature found tha 
cigarette smoking 
presents serious financial concerns for the state. Under certain health-care programs, 
the state may have a legal obligation to provide medical assistance to eligible persons 
for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking, and those persons may have a 
legal entitlement to receive such medical assistance. 
I.C. § 39-7801 (b). The legislature also concluded that it is in the interest of the state to require tha 
cigarette manufacturers who determine not to enter into the Master Settlement Agreement "establish 
reserve fund to guarantee a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from derivin 
large, short-term profits and then becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise." I.C. § 39 
7801(f). The Complementary Act sets forth the legislature's finding that "violations of Idaho' 
master settlement agreement act threaten the integrity of Idaho's master settlement agreement wit 
leading tobacco product manufacturers, the fiscal soundness of the state, and the public health.' 
Because of these concerns, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury i 
Defendant were not permanently enjoined from violating Idaho's laws regarding cigarette sales. 
The Court must also weigh the relative hardship to Defendant should injunctive relief b 
granted. See Public Service Co. of Colo., 825 F. Supp. at 1508. There has been no showing in thi 
case that a permanent injunction would cause Defendant any harm beyond the obvious loss 0 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 14 
001077
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
continued profits from its sales of noncompliant cigarettes. The Court finds that the threat 0 
irreparable injury to the public health and the fiscal soundness of the state, when weighed agains 
Defendant's loss ofprofits, tips the balance of harm in favor of issuing a permanent injunction.! 
Finally, the public interest does not favor Defendant's continued sales of noncomplian 
cigarettes in Idaho. As noted above, the legislature has determined that violations of th 
Complementary Act threaten the public health as well as the fiscal soundness of the state. The Cou 
finds that the permanent injunction sought by Plaintiffs would be in the public interest. 
Having concluded that (1) Plaintiffs have shown success on the merits, (2) denial of injunctiv 
relief would result in irreparable injury to Plaintiffs, (3) the harm to Defendant if an injunction i 
issued does not outweigh the harm to Plaintiffs, and (4) a permanent injunction would serve th 
public interest, the Court grants Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. Injunctive relief i 
appropriate under both I.e. § 48-606(1)(b) and I.C. § 63-2519. Defendant is permanently enjoine 
from selling noncompliant cigarettes in Idaho in violation of I.e. § 39-8403(3) and from engaging i 
business as a wholesaler without obtaining a valid cigarette tax permit in violation of I.C. § 63­
2503(1 ). 
B. Civil Penalty 
Plaintiffs also request that the Court impose a civil penalty pursuant to I.e. § 39-8406(1), 
which provides: 
Each stamp affixed, each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation 
of section 39-8403(3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each 
violation hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to 
exceed the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes 
or five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of section 39­
8403(3), Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto. 
I In Public Service Co. oIColo., the party opposing the injunction had committed obvious violations of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Weighing the relative harm to each party, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho took 
into consideration the opposing party's "record of disregard for the law" in concluding that the balance was tipped in 
favor of issuing an injunction in the interest of safety and to protect the environment. 825 F. Supp. at 1509. Similarly, 
Defendant in this case was notified by a June 5, 2008, letter from the Idaho Attorney General's Office that sales of 
cigarettes manufactured by Grand River Enterprises to Idaho retailers had been enjoined. The letter demanded that 
Defendant cease the unlawful sales of these cigarettes to Idaho retailers. First Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibit C. After 
receiving the notice of violation letter, Defendant continued to sell these cigarettes to Warpath. First Kittelmann Affidavit 
at ~ 9. Since receiving the letter, Defendant has sold 14,272,000 cigarettes in Idaho, 8,850,000 of which were sold after 
Defendant was served with the summons and complaint in this action. Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit at ~~ 5-6. 
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Plaintiffs are seeking a civil penalty of $2,000,000 for Defendant's violations of I.c. § 39-8403(3). 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 9. 
As a preliminary matter, Defendant asserts that the Court cannot impose a civil penalty in thi 
case. Citing federal case law, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the form 0 
an injunction, and a court sitting in equity cannot impose civil penalties. Defendant's Memorandu
 
in Opposition at 23. In Idaho, however, "distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity
 
are ... prohibited." Idaho Const. Art. V, § 1. As a court of general jurisdiction, the district court rna 
...
 
grant relief in any case where the pleadings and proof entitle the plaintiff to relief, whether legal 0
 
equitable. Miller v. Remior, 86 Idaho 121, 127-28,383 P.2d 596, 600 (1963), citing Addy v. Stewart
 
69 Idaho 357, 207 P.2d 498 (1949); see also Idaho Const. Art. V, § 20 and Lodge v. Miller, 91 Idah
 
662, 665, 429 P.2d 394, 397 (1967) (the district court, having jurisdiction both at law and in equity
 
will grant all proper relief consistent with the case made).
 
Defendant also asserts that it is entitled to a trial by jury on the question of the imposition of
 
civil penalty. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 19-20. Without deciding whethe
 
Defendant would be entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the civil penalty as a matter of right, th
 
Court finds that Defendant has waived any such right to a jury trial in this case. No answer 0
 
demand for jury trial has ever been filed by Defendant. Failure to make a timely demand for a tria
 
by jury constitutes a waivt:r of the right. City ofPocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372, 679 P.2
 
647,649 (1984), citing Meyer v. Whipple, 94 Idaho 260, 486 P.2d 271 (1971); I.R.C.P. 38(d). To th
 
extent that Defendant is making a demand for jury trial at this time, the Court denies the request.
 
I.R.C.P.39(b).
 
Next, Defendant argues that I.C. § 39-8406(1) is unconstitutional on its face because th 
formula set forth in the statute would allow a court to impose excessive penalties; for example, 
$1,000,000 penalty could be imposed for the sale of one carton of noncompliant cigarettes. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 21. Defendant asserts that the potential for imposition of 
large penalties under I.e. § 39-8406(1) implicates the Eighth Amendment protection agains 
excessive fines. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 21-23. 
A facial challenge to a statute is a question of law. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C v. State, 147 Idah
 
232, 240, 207 P.3d 963, 971 (2009), quoting State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 24
 
(1998). In order for a facial constitutional challenge to succeed, the party must demonstrate that "th
 
law is unconstitutional in aU of its applications." Lochsa Falls, 147 Idaho at 240, 207 P.3d at 971. I
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other words, "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law]
 
would be valid." Id. at 240-41, 207 P.3d at 971-72, quoting State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 6
 
P.3d 126, 132 (2003). The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment limits the government'
 
power to extract payments as punishment for an offense. Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v.
 
Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 898, 136 P.3d 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2006). A civil sanction is considere
 
punitive for Eighth Amendment purposes if "it can only be explained as serving in part to punish.'
 
Louis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 1232, 1236 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting Austin v.
 
United States, 509 U.S. 602,610 (1993).
 
A district court's imposition of a civil penalty pursuant to I.e. § 39-8406(1) is discretionary
 
both in terms of the amount of the penalty and whether a penalty will be imposed at all. In focusin
 
on the potential for the imposition of large penalties under I.e. § 39-8406(1), Defendant does no
 
demonstrate that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. In bringin
 
a facial constitutional challenge to I.e. § 39-8406(1), Defendant must show that the statute i
 
unconstitutional in all of its applications. Even if the Court were to assume that the civil penalt
 
allowed for in I.C. § 39-8406(1) implicated the Eighth Amendment, the statute is not unconstitutiona
 
on its face because it does not mandate an excessive penalty, or indeed any penalty at all. See, e.g.,
 
United States v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 689 F.Supp. 389, 392 (D. Del. 1988) (holding that eve
 
if civil penalty at issue falls under the Excessive Fines Clause, it cannot be unconstitutional on it
 
face "because it in no way mandates an excessive fine").
 
Next, Defendant asserts that the penalty sought by Plaintiffs does not comply with due proces
 
requirements. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 21. Defendant does not articulate th
 
basis for this assertion. Substantive due process "prohibits imposition of penalties for violations 0
 
rules or statutes that do not convey sufficiently definite warnings as to proscribed conduct." Pence v.
 
Idaho State Horse Racing Comm 'n, 109 Idaho 112, 115, 705 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Ct. App. 1985), citin
 
Wyckoff v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 12, 607 P.2d 1066 (1980).
 
Idaho Code section 39-8403(3) contains sufficient detail as to the conduct proscribed, and I.e. § 39
 
8406 sets forth the potential penalties for violation of that statute. This statutory scheme complie
 
with substantive due process requirements.
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Procedural due process "requires that there must be some process to ensure that the individua
 
is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions." Meyers v.
 
Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, "--, 221 P.3d 81, 89 (2009), quoting Cowan v. Board ojComm'rs, 143 Idah
 
501, 510, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006). The individual "must be provided with notice and a
 
opportunity to be heard." Meyers, 148 Idaho at ---, 221 P.3d at 89, quoting Spencer v. Kootena
 
County, 145 Idaho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 487, 493 (2008). As noted above, the relevant statutes ar
 
sufficiently clear to provide notice of the proscribed conduct. Further, Defendant received a notice 0
 
violation letter from the Idaho Attorney General's Office stating that Defendant's
 
noncompliant cigarettes in Idaho were unlawful, and demanding that the sales cease. Finally,
 
Defendant has fully participated in the action before the Court and has been given ample opportunit)
 
for briefing and oral argument on these issues. There is no basis upon which the Court coul
 
conclude that the relevant statutes themselves fail to comply with due process requirements, or tha
 
Defendant has not been afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.
 
Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence upon which th 
Court could determine an appropriate penalty. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition at 19. 
light of the Court's decision regarding Defendant's motion to strike set forth above, the Court agrees. 
Assessment of a civil penalty under I.C. § 39-8406(1) requires a determination of the retail value 0 
the cigarettes. Plaintiffs' evidence regarding the retail value of the Opal and Seneca cigarette brand 
was set forth in Exhibits A, B, and C of the Third Kittelmann Affidavit, which the COlirt will no 
consider as a result of its granting Defendant's motion to strike as set forth above. Accordingly, th 
Court finds that a hearing on this matter is appropriate, at which the parties may present evidenc 
relevant to the issue of the amount of any penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Court also grants Defendant's motion to strike as to Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, and I to the 
Kittelmann Affidavit, Exhibits F, I, and J to the Second Kittelmann Affidavit, and Exhibits A, B, an 
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C of the Third Kittelmann Affidavit. Defendant's motion to strike is denied as to the remainder 0 
Plaintiffs' affidavits. 
Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction is granted. Plaintiffs are directed to prepare a 
appropriate order and permanent injunction consistent with this decision for the Court's signature. 
Finally, the Court reserves ruling on the amount of civil penalty requested by Plaintiffs, pending 
hearing on this issue. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 
2t.I-c-. day of November, _2_0G£_10-'-.--='"- ----- _ 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, J. David Navarro, the ~ndersigned authority, do hereby certify that I havemailed.by 
United States Mail, on this J4'.U:1.day of November, 2010, one copy of the ORDER as notice 
pursuant to Rule ned) LC.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed 
as follows: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
954 W. JEFFERSON ST., SECOND FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 83720
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010
 
THEODORE V. SPANGLER, JR., 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
800 PARK BOULEVARD 
P.O. BOX 36
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83722-0150
 
SAMUEL A. DIDDLE
 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
 
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED
 
1111 WEST JEFFERSON ST., SUITE 530
 
P.O. BOX 1368
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701
 
1. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
BY~ 
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KAIHNG, TURNBOW 
& MeKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
P. O. Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
l")"')l '.' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF A 
PORTION OF MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER OF 
NOVEMBER 26, 2010 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company (''NWS''), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and pursuant to Rule 
II(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the Cowt to reconsider that 
portion of its decision and order holding that Defendant has waived its right to a jury trial on the issue of 
the imposition ofa civil penalty. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER OF NOVEMBER 26, 2010- 1 
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I. FACTUALBACKGROl~ 
As the Court knows, this case has a fairly complicated procedural history. The Complaint was 
filed on August 14, 2008. The Defendant attempted to remove it to Federal Court but the case was 
remanded on April 7, 2009. Two days later, on April 9, 2009, the Plaintiffs State of Idaho and Idaho 
State Tax Commission moved for a preliminary injunction. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12 of the Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure, and the parties started briefing 
in earnest. Most recently, the Court has heard and decided Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
granting Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction but reserving its ruling on the amount of civil 
penalty requested by the Plaintiffs pending a hearing on the issue. 
The Court will note that, in light of the filing of Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction 
immediately after the case was remanded from federal court, Defendant never had the opportunity, nor 
was it required, to answer the Complaint, as the request for injunctive relief and Defendant's motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction postponed any requirement to file an Answer. Defendant is 
filing an answer concurrently with this motion for reconsideration. In that answer, Defendant requests a 
jury trial. 
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
In its Decision ofNovember 26,2010, the Court stated: 
Without deciding whether Defendant would be entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the 
civil penalty as a matter of right, the Court fmds that Defendant has waived any such 
right to ajury trial in this case. No answer or demand for jury trial has ever been filed by 
Defendant. Failure to make a timely demand for a trial by jury constitutes a waiver of 
the right. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at 16. 
The Court cites City ojPocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372, 679 P.2d 647,649 
(1984), and Rule 38(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Anderton case does indeed 
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hold that failure to make a timely demand constitutes waiver of the right to a jury trial. It held 
that because the defendants had filed an answer without demanding a trial by jury, their right to 
demand a jury trial was extinguished. The Court noted that since no new issues were raised by 
any of the subsequent pleadings, an amended pleading cannot "revive the right to demand a jury 
trial as to that new issue." Id. at 372. 
Rule 38(d) does state that the failure of a party to serve a demand as required by the Rule 
constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury. 
But, Rule 38(b) provides: 
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by 
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the 
commencement of the action and not later than fourteen (14) days after the service 
of the last pleading directed to such issue. (emphasis added.) 
"Pleadings" are defined in Rule 7(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as "a 
complaint and an answer," reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a crossclaim, a third party 
complaint, and a third party answer. "No other pleading shall be allowed ...." Therefore, in the 
case at bar, there has pn:viously not been any "last pleading directed to such issue" because 
Defendant has not previously filed an answer, as it is entitled to do. No other "pleading," as 
defined in Rule 7(a), has been filed and therefore Defendant has not in any way waived its right 
to demand a trial by jury. 
Because all prior issues before this Court involved either questions of law under Rule 
12(b) or equitable issues involving injunctive relief which were not triable by jury, the first time 
Defendant was required to file this answer is now when the Court has made its determination on 
equitable relief and is moving on to the penalty determination phase. Because Defendant is 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
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concurrently answering the complaint and demanding a jury trial, it is entitled to trial by jury on 
the amount of penalty to be assessed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests the Court to reconsider that paragraph in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order which holds that Defendant has somehow waived its right to a 
jury trial on the issue of amount of penalty. Defendant respectfully requests the Court to find that 
Defendant has a right to jury trial to determine the amount of civil penalty, if any, which would 
be appropriate. 
DATED this 10th day ofDecember, 2010. 
EBERLE, BERLIN DING, TURNBOW 
& MCKLVEE CHARTERED 
By_-----.f---7<~+-...L...:.-~fL---=->.J------'<J.L.J"-----"'=-----
Samu. A. iddle, of the firm 
Atto eys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney this 10th day of December, 2010, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden ] U.S. Mail 
Brettt T. DeLange ] Hand Delivery 
Office of the Attorney General ] Overnight Mail 
PO Box 83702 ] Fax (208) 334-4151 
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010 ] Electronic Court Transmission 
William Von Tagen ~ U.S. Mail 
Deputy Attorney General [ ] Hand Delivery 
Office of the Attorney General [ ] Overnight Mail 
State Tax Commission [ ] Fax (208) 334-7844 
[ ] Electronic Court Transmission POBOX36 
/Boise, Idaho 83720-0410 
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& MeKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
P. O. Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
ANSWER TO VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS") and hereby admits and 
denies the allegations in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint as follows. To the extent that any 
allegation is not specifically admitted, it shall be deemed denied. 
1. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 1 
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2. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
3. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
4. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
5. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
6. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
7. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
8. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 2 
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9. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
10. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
11. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
12. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
13. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
14. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
15. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
16. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
17. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 17 of Plaintills' Complaint. 
18. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
19. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
20. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
21. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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22. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
23. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
24. In response to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
NWS admits that it is a tribal entity chartered by the Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma. NWS 
denies all remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph 24. 
25. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
26. The allegations set forth in Paragraph 26 are not short and plain statements of fact 
on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on 
that basis, denies the same. 
27. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
28. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
29. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
30. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
31. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
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32. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
33. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
34. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
35. NWS is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of 
the allegations set forth in Paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and on that basis, denies the 
same. 
36. NWS admits the allegations set for in Paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
37. NWS deni{~s the allegations set forth in Paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
38 In response to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
NWS admits that it has purchased cigarettes from Grand River and sold those cigarettes to 
enrolled members of tribes or tribal entities on Indian Country. NWS denies all remaining 
allegations set forth in Paragraph 38. 
39. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
40. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
41. NWS admits that it has not procured a cigarette permit but fervently denies that 
any such permit is required of it. 
42. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 5 
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43. The allegations set forth in Paragraph 43 are not short and plain statements of fact 
on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on 
that basis, denies the same. 
44. In response to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
NWS admits that it received a letter from the State of Idaho setting forth various statements of 
law under the Complimentary Act. NWS specifically denies all remaining allegations set forth in 
Paragraph 44 and affirmatively states that its conduct is not in violation of the Complimentary 
Act. 
45. The allegations set forth in Paragraph 45 are not short and plain statements of fact 
on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on 
that basis, denies the same. 
46. The allegations set forth in Paragraph 46 are not short and plain statements of fact 
on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on 
that basis, denies the same. 
47. NWS deni~~s the allegations set forth in Paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
48. The allegations set forth in Paragraph 48 are not short and plain statements of fact 
on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on 
that basis, denies the samt:. 
49. The allegations set forth in Paragraph 49 are not short and plain statements of fact 
on which the Plaintiffs base their claims for relief but rather abstract statements of law and on 
that basis, denies the sam~~. 
50. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
51. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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52. NWS denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred based upon tribal sovereign immunity. 
2. Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because NWS has engaged in no 
conduct within the boundaries ofthe State ofIdaho, not located within the Coeur d' Alene 
reservation. 
3. Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims must be barred because the Plaintiff lacks 
authority to regulate Indian commerce. 
4. Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because they would violate due 
process. 
5. Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because it would constitute an 
excessive fine barred by the Eighth Amendment. 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury of at least twelve members on all issues in the 
above-entitled matter. 
Before having fully answered Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant requests that the Court 
dismiss the action, deny Plaintiffs any recovery and award NWS its fees and costs incurred in 
defending this matter. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2010.
 
EBERLE, BERLI ,
 
& MCKLVE
 
By_-+~.-+ ----Io~_~",""",c.....- _ 
Sa e Diddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney this 10th day of December, 2010, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Brettt T. DeLange 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office ofthe Attorney General 
Len B. Jordan Building 
650 W. State Street, Lower Level 
PO Box 83702 
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010 
William Von Tagen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Tax Commission 
PO BOX 36 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 334-4151 
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] U.S. Mail 
[ Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 334-7844 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIs~jMII§~itAmt\.J,~ 
THE STATI~ OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 8yE.CHlD
IM!FVT'V 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through ) 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney ) 
General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX ) Case No. CV OC 0815228 
COMMISSION, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER 
vs. ) 
) 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY ) 
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1 ) 
through 20, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
TO: NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY: 
Pursuant to this Court's November 26,2010, Memorandum Decision and Order entered 
in the above-referenced case, the Court hereby enters the following orders: 
IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 48-606(1 )(b) of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (CPA Act), Idaho Code Section 63-2519 ofIdaho's cigarette tax laws, and Rule 
65(d), I.R.C.P., that Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company, its officers, employees, 
agents, servants, attorneys and all other persons in active concert with them and who receive 
actual notice of this permanent injunction by personal service or otherwise are 
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from: 
1. Sel ling, transporting, importing, or causing to be imported into 
Idaho cigarettes, as that term is defined by Idaho Code Section 39-8402(2) of the 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (the Act), that are not 
included on Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and 
Brand Families, as provided by Idaho Code Section 39-8403 of the Act; and 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER - 1 
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2. Engaging in business as a wholesaler of cigarettes, as those terms 
are defined by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(a) and (d) of Idaho's cigarette tax 
laws, with other wholesalers or retailers located in Idaho, without first applying 
for and possessing a valid permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1) 
of Idaho's cigarette tax laws. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any material violation of the injunctive provisions by 
Native Wholesale Supply Company, its officers, employees, agents, servants, attorneys and all 
other persons in active concert with them and who receive actual notice of the permanent 
injunction by personal service or otherwise shall be punishable by this Court. Sanctions for such 
contempt may include, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 48-615 of the CPA Act, the assessment 
of civil penalties of up to Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) per violation should the Plaintiffs be 
required to return to this Court to seek enforcement of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce all 
provisions of this Permanent Injunction. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ~ day of 0. ! , 20 10. 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of k... , 2010, I mailed, by United 
States Mail, one copy of the foregoing document to each of the attorneys of record in this cause 
in envelopes addressed to the following: 
Samuel A. Diddle 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKI veen, Chartered 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701 
Brett T. DeLange 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83701 
William Von Tagen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
800 Park Boulevard 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150 
1. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
By 2. c?~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
P. O. Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF A 
PORTION OF MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER OF 
NOVEMBER 26, 2010 
TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 8th day of February, 2011, at the hour 
of 3:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the Ada County Courthouse, 
Boise, Idaho, Defendant will call up for hearing Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of a 
Portion of Memorandum Decision and Order of November 26, 2010. 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PORTION OF MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER OF NOVEMBER 26, 2010-1 
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__ 
DATED this 15th day ofDecember, 2010. 
EBERLE, BERLI, DING, TURNBOW 
By&_M_C;::7Ks-L.....,Vr-E~_C_Hi_AR---=~::....:...E_~.---e-.D.J£.-'-II-::.~
Sam iddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
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was served upon the following attorney this 15th day of Deceber, 2010, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Brett T. Delange U.S. Mail
 
Deputy Attorney General
 ] Hand Delivery 
Consumer Protection Division [ ] Overnight Mail Office of the Attorney Gtmeral [ ] Fax (208) 334-4151 954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor 
[ ] Electronic Court Transmission 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
William Von Tagen 
P. O. Box 83720 
] U.S. Mail
 
Deputy Attorney General
 ] Hand Delivery
 
Office of the Attorney General
 [ ] Overnight Mail
 
State Tax Commission
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P.O. Box 36
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BACKGROUND
 
On November 26, 2010, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order 
(November 26 Order), ruling, among other things, on the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax 
Commission's (Plaintiffs) motion for summary judgment. Therein the Court ruled in part, as a 
matter of law, that Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company (Defendant) has violated: 
1. Idaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Idaho Tobacco Master 
Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act), as a result of 
Defendant's sale of millions of cigarettes unlawful to be sold under the 
Complementary Act. November 26 Order, pp. 11 - 12; and 
2. Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1) ofIdaho's cigarette tax laws, as a result 
of Defendant's selling these cigarettes at wholesale without first obtaining the 
Idaho wholesaler permit required by Idaho's cigarette tax laws. November 26 
Order, p. 12. 
As a result of these rulings, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment. It also granted their request for a permanent injunction. November 26 Order, pp. 15, 
18. 
With respect to the State of Idaho's request for civil penalties under the Complementary 
Act, the Court reserved ruling on the amount of civil penalty requested by the State pending 
further hearing on the issue. November 26 Order, p. 19. The primary reason for this was the 
Court's ruling that the State could not establish the retail value of the illegal cigarettes Defendant 
sold based upon the affidavits that had been, as of that point in time, filed with the Court. 
November 26 Order, p. 18. 
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At the time the State moved for summary judgment, it had attached, as exhibits, true and 
correct copies of web pages from three different Internet cigarette retailers, indicating that the 
retail price of Opal cigarettes was between $23.10 and $28.99 per carton and for Seneca 
cigarettes the range was $21. 80 and $26.99 per carton. See Third Affidavit of Beth A. 
Kittelmann, p. 2 paras. 4 - 6. The Court ruled that these exhibits are hearsay and not admissible. 
November 26 Order, p. 4. 
The reason for reporting the retail price of the illegally sold cigarettes is that Idaho Code 
Section 39-8406(1) of the Complementary Act states that the Court may, as one alternative in 
determining the appropriate amount of penalties to assess in a given case, impose a penalty of up 
to 500 percent of the retail value of the cigarettes at issue. 
Subsequent to the Court's November 26 Order, the State proceeded to purchase Seneca 
cigarettes in Idaho. The Affidavit of Roderick Howard, filed concurrently with this 
memorandum, indicates that on November 30, 2010, he personally bought a carton of Seneca 
72's in Idaho for $23.25 and a carton of Seneca 120's also in Idaho for $23.80. See Affidavit of 
Roderick Howard, p. 2, paras. 2 - 3. I These prices are consistent with the pack of Seneca 
cigarettes that the State purchased in 2009. Specifically, on June 9, 2009, Mark Ausman bought 
a package of Seneca cigarettes for $2.55. See Affidavit of Mark Ausman, pp. 1 - 2, paras. 2 - 3. 
Multiplying that by ten, the number of cigarette packages in a carton of cigarettes, equals $25.50. 
These purchases, and the affidavits reporting these purchases, are not subject to hearsay or other 
evidentiary objection and provide adequate evidence for this Court to consider the retail value of 
the Seneca cigarettes that were illegally sold into Idaho. 
The State was not able to purchase any Opal cigarettes. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR CIVIL 
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ARGUMENT
 
By way of quick background, civil penalties may be imposed for violations of the 
Complementary Act. Idaho Code § 39-8406. The undisputed fact is that since at least January 
2004, Defendant's own records indicate that it has sold at wholesale, and/or imported or caused 
to be imported for sale or distribution in Idaho, over 115 million cigarettes to Idaho retailers for 
which neither the cigarette brands nor their manufacturer, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, 
Ltd. (Grand River), were ever on the Idaho Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product 
Manufacturers and Brand Families. See Fourth Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann (Fourth Kittelmann 
Affidavit), p. 2, para. 4. 2 And the further undisputed fact is that Defendant continued to engage 
in such sales-over 14,000,000 in fact-after being advised by the State of Idaho that such sales 
violated Idaho law. Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit, p. 3, paras. 5 - 6. 
The Complementary Act provides various remedies for violations of Section 39-8403(3) 
of the Act. Specifically, the Complementary Act provides: 
Each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in violation of section 39­
8403(3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each violation 
hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed 
the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes or 
five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of section 39­

8403(3), Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto.
 
Idaho Code § 39-8406(1).
 
Applying Section 39-8406(1) is thus straightforward and clear, namely that the Court is
 
statutorily authorized to assess civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $5,000 per violation, 
or, in the alternative, 500% of the retail value of the cigarettes. 
The State has respectfully requested that Defendant be assessed civil penalties and, given 
the record in this case, suggested that $2,000,000 is an appropriate amount of penalties. It 
The Court rejected all of Defendant's challenges to the Fourth Kittelmann Affidavit. November 26 
Order, p. 5. 
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certainly falls within the range of penalties the Legislature has authorized this Court to assess. 
But if the Court determines, in its discretion, based upon the record in this case, to assess a 
different amount, it clearly has the authority to do so. 
It is undisputed that the State's civil penalty request falls well within that allowed for by 
the Complementary Act. Defendant has sold and imported or caused to be imported into Idaho 
over 115 million illegal cigarettes. It sold them in cartons of 200 cigarettes. 115,000,000 
cigarettes equates to 575,000 illegally sold cartons of cigarettes. 3 A $2,000,000 civil penalty 
would equal $3.48 per Calion of cigarettes.4 In short, a civil penalty of $2,000,000 falls well 
within the statutorily authorized $5,000 per violation range for violations of the Complementary 
Act. 
Alternatively, as also explained in Plaintiffs' summary judgment papers, utilizing the 
Complementary Act's "not to exceed" 500% of the retail value of the illegally sold cigarettes 
penalty calculation, a $2,000,000 civil penalty also falls well within what is statutorily 
allowable.s Shortly before Plaintiffs filed their summary judgment papers, the average retail 
value of a pack of Seneca cigarette that Defendant illegally sold into Idaho was $2.55. Affidavit 
of Mark Ausman, p. 1, para. Multiplying that by ten, the number of cigarette packages in a 
carton of cigarettes, equals $25.50. Subsequent purchases of a carton of Seneca cigarettes 
indicate a retail range between $23.25 and $23.80. See Affidavit of Roderick Howard, p. 2, 
paras. 2 - 3. 
As noted above, the State was unable to purchase any Opal cigarettes. This fact does not 
undercut the State's request for $2 million in civil penalties. A review of Exhibit C to the Fourth 
Affidavit of Beth Kittelmann indicates that of the 115 million illegal cigarettes at issue in this 
3 115,000,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 575,000.
 
4 $2,000,000 divided by 575,000 equals $3.48.
 
5 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 9 - II.
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case, 8,586,000 are Opal cigarettes. If all Opal cigarettes are removed from the total amount of 
illegal cigarette sales, there are still 107,412,000 illegal Seneca cigarettes remaining. 
107,412,000 cigarettes equates to 537,060 cartons of cigarettes.6 Utilizing, conservatively, 
$23.00 as the retail price of a carton of the illegally sold Seneca cigarettes and multiplying it by 
537,060 illegally sold cartons of cigarettes equals $12,352,380.7 In short, even if the Court only 
considers Defendant's illegal sale of Seneca cigarettes and utilizes an average retail value 
formula for those cigarettes in evaluating the State's requested civil penalty, the amount of 
$2,000,000 falls well below the statutorily authorized range of up to 500% of the retail value of 
these illegally sold cigarettes for violations of the Complementary Act. 8 
The reasonableness of the State's request is further highlighted by just looking at the 
illegal Seneca cigarettes sold after Defendant was advised by the State that such sales violated 
Idaho law. Review of Exhibit C to the Fourth Affidavit of Kittelmann indicates that there were 
12,934,000 illegal Seneca cigarettes sold after Defendant was advised by the State on June 8, 
2008 that such sales violated Idaho law. 12,934,000 Seneca cigarettes equates to 64,670 
cartons.9 That figure, multiplied by $23.00, equals $1,487,410. $1,487,410, multiplied by 500 
percent, equals $7,437,050, a figure far in excess of the $2,000,000 that the State requests here. 
Thus, even if the Court were to look only at Defendant's post June 2008 Seneca sales, the State's 
requested $2,000,000 civil penalty is still reasonable and within the law. 
Previously, Defendant has argued against the imposition of any civil penalties, stating 
that all it has done is "simply exercise[e] its right to have these issues addressed by the Court," 
and that what the State of Idaho is doing in response "is seeking to punish NWS for exercising 
6 107,412,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 537,060. 
7 $23.00 multiplied by 537,060 cartons equals $12,352,380. 
8 500% of the retail price of the illegally sold cigarettes would equal $61,761,900. ($12,352,380 
multiplied by 500% equals $61,761,900) 
9 12,934,000 cigarettes divided by 200 equals 64,670. 
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that right ...." Defendant's Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment, p. 25. Defendant 
does not cite any support for the proposition that a tobacco seller can continue to violate specific 
Idaho law and avoid consequence for such lawbreaking so long as the case addressing the 
violations is ongoing. The record reflects that regardless of the warning letter received and 
regardless of the filing of this litigation, Defendant did not stop selling and importing cigarettes 
into Idaho in violation of Idaho law. Rather, Defendant opted to continue to sell millions and 
millions of cigarettes that were and are today illegal to be sold in Idaho under the 
Complementary Act. These are not facts of good faith or innocent mistake. They are facts 
indicative of the need for the deterring effect of civil penalties. 10 Indeed, it is the rule that a 
defendant's refusal to cease the illegal conduct is a reason to support the imposition of civil 
penalties. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (Cal. 
Ct.App. 2000) (Defendant's failure to cease its unlawful conduct when notified the conduct was 
illegal is one reason for upholding the penalty) and People ex reI. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life 
Ins. Co., 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 (Cal. Ct.App. 2002) ($2.5 million civil penalty upheld, the court 
observing that the defendant continued to sell policies after it had been notified by the 
Department of Insurance that the policy language was deceptive). In short, Defendant has not 
acted reasonably. Its conduct does not justify an award of zero or de minimus civil penalties. 
Rather, it justifies the imposition of civil penalties reflective of the violations in this case. 
Plaintiffs have previously noted that absolving Defendant of any civil penalty, or 
imposing one that is not commensurate with the unlawful conduct involved in this case, will 
10 As Plaintiffs pointed out in their summary judgment papers, civil penalties are a proper tool to 
implement and enforce a regulatory program. State ex reI. Brown v. Howard, 444 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 
App. 1981). Civil penalties deter future unlawful behavior by a defendant and those similarly situated. 
Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 527 A.2d 1368, 1371 (N.J. 1987). They also can serve to 
compensate society at large for the harm it has suffered at the hands of the violators and compensate the 
government for the cost of enforcing the applicable law. State v. Goffe, 676 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Conn. 
Ct.App. 1996). 
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produce negative results for at least two reasons. First, it will send a message to tobacco 
companies disobeying Idaho law that it makes more financial sense to litigate and not settle: 
Why settle when, even if you are found to have violated Idaho law, there will be no or trivial 
financial consequence for continued illegal cigarettes sales? 
Second, absolving Defendant punishes the companies who were willing to be accountable 
for their conduct and amicably and promptly resolving those problems. In short, absolving 
Defendant here will reduce other future settlements and cause the Court to have to deal with 
significantly more tobacco related litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerning civil penalties, the undisputed fact is that Defendant has sold over one 
hundred million non-compliant cigarettes to Idaho retailers, violating Idaho's Complementary 
Act. An appropriate civil penalty is necessary to address Defendant's systemic, repeated and 
long-term violations of Idaho law. Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that the Court 
assess civil penalties against Defendant and that the amount of civil penalties be $2,000,000. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this2'1~ofDecember,2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BY:~'1r {-­BRETTT.DE~---------
Deputy Attorney General 
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P.O. Box 1368 
DHand Delivery
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Brett T. DeLange 
Deputy Attorney General 
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BACKGROUND
 
On November 26, 2010, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order 
(November 26 Order), ruling, among other things, on the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Tax 
Commission's (Plaintiffs) motion for summary judgment. In ruling upon the various issues 
presented to it, the Court rejected Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company's (Defendant) 
argument that it is entitled to a trial by jury on the question of civil penalties. The Court ruled 
that Defendant has waived any such right to a jury trial. November 26 Order, p. 16. 
Defendant has now filed a motion to reconsider related to the Court's ruling on 
Defendant's jury request, contending that it "never had the opportunity, nor was it required, to 
answer the Complaint" and that now, even after summary judgment has been granted, it may still 
file an answer which, in part, requests a jury trial. Motion for Reconsideration of a Portion of 
Memorandum Decision and Order of November 26, 2010 (Reconsideration Motion), p. 2. 
Defendant asserts that it "has a right [which it has not waived] to jury trial to determine the 
amount of civil penalty, if any, which would be appropriate." Id. p. 4. Concurrent with its 
motion for reconsideration, Defendant has also filed an answer, which, in part, demands a jury 
trial. 
Defendant is wrong on the facts and the law. The Court was correct: Defendant has 
waived its right to a jury trial. In any event, even if the Court were to allow Defendant to request 
a jury, Idaho law statutorily assigns the Court the duty to assess civil penalties and there is no 
constitutional right to a jury that conflicts with that statutory delegation of duty. Accordingly, 
the Court should deny Defendant's motion for reconsideration and grant Plaintiffs' motion to 
deny Defendant's jury demand. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO A JURY 
After this case was remanded from federal court, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, 
which this Court denied on May 20,2010. Normally, Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(a) requires a defendant 
to file an answer within 20 days after the service of the summons upon it. In instances such as 
here, though, where Defendant filed a Rule 12 motion, Rule 12(a) alters the 20-day time period 
as follows: "if the court denies the motion ... the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action." (Emphasis added). Thus, in this case, pursuant to Rule 
12(a), Defendant was required to file its answer on or before June 1, 2010.' Accord Bach v. 
Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 552, 224 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2010) ("Under I.R.C.P. 12(a), where a motion 
is made under rule 12(b) prior to filing a responsive pleading, a responsive pleading must be 
filed within ten days of the denial of the last rule 12(b) motion in order to avoid default. Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 12(a)." (Emphasis added» Of course, as the record reflects, Defendant did no such 
thing. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12's applicability is important. Defendant claims that it was not required 
to answer the Plaintiffs' complaint until now. Reconsideration Motion, pp. 2 - 3. This is in 
error. Defendant was required by Rule 12 to file an answer by June 1, 2010, but simply did not 
comply.2 After June 1, 2010 it was in default. Further and relevant here, the time to request a 
jury trial commenced on June 1,2010. 
I Normally, Defendant's answer would have been required on May 30, 201 O-which is ten days after 
the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss-but that day was a Sunday and the next day, May 3], 
2010, was the Memorial Day holiday. In such circumstances, Idaho R. Civ. P. 6(a) extends the deadline 
to the next applicable day, here June 1, 2010. 
2 Defendant also claims that it did not have an opportunity to file an answer. Reconsideration Motion, 
p. 2. This also is in error. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Defendant was denied 
opportunity to file an answer. Indeed, the record reflects that after June 1, 2010, Defendant filed seven 
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With respect to jury requests, Idaho R. Civ. P 38(b) states that a party may demand ajury 
trial for any issue "triable of right by a jury." Such demand, however, must be no later than 14 
days "after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue." Defendant argues that 
because it never filed an answer, the time period in which to demand a jury never began. In 
other words, Defendant's argument is that its noncompliance with Idaho R. Civ. P. 12 protects 
and extends months out its right to demand a jury trial. There is no precedent for the proposition 
that disobedience to a court rule can be used to extend the time by which a jury trial must be 
requested. Indeed, persuasive judicial precedent is to the contrary. 
In Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 387 (N.D. III 1982), aff'd 851 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1047 (1989), the defendants were required to file their answer on or 
before September 20, 1982, making the deadline (under the federal rules) to request a jury trial 
September 30, 1982. They did not, however, file their answer until October 7, 1982, at which 
time they requested a jury trial. In response, the Court ruled that the defendants' "jury demand 
must be measured not from the Answer's actual filing date but rather from its September 20 due 
date ...." Jd. Accordingly, because defendants did not file their jury demand until after 
September 30, 1982, they had "no right to jury trial under Rule 38(b)." Jd. Accord Larson v. 
General Motors Corporation, 134 F.2d 450, 452 (2nd Cir. 1943), cert. denied 319 U.S. 762 
(Plaintiffs request for a jury trial was untimely because it was made after the 20-day time frame 
he had to respond to the defendant's counterclaim.) 
The analysis of these cases is square on here. Defendant was required to file its answer 
by June 1, 2010. It did not do so. Defendant's delay should not be a tool it may use to 
circumvent Idaho Rule Civ. P. 38's requirement that requests for a jury be timely made. Instead, 
different notices, motions and memoranda in this case, none involving an answer or a request for a jury 
trial. 
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the 14 days in which to request a jury trial should be measured from the date that Defendant's 
answer should have been filed, which in this case was June 1,2010. Because Defendant failed to 
request a jury by June 15, 2010, its request for a jury now should be deemed to have been 
waived. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for reconsideration should be denied and its request 
for a jury rejected. 
II.	 THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY DETERMINE 
THE AMOUNT OF A CIVIL PENALTY 
Defendant contends that it "has a right to jury trial to determine the amount of civil 
penalty, if any, which would be appropriate." Reconsideration Motion, p. 4. Defendant is 
wrong. Even if this Court were to allow Defendant to request a jury here, it is clear that the issue 
of what amount of civil penalties to assess in this case is not a matter, constitutionally or 
statutorily, that is subject to jury review. Thus, on this separate ground, Defendant's request for 
a jury may be rejected. 3 
Although the right to a jury trial is protected by the Seventh Amendment, that provision 
has not been applied to the States. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n. 6 (1974). Thus, in 
considering jury requests, Idaho courts have historically looked to Idaho's own constitutional 
provision, Article I, Sec. 7, which guarantees the right to jury trial "as it existed at common law 
when the Idaho Constitution was adopted." Sheets v. Agro-West, 104 Idaho 880, 884, 664 P.2d 
787,791 eCt. App. 1982); accord Rudd v. Rudd. 105 Idaho 112, 115-16,666 P.2d 639, 642-43 
(1983). This analysis is quite analogous to that performed by the United States Supreme Court 
under the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). 
3 With respect to the determination of grounds for the imposition of a civil penalty, Defendant does not 
dispute the rule that any matter, whether subject to trial by jury or not, may be resolved pursuant to a 
motion for summary judgment as happened here without the need or requirement ofjury review. See, e.g. 
G & M Farms v. Funk lIT. Co .., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
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The State has not found an Idaho case declaring a jury right to the assessment of civil 
penalties. In Tull, the United States Supreme Court, analyzing the issue under the Seventh 
Amendment, noted that assessment of civil penalties does not "involve the 'substance of a 
common-law right to a trial by jury.'" 481 U.S. at 426, quoting Hepner v. United States, 213 
U.S. 103, 109 (1914). Accordingly, the Court declared that the Seventh Amendment does not 
confer a constitutional right to a jury assessment of civil penalties. Tull, 481 U.S. at 425 - 27. 
As a result the Court held that Congress can authorize judges to assess civil penalties. Id Said 
the Court: "Since Congress may itself fix the civil penalties, it may delegate that determination 
to trial judges." Id at 427. The Court stated that such determinations are "traditionally 
performed by judges." Id 4 
TuB's analysis on this issue is persuasive and should apply here. The Idaho Legislature 
authorized the "district court" to assess a civil penalty for violations of the Idaho Master 
Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. See Idaho Code § 39-8406(1). At the time the 
Idaho Constitution was adopted, there was nothing in the common law indicating that 
determining the amount of a civil penalty was the province or duty of a jury. Accordingly, as in 
Tull, even if the Court were to allow Defendant to request a jury, this Court should nevertheless 
rule that Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial with respect to the assessment of civil penalties 
It is true that Tull held that the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment does apply to the 
detennination of liability for civil penalties under the federal Clean Water Act. Id. at 422-23. That issue 
is not present here, because with respect to liability there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning 
Defendant's illegal sale of cigarettes into Idaho. Thus, the Court need not consider Tull on this issue, 
which, in any event, has not been followed by a number of state courts interpreting their state 
constitutional provisions related to jury trials under their respective consumer fraud statutes. See, e.g. 
State of Vermont v. R.J. Reynolds, 2008 WL 7929225, pp. 4-5 (Vt.Super. 2008) (no state constitutional 
right to a jury trial in the context of a civil penalty claim in a consumer fraud statute); Associated 
Investment Co., L.P. v. Williams Associates IV, 645 A.2d 505 (Conn. 1994) (same); State v. Ameritech 
Corp., 517 N.W.2d 705 (Wis.Ct.App. 1994), aff'd 532 N.W.2d 449 (1995)(same); Walsh v. Chestnut Hill 
Bank & Trust Co., 607 N.E.2d 737, 740-41 (Mass. 1993) (same); State v. I.H. Schroeder, 384 N.W.2d 
626 (Neb. 1986) (same); Kugler v. Market Development Corp., 306 A.2d 489 (N.J.Super.Ch.Div. 1973) 
(same). 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DENY 
DEFENDANT'S JURY DEMAND - 6 
001117
in this case. That duty has been assigned by the Legislature to this Court and there is nothing 
unconstitutional with such a delegation. 
In short, even if the Court were to rule that Defendant has not waived its right to a jury, 
or for other reasons should be allowed to request a jury in this case, there is no constitutional 
right to a jury for the assessment of civil penalties. And because the Legislature has delegated 
that duty to the Court, there is nothing remaining for a jury to do. Accordingly, on this ground as 
well, Defendant's request for ajury should be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Defendant's motion for 
reconsideration and grant the Plaintiffs' motion to deny the Defendant's request for a jury. 
'""P1K RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this_". day of December, 2010. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BY:~~~· 
BRETT T. DELAN 
Deputy Attorney General 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
~ 
B .~ 
WILLIAM VON TAGEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Samuel A. Diddle 5Q U.S. Mail 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow & 
McKlveen, Chartered 
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D Certified Mail, Retum Receipt Requested 
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Brett T. DeLange 
Deputy Attorney General 
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1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
P. O. Box 1368 By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTYBoise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
To: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS AND THE CLERK FO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Native Wholesale Supply Company, appeals against 
the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and 
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Order regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss entered May 30,2010, the Preliminary 
Injunction Order entered August 24, 2010, and the Permanent Injunction Order entered 
December 13,2010, the Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen presiding. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders 
described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to R~le 11 (a)(l), I.AR. 
3. The issues on appeal which the appellant intends to assert in the appeal: 
(a) Does the State of Idaho have personal jurisdiction over appellant. 
(b) Does the State of Idaho have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims 
raised in the Complaint. 
(c) Does the Federal Commerce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause 
prohibit Idaho from exercising jurisdiction over appellant. 
(d) Did the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act, Idaho Code §§ 
39-7801 et seq. and/or the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complimentary Act, Idaho 
Code §§ 39-8401 et seq., apply to these transactions by appellant. 
(e) Is the Defendant entitled to sovereign immunity. 
(f) Is State law preempted by Federallaw. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript 
as defined in Rule 25(c) I.AR., supplemented by the following: 
Transcript of the hearings on July 2,2009, December 17,2009, August 24,2009 
and October 26,2010. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
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All briefing and affidavits submitted in support of or opposition to: 
a. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction; 
b. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction; 
c. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; and, 
d. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Vanessa Gosney 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 5113 
Boise, ID 83702 
(b)(1) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, and the Attorney General ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1), Idaho Code. 
Dated this J!i- clay of January, 2011. 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
BY& MCKLV 7;r~~
 
Sainu ~. Diddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for the appellant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney this Jt- day of January, 2011, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Brett T. Delange 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
William Von Tagen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Tax Commission 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, ID 83722 
U.S. Mail 
] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[0Fax (208) 334-4151 
[J Electronic Court Transmission 
] U.S. Mail 
] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail
rX1 Fax (208) 334­
f l Electronic 
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
P. O. Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' 
OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO DENY 
DEFENDANT'S JURY DEMAND 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and submits this 
Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to NWS' Motion to Reconsider and in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny Defendant's Jury Demand. 
NWS submits that it did not waive its right to demand a jury and that it would be appropriate for 
a jury to consider whether to assess civil penalties. 
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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 
On November 26,2010, the Court entered its Memorandmn Decision and Order which, runong 
other things, concluded that Defendant had waived its right to a jury trial. Defendant timely filed a 
motion asking the Court to reconsider that specific ruling and allow a jury to decide the remaining issue 
of the imposition of civil penalties. Defendant filed an answer to the Verified Complaint containing a 
demand for jury trial on December 10,2010. Plaintiffs have now filed a memorandmn in opposition to 
this motion for reconsideration and also asked the Court to deny Defendant's jury demand. 
II. DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO DEMAND A JURY TRIAL 
The procedural history ofthis case is long and involved. In short, Plaintiffs filed a Verified 
Complaint in August of2008, Defendant removed the case to federal court, the federal court remanded 
the case and immediately thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. Defendant moved to 
dismiss for lack ofsubject matter and personal jurisdiction in May of2009 and the parties engaged in 
substantial briefmg and argmnent before the Court. Supplemental authority was requested by the Court 
and submitted by the parties. The Court issued a preliminary il1iunction order in May of2010. 
Defendant sought permission to appeal that order and at the same time that Plaintiffs moved for 
summary judgment. Additional briefmg and argwnent ensued. The Court denied Defendant's motion 
for permission to appeal. 111e Court then entered its Memorandmn Decision and Order ofNovember 26. 
2010, noting that the issue ofwhether civil penalties should be assessed remained to be determined. 
Based on this course ofproceedings, Defendant felt justified in not answering the Complaint and 
demanding a jury trial until the Court made its determination on the permanent irUunction. Up to that 
point, the parties were dealing with the issues specified in their pleadings and no Answer was required 
until dispositive motions had been decided. 
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Plaintiffs ignore most of this procedural history, and focus on the Rule 12 proceedings. They 
point out that the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss on May 20, 20 1O. They ignore the reality 
that the parties were still embroiled in briefing on other dispositive motions and had never abandoned 
motion practice for actual trial preparation. 
More importantly, Plaintiffs ignore the reality that Defendant was not obligated to file its Answer 
containing a jury demand unless and until Plaintiffs gave it a three-day notice of intent to take default, 
which they still have not done. Plaintiffs misread or misrepresent the holding ofBach v. Miller, 148 
Idaho 549, 224 P.3d 1138 (2010), which was based on the previous Rule 55(a)(1), which did not require 
a three-day notice before default could be entered. Under the previous 2003 Rule, the Plaintiffs' 
argument that Defendant waived its right to file an answer and demand a jury trial might be valid; under 
the current Rule, the argument is specious. Under the current Rule, Defendant has filed its Answer 
timely and has the opportunity to demand ajury trial. 
III. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE A JURy TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR
 
NOT A CIVIL PENALTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED AND THE AMOUNT OF ANY SUCH
 
PENALTY
 
Idaho Rule ofCivil Procedure 38(a) provides: "The right oftrial by jury as declared by the 
Constitution or as given by a statute ofthe state ofIdaho shall be preserved to the parties inviolate except 
in the small claims department." The Constitution of the State ofIdaho, Article I, Section 7, specifically 
provides: "The right oftrial by jury shall remain inviolate." As the State notes in its brief, the Idaho 
Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial "as it existed at common law when the Idaho Constitution 
was adopted." Sheets v. Agro-West, 104 Idaho 880, 884, 664 P.2d 787, 791 (Ct. App. 1982). And, as the 
United States Supreme Court noted after doing historical legal research on the 7th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution in Tull v. United States, 481 US 412, 417 (1987), the English common law 
treated a civil penalty suit as a particular type ofaction in debt, requiring a jury trial. "Actions by the 
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government to recover civil penalties under statutory provisions therefore historically have been viewed 
as one type ofaction in debt requiring trial by jury." Id Thus, Defendant has a constitutional right under 
the Idaho Constitution to determination of its liability for a civil penalty. It is also entitled to a jury trial 
on the amount ofpenalty, if any, under the case law discussed in Defendant's Memorandum ofLaw in 
Support of its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
While Tull did hold that that a court may determine the amount of civil penalties that should be 
paid to the government after a jury determined liability, in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 
523 U.S. 340 (1998), the Court rethought this whole issue and concluded that the 7t1l Amendment 
guaranteed the right to a jury trial on statutory damages due under the Copyright Act as there was direct 
historical evidence of such practice as a general matter and in copyright cases. In the present matter, 
analogous common law proceedings similar to the punishment contemplated under the Tobacco Statutes 
would be criminal fmes which obviously required ajury trial at the time the Idaho Constitution was 
adopted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defendant did not waive its right to ajury trial on its liability for and the amOlmt ofany civil 
penalties. It has appropriately demanded a jury trial and should be permitted to have a jury decide the 
issues. The State has apparently conceded and the United States Supreme Court has determined that the 
7t1l Amendment right to a jury trial applies to determination ofliability for civil penalties, and the state 
does not suggest that the Idaho Supreme Court diverts from this holding under the Idaho Constitution. 
Finally, this case is analogous to common law cases in which the jury also determined the amount of 
civil penalties. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests the Court to grant its motion to reconsider 
the issue of its right to a jury trial and to deny Plaintiffs' motion to deny Defendant's jury demand. 
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Dated January 25,2011. 
EBERLE, BERLI~'DING, TURNBOW, 
& MCKLVEE BARTERED 
" 
By_-+""""*----+~OL......:-.:.....+__4".£~-----''----------=-----
Sam I iddle, of the finn 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DENY 
DEFENDANT'S JURY DEMAND - PAGE 5 
001128
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does I 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
CIVIL PENALTIES 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS"), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and submits this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Civil Penalties. NWS asserts that the State's 
request for a $2,000,000 penalty is unjustified and excessive. 
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I. CONTINUING SALES
 
One of the primary argmnents the State raises to support its contention that NWS should be 
subjected to a large penalty is that NWS continued to engage in cigarette sales even after being advised 
by the State ofIdaho on June 8, 2008 that such sales violated Idaho law. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4.) 
At first blush, this argmnent suggests some superficial appeal: NWS simply ignored the State with no 
justification. If, however, the Court looks more closely, it will see that NWS had legitimate reasons to 
believe the State had no jurisdiction to regulate NWS' activities. 
NWS is not attempting to reargue the substantive jurisdictional issues which the Court has 
already decided. Instead, NWS is simply explaining the historical context in which the Idaho actions are 
placed. That context involves concerted attacks on NWS sales by the Attorneys General of various 
states, all of which (except Idaho) were unsuccessful, at least at the trial court level, during the time that 
NWS continued to sell cigarettes after the State's notice. Specifically, the trial court in Oklahoma on 
June 10, 2009 found in State ofOklahoma v. Native Wholesale Supply that enforcement of the Oklahoma 
Complementary Act would violate the Indian commerce clause, and thus the Court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction. l The jurisdictional issue was also raised in California where the state attempted to regulate 
NWS' activity but the trial court in State of California v. Native Wholesale Supply on September 25, 
2009 again found that a state did not have the right to regulate NWS' activities. That decision was 
reargued and again NWS prevailed. 
This history shows that at the time NWS was being sued by the state of Idaho to stop its sales, 
other state courts had already determined that a state did not have jurisdiction over NWS' sales of 
NWS concedes that the Oklahoma trial court's decision was reversed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court on July 6, 
20 IO. That decision is the subject of a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. While the 
Oklahoma Attorney General attempted to waive its right to oppose the petition, the Supreme Court has adviied the 
Oklahoma Attorney General that the Court wishes the state to file a response. This suggests strongly that the United 
States Supreme Court is taking the issue seriously. 
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tobacco into Indian country within a state. NWS believed it had legitimate and more than persuasive 
reasons to proceed with its business in Idaho. 
II. THE STATE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE NUMBER OF SALES BY NWS 
The Complementary Act, Idaho Code § 39-8406, defines a "separate violation" as including 
"each sale or offer to sell." It allows a civil penalty of $5,000 per violation. The State appears to suggest 
to the Court that NWS ha'3 committed 115,000,000 separate violations, or perhaps 575,000 separate 
violations (cartons), or 107,412,000 violations (Seneca cigarettes), or 537,060 violations (Seneca 
cartons), or 12,934,000 violations (Seneca cigarettes sold after advice by state). This inconsistency itself 
dooms the State's argument. 
The reality is that NWS did not sell any cigarettes at retail to individual customers. There is 
absolutely no proof NWS engaged in retail sales. Thus, the only "violations" that might have been 
established were the few sales at wholesale to Warpath, which was the tribal entity which sold the 
cigarettes at retail. 
The sales data that the Court may consider is submitted the Fourth Affidavit of Beth A. 
Kittelmann on or about October 19, 2010. That affidavit shows that NWS made only seven sales to 
Warpath after the State's letter of June 8, 2008. (See Exhibit C to Kittelmann Affidavit.) That nwnber 
should be the limit on asserted penalties. Even if the Court takes into account all ofthe sales listed by the 
State going back to 2004, before NWS even had an inkling its sales onto Indian country were somehow 
able to be regulated by the State, that total is only 51 sales, which would be the absolute maximum 
number of ''violations'' that could even be contemplated as a basis for imposing penalties. 
Moreover, Idaho Supreme Court case law prohibits the stacking of penalties for what is 
essentially one violation. In Employers Resource Management Co. v. Department of Insurance, 143 
Idaho 179, 141 P.3d 1048 (2006), the Department of Insurance imposed sanctions against Employers 
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Resource Management for improperly transacting insurance without a proper license. The hearing 
officer and the Director of the Department attempted to impose the maximum per violation penalty for 
84 individual sales. The Supreme Court vacated this stacking of penalties, noting that the proper penalty 
would be for the single violation oftransacting insurance without a proper license. ld. at 184, 141 PJd at 
1053. 
In the present case, NWS' violation (if any) of the tobacco statutes consists of the sale to 
Warpath. It is not the sales of individual cigarettes to individual conswners. 
III.	 THE STATE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE RETAIL VALUE OF THE 
ALLEGEDLY ILLEGALLY SOLD CIGARETTES 
The State's evidence on the retail value of the cigarettes sold appears to consist of an affidavit 
regarding the price of a pack of Seneca cigarettes. That is the only evidence regarding sales occurring 
before the summary judgment motion was filed, and thus is the only evidence that should be considered. 
(The State itself acknowledges that it did not purchase any Opal cigarettes and thus cannot base its claim 
on the importation of Opal cigarettes.) There is no evidence of the retail price of a carton of cigarettes. 
which is how most cigarettes are sold. (Simply multiplying the price of a pack x lOis not sufficient to 
establish the actual sales price of a carton, just as multiplying the price of a single soda does not 
accurately reflect the retail price of a carton of sodas.) Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' evidence fails and 
there is no basis on which the Court can assess penalties. More important, NWS has not engaged in any 
retail sales in Idaho. 
IV.	 THE REQUESTED PENALTY IS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH OTHER 
PENALTIES ASSESSED AGAINST SIMILARLY SITUATED COMPANIES 
As discussed in Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed September 30, 2010 and the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle 
submitted in support of that opposition which is incorporated hereto by reference, the State sued various 
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other cigarette companies and entered into various consent decrees with those companies. The amounts 
of those consent decrees are de minimus; some only require payment of the State's attorney fees. What 
is the difference between NWS and Blacksheep Distributing, Carolina Tobacco, Changdee Cigarette 
Factory, Smokin Joes and Yakima Distributors, where consent decrees sought only a few thousand 
dollars? The difference is clear: NWS was the only company that attempted to assert its right to have a 
court determine whether it actually was in violation of the state law. It is clear not only that the 
$2,000,000 penalty requested by the State is out ofproportion to those companies' consent decrees, but it 
is also clear that the State is attempting to punish NWS simply because it had the audacity to ask this 
Court to consider whether the State actually had the right to prevent it from continuing its business. 
NWS had the audacity to challenge the State's exercise ofjurisdiction over it. NWS had the audacity to 
exercise its right to seek resolution of the complicated question of tribal sovereignty. The State is 
attempting to punish NWS for that audacity, which flies in the face of due process and the American 
judicial process. 
Even in the case where the matter went to trial and judgment was granted to the State, State v. 
Maybee, Judge Sticklin assessed only a $163,225.00 civil penalty. The State has not shown why NWS 
should be penalized ten times as much. 
It is important to note a distinction between this case and the Maybee case. Here, NWS sold to 
an Indian corporation within reservation boundaries. In Maybee, the defendant sold by internet sales to 
any individual purchaser at any place throughout the state of Idaho. There was no Indian to Indian sales 
but rather simply retail sales to consumers no matter whether they were Native American or not and no 
matter whether they lived on a reservation or not. 
Unlike NWS, Maybee had no strong legal claim under the Indian Commerce Clause. Unlike 
NWS, Maybee made hundreds of individual sales to individual consumers. Unlike NWS, Maybee was 
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not relying on other states' court decisions upholding NWS' right to conduct a business which Idaho wa'> 
attempting to shut down. 'Thus, Judge Sticklin's imposition of the $163,000 penalty, while supported 
against Maybee, has no precedental value justifYing any penalty against NWS. 
v. $2,000,000 IS SIMPLY TOO MUCH 
NWS believed that it was acting within its right to conduct business as a Native American 
corporation selling cigarettes to another Native American corporation within reservation boundaries. 
'This Court has decided otherwise, but NWS' actions do not justifY the imposition of a $2,000,000 fine. 
The State has presented no argument why $2,000,000 or $1,000,000 or $20,000,000 would be 
appropriate. NWS has disobeyed no Court order and will not do so. 
The tobacco statute, by setting maximum amounts instead of fixed amounts, vested in the courts 
broad discretion in imposing penalties based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the 
absence of a statutory minimum, this broad discretion includes the power to impose no penalty at all for 
violations if the facts and circumstances justifY such a result. See State ofNew York v. Town ofTYallkill, 
170 A.D. 2d., 8, 11-12,572 N.Y.S. 2d. 758 (N.Y. A.D. 1991). In the present case, NWS acted in good 
faith and has not violated any Court orders. The State has obtained a permanent injunction and thus the 
purposes of the tobacco statutes have been and will continue to be served. There is no need for any type 
of penalty. If the Court concludes that some type of penalty would be appropriate, it should assess a 
nominal penalty. 'This would serve the purpose under the statute by enforcing the State's interest and 
warning other similarly situated companies to comply with tobacco laws. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
NWS conducted its business in a good faith belief that, as found by the trial courts in Oklahoma 
and California, the State had no jurisdiction to regulate NWS' sales on reservations. The Court ha'> 
decided NWS' sales are in violation of Idaho Code and that Idaho does have jurisdiction to regulate 
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NWS' business. Accordingly, NWS has discontinued its sales. A penalty would serve no further 
purpose and would be unjustified under the circumstances of this case. NWS respectfully requests the 
Court to reject the State's request for a $2,000,000 penalty. 
Dated February 1, 2011. 
EBERLE, BERL , KADING, TURNBOW 
& MCKLV N, CHA 
By------\..,L-~---=-~-=--=----==---L------'~----L.~,...L:--b......L--­
Sa uel A. iddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney on February 1,2011, as indicated below and addressed as 
follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden u.s. Mail
 
Brett T. DeLange ] Hand Delivery
 
Office of the Attorney General ] Overnight Mail
 
954 West Jefferson St., 2nd Floor Fax (208) 334-4151
 
Boise, Idaho 83no-oo10
 
(208) 334-2424
 
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr. U.S. Mail 
Office of the Attorney General ] Hand Delivery 
State Tax Commission [ ] Overnight Mail

PO BOX 36
 0. Fax (208) 334-784~
 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
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Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
P. O. Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney Case No. CV OC 0815228 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. DIDDLE 
Plaintiff, IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
vs. MOTION FOR CIVIL PENALTIES 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SAMUEL A. DIDDLE being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant Native Wholesale Supply 
Company in this matter and as such have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL A. DIDDLE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
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2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the decision of the Oklahoma District Court 
in Oklahoma County dated June 10, 2009 and captioned State ofOklahoma v Native Wholesale 
Supply. That decision was overturned by an Oklahoma Supreme Court case filed July 6, 2010. 
That decision is the subject of a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a copy of the Order of the California Superior Court 
for Sacramento County dated September 25, 2009 and captioned The People of the State of 
Cal(jornia v Native Wholesale Supply. To my knowledge, that decision has not been reversed. 
Further, your affiant sayeth not. 
61 
DATED this I day of February, 2011. 
/s!
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisL__ day of February, 2011. 
""­~ 
Residing: Nampa,ID 
My Commission Expires: 1/25/12 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney on February 1,2011, as indicated below and addressed 
as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden
 
Brett T. DeLange
 
Office of the Attorney General
 
954 West Jefferson St., 2nd Floor
 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
 
Theodore V. Spangler, Jr.
 
Office of the Attorney General
 
State Tax Commission
 
PO BOX 36
 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150
 
(208) 334-7530
 
LXi u.s. Mail 
[ ) Hand Delivery
 
[ ] Overnight Mail
 
k] Fax (208) 334-4151
 
[ U.S. Mail
 
[ ] Hand Delivery
 
[ ] Overnight Mail
 
[)4 Fax (208) 334-7844
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY !i 
STATE OF OKLAHOMA 
STATE OF OKLAJIOMA ex I'l'l. WA )
 
"DREW" EDMONDSON, ATrORNEY )
 
GENERAL OF OKLAIIOMA, )
 
)
 
Plaintiff, )
 
vs	 ) e<lSe No. CJ-2008-4942 
) 
NAIlVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY, a	 ) 
Corporation chartered by the Sac and Fox ) 
Tribe of Oklahoma, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
JOURNAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Now on this 10'" Day of April, 2009. this matter comes on for hearing all 
Defendant Native Wholesale Supply's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended 
Petition bases upon lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, read the briefs filed by the panics and 
heard argument finds that the Defendant has sufficient contacts with the State of 
Oklahoma for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. The 
DeJendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction should b<~ and is 
hereby deni cd~ 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, read the briefs filed by the parties and 
heard argument linds that the relicf PlaintilT seeks, injunctive relief and disgorgemelll of 
thc gross proceeds realizcd by Native Wholesale Supply for cigarette sales to the 
Muscogee Creek Nation for resale to Oklahoma consumers, in violation of the Oklahoma 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act, 68 O.S. § 360.J el seq., is 
barred by the indian Commerce Clause. 
The Court further llnds that Plaintiffs Amended Pelition seeks relief Ihal is 
baITed by the Indian Commerce Clause which cannot be cured by amendment. Theref()re, 
this matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AJUDGED AND DECREED that Native 
Wholesale Supply's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is hereby denied. 
001144
iT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Native 
Wholesale Supply's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby 
granted and this matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
,.~/ ?/ (~fl, /~~---'~ 
Bryan C. Dixon 
District Judge 
Certificate of Mailing 
This is to certify that on the WIll day of June, 2009, I mailed a true ancI 
coneet copy of the foregoing Order to: 
E. Clyde Kirk Robert Sheets 
Assistant Altorney General 101 N. Robinson, 13 th Floor 
313 NE 21 st Street OKC, OK 73102 
OKC, OK 73105 
Vh71lF~~~
~-lf!dfJ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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,,-,UPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA . RECEIVED 
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO "-' 
GORDON 0 SCHABER COURTHOUSE JAN 06 2010 
MINUTE ORDER FP&M-Sacramento 
Date: 09/25/2009 Time: 02:25:14 PM Dept: 54 
judicial Offjcer PresIding: JUdge Shelleyanne W L Chang
 
Clerk: E. Higginbotham
 
Bailiff/Court Attendant: None
 
ERr0: None
 
. Case lnit. Date; 06/30/2008 
Case No: 34~2008~00014593-CU~CL-GDS Case Title: People of the State of-California ex real Edmund 
G Brown Jr Attorney General vs. Native Wholesale Supply 
Case Category: Civil - Unlimited 
Event Type: Motion to Quash Service of Summons - Civil Law and Motion 
Causal Document & Date Filed: 
AppearanGes~ 
Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Quash Service of Summons (Taken Under Submission 
8/2412009) 
TENTATIVE RULING· 
Defendant Native Wholesale Supply {"NWS")'s motlon to quash is granted for the reasons set forth 
below. 
The complaint alleges that NWS has violated Rev. & Tax.· Code section 30165.1 by selling to California 
businesses brands of cigarettes that are not listed In the Attorney General's directory of manufacturers 
who have complied with -this state's financial responsibility laws. 9uch sales also allegedly violate Health 
and Safety Code section 14950 (establishing .ignition-propensity standards), 15 USC section 375 ~t. seq 
(shipping cigarettes'ln interstate commerce to persons or entities' in California that are not licensed as 
cigarette distributors by the California Board of Equalization) and Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200 
{unfair competition). . . . 
. . 
NWS contends that California does not have personal jurisdiction over it because it has no minimum 
contacts with the State of California 1 ,as it is an out-of-state corp'oration that sells and shlRs cigarettes 
only to Native American tribes and Native American-owned entities located on the land of recognized
Indian tribes. ..
The following facts are undisputed. NWS is chartered by Sac and Fox Nation, a federally recogniz.ed 
sovereign Native American nation, and is wholly owned by Arthur Montour, a member of the Seneca 
NatIon of Indians. a federally recognized sovereign Native American nation. Its business operations are 
maintained on the Seneca Cattaraugus, Indian Territory which is physically situated in New York. NWS 
does not have an office, Rersonnel, mailing address, bank accounts, sales agents, telephone, real estate 
or vehicles in California. NWS is an oLJt-of-state corporation that has no offIce or other presence in this 
State. Montour dec!. 
The record before the Court establishes that the only entity in thl·s state to which NWS' has directly sold 
. Date: 09/25/2009 Page: 1 MINUTE ORDER 
Dept: 54 , Calendal No.,: 
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Case Title: People of the stare of California ex real Case No: 34~08-00014593-CU-CL-GDS 
Edmund G Brown Jr Attorney General vs. Native 
cigarettes is Big Sandy Rancheria, a recognized Indian tribe. Big Sandy, in turn, has soId cigarettes 
purchased from NWS to 'other Indian and non-Indian persons and entities in California. Some of NWS 
sales to Big Sandy were shipped directlyto other entities in California.. . 
Plaintiff concedes that the State has no general jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff contends, however, 
that this court has specific jurisdiction over NWS. Specific jurisdiction arises when a defendant has 
Rurposefully availed Itself of the privilege of conductifl9 activities. in California; the claim arises out of 
defendant's California-related activity; and the exerCIse of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable. F. 
Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782; 796. Plaintiff asserts that NWS 
has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in California by: 11 its direct sales to 
Big Sandy Rancheria, and 2) its indirect sales to entities and persons "downstream from Big Sandy. 
The' Court examines each of these contentions in turn. 
Whether mInimum contacts are established by sales to Big Sandy 
Plaintiff has cited no authorities, and the Court is aware of none, holding that sales by an out~of-state 
corporation to an Indian tribe on a reservation located in this state constitute minimum contacts with this 
state that will support personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state corporation. Indeed, the Court has found 
no California authoritIes applying' a minimum contacts analysis where any activities on an Indian 
reservation were involved. . 
Authorities in other jurisdictions applying a minimum contacts analysis' involVing Indian reservations have 
concluded that activities takjng place 'solely on Indian lands do not constitute contacts with the forum 
state. InFlammond v. Flammona(Mont. 1980) 621 P.2d 471, the Court held that Montana did. not have 
personal jurisdiction to enforce a CalifornIa court's order. to pay child support against a father who was 
an enrolled member of the' Blackfeet Tribe and lived on the tribe's reservation. The Montana court 
reasoned that there were no off-reservation acts in Montana sufficient to vest that state's courts with 
personal jurisdiction over the father. The marriage had taken place in California, and the mother had 
returned to California after separating from the father. The father's domicile on the reservation 'was not 
an in-state contact that would supporf jurisdiction. '. . 
In Martinez v. Superior CourtJAriz.App.1987) 731 P.2d 1244, 1246, a dissolution action by a non-Indian
 
wIfe against a reservation In ian husband, the court applied the general rule that state courts do not
 
have jurisdiction over an IndIan living on an Indian reservation absent sufficient minimum contacts by the
 
Indian within the state away from the reservation. As the marital domicile was on the reservation, the
 
children were conceived on the reservation and the separation occurreq on the reservation, the court
 
concluded that it had no jurisdiction. On similar facts, the court in Byzewski v. ByzBwski (N.D. 1988) 429
 
N.W.2d 393, 397 came to the same conclusion.
 
Out-of-state authorities are not, of course, controlling. Further, these cases involve domestic
 
relationships, while this case involves commercial activity. However, to the extent that plaintiff asserts
 
that NWS' sales to Big Sandy constitute minimum contacts with this state simply because Big Sandy is
 
physically located in thi~ state, the ·Court rejects that proposition. The Court is persuaded by the cases
 
discussea above that on-reservation conduct is insufficient to establish minimum contacts with a forum
 
state absent off-reservation activities within the forum state.
 
Plaintiff further contends that NWS' sales to BIg Sandy constitute minimum contacts with this state 
because state law applies to reservations located In this state. The issue of the application of state law to 
Indian reservations IS not as simple as the broad generalities relied upon by plaintiff, e.g. "reservations 
are part of the 'state within which they lie and state laws, civil and criminal, have same force within 
reservation as elsewhere exceRt for restricted application to Indian wards. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook 
(1930) 281 U.S. 647, 650-651. That statement was, in any event, dicta as the only issue decided by the 
court was state taxation of non-Indian owned private property located on a federal military base·. As the 
U.S. Supreme Court later observed, "That Is not to say that States may exert the same degree of 
regulatory authority within a reservation as they do without. To the contrary, the principle that lndians 
have the right to make their o~ laws and be governed by them reqUires 'an accommodation between 
the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government; on the one hand, and those of the State, on the . 
other.''' Nevada v. Hicks (2001) 533 U.S. 353, 362, quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Reservation (1980) 447 U.p. 134,156. . . 
..__....__.- .. ---._------­
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As the court in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB {D.C.Cir. 2907) 475 F.3d .1306, 1312, 
concluded "la]n examination of Supreme Court cases shows tnbal sovereigntY' to be at Its .strongest. 
when exp icitly established j by a treaty ... or when tribal goverhment acts wIthin the borders of its 
reservation, in a matter of concern only to me'!1bers of tbe tribe[.] [citations omitted] ~onversely, whe~ a 
tribal government goes beyond matters of mternal self-9~vernance and enters Into off-reservation 
business transaction with non-Indians, its claim of sovereigntY is at its weakest." 
In sum, state's interests are generally highest when the individual Indian or Indian tribe engages in 
off-reservation conduct within the forum state. E.g., Nevada v. 'Hicks, supra (state officers executing 
process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan (1962) 
369 U.S. 60 (state regulation of fish traps operated in non-reservation waters); .Mescalero Apache Tribe 
v. Jones (1973) 411 U.S. 145 (state tax on gross receipts of ski resort operated on land outside' the 
tribe's reservation). 
The state's interests are weakest where the conduct of the individual Indian or Indian tribe is 
on-reservation conduct., relating to tribal sovereignty. "When on~reservation conduct involving only 
Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapPlicablebfor the State's regulatory interest is likely to be 
minimal and the federal interest in ,encouraging tri al self-government is at its strongest." White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980) 448 U.S. 136, 144. , " 
Plaintiff contends that, where state interests outside the' reservation are implicated, a state may regulate
the activities of even tribe members on tribal land, such as sales of cigarettes on reservation land by
tribal entities to nonmembers from off the' reservation. Nevada v. Hicks, supra, 533 U.S. at 362, citing
Washington'v. Federated Tribes of Colville Reservation (1980) 447 U.S. 134, 1151. Plaintiff urges the 
Court to fin? that NWS'. sales to Big Sandy implic~te ~.midentjfi~d s~ate int~tests outside the reservation 
because Big Sandy, In turn, selfs those cigarettes to California' entitles and consumers off the 
reservation. 
The Court initially notes that the power of the state to regulate on-reservation conduct implicating
 
off·reservatjon state interests cannot be assumed in ev~ry situation. In Lawrence v. Barona Valley
 
Ra.nc~ ~esort &, Casino (2007) 153 ~al.App.4th 1~64, 13~8-1370, the court held it had no subjec~ matter
 
JUriSdIction to aRply state tort laws against IndIan casino operated on reservation. In Amerlloan v.
 
Superior Court (2008) 169 CaLAppAtti 81,·84" the court held that tribal immunity extends to a tribe's
 
for-profit business entities when the entity is operating on behalf of the tribe. In Middletown Rancheria v.
 
Workers' Comp-. Appeals Bd. (1998) 60 CaI.App..4th 1349, the court concluded that Public Law 280 does

not confer on California the power to enforce Its full eanoply of general, civil regulatory jurisdiction over
 
Native American Indian tribes, and therefore the Cahfornia WorKers Compensation Appeals Board had
 
no jurisdiction over injuries sustained by an employee of an Indian casino operating on reservation land.
 
Recognition by the courts that states have the power to Impose taxes on the o'n~reservatjDn sales of . 
cigarettes, to non-Indians Is not authority that the'states may regulate on-reservation sales'in general, or 
NWS' sales to Big Sandy In particular. As the \J.S. Supreme Court explained in Federated Tril5es, supra, 
state taxing schemes on cigarettes and other goods sold to non-Indians have beEm upheld because the 
legal incidence 'of the tax fell on the non-Indian purchaser. The effect was simply to neutralize the 
competitive advantage gained by the tribes 'over other retailers by exploitiqg the willingness of 
non-Indian purchasers to "flout" their legal obligation to pay the taxes. 447 U.S. at 151. States are 
categorically barred from placing a tax's legal incidence on· a tribe or on tribal members for sales made 
inside Indian country. Wagnon v. Prarie Band Potawatomi Nation (2005) 546 U,S. 95, 106 (upholding 
sales tax imposed on in-state distributors, manufacturers or importers of fuel sold to Indian tribe for sale 
on tribal land because the legal incidence of the tax did not fall on the tribe). 
Here, the legal incidence of the statutes at issue in this case would not fall on 1l0n~lndian consumers. 
These statutes do not Impose. a tax that can be passed along to the non-Indian consumer. Rev. & Tax. 
Code section 30165.1 imposes an absolute ban on the sates of certain brands of cigarettes that are not 
listed on the Attorney General's directory: "No person shall sell, offer, or possess for sale in this state, or 
import f9r personal consumption in this st~te, cigarettes of a !obacco p'r~duct mar1ufac~urer not, incluqed 
In the directorY." Rev. & Tax. Code section 30165.1 (e)(2). rhe legal incIdence of thiS ban, If apphed
here, would fall, directly on Big Sandy as an importer as well as NWS as a seller of unregistered 
cigarettes, , 
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Of even more significance, NWS' sales to 'Big Sandy constitute' not only commerce between
 
Indian-owned entitles but also interstate commerce, The authorities upholding the power of a state to
 
impose taxes on sales of goods have concerned only sales within that state. Plaintiff has not cited, and
 
this Court is not aware OT any authority permitting a state to regulate interstate commerce between
 
Indian tribes or tribal entities. Such activIties are more p'roperly subject to Congressional regulation,
 
which' has plenary power to regulate Indian commercial activities. Agua 'Caliente Band of Cahuilla
 
Indians v. Superior Court (2006) 40 Cal.4th 239, 249. .
 
As the Court finds that the state cannot regulate the interstate commerce between NWS and Big Sandy, 
it rejects defendant's contention that NWS' sales to Big Sandy constitute minimum contacts with thIs 
state. . . . 
Stream of commerce theory 
Plaintiff alternatively contends that purposeful availment can be shown by placing goods in the stream of 
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state. Bridgestone 
Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 99 CatApp.4th 767, 777. Plalntiff contends that courts regularly find 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where the defendant's product arrived through' the stream of 
commerce In the forum state '(ia. a'1 e.qually foreig!l middleman. A. Uberti & C. v. Leonardo (.t:\riz. 1995) 
892 P.2d 1354, 1362-1363 OUrlsdlctlon over Italian manufacturer whose guns were sold In Arizona 
throuph third part)' middleman in Massachus~tts); Duple Motor Bodi~SI L,.td. v. Hollingsworth (9th Cir. 
·1969).417 F.2d 231 (sale of product by foreIgn manufacturer vIa mldaleman in England to buyers in 
. Hawaii); Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Dlspray Fireworks Co. (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 610, 613-614 
(Japanese corporation subject to suit in Nebraska where middlemanwas South Dakota distributor). ' 
Defendant contends that shipments of cigarettes Rurchased' by Big 'Sandy to other entities IS at the 
direction of Big S;lndy, and that Big Sanay's re-sales of cigarettes to other entities are the unilateral 
activities of a tnird party. 
Plaintiff bears the initial burden to demonstrate facts that sUPp'ort the exercise of jurisdiction. Bridgestone 
Corp. v: Superior Court, supra, 99 CaLAl?pAth 767. PlaintIff has produced the follOWing evidence in 
opposition to this motion: declarations of· Cook, Allison, Carlson and Diaz regarding their purchases of 
Opal and Seneca cigarettes from Big Sandy Rancheria, Huber Enterprises Smoke Shop, Native Made . 
Tobacco Shop, and Black Hawk Tobacco Shop; the declaration of Gable regarding various records 
demonstrating the amount of sales and shipments made by defendant to Big Sandy and to BIg Sandy 
consignees. The Court notes that the. Gable declaration includes as an exhi~if the declaration ofVincent 
Buehrer, a law clerk who prepared spread sheets based on sales and shipping documents. Notably, 
Buehler's declaration states at para. 8 that the only I?urchaser identified on any of the 234 shipments 
made by defendant from December 203 to mid-2008 was Big Sandy Rancneria, although several 
shipments designated Huber Enterprises and Native Buy as consignees. Gable's declaration states that 
. her revIew of all records available regarding defendant's sales and shipments to entities in California 
show sales only to Big Sandy, with 40 shipments to HUber Enterprises, 27 shipments to Native Made' 
Tobacco. 6 shipments to Native Buy and one shipment to Black Hawk Tobacco. . 
Plaintiff's contention that this evidence shows that defendant directed the sales to Big Sandy and 
downstream to other California entities Is not persuasive. The only inference the Court draws from the 
evidence of Big Sandy's downstream sales is that Big Sandy acted as a seller and distributor of 
cigarettes to otller entitles in California, Indian and non-Indian, as a result cif the tribe's own Independent 
economic decision. There is no evidence supporting an itifer~nce that NWS exercised any control over 
Big Sandy's downstream sales. The record establisfJes only that NWS filled orders placed by Big Sandy 
ana shipped those orders to Big Sandy or other entIties designated by BIg Sandy. NWS did not Qlace its 
.own name on the cigarettes as the Massachusetts distributor' dId in Ubertl, supra, 892' P.2d at 
1360~1361. Unlike the manufacturer in DURie, supra, who made special modifications to its coach for the 
Ha\yaii !TIarket. NWS. did not m~dify the cigarettes it sold to B!g Sandy in any way so as to serve the 
Calrfornla market. Rather, the eVidence that each package of cigarettes sold by NWS was stamped "for 
reservation sales only" indicates NWS intended to sell its cigarettes only to Indian reservations and not 
the wider California market. . 
While it mi3Y have b~el) fore;;;~eable to NWS that <:i.ga.re~e~ s.old to Big Sandy wowld be resold to oth~rs, 
foreseeabIlIty alone IS inSUffICient to support speCIfic jUrisdictIon. As You Sow v. 'Crawford LaboratOries, 
------------.,----­
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Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1859, 1868-1869 (mtJltl~mll1iol) dollar sales to GSA's California depot over a 
period of six years insufficient ..to apply·stream of co.mmerce theory where seller had no contro over final 
. destination of its products). "Foreseeability that a product will enter California Without having some 
control over its ultimate destination does not satisfy the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution." 
Finally, the C9urt must also find that the exercise of jurisdiction in. t~!s cas(~ would be f~ir. and 
reason~ble. Bndgestt;>n.e Corp., s!Jpral..99 Cal.AppAth.at 774. The Court 1n!t1ally observ~s that thiS IS not 
the typical personal Injury case In wnlcR a manufacturer places a defectIve produc~ In the stream of 
commercehand jurisdiction will allow a California consumer to seek redres~ from injuries caused by tnat 
product. T is is also not a case where the sales of unregistered cigarettes is a criminal violation, and 
thus the ban on such sales would be enforceable against Indian tribes und,er Public Law 280. ' 
This case Involves state laws which allow some cigarette manufacturers and not others to sell their 
cigarettes in California. The primary burden of these laws falls on the manUfacturer, Le. to meet the 
financial responsibility requirements and ignition-propensity standards. There is no evidence here that 
NWS knew or should have known. that Grand River,' the cigarette manufacturer and another 
Indian-owned entity operating in Canada, was SUbject to and had not complied with these conditions 
when NWS sqld the cigaretfes to Big Sandy. As the state's genera) civil regulatory power does not 
extend to Indian tribes, there is uncertainty at the oth.er end of the distribution as to whether the state's 
financial responsibility and other laws at issue in this case could be enforced against Big Sandy. It would 
be unfair to place the burden on an out-of-state distributor to determine, whenever it sens products to an 
Indian tribe located in California, what state laws are enforceable agamst the tribe with respect to any 
resales of those products. In the Court's view, that burden more faIrly falls on the tribe importing the 
products for resale. The Court finds that, under these circumstances, it would not be reasonable Dr fair 
to exercise jurisdiction over NWS. 
Transportation of c.igarettes over state highways 
Plaintiff contends that defendant's shipment of the cigarettes by truck over California roadways is 
sufficient to find jurisdictional contacts. However, there is no evidence in this case to on which the Court 
may find that defendant has directed the shipments on California roadways. Rather, the evidence shows 
only that defendant has sold cigarettes to a California Indian tribe l and at that tribe's direction, has 
shipped the cigarettes primar~y to the tribe itself and occaslonall~ to consignees. In these 
circumstances, mere shipment of goods over CalifolTlia roadways is insufficient to establish minimum 
contacts. Lakeside Bridge and Steel CD. v. Mountain State Construction Co., Inc.. (7th Cir. 1979) 597 
F.2d·596, 604 n.14 (out-of-state defendant's shipment of goods through state to another forum did not 
constitute minimum contacts not established solely by fact that goods were transited through a state). 
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to eRe Rule 3.1312 or further 
notice is required. 
COURT RULING 
The matter was argued and submitted. The Court took this matter under submission. 
SUBMITTED MATTER RULING 
Having taken this matter under submission, the Court now rules as follows. The tentative ruling is 
affirmed with the follOWing comments and evidentiary rulings. 
At the hearin'g, plaintiff contended that the law recognizes no distinction between sllipments of cigarettes 
to Big Sandy and shipments of cigarettes to a WalMart store located in the State of California. The 
argument is fundamentally flawed as it ignores the fact that Big Sandy is a sovereign Indian tribe. 
Activities involving a sovereign physically located in California are not treated in the same manner as 
activities involving other entities located in California. "When on-reservation conduct involVing only 
Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regUlatory interest Is likely to be 
minimal and the federal Interest in encouraging tribal self-government IS at its strongest." Nevada v. 
Hicks (2001) 533 U.S. 353, 361-362. Absent Congressional authorizatIon or a tribe's or consent, the 
courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over a tribe. Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & 
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Casino (2007) 153 Cal.AppAth 1364, 1368-1370.. 
Plaintiff is' correct that thlS, is not a lawsuit against an Indian tribe, However, plaintiff too narrowly
construes the subject matter of this action as merely sales by an out-of-stale corporation to a California 
entity, as though the sales were a unilateral act of NWS. No sales would be made by NWS unless Big 
Sanaypurchased, the cigarettes. Thus, the activity which plaintiff contends is unlawfur is not just the act 
of NWS in shipping cigarettes Into California; It is a business transaction between an out-of-state 
corporation: a.nd. an Indian en~ity located in Califorflia. This kind of busjn~ss transa~tion is. n~t ~nly 
~ubJect to limitatIons .on a state's power to regulate Interstate cOIT1JTlerce, .It IS also subject ~o .IJml~atlon~ 
Imposed by the Indian Commerce c1au~e. None of the authOrities relied ,upon by pl~lntlff diSCUSS 
minimum contacts where the activity involve~ interstate commerceand/or the Indian Commerce clause. ' 
, Defendant's request for ru'/lngs on Its objections to plaintiffs evidence i~ granted as follows. 
Defendant's objections to the declarations of Gerald K. Carlson (4/15/09 and 5/18/09), Chris Cook, 
AI.ber:t Allison (4/15/09 and 5/15/09). and Andrew Diaz are sustained on the ground of relevance. These 
declarations are not relevant in the absence' of a showing that defendant exercised control over Big 
Sandy's sales to downstream customers. Having sustained-the objections on the qrounds of relevance, 
the court n,sed not rule on defendants' other objections (e.g. hearsay, etc.). ~ 
Defendant's objections'to'the declaration of Monica Gable are overruled. 
Defendant's objections to the lodging of the transcript of the Jo Anne Tornberg deposition are overruled. 
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STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
FEB 07 2011 
1srt4~.f1n:1A..QI H, Clerk 
Plaintiffs, Case No. CV OC 0815228 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
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'-, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJ1t;1(f.Y OF AD~ 
A.M:J[~.M.--­
BACKGROUND 
This is a case involving the wholesale sale and distribution of cigarettes in violation of th 
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act, I.C. § 39-8401, et seq., and th 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.e. § 48-601, et seq. The procedural history of this case has bee 
set forth in the Court's previous orders, which are incorporated herein by reference. 
Pursuant to its Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 26,2010, (hereinafte 
Memorandum Decision and Order), the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, a 
well as Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The Court reserved ruling on the amount dfth 
civil penalty requested by Plaintiffs, pending a hearing on this issue. Without deciding whethe 
Defendant would be entitled as a matter of right to a jury trial on the issue of the civil penalty, th 
Court found that Defendant had waived any such right by failing to make a timely demand for a jur 
trial. Memorandum Decision and Order at 16. 
On December 10, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of a Portion 0 
Memorandum Decision and Order of November 26, 2010, asking the Court to reconsider whethe 
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Defendant had waived its right to a jury trial on the issue of the assessment of the civil penalty. 0
 
the same date, Defendant fLIed an Answer to Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny Defendant's Jury Demand was filed on Decembt~r 29, 2010, along wit
 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and in Support 0
 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Deny Defendant's Jury Demand. Defendant's Memorandum in Reply t
 
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion t
 
Deny Defendant's Jury Demand was filed on January 25,2011.
 
Hearing on this matter was held on January 31, 2011, at which time the Court denie 
Defendant's motion for reconsideration, based on the Court's conclusion that its previous findin 
regarding the waiver of a jury trial by Defendant was correct. The Court indicated that it woul 
reduce this ruling to a written decision that would also address the issue of whether Defendant woul 
be entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right on the issue of the civil penalty. 
DISCUSSION 
A decision regarding whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration brought pursuan
 
to I.R.C.P. II(a)(2)(B) "is left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Van v. Portneuf Medica
 
Or., 147 Idaho 552, 560,212 P.3d 982,990 (2009), citing Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M &
 
Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d 955, 959 (2008). The procedure for demandin
 
a trial by jury is set forth in LR.C.P. 38(b): "Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issu
 
triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any tim
 
after the commencement of the action and not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the las
 
pleading directed to such issue." Failure to make a timely demand for a trial by jury constitutes
 
waiver of the right. City of Pocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372, 679 P.2d 647, 649 (1984)
 
citing Meyer v. Whipple, 94 Idaho 260, 486 P.2d 271 (1971).
 
The Verified Complaint in this matter was filed on August 14, 2008, and the summons an 
complaint were served on Defendant by August 20, 2008. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l2(a 
provides that a "defendant shall serve an answer within twenty (20) days after the service of th 
summons upon the party, or within such longer period as is provided by statute." However, the filin 
of certain motions will alter this requirement. On May 6, 2009, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismis 
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for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction. A Memorandum Decision and Order Regardin
 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss entered on May 20, 2010, in which the Court denied Defendant'
 
motion. Pursuant to LR.C.P. l2(a), if the court denies such a motion, "the responsive pleading shall
 
be served within ten (10) days after notice of the court's action." Accordingly, Defendant shoul
 
have filed an answer within ten days of the Court's May 20, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order,
 
and a demand for jury trial within fourteen days thereafter. The Court concludes that Defendant'
 
failure to file a timely answer should not toll the period for filing its demand for jury trial.
 
No answer or demand for jury trial had been filed by Defendant at the time that the Court'
 
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 26, 2010. Further, the filing of Defendant'
 
answer and demand for jury trial on December 10, 2010, was not timely pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(a
 
and LR.C.P. 38(b). Defendant's failure to make a timely demand for a trial by jury constitutes
 
waiver of the right. Anderton, 106 Idaho at 372, 679 P.2d at 649, citing Meyer, 94 Idaho 260, 48
 
P.2d 271. Therefore, Defendant's motion for reconsideration is denied.
 
The Court also concludes that Defendant does not have a right to a trial by jury on the amoun
 
of the civil penalty. It is well settled that the Seventh Amendment to the Unites States Constitution
 
"does not apply to the states in so far as the right to a jury trial in civil cases is concerned.'
 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 644, 39 P.3d 577, 584 (2001), quoting Sheets v. Agro-West,
 
Inc., 104 Idaho 880,884,664 P.2d 787,791 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 29
 
(1877)). Under the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, § 7 "preserves the right to jury trial as it existed a
 
the common law and under the territorial statutes when the Idaho Constitution was adopted.'
 
Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 467, 4 P.3d 1115, 1118 (2000), quoting Stat
 
v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d 952, 957 (1986). Accordingly, "the right of trial by jury i
 
strictly enforceable only as to rights, remedies and actions triable by jury under the common law, an
 
not necessarily as to new or different rights or remedies not in existence or in contemplation of th
 
constitution when adopted." Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300,
 
310 (1999), citing Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 751,242 P. 314,315 (1925).
 
Defendant has not cited any Idaho case law recognizing the right to a jury trial in th 
assessment of civil penalties, nor is the Court aware of any such precedent. The issue was addresse 
by the United States Supreme Court in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), in which the Cou 
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concluded that although the petitioner had a right to a trial by jury on the issue of his liability fo 
violations of the Clean Water Act, the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial fo 
determination of a civil penalty for such violations. The legislative history of the Clean Water Ac 
indicated that Congress "intended that trial judges perform the highly discretionary calculation 
necessary to award civil penalties after liability is found." 481 U.S. at 425 (citations omitted). Th 
question considered by the Tull court was "whether Congress can, consistent with the Sevent 
Amendment, authorize judges to assess civil penalties." Id The Court concluded that the assessmen 
of civil penalties does not involve the "substance of a common-law right to a trial by jury," nor 
"fundamental element of a jury trial." Id. at 426. The Court therefore held "that a determination of 
civil penalty is not an essential function of a jury trial, and that the Seventh Amendment does no 
require a jury trial for that purpose in a civil action." Id at 427. This Court finds the reasoning se 
forth in Tull persuasive with regard to the question of whether a right to a jury trial on the assessmen 
of civil penalties existed at common law. 
Defendant asserts that the United States Supreme Court later "rethought" this issue and hel 
differently in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), which involve 
violations of the Copyright Act. However, the Feltner decision is distinguishable from Tull and i 
also distinguishable from the case at bar. The Feltner court noted that unlike many of its recen 
Seventh Amendment cases, "which have involved modem statutory rights unknown to 18th-centur. 
England," in Feltner there were "close analogues to actions seeking statutory damages" under th 
Copyright Act: "Before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the common law and statutes it 
England and this country granted copyright owners causes of action for infringement. 
importantly, copyright suits for monetary damages were tried in courts of law, and thus befor 
juries." 523 U.S. at 348-49. In distinguishing the case from its holding in Tull, the Feltner Cou 
noted that in Tull, 
we were presented with no evidence that juries historically had determined the amount 
of civil penalties to be paid to the Government. . .. Here, of course, ... there is clear 
and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright 
cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff. Tull is thus 
inapposite. 
Id at 355. Similarly, in the case at bar, the Court has been presented with no evidence of an 
historical analogy that would suggest that juries must determine the amount of civil penalties to b 
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'-' 
assessed pursuant to I.C. § 39-8406(1). Thus, the assessment of civil penalties by a court in suc 
cases does not violate Article 1, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution. 
There is also no statutory requirement for a jury trial on this issue. See, e.g., Coeur dAlen
 
Lakeshore Owners and Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 590, 596-97, 661 P.2d 756,
 
762-63 (1983) (finding no right to a jury trial in taxpayers' refund actions existed at common law
 
and stating that therefore if there is such a right its basis must be statutory). The Idaho Legislatur
 
has provided that "the district court may impose a civil penalty" for violations of the Tobacco Maste
 
Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. I.C. § 39-8406(1) (emphasis added). This appears t
 
express a legislative intent that a court, rather than a jury, determine the amount of the civil penalty t
 
be imposed in such cases. See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners and Taxpayers, 104 Idaho a
 
597, 661 P.2d at 763 (concluding that I.C. § 63-38l2(c) seems to express a legislative policy tha
 
taxpayers' appeals in general should be heard by a court sitting without a jury). For the reasons se
 
forth above, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the civil
 
penalty to be imposed for its violations ofI.C. § 39-8403(3).
 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of a Portion of Memorandum Decision and Order of 
November 26,2010, is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 7-/1.. day of February, 2011. 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 5
 
001159
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
10
 
11
 
12
 
13
 
14
 
15
 
16
 
17
 
18
 
19
 
20
 
21
 
22
 
23
 
24
 
25
 
26
 
I. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I faxed on this 7th 
day of February, 2011, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule ned) I.C.R. to each of 
the attorneys of record as follows: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
STATE OF IDAHO
 
BRETT T. DeLANGE
 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION
 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
954 W. JEFFERSON ST., SECOND FLOOR
 
P.O. BOX 83720
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010
 
Via Fax No. 334-4151
 
THEODORE V. SPANGLER, JR.,
 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION
 
800 PARK BOULEVARD
 
P.O. BOX 36
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83722-0150
 
Via Fax No. 334-7844
 
SAMUEL A. DIDDLE
 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
 
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED
 
1111 WEST JEFFERSON ST., SUITE 530
 
P.O. BOX 1368
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701
 
Via Fax No. 344-8542
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
By \f IJ-Y'\r/__ ~-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NO. AM~'11\\FiLeD.~~P.M .. _ 
MAR 09 2011
 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ClerkLAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
By KARl HOPPGeneral; and the IDAHO STATE TAX OEPVTY 
COMMISSION, 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 Plaintiffs, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON CIVIL PENALTY 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE S'UPPLY
 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1
 
through 20,
 
Defendants. 
BACKGROUND 
This is a case involving the wholesale sale and distribution of cigarettes in violation of th 
Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act, I.e. § 39-8401, et seq., and th 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48-601, et seq. The procedural history of this case has bee 
set forth in the Court's previous orders, which are incorporated herein by reference. 
Pursuant to its Memorandum Decision and Order entered on November 26, 2010, the Cou 
granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and found that Defendant had violated 
§ 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act and I.e. § 63-2503(1) of Idaho's cigarette tax laws. Th 
Court also granted Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The Court reserved ruling on th 
amount of the civil penalty requested by Plaintiffs, pending a hearing on this issue. 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Civil Penalties (hereinafter Plaintiffs'
 
Memorandum) was filed on December 29, 2010, along with the Affidavit of Roderick Howard. 0
 
February 1, 2011, Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Civil Penaltie
 
(hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum) was filed, along with the Affidavit of Samuel A. Diddle i
 
Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Civil Penalties.
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Hearing on this matter was held on February 8, 2011, at which time the Court took the issu 
of the civil penalty under advisement. 
DISCUSSION 
Idaho Code § 39-8406(1) authorizes the Court to impose a civil penalty for violations of I.e. 
§ 39-8403(3) as follows: 
Each stamp affixed, each sale or offer to sell, and each cigarette possessed in 
violation of § 39-8403(3), Idaho Code, shall constitute a separate violation. For each 
violation hereof, the district court may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to 
exceed the greater of five hundred percent (500%) of the retail value of the cigarettes 
or five thousand dollars ($5,000) upon a determination of violation of § 39-8403(3), 
Idaho Code, or any rule adopted pursuant thereto. 
I.e. § 39-8406(1). Both parties agree that the determination of the amount of the civil penalty to be 
imposed, if any, is within the discretion of the Court. 
Plaintiffs seek a civil penalty of $2,000,000 in this matter, arguing that this amount falls weI 
within the range of the penalties permitted by I.C. § 39-8406(1). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert tha 
since at least January of 2004, Defendant has sold over 115 million cigarettes to Idaho retailers i 
violation of I.e. § 39-8403(3), which equates to 575,000 cartons of cigarettes. Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum at 4-5. A civil penalty of $2,000,000 would equal approximately $3.48 per carton, 
which is substantially less than the penalty that could be assessed if the Court considered the sale 0 
each carton as a separate violation and imposed a penalty of $5,000 per carton. Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum at 5. 
Plaintiffs also assert that they have submitted evidence demonstrating that the retail value of 
carton of Seneca cigarettes is between $23.25 and $23.80. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant ha 
illegally sold 537,060 cartons of Seneca cigarettes. Therefore, even if the Court only considers sale 
of Seneca cigarettes, the requested penalty of $2,000,000 falls well below the penalty that could b 
assessed if the Court were to impose a penalty of 500% of the retail value of the cigarettes. Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum at 5-6. 
Defendant argues that the $2,000,000 penalty sought by Plaintiffs is excessive and is no 
commensurate with the amounts set forth in consent decrees that the State has entered into with othe 
similarly situated tobacco sellers. Defendant's Memorandum at 4-5. Defendant notes that th 
penalty assessed by the district court in State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 1109 (2010), wa 
only $163,225, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated why Defendant should be penalized ten times a 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 2 
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much. Defendant's Memorandum at 5-6. Defendant also asserts that in determining an appropriat 
penalty, the Court should only consider the number of "sales" made by Defendant, rather than th 
number of cigarettes or cartons of cigarettes sold. Since 2004, Defendant has made a total of 51 
"sales" of cigarettes to Warpath, and only seven of these sales occurred after Plaintiffs sent Defendan 
a notice of violation letter in June of 2008. Defendant's Memorandum at 3. Finally, Defendan 
asserts that its conduct in continuing to sell non-compliant cigarettes in Idaho was not the type 0 
wanton or egregious conduct that would justify imposition of a civil penalty; rather, Defendant ha 
simply defended itself in good faith in this legal proceeding, which has involved complicated issue 
of jurisdiction and sovereignty, against enforcement of a statute that had never before been applied t 
on-reservation tobacco sales. See Defendant's Memorandum at 2-3. 
The Court notes that while it agrees Defendant should not be penalized for seeking a lega 
determination of its rights, Defendant's conduct in continuing to sell non-compliant cigarettes in 
Idaho after receipt of the June 2008 notice of violation letter was not reasonable. Even thoug 
Defendant had apparently sold cigarettes manufactured by Grand River Enterprises to Idaho retailer 
since at least 2004 with no interference from the State, the June 2008 letter put Defendant on notice 
that the State of Idaho considered such sales violations of the Complementary Act. The letterl 
demanded that Defendant cease the unlawful sales of these cigarettes to Idaho retailers. See Affidavi~' 
I 
of Beth A. Kittelmann dated April 9, 2009, Exhibit e. There is no reason Defendant could not hav 
suspended its sales of cigarettes in Idaho pending legal determination of the applicability of th 
Complementary Act to such sales. Further, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant's argument tha 
it was simply winding up its affairs in Idaho during the seven months it continued to sell cigarettes t 
Warpath following receipt of the notice of violation letter. In exercising its discretion pursuant to I.e. 
§ 39-8406(1), the Court concludes that the civil penalty imposed in this matter should be based on th 
sales made by Defendant after the June 5, 2008, notice of violation letter. The Court further finds tha 
a penalty based on the retail value of the cigarettes sold, rather than the number of violations, i 
appropriate since Defendant is a wholesaler and each of the seven "transactions" during the reIevan 
period involved the shipment of numerous cases of cigarettes. 
Plaintiffs' evidence of the retail value of the cigarettes sold by Defendant is set forth in th 
Affidavit of Roderick Howard filed on December 29, 2010, as well the Affidavit of Mark Ausma 
filed on June 23, 2009. Mr. Howard, a Senior Tax Compliance Officer for the Idaho State Ta 
Commission, visited the Warpath Smoke Shop in Plummer, Idaho, on November 30, 2010. 
Mr. Howard purchased one carton of Seneca Menthol 72's cigarettes for $23.25 and one carton 0 
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Seneca Menthol 120's cigarettes for $23.80. Affidavit of Roderick Howard at ~ 2. Attached t 
Mr. Howard's affidavit are his receipts and the images of the cigarette cartons he purchased. 
Mr. Ausman, a Tax Compliance Officer for the Idaho State Tax Commission, visited the Warpat 
Smoke Shop on June 9, 2009. Mr. Ausman purchased one pack of Seneca Menthol Ultra Light 
100's cigarettes for $2.55. Affidavit of Mark Ausman at ~ 2. Attached to Mr. Ausman's affidavit ar 
his receipt and an image of the pack of cigarettes he purchased. 
Defendant's invoices indicate that Defendant sold two brands of noncompliant cigarettes, 
Opal and Seneca, after the June 5, 2008, notice of violation letter. See FOUIth Affidavit of Beth A. 
Kittelmann, Exhibit D. Plaintiffs have not presented any admissible evidence from which the Cou 
could determine the retail value of the Opal cigarettes sold.! Therefore, the Court will focus only 0 
the Seneca cigarettes sold by Defendant after the June 2008 notice of violation letter. 
In reviewing the relevant invoices, the Court finds no sales of Seneca Menthol 72's cigarette 
or Seneca Menthol 120's cigarettes by Defendant during this time frame. The only Seneca cigarette 
sold by Defendant after the June 2008 notice of violation letter for which the Court has evidenc 
concerning retail value are the Seneca Menthol Ultra Lights 100's cigarettes. See Fourth Affidavit 0 
Beth A. Kittelmann, Exhibit D. The Court has not been presented with any evidence from which i 
could reasonably conclude that all of the various types of Seneca cigarettes sold by Defendant woul 
necessarily have the same retail values. For purposes of calculating the civil penalty in this matter 
therefore, the only relevant, admissible evidence before the Court is that the retail value of one pac 
of Seneca Menthol Ultra Lights 100's cigarettes is $2.55. 
Defendant's invoices indicate that Defendant sold 28 cases, or 1,680 cartons, of Senec 
Menthol Ultra Lights 100's cigarettes to Warpath during the relevant time period. See Fourt 
Affidavit of Beth A. KittelmaJID, Exhibits C, D. With each carton containing ten packs of cigarettes 
the evidence presented by Plaintiffs indicates that the total retail value of these cigarettes wa 
$42,840.1 In exercising its discretion, the Court finds it appropriate to impose a civil penalty fo 
Defendant's violations of I.C. § 39-8403(3) in the amount of 500% of the retail value of thes 
I Plaintiffs indicate that the State was not able to purchase any Opal cigarettes. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 3 n.l. 
2 Defendant argues that the civil penalty should not be calculated by the retail value of one pack of cigarettes, a 
Defendant is a wholesaler that has 110t engaged in any retail sales in Idaho, and most cigarettes are sold by the carto 
rather than by the pack. Defendant's Memorandum at 4. However, I.e. § 39-8406(1) clearly states that the retail value 0 
the cigarettes is a basis upon which the Court may calculate the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Further, Defendan 
has made no showing that the civil penalty must be calculated according to the retail value of a carton of cigarettes, rathe 
than the retail value of a pack of cigarettes. Based on the guidance provided by I.e. § 39-8406(1) and the evidenc 
presented in this matter, the Court concludes that a civil penalty based on the retail value of a single pack of the relevan 
cigarette brand and type is both reasonable and appropriate. 
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cigarettes. I.e. § 39-8406(1). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the amount of the civil penalt 
to be imposed in this matter shall be $214,200.3 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to I.C. § 39-8406(1), the Court orders that Defendant shall pay a civil penalty in th 
amount of$214,200 for its violations ofI.C. § 39-8403(3). 
Plaintiffs are hereby directed to prepare an order and judgment consistent with this opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this Jic-.. day of March, 2011. 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
3 The Court notes that neither party has raised the issue of the applicability ofI.C. § 39-8407(6), which provides: 
If a court determines that a person has violated this chapter, the court shall order any profits, gain, 
gross receipts or other benefit from the violation to be disgorged and paid to the state treasurer for deposit in the 
general fund. Unless otherwise expressly provided the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are 
cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state. 
This remedy has not been pursued by Plaintiffs, and the Court does not find it appropriate to address the provision sua 
sponte. Additionally, Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence from which the Court could determine an amount to 
be disgorged pursuant to this provision. 
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 001167
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
'­
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I faxed on this 9th 
day of March, 2011, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule ned) r.C.R. to each of the 
attorneys of record as follows: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
BRETT T. DeLANGE 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
954 W. JEFFERSON ST., SECOND FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010 
THEODORE V. SPANGLER, JR., 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
800 PARK BOULEVARD 
P.O. BOX 36 
BOISE, IDAHO 83722-0150 
SAMUEL A. DIDDLE 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & 
McKLVEEN,CHARTERED 
1111 WEST JEFFERSON ST., SUITE 530 
P.O. BOX 1368 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
CHRITOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
By _\-,.I'\-¥t->.ool-\~lj--L'-----_. 
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FILED .,. '""I dA.M·· -'P.M a, "" .L 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC~~3 1 2011 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY ~ItmtOPHERD. RICH, Clerk 
By MIREN OLSON 
-------------------------- DEPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-OC-0815228 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) JUDGMENT 
vs. ) 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation, and Does 1 
through 20, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
---------------) 
Pursuant to this Court's August 24, 2010 Permanent Injunction, November 26, 2010, 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and March 9, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order 
THIS COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company is permanently enjoined from: 
A. Selling, transporting, importing, or causing to be imported into Idaho 
cigarettes, as that term is defined by Idaho Code Section 39-8402(2) of the Tobacco 
Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (the Act), that are not included on 
Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brand Families, as 
provided by Idaho Code Section 39-8403 of the Act; and 
B. Engaging in business as a wholesaler of cigarettes, as those terms are 
defined by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(a) and (d) of Idaho's cigarette tax laws, with 
other wholesalers or retailers located in Idaho, without first applying for and possessing a 
valid permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1) of Idaho's cigarette tax laws. 
JUDGMENT - 1
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_. 
2. Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company shall remit to the Office of the 
Idaho Attorney General, as a civil penalty, the sum of $214,200. 
3. The State of Idaho is the prevailing party and is entitled to costs and reasonable 
attorney fees upon timely presentation of an appropriate Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees. 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2011. 
r 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Court Judge 
JUDGMENT - 2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ::~ / day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Samuel A. Diddle 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKlveen, Chartered 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701 
Brett 1. DeLange 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83701 
William Von Tagen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
800 Park Boulevard 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0150 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
ADA COUNTY CLERK 
J0u1"-- {2l-Az/ .--1------2_ 
Deputy Clerk 
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A.M. F-J'l~M.~2 ~~OR\G\NAL 
Samuel A. Diddle, ISB #4967 MAY 05 2011 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED By JAMIE AANDi~LL 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 DEPUTY 
P. O. Box 1368 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
Attorneys for Defendant Native Wholesale Supply Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0815228 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
To: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, STATE OF IDAHO by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney General, and the IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS AND THE CLERKFO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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1. The above named appellant, Native Wholesale Supply Company, appeals against 
the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and 
Order regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss entered May 30, 2010, the Preliminary 
Injunction Order entered August 24,2010, the Permanent Injunction Order entered December 13, 
2010. The Memorandum Decision and Order on Civil Penalty entered on March 9,2011 and the 
Judgment entered on March 31,2011, the Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen presiding. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders 
described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1), I.AR. 
3. The issues on appeal which the appellant intends to assert in tht:: appeal: 
(a) Does the State of Idaho have personal jurisdiction over appellant. 
(b) Does the State ofIdaho have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims 
raised in the Complaint. 
(c) Does the Federal Commerce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause 
prohibit Idaho from exercising jurisdiction over appellant. 
(d) Did the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act, Idaho Code §§ 
39-7801 et seq. and/or the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Complimentary Act, Idaho 
Code §§ 39-8401 et seq., apply to these transactions by appellant and did the appellant violate 
those statutes. 
(e) Is the Defendant entitled to sovereign immunity. 
(f) Is State law preempted by Federal law. 
(g) Did the Court err in entering its December 13, 2010 Permanent Injunction 
Order. 
(h) Did the Court err in entering its injunction and assessing its civil penalty 
as set forth in its March 9, 2011 Memorandum Decision and/or March 31, 2011 judgment. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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4.	 No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5.	 (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript 
as defined in Rule 25(c) I.A.R., supplemented by the following: 
Transcript of the hearings on July 2,2009, December 17,2009, August 24, 2010 
October 26,2010 and February 8, 2011. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
All briefing and affidavits submitted in support of or opposition to: 
a.	 Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction; 
b.	 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction; 
c.	 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
d.	 Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration; and, 
e.	 Plaintiffs Motion for Civil Penalties. 
7.	 I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Vanessa Gosney 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 5113 
Boise, ID 83702 
(b)(l) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of the reporter's transcript. 
(c)	 That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(d)	 That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, and the Attorney General ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code. 
Dated May 5, 2011. 
EBERLE, BE , KADING, TURNBOW 
& MCKLV N,CHARTERED 
By ~J.4/£ 
S e . Diddle, of the firm 
Attorneys for the appellant Native Wholesale 
Supply Company 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorney on May 5, 2011, as indicated below and addressed as 
follows: 
Brett T. Delange 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson, St., Second Floor 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
William Von Tagen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Tax Commission 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, ID 83722 
~ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
~Fax (208) 334-4151 
[ ] Electronic Court Transmission 
b<] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight M '1 
[b4Fax (20 3 ~-7844 
[ ] Electr i ourt Transmission 
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TO:	 CLERK OF THE COURT 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT NO. 
A.M f3~OC) ~ _451 WEST STATE STREET
 
B0 I SE , I DAH 0 8 3 7 0 2
 
AUG 08 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,C1erk
 
By BRADLEY J. THIES
 
DEPUTY
 
STATE OF IDAHO,	 ) 
) Supreme Court No. 
) 38780-2011 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
vs. )Case No. CVOC-08-15228 
) 
NATIVE WHOLESALE ) 
SUPPLY COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
------------------) 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice	 is hereby given that on June 9, 2011, I lodged a 
transcript 225 pages of length	 for the above-referenced 
appeal	 with the District Court Clerk of the County of 
Ada in	 the Fourth Judicial District. 
Court Reporter 
001177
2 
HEARING DATES INCLUDED: 
Jul y 2, 2009 
December 17, 2009 
August 24, 2010 
October 26, 2010 
February 8, 2011 
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IN THE DISTRI[CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO, by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney Supreme Court Case No. 38780 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Plaintiffs- Respondents, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County ofAda, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 10th day of August, 2011. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 
Clerk of the District Court
 
,/ 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO, by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs- Respondents, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38780
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or maile:d, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
SAMUEL A. DIDDLE BRETT T. DELANGE; 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT WILLIAM VON TAGEN 
BOISE, IDAHO ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 
Clerk of the District Court
 
AUG 11 2011Date of Service: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ByQ 
Deputy Clerk 
, 
001180
IN THE DISnUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
STATE OF IDAHO, by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, Attorney Supreme Court Case No. 38780 
General; and the IDAHO STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
Plaintiffs- Respondents, 
vs. 
NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a corporation; and Does 1 
through 20, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
5th day of May, 2011. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
r--......
 
B~~
Deputy Clerk  
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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